Pukguksong-1

Korean name
Chosŏn'gŭl	북극성1호
Hancha	北極星1号
Revised Romanization	Pukkuksong-1
McCune–Reischauer	Bukgeukseong-1

Pukkuksong-1
Type	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
Place of origin	North Korea
Service history
In service	2016 / 2017 (South Korea estimates) 2018 (US estimates)
Used by	North Korea
Production history
Manufacturer	North Korea
Produced	2015 (First known test year)
Specifications
Warhead	nuclear
Engine	Solid
Propellant	Unknown
Operational range	500 km (Based on tested, lofted trajectory) 1,250 km (Estimated, based on standard minimum energy trajectory by David Wright, A physicist and co-director of the UCS Global Security Program) 2,000 km (South Korea estimation of the actual deployed range)
Launch platform	Sinpo-class submarine

The Pukkuksong-1 (choshongul 북극성1호 (or 북한명 북극성 , Hwasong-10 화성10호 ) hanzhi 北極星1号), which has alternative name of KN-11 by intelligence outside of North Korea, Polaris-1 (Which is the English name translated from the original Korean name, which means North Star) or Bukgeukseong-1, is a North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that has been successfully flight tested on 24 August 2016 and expected for operational deployment at as early as 2017 by South Korean military sources.

Pukkuksong-1 is officially recognized as a missile that went through a complete successful test on 24 Aug 2016 (See List of Pukkuksong-1 tests below) by South Korea, the United States, and North Korea. North Korea has never announced the actual operational range and payload as this technical information is probably considered classified. Most countries do this, e.g. the United States considers the exact operational range of its current SLBM, UGM-133 Trident II, as classified information as well.

