Manuel Roergas Serviez

Emmanuel Roërgas de Serviez
A bronze bust of Serviez located in Paris Park, Bogotá, Colombia.
Born	May 16, 1785 Cutry, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Kingdom of France
Died	November 30, 1816(1816-11-30) (aged 31) Apure, Venezuela
Allegiance	France until 1809 United Provinces of New Granada from 1813
Service/branch	French Army Army of the Union
Years of service	1798–1809 (France) 1813–1816 (New Granada)
Rank	Brigadier General
Unit	Army of Italy, Army of the South
Commands	Army of the North
Battles/wars	Colombian Independence War Battle of the Palo River (1815) Battle of Hato Yagual

Emmanuel Roërgas de Serviez (Cutry (Meurthe-et-Moselle), May 16, 1785 – Apure, November 30, 1816), known by the Hispanicized name of Manuel Roergas de Serviez, was a French soldier and adventurer who participated in the wars of independence in South America.

Born to a noble family in France, Serviez served in various units of the French Army during the French Revolutionary Wars and Napoleonic Wars where he reached the rank of lieutenant. In 1809 he deserted the French army and would later end up in South America where he participated in the Venezuelan and Colombian wars of independence.

After serving briefly in Venezuela, with the fall of the first republic to the Spanish royalists he fled to neighboring New Granada. There he was commissioned as a lieutenant colonel in the army of the Union of the United Provinces of New Granada. Due to his knowledge and experience, he was tasked with the instruction of troops. Serviez along with other foreign officers helped train and implement the French manual of arms and as well as doctrine to the army of the nascent republic. In late 1813 he was accused of having conspired to remove General Antonio Nariño as commander of the army, an accusation with dubious evidence and was arrested and tried before a military tribunal. In 1814 the military tribunal acquitted Serviez and absolved all the charges allowing him to rejoin the army. That same year he helped establish a military academy in Medellin alongside scientist Francisco José de Caldas. As an instructor there he became a mentor to a promising young cadet, José María Córdova, who later got on to be one of the best generals of the future Colombian army.

Serviez then took part in the Battle of Bogotá under the command of General Simón Bolívar. After that he traveled to the Cauca province and was made chief of general staff of army of the south of brigadier general José María Cabal. In 1815 he played a pivotal part in the Patriot army victory at the Battle of the Palo River, where he personally led a bayonet charge on foot, and later chased after the retreating Spanish forces.

During the crisis that the republic was suffering as a result of the Spanish reconquest of New Granada in 1816, the president of the republic Camilo Torres Tenorio named Serviez commander of the army of the union and promoted him to brigadier general. Serviez knowing that his troops were no match against the veteran Spanish troops of General Pablo Morillo, devised a strategic retreat to to the eastern plains of New Granada to save what what was left of the Patriot army from capture by three Spanish. Serviez began his retreat on April 2, 1816, during the difficult retreat many troops were lost due to desertion as well as combat as the Spanish chased after them. In July of 1816 Serviez was able to shake off his pursuers and met up with the Venezuelan rebels in the region who joined forces with him. Serviez's strategic retreat ended up saving the lives of many of important officers such as Francisco de Paula Santander, José María Córdova, as well as other officers that would later be pivotal when the war shifted in favor of the patriots in 1819. Battered remains of the army of the union joined up with the Venezuelan rebels in the region who were led by José Antonio Páez. This rebel army took part in theBattle of Hato Yagual, where Serviez led a cavalry brigade.

Shortly after the victory, Serviez tired and riddled with poor health sought rest in a house near where the battle had taken place. He was soon murdered in suspicious circumstances by a group of 3 men who showed up at his door one night. Serviez's death has never been solved, although it has often been suspected that Venezuelan caudillo José Antonio Páez ordered him to be killed.

Early life

Emmanuel Roërgas de Serviez was born on May 16, 1785 and baptized on June 6, 1785. He hailed from a lineage of minor nobility who traditionally served in the military, his father was Emmanuel-Gervais Roergas de Serviez, then a lieutenant in the Royal-Roussillon Regiment. His mother was Marie-Henriette de Trelliard, the two married on December 25, 1784 in Cutry, Meurthe-et-Moselle, her family was dedicated to industry and public affairs. Her father, François de Trelliard, was described as a "noble patrician of Parme, secretary of the cabinet with the approval of His Royal Highness the Lord Infante of Parme, and former mayor of agriculture and commerce in the states of His Royal Highness." Among the witnesses of the marriage ceremony was the future General Anne-François-Charles Trelliard, the bride's brother.

