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Sino-Soviet conflict (1929)

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Sino-Soviet conflict (1929)

Soviet soldiers with captured Kuomintang banners.
DateJuly 22 – September 9, 1929
Location
Inner Manchuria
Result
Provisions of 1924 agreement were upheld.
Belligerents

Taiwan Republic of China

 Soviet Union

Commanders and leaders
Taiwan Zhang Xueliang Soviet Union Vasily Blyukher
Strength
100,000 40,000
Casualties and losses
7 ships lost
2,000 killed
1,000 wounded
more than 8,550 prisoners[citation needed]		 187 killed
665 wounded[1]

The Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929 (Chinese: 中东路事件, Russian: Конфликт на Китайско-Восточной железной дороге) was a minor armed conflict between the Soviet Union and Chinese warlord Zhang Xueliang of the Republic of China over the Chinese Eastern Railway (also known as CER).

When the Chinese seized the Chinese Eastern Railway in 1929, swift Soviet military intervention quickly put an end to the crisis and forced the Chinese to accept restoration of joint Soviet-Chinese administration of the railway.[2]

Origin

In order to understand why the Chinese forced a hostile takeover, one must look at the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924. On July 25, 1919 the Soviet government’s Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Lev Karakhan, had issued a manifesto to the Chinese government promising them, among other things, to return the CER to Chinese control free of charge.[3] On August 26, 1919, the Karakhan Manifesto was published by the Soviet press, but the document did not contain anything about returning the CER to China without compensation. The Soviets had laid the foundation to double-cross the Chinese. The Soviets would later use of the August 26th version of the Manifesto to argue with the Chinese government that they did not have to pay compensation for the CER.[4]

Along with the original Karakhan telegram the Chinese had the Vilenski pamphlet as evidence.[5] The Vilenski pamphlet also shows the Chinese that they were willing to return the CER to the Chinese without compensation. The July 25th Karakhan telegram shows the Soviet Unions original intentions. Which was to return the CER back into Chinese control without compensation. The July 25th telegram was used to satisfy the diplomatic requirements for the Chinese government, while the August 26th was published to uphold propaganda requirements inside the soviet union.[6]

The first major step in uncovering the hostile take over of the CER by the Chinese in 1929 starts with the understanding of the Secret Protocol of March 14, 1924 and the Secret Agreement of September 20, 1924. The March 14, 1924 Secret Protocol stated that all former conventions, treaties, protocols, contracts and any other document between the Soviet and Chinese would be annulled until a conference could convene.[7] This made all treaties, border relations and commercial relations dependent on the upcoming conference. This gave the Soviets time to turn to Zhang Xueliang in Manchuria. Zhang Xueliang was the strongest warlord in Manchuria at the time. He had control of the Mukden government, today the city is known as Shenyang. The Soviets were the first to propose joint management of the CER with the Chinese. But Zhang stood in the way of this joint management. The Soviets decided to make a deal with Zhang.[8]

On May 31, 1924, Lev Karakhan and Dr. V.K. Ellington Koo, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Republic of China, signed the Sino-Soviet treaty. The treaty included multiple articles. Which played right into the Soviets hand because in Article V “the employment of persons in the various departments of the railway shall be in accordance with the principle of equal representation between the nationals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and those of the Republic of China.”[9] And the Soviets added “In carrying out the principle of equal representation the normal course of life and activities of the Railway shall in no case be interrupted or injured, that is to say the employment of the both nationalities shall be in accordance with experience, personal qualifications and fitness of applicants.”[10]

While negotiations had been concluded with the Chinese, the Soviets turned to make a deal with Zhang Xueliang. They promised him full control of choosing which Chinese officials would be on the board in the joint Chinese-Soviet management of the CER. This would give Zhang Xueliang half control of CER. On September 20, 1924 Zhang signed the Secret Agreement not knowing the Chinese government had signed the Secret Protocol earlier in the year. And since the CER was originally controlled by the Soviets, the majority of the positions would be under Soviet control. Then the Soviet claimed they should keep majority control is because any other solution would interrupt or injure the railway.[11]

The Soviets were also the puppet master of the President for the CER. The Soviet government was able to regain majority control of the CER by playing the secret protocols off each other and out maneuvering the Chinese. The Soviets allowed the Chinese to think they were adding workers loyal to their government. However, in reality, the Soviets were creating more job on the railway and hiring Soviet workers. In the end, the Soviets controlled sixty-seven percent of all positions on the CER.[12]

The Chinese entertained joint- management until mid-1929. The change from Soviet control to Chinese control started when the Chinese authorities made a radical move to try and remove Soviet management. The Chinese authorities stormed the Soviet Consulate in Harbin. The Chinese arrested the General Manager of the CER, his assistant, other Soviet citizens and removed them from power of the CER. The Soviets retaliated by arresting Chinese citizens inside the USSR. On July 13, 1929, the Soviets sent their formal demands to the Chinese concerning what was happening on the CER. On July 19, the Soviets discontinued their diplomatic relations with the Chinese. They suspended railway communication and demanded all Chinese diplomats to leave Soviet territory.[13] By July 20, the Soviets were transferring their funds to New York. While in the cities of Suifenhe and Lahususa, the Soviets were terrorizing the Chinese civilians by having their warships guns pointed at the city and having their planes make fly-bys.[14] On August 6, The Soviet Union created the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. By doing this, the Soviets were willing to do what ever it takes to return the CER back into their control.