List of Pukkuksong-1 tests

Attempt	Date	Location	Pre-launch announcement / detection	Outcome	Additional Notes
1	Late October 2014	Sinpo	None	Success	Land based static ejection test only.
2	November 2014	Sinpo	None	Failure	Land based static ejection test only.
3	21 December 2014	Sinpo	None	Failure (US & South Korea) / Success (North Korea)	One report claims that this is the first attempt to eject a missile from Sinpo class submarine but the submarine gets damaged as a result of launch failure. Washington Free Beacon concludes that the undated footage from KCNA refers to this test. The other report points that the footage from KCNA was manipulated which exaggerates their current progress in Pukkuksong-1 and also that this launch is done by a submersible barge, not a Sinpo-class submarine. The missile did not fly far as well.
4	23 January 2015	Sinpo	None	Success	Launch from a Sea Based Platform (The Washington Free Beacon & US) or Test of vertical missile launcher in a coastal area without involving sea-based platform (South Korea)
5	22 April 2015	Sinpo	None	Success	Washington Free Beacon reported another test on underwater test platform. South Korean officials later stated it was an "ejection test" to evaluate ejecting a submerged ballistic missile rather than a full test of a new missile system, and that the test missile seemed to have been launched from a submerged barge rather than a submarine.
6	9 May 2015	Unknown	None	Success from submarine (North Korea) / Partial Success ONLY by underwater barge (US & South Korea - Range is only mere 100 meters)	Reported by North Korea's state run television where Kim Jong Un was watching the test with a missile fired from a submarine with the name Bukkeukseong-1 or Polaris-1 inscribed on the missile body. Crucial details such as place of test, time of test and technical details including its range are not reported. However, U.S. and South Korean officials pointed out that the missile was fired from an underwater barge rather than a submarine, and that it flew only 100 meters above the water.
7	28 November 2015	East Sea	None	Failure	Reportedly, the missile was fired from an Sinpo-class submarine and did not successfully eject, resulting in damage to the conning tower of the submarine. Source further claimed that the cover of the capsule where the missile was placed has been found (By the South Korea authorities) Within a month, satellite photos of a shipyard at the east coast site of Sinpo suggested that the submarine used in the test remains seaworthy and that development and testing activity of the SLBM may continue. The imagery also showed construction of facilities that could accommodate the building of larger submarines.
8	21 December 2015	Sinpo	None	Partial Success (North Korea in terms of ejection of missile from 'submarine' when it is from a launch tube) / Failure (South Korea)	Successful ejection was reported with a video showing Kim Jong Un in attendance. Further analysis of the published video suggested that while the missile was successfully ejected from the launch tube, it exploded upon ignition. North Korea released footage of the launch in January 2016, which South Korea claimed was manipulated to show a successful test that didn't occur. This test was from a submerged barge, likely so as not to risk damaging the launch submarine again. Video showed the 10-ton missile firing directly vertical out of the water, unlike the first test that emerged at a distinct angle. The first stage of the engine ignited, but the rest of the footage was inconsistently spliced together to appear it continued flying.
9	23 April 2016	Sinpo	None	Success (North Korea, in terms of demonstrating Cold Launch capability) / Partial Success (South Korea, due to its range to be less than 'expected of' 300 km or more)	"Cold Launch" technology and able to ignite the rocket engine only after the missile was ejected from a submarine to a certain height. However, the missile flew only for a few minutes and estimated the missile to have flown for about 30 km instead. The missile range fell short of expected 300 km range as the minimum SLBM range. Worldwide medias have quickly reported on this new development. North Korea media claimed a success by citing the fact that "the missile was launched from its maximum underwater depth, and that its "cold launch" ejection mechanism and high performance engine using solid fuel worked without a hitch, along with its flight controls and warhead release systems." South Korea military sources reckoned that North Korea is trying to build a new 3,000 ton submarine that is capable to armed 3 of such missiles. The same source also claims that the current Sinpo-class submarine can only launch at about 10 to 15 meters below water's surface, which is much shallow than other bigger submarines which can launched their missiles at around 50 meters and therefore the Sinpo-class submarines will face higher risk of being detected by anti-submarine warfare efforts. The United States sources did not make any acknowledgement or denies such report's credibility.
10	9 July 2016, about 11:30am Pyongyang Standard Time	Sinpo	None	Partial Failure (Ejection successfully, but exploded within short flight)	South Korea claims that the SLBM confirms the missile has ejected from the Sinpo-class submarine successfully, but it has appeared to be exploded "at an altitude of some 10 kilometers and a distance of merely a few kilometers" after the missile was fired and hence the initial flight was likely to be a failure. The same report cited from South Korea military who has also confirmed that North Korea has made progress with the initial undersea ejection stage of the SLBM technology and Pukkuksong-1 is currently in the flight test stage. South Korea military believes that the North Korea might be able to deploy Pukkuksong-1 by 2019. The U.S. Strategic Command concluded that the missile from this test has fell on to the Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea) as well. North Korea is likely to use this test as a way to protest US over the 2 decisions made within a day earlier. The 2 decisions from US in 8 July 2016 are namely: 1) The decision to impose additional sanctions against the nation's leader, Kim Jong Un for alleged human rights abuse in his nation 2) The decision to install THAAD at South Korea despite strong objections from China and Russia However, North Korea kept silent on the test instead.
11	24 August 2016, about 5:30am Pyongyang Standard Time	Sinpo	None	Success (First full range SLBM test that shows success)	The missile flew about 500 km and reached Japan's air defense identification zone. The report noted that this launch comes at the same day where foreign ministers of China, Japan and South Korea are scheduled to meet at Tokyo and also two days after archrival South Korea and the United States began Ulchi-Freedom Guardian exercise in the South. As a sidenote, North Korea routinely condemns the twice per year military exercises (Specifically annual Ulchi-Freedom Guardian military exercise which always held during August and Foal Eagle / Key Resolve joint military exercise which is always held annually during February to April) as a preparation for invasion, and has threatened retaliation. The experts acknowledged that North Korea's repeated tests shows considerable progress that pays off and raised the possibility of the missile is launched in lofted trajectory. The South Korea military later confirmed the launched was indeed in lofted trajectory without specify exact apogee, unlike the recent Musudan success flight test.

Strategic implications

The Pukkuksong-1 is the first sign of a North Korean sea-based nuclear deterrent, which complicates the U.S. and South Korean ability to preemptively destroy the country's nuclear capabilities by threatening a second strike. While there is a chance to take out land-based nuclear sites, ballistic missile submarines ensure that a retaliatory strike could still be launched before it can be found and neutralized.

North Korea's unique circumstances limit the ways such a capability could be employed. The Korean People's Navy has no nuclear submarines, and no diesel-electric submarines equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP), so the launch submarine's range (and by extension the missile's) is limited and assuredly prevents it from threatening America's western seaboard.

Given their submarines' insufficient power to outrun U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and lack of aerial and surface coverage to protect them out to long distances, they cannot venture far out to sea, although a scenario where a missile-equipped sub travels into the Sea of Japan (East Sea of Korea) on a "suicide mission" to fire the Pukkuksong-1 before it expects to inevitably get destroyed is not implausible given the loyalty of the elite crewmen of the submarine force.

A more likely scenario would be to deploy along the Korean coastline within its local air and surface cover to silently creep into or out of various hiding spots like bays, inlets, and outer isles before reaching its pre-designated position to stay quietly submerged by running on batteries; because of its finite power capacity, the sub would have to surface or snorkel for air to recharge its batteries if it remains hiding for an extended period, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts.