Military career

Serviez enlisted into the French Revolutionary Army during the government of the directorate entering in with the rank of lieutenant in 1798 and was assigned to the general staff of the Army of Italy. He was a later an aid-de-camp of his maternal uncle General Anne-François-Charles Trelliard. He was then a chasseur in the 11th regiment, by 1800 he requested to be transferred to the colonies, a request that was denied. In 1803 he was a sublieutenant in the 7th Crussaires. He took an absence of leave in 1805 to marry Eugenia Tessier de Margueritte with whom he had two children. In 1806 he returned to the army as a lieutenant in the Mounted Chasseurs of the Imperial Guard and was assigned to the army of Spain in 1808 taking part in the fighting there. He was wounded at the Battle of Vimeiro and returned to France.

In 1809 Serviez deserted the French army and fled to England with his mistress and later ended up in the United States.

New Granada

In 1811 Serviez traveled to Venezuela and joined General Francisco de Miranda's Venezuelan patriot army that had begun its war of independence from Spain. With the fall of the 1st republic of Venezuela to Spanish forces, Serviez fled to neighboring New Granada along with other officers from Venezuela arriving in Cartagena de Indias. New Granada had also declared independence from Spain and commissioned many of the exiled Venezuelan officers into their army to augment their forces against the Spanish royalists. The federalist congress of the United Provinces of New Granada commissioned Serviez into the neogranadine army of the union, as a lieutenant colonel, and tasked him with training the troops in the south of the country.

In 1813 Serviez was deployed to the south of the country with a number of troops to assist the beleaguered forces of the army of the south which had been pushed back from the provincial capital of Popayán all the way north to the Cauca Valley as a result of an offensive launched by Spanish Brigadier Juan de Sámano. In June of 1813 Serviez arrived in the town of Cartago in the Cauca valley where the remanants of the army of the south some 150 troops had retreated to. Jose Hilario Lopez who was one of the troops of the army of the south and later future president of New Granada, described his first encounter with the french officer who attempted to rally the demoralized troops in his limited spanish and to defend the town from the spanish advance. There Serviez trained the troops in the French manual of arms, however his strict discipline led to many of the them deserting, leaving him with only around 400 men, Serviez and his troops waitied in Cartago for the promised reinforcements from Sante Fe which never came, while this happened Samano's troops slowly made their way north from Cali. Samano's troops and Serviez's troops clashed near Cartago soon after in a defeat that forced the patriots to retreat Northeat towards the Quindio road.

Serviez and his battered troops retreated to Ibagué, arrivng there in july of 1813, during the diffcult retreat he had been reduced to 20 officers and only a handful soldiers. Upon arriving to Ibague they were met by Colonel Jose Maria Cabal who was in charge of relieving them, Cabal who had lived in Paris for time in his youth communicated in french with Serviez who gave him a report of their actions and had also praised the conduct of the young cadet Jose Hilario Lopez in battle.

Nariño's Southern Campaign

While in Ibague, Cabal tasked Serviez with recruiting and training new troops that would be destined for the upcoming campaign to liberate Popayán and the south of the country led by Lieutenant General Antonio Nariño. Serviez along with english Captain Willam Henry Virgo created a cavalry squadron of lancers that would be part of the campaign. After a few months, Serviez led this cavalry group to the town of Purificación in Septemeber of 1813, where General Nariño had ordered that the rendevouz point be so that the various battalions and troops from other parts of the country would gather to form the army. Now joined up with the bulk of the army, they marched south to the town of La Plata arriving there on October 25. La Plata was chosen as Nariño was still waiting on the troops coming from the Antioquia Province, in the meantime the troops already there underwent instruction and training. Serviez continued as commander of the 3rd battalion but was also placed as the cavalry instrucutor for the whole army. As instructor his training was harsh on the troops as his expected nothing less than fierce disclpine, which gained him notoriety and much dislike among the troops and officers. Serviez alongside spanish Colonel Manuel Cortés Campomanes proposed to Nariño that the army do away with the Spanish military doctrine they had been following and adopt the french one in its place, which would require retraining the troops to adopt the new formations and tactics as well as adopting bugle commands. Nariño gave his approval of this initaive and the two officers went to work on implementing the new doctrine.