The Conflict

Small skirmishes had broken out in July but this would not be considered the first major military action. The first battle happened on August 17, 1929 when the Soviets attacked Chalainor, the Chinese troops retreated to an entrenchment which was supported by machine guns. The Soviets had walked into a trap, whether by Chinese deception or by accident nobody can say. The Soviets suffered heavy losses that day; this would be the only time the Soviet forces would encounter heavy losses.[15]

In October, the Soviets would force their naval fleets up the Amur and Songhua Rivers and capture the Lahasusu. This maneuver caused the Chinese to move to a different location. On their way to Fujin, the Chinese troops would kill any civilian they came across and raid any stores.[16] The Soviets stated that they did not touch the civilian population, and encouraged Chinese civilians to fight along side them against the Chinese army. They also denied killing civilians, and was said to only take military goods. All civilian personal items were left in place; this was strictly enforced.[17]

On November 17, the Soviets decided to take ten divisions and split their attack into two stages. The first stage of the attack was to go past Manzhouli and attack the region of Chalainor. After capturing the region, the Soviet troops set their sights on Manzhouli.[18] When they reached Manzhouli they found that the Chinese troops were not prepared for battle. and stated the Chinese forces were looting houses, stores, and stealing civilian clothes and trying to escape. The Soviets strategy was a success; on November 26, the Chinese were ready to sign a treaty with the Soviets on Soviet terms. On December 13, after much debate on the Chinese side, the Chinese signed the Khabarovsk Protocol. This restored peace and the 1924 status quo ante, which was the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1924.[19]

The victory over China was an eye opener for the world. Nobody expected the Soviets to win. During the conflict, the Soviets used propaganda to help spread communist ideology and to confuse the Chinese Army by using radio and leaflets. They did this by deceiving the Chinese command on which town was the Soviets next target. “Its military forces combined carefully measured use of depth and variety, coordinated in the fashion of a swift action design to achieve the precise goal of ‘an annihilating offensive under complex condition’ against enemy forces.”[20]The conflict brought back a sense of military prestige into the Asian region. The Soviet victory was also applauded by western nations (United States, France, Great Britain) at the time. It showed the west that the Soviets were able to use both diplomacy and military might to achieve its goal. But while some might have applauded the Soviets for using this technique, others feared it. This was a legitimate concern. The western nations were frightened that this method could potentially mean the Soviet Union might one day be able to beat a western nation at their own game.[21]

The impact of the conflict left the Manchurian region in a power vacuum. This left the door wide-open for the Japanese to take control of the region. After observing how easily the Soviet forces beat the Chinese; the Japanese employed a similar technique to defeat the Chinese and occupy Manchuria before WWII.[22]


See also

Notes

  1. ^ Krivosheev, G. F. (1997). "Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century". Page 370, Table 111.
  2. ^ Collective security
  3. ^ Elleman, Bruce (May 1994). The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1924-1925 (2nd ed.). Association of Asian Studies. p. 460. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  4. ^ Elleman; 461
  5. ^ Elleman; 461
  6. ^ Elleman; 461
  7. ^ Elleman; 468
  8. ^ Elleman; 471
  9. ^ Elleman; 476
  10. ^ Elleman; 476
  11. ^ Elleman; 476
  12. ^ Elleman; 476
  13. ^ Patrikeef, Felix (2010). Elleman, Bruce; Kotkin, Stephen (eds.). Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History Railway as Political Catalyst: The Chinese Eastern Railway and the 1929 Sino-Soviet Conflict. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
  14. ^ Patrikeef
  15. ^ Patrikeef
  16. ^ Patrikeef
  17. ^ Patrikeef
  18. ^ Patrikeef
  19. ^ Patrikeef
  20. ^ Patrikeef
  21. ^ Patrikeef
  22. ^ Patrikeef

Bibliography

  • Elleman, Bruce A. The Soviet Union's Secret Diplomacy Concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, 1924-1925. 2nd ed. Vol. 53. May: Association of Asian Studies, 1994.
  • Felix Patrikeeff, Russian Politics in Exile: The Northeast Asian Balance of Power, 1924-1931 Basingstoke 2002, ISBN 0-333-73018-6
  • George Alexander Lensen, The Damned Inheritance. The Soviet Union and the Manchurian Crises. 1924-1935, Ann Arbor 1974
  • Patrikeef, Felix Railway as Political Catalyst: The Chinese Eastern Railway and the 1929 Sino-Soviet Conflict. Edited by: Elleman, Bruce A., and Stephen Kotkin. Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2010.


Time Magazine
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