A land based, mobile derivative of the Pukkuksong-1 would significantly complicate U.S, Japan and South Korean defenses. Unlike the liquid fueled Rodong or SCUD derivatives, the solid fueled Pukkuksong-1 can be fired at a much shorter notification time.

First Completely Successful Pukkuksong-1 Test

On 24 Aug 2016 at around 5:30am (Pyongyang Standard Time), North Korea have successfully tested Pukkuksong-1 as the missile flew 500 km into Japan's ADIZ without issue. Unlike the recent successful Musudan flight, KCNA did not officially announce the test until a day later as a great success from Kim Jong Un. The entire development has since published worldwide.

In light of recent development of Pukkuksong-1, South Korean military sources concluded that the first successful Pukkuksong-1 test was in fact launched in lofted trajectory without confirm the actual apogee and therefore the range could have been at least 1,000 km or more had the missile was launched in normal trajectory and could be operationally deployed as early as 2017. Hawkish forces in South Korea have renewed calls for South Korea to construct nuclear submarines to counter North Korea 'provocation'.

However, the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University rejected South Korean claims of Pukkuksong-1 could be operationally deployed before 2017 and suggested its initial operational capability will not be achieved before 2018 June. Specifically, North Korea is still facing significant technological challenges including building a new class of submarine to carry 3 of such missiles at the same time.

In 30 Aug 2016, David Wright, a missile expert and co-director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program suggested that the apogee achieved by this test was 550 km and the range would have been 1,250 km assuming the same payload on standard trajectory.

On the same day, the South Korean media reported that Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) have since recommends South Korea to deploy 2 batteries of THAAD instead of 1 in order to counter the possibility of North Korea fires Pukkuksong-1 outside of its 120 degree field of vision.

However Jeffery Lewis have also stressed that it does little to address the possibility of its lofted attacks, because the missile's reentry in lofted trajectory will be at very high speeds and at a very severe angle, since the ability of THAAD intercepting it will depends on the missile range. He has also pointed out that THAAD was never field tested against an intermediate-range target, moreover on an unusual angle of attack. With this in mind, he ended by suggesting that it is time to use diplomatic measures for dissuading North Korea to enhance such capabilities and defense measures is a very ineffective strategy due to North Korea has the ability to use numerous counter-measures for every measures that US and South Korea have made.

Suspected China involvement on proliferation of SLBM technologies to North Korea

In 3 Sep 2016, a US expert named Bruce Bechtol who is a North Korea expert at Angelo State University and another South Korean national security researcher named Shin Jong-woo claimed that China must have provided North Korea the relevant SLBM technologies so that it took just a mere 4 months to complete the first successful Cold launch Test (23 April 2016) to first complete test (24 August 2016) and further claimed that the Pukkuksong-1 is a carbon-copy of the first China's SLBM, JL-1. In a comparison, China took 15 years to develop JL-1. Bruce Bechtol also stated that his analysis is supported by space program expert Tal Inbar of Israel's Fisher Institute as well. However, Dave Schmerler, an expert with the James Martin Center of Non Proliferation Studies noted that the North Korean missile used a single engine design (the JL-1 used 4 engines) and grid fins for flight stability, features which are not found on the Chinese JL-1 and urge caution in jumping to conclusions. He added that the single engine design was more in common with the Iranian Sejjil MRBM than the JL-1.

Response from the China to alleged proliferation activites

In 5 Sep 2016, the Chinese media has rebuts the report by citing the People's Republic of China as a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory state and one of the permanent members of United Nations Security Council will never proliferate by providing or selling the nuclear and missile related technologies to North Korea (The actual excerpts is as follows: 作为联合国安理会常任理事国、《核不扩散条约》缔约国，中国绝对不会向朝鲜提供或者出售与核武器和弹道导弹相关的装备和技术。).

This report also cites that some US experts and think-tanks have all along being irresponsible by making a completely defamatory statements to China as they unreasonably links North Korea nuclear issue to China and wishfully sought to use media influence to pressurize China but yet these reports usually does not accompanies with actual evidence of supposed China proliferation acts. (The actual excerpts read as follows: 一些美国媒体和智库一向很擅长将朝鲜的涉核问题与中国进行无端挂钩，就是希望通过这种方式向中国施压，而这些说法通常没有任何证据，是很不负责任的。)

See also

• Korean People's Navy
• R-27 Zyb
• Hwasong-10
• JL-1
• List of missiles

External Links

• CSIS Missile Threat - KN-11 (Pukkuksong-1)