Despite the assistance and know how that was provided to the army by Serviez and the other foreign officers like him, there was an air of distrust from the native neograndine troops towards them. Serviez's harsh training and arrogant attitude when it came to his harsh criticism of the quality neogranadine officers, did not gain him any favors. This would culminate with the arrest of both Serviez and Campomanes after they wereb accused of by Nariño and his general staff of trying to cause insubordination among the troops and attempting remove him as commander of the army to take control. The supposed evidence behind this accusation was dubious at best, and many historians have criticized Nariño's handling of situatuion citing that the one of the possible reasons he arrested them was to get rid of the two was because they questioned his eadership as well as the fact that they were part of army of the federalist congress that despite working together with to prepare this campaign was still distrusted by Nariño. In december while Narino and the army of the union began their march to Popayan and began their campaign, Serviez and Campomanes were transported as prisoners to Santfe to face a military tribunal for their perceived crimes. Nariño's campaign while succsesful as first, would end in disaster with many historians arguing that not having present two experienced offiicers such as Serviez and Campomanes in their ranks contributed to the defeat.

The arrested officers arrived in Santafe on January 8, 1814, and on January 18, their case ended with military tribunal ruling in their favor and allowing them to rejoin the army. At the end of that month both officers left the city, with Campomanes traveling to Cartagena, meanwhile Serviez was transferred to Medellín in the Antioquia Province where the provincial authorities had hired him to become an instructor at the military academy being established there. At this short lived academy Serviez worked along side scientist Francsico José de Caldas who had been tasked with teaching and creating a military engineer corps. At the academy one the new cadets caught his eye, this being 15-year-old José María Cordova, of whom Serviez took a liking to and became his mentor, eventually naming Cordova as his aid-de-camp.

Serviez was then called up by the congress to join General Simón Bolívar’s army that was tasked with subjugating the centralist Cundinamarca state into the United Provinces of New Granada where he would participate in the Battle of Bogotá. After the federalist victory, Serviez was sent to join the army of the south under the command of Brigadier General José María Cabal to assist him in his defense of the Cauca Valley from a royalist offensive. At the Battle of the Palo River, Serviez played an important role leading the Patriot center with the artillery during the battle and personally leading the combined bayonet charge on foot as his horse was shot out from under him. The victory halted the Spanish offensive in the south and with 300 men Serviez gave chase to the retreating Spanish eventually retaking the city of Popayán.

Despite the victory at El Palo, the 1st republic was plunged into crisis as in August 1815 the 10,000 strong Spanish Expeditionary Army under the command of Lieutenant General Pablo Morillo arrived on the Neogranadine shores. This would mark the beginning of the Spanish reconquest of New Granada, with the Spanish laying siege to Cartagena that same month, in October another Spanish army invaded from Venezuela. Due to Serviez's ample military experience, he was called back to Santafé where President Camilo Torres named him commander of all the armies of the republic and promoted him to the rank of brigadier general after General Custodio García Rovira was defeated by the Spanish Army in the north of the country at the Battle of Cachirí in February 1816. On March 22, Serviez arrived at the town of Puente Real de Veléz where he relieved Gracia Rovira and took command of what was left of the army of the north after it was battered at Cachirí, his second in command was Colonel Francisco de Paula Santander.

Retreat to the Llanos

Shortly after sending that letter, Serviez conceived the idea of conducting a strategic retreat to the Casanare province in the eastern plains with the troops of the union. He sought to save what was left of the army, and believed that retreating there would allow his army to take advantage of the conditions of the immense and vast territory of the plains where they could wear down the enemy by applying guerrilla war tactics, until the army could be rebuilt to properly face the Spanish. On April 2, Serviez began the initial phase of his withdrawal, his first course of action was protecting the retreat with a squadron of dismounted Dragonos. He ordered them to cut the bridges over Suárez River from Moniquirá to the Monte de la Paja road and to make the roads as unusable as soon as possible, this order was executed with great discipline. Soon after the army departed the town by taking the route that when through the towns of Chiquinquirá, Ubaté, Lenguazaque and Chocontá.

Upon arriving in Chiquinquirá, the Army of the Union had been bolstered by new recruits and reinforcements to a total of around 2000 troops (1,000 infantry 1000 cavalry) and 4 artillery pieces. Their presence in the town was brief as the rapid advance of the Spanish troops coming from the north forced Serviez to accelerate the retreat and they departed in good order marching in the direction of Chocontá. However before leaving Chiquinquirá, Serviez ordered his troops to take out of the town chapel the painting of ‘’Our Lady Virgin of Chiquinquira’’ and take the painting with them. This was an attempt by Serviez to use the powerful religious image of Our Lady of Chiquinquirá to compromise the religious spirit of the peoples in favor of the cause of the Republic and as way to raise the morale of his battered and demoralized troops.

The army continued its withdrawal arriving at Chocontá, by then news of Serviez’s decision to retreat to the Llanos had reached the new president of New Granada, José Fernández Madrid. Madrid and his secretary war Jose Maria del Castillo y Rada sent a serious of letters to Serviez ordering him to halt his withdrawal. Madrid wanted Serviez take the army and march south to Popayán and comnbine it with the army of the south. Serviez wrote back that he would not change his plan and intended to leave for the Llanos de Casanare and also argued that it would be safer too for the president of the Union and the armed corps Guard of Honor of the national authority, composed of officers and troops from all the sovereign provinces of the Union, which obeyed orders directly from the executive branch to retreat to the llanos as well. Serviez, who was undoubtedly an experienced military officer, had at that time a much more appropriate strategic vision than the thesis of President Fernández Madrid proposed. Marching to the south to Popayán would be suicidial, even with the combined forces both the army of the north and army of the south the republicans would not be able to defend themselves from an attack from the north through the Antioquia province, which Spanish Colonel Warleta was already marching through and one from the south from Pasto where the southern royalist army with support from the Viceroyalty of Peru and the Royal Audience of Quito would easily crush the army of the union. Despite these counterarguments, Madrid would not compromise.

As a result the government then tried through a letter written by the Secretary of War José María del Castillo Rada dated April 23, to get the second in command of the army ,Colonel Santander, to depose Servíez from his position if he did not follow the order to march south, and take command and march the army to the south to which Santander refused to do so even when the government offered him his promotion to general.

President Madrid, unable to force Serviez to retreat to the South, left the capital on the night of May 2 along with other members of the government . Serviez, who had garrisoned his troops in Usaquén, learned of the arrival of the Spanish forces of Brigadier Miguel de la Torre and Colonel Sebastián de la Calzada with 3000 troops to Zipaquira on May 4 at 4:30 pm. He immediately accelerated the retreat, with his vanguard passing through Santafé that same night and the next day the rest of the army passed through to take the road to Cáqueza. They carried a large amount of luggage and more than two hundred cattle, they also carried the painting of the Virgin of Chiquinquira in a wooden drawer. The day after May 6, the Republican army arrived in the small town of Chipaque around 4:30pm. But the night before, much of the army had evaporated. Of the 2,000 infantry and cavalry men in its ranks, there were no more than 600 infantry and 30 horsemen left that night. The rest deserted with their officers fearing the reprisal of the Spanish. The troops who remained were forced to throw their artillery and heavy equipment into the moats and ravines of the mountain pass because it was so numerous and because they had few mules to transport them. Thae same day May 6, the Spanish troops of Brigadier Miguel de la Torre entered Santafé, he immediately ordered Captain Antonio Gómez, commander of the ‘’ loyal carabineros of Fernando VII’’, to take his unit along with a company of Cazadores of from the Numancia regiment to chase after Serviez.

During the following days, Serviez and his army marched through the eastern Andes mountain range using the royal road that led to the town of Cáqueza. Already plagued by desertion, the march was difficult as the road was narrow and hugged the mountain on one side while the other side at times was cliff that fell hundreds of meters down into the ravine. Things worsened when Captain Gómez and his column reached the Republican rearguard on May 9, in the Alto de Ubatoque. This led to a light skirmish, but the patriots were able to lose their pursuers and continued their retreat through the Quebradahonda forest. They then proceeded to abandon the drawer that contained the painting Virgin of Chiquinquirá in a hut located at the height of Sáname, where some clergymen lived, they eventually transported it back to Santafé. A few days later, on May 11, the army reached the Cabuya passage of the Negro river. This presented a problem, since it was winter rain season, the river was heavily flooded and the only means of getting across was via a narrow suspension bridge which complicated the crossing. The army crossed slowly but then were suddenly attacked again by Gomez’s Spanish troops, this lead to a 3 hour fight between the two forces. The encounter was a near complete disaster for the patriots, as many soldiers were either killed, dispersed, and taken prisoner. Their supply train which included much of their luggage, weapons, ammunition and even the archive were lost as well. Serviez himself had to cut with his Sabre the suspension bridge, but only around 200 officers and soldiers had been able to make it across before it was cut. the army now in even worse conditions than before headed for San Martín.

From there they continued their retreat marching through Apiay with the Spanish still in pursuit of them with even de la Torre himself in pursuit. In order to buy time and his enemy, Serviez ordered a policy of scorched earth tactics, in order to deny the Spaniards from taking advantage of the natural resources of the places where they would inevitably follow him to. This tactic greatly hampered the Spanish’s effort with de la Torre himself admitting this problem in a letter to General Morillo, stating “where I go everything was ruined by Serviez with the effect that we had no resources left.”

After 4 weeks marching eastward the tattered forces of General Serviez along with the civilians who accompanied them arrived in the provincial capital of Pore on June 23. Just under 300 people had barely reached Pore, including civilians, officers, cavalry and infantry, 56 no more than the latter. Although Serviez wanted to stay at least a month in the city in order to recover from the many fatigues suffered from their painful march. There were still being pursued by de la Torre and his troops. Morillo, as a career soldier, knew that the greatest threat to the Spanish in New Granada would be a rebel insurgency based in the Eastern Plains, a region difficult to operate European troops in, so he scolded and ordered La Torre to do everything possible to annihilate them before it was to late. The troops of de la Torre eventually occupied Pore on July 10, but Serviez had long left the city.

In the prior weeks, Serviez departed Pore and continued eastwards into the vast eastern plains. On June 29, Serviez and his army were near Guachiría lagoon which was between 2 or 3 leagues east of Pore when they encountered a Spanish cavalry unit under the command Colonel Manuel Villavicencio who had been personally sent by Morillo from San Gil with a squadron of the ‘’Hussars of Fernando VII’’ this unit had been dispatched all the way back in March and had crossed the Andes through a different pass. Serviez was forced to skirmish with them, the combat was long and only came to an end thanks to the darkness of the night which forced the the Spanish to withdraw the field and head towards the mountain range. With this skirmish over, the path was now clear for Serviez and his men.

3 days later, Serviez was finally able to find refuge in Chire where he met with Venezuelan general Rafael Urdaneta and his 400 cavalry near Chire on July 1, 1816. The retreat that had began on April 2, was over, of the 2000 troops and 4 artillery pierces Serviez had at his command there now remained only 56 infantry and 150 cavalry along with the civilians that accompanied them. Despite the immense losses, suffering, and difficulties that they encountered, thanks to this strategic retreat, General Manuel de Serviez had managed some of the most valuable Neogranadine officers these being Francisco de Paula Santander, Antonio Morales, Tomás Montilla, Jose Maria Vergara and others.

Serviez later participated in the Battle of Hato Yagual which prevented the Spanish from penetrating into the Llanos.

Death

Shortly after the battle, Serviez who had been complaining about his health, retired to a small farm near Yagual to recuperate his health, one night three men showed up at the door claiming be messengers from the army with orders to go at once to the camp, they then took Serviez to a forest and killed him there. Many suspected this was Paez's doing in an effort to assume control in the power struggle for the control of the combined Venezuelan and New Granadan army. However no concrete evidence has ever proven this theory, another theory speculates that the men had followed the army and came to rob Serviez of his money.

Cordova blamed his mentor's death solely on Paez and expressed this in a letter written to General Francisco de Paula Santander in 1826 where he referred to Paez in a negative tone stating:

"What good can come from the man who ordered the assassination of General Serviez, the one who disobeyed the Liberator repeatedly in campaigns of 18' and 19'"

Legacy

Although Serviez has often been forgotten, he is considered one of the heroes of the Colombian War of Independence. The National Army of Colombia's 20th airborne battalion based in the city of Apiay, in the Meta department is named after him in his honor.

In 1966 the Colombian Academy of History erected a bust of Serviez in commemoration of the 100th anniversary of his death, this bust is located in Bogotá on Calle 61 near the University of La Salle in the Chapinero district.