Talk:American Eagle Flight 4184

Speed

The article mentions that the aircraft hit the ground at over 430 mph, and this is described as an extreme velocity. My first thought was to explain why this velocity is extreme, but the article on the ATR 72-212 only gives the aircraft's cruising speed (318 mph). It would be nice to know how fast the aircraft can be pushed in safe flight. -Ashley Pomeroy 17:15, 12 November 2007 (UTC)

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The ATR72 VMO (max operating spped) is 250kts (287MPH) Source ATR72 ACM —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.11.207.122 (talk) 07:27, 29 October 2009 (UTC)

I think you missed the point. That is an extreme speed for any airliner which makes contact with the ground. Even the biggest ones are not traveling at more than 140 to 150 Kts, when they make normal landings. That speed, and the severe disintegration that resulted, is major evidence that the pilots had lost all control of the aircraft. That was the point: It crashed because the pilots had lost all control.

EditorASC 03:14, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

• They regained some control, but the pilots ran out of room to recover. WhisperToMe (talk) 02:59, 30 May 2009 (UTC)

Well, I suppose it boils down to what one might consider as "some" control. They did finally get the wings back to level with the horizon, so that they could start to pull the nose back up, in a desperate attempt to arrest the high rate of descent, before impacting the ground. However, they pulled back too hard on the elevators, considering their speed (375 kts). Doing that increased the G-load on the aircraft to over 3.7 Gs, so that the outer portions of the wings, and the tail plane snapped off. Did that constitute having "some" control?

I guess it would be fair to answer that in the affirmative, if one means the same kind of control that the Captain still had of the Martin 404 charter flight for the Wichita State University football team, before he finally flew into the mountains, west of Denver, because he was flying over a valley that was not wide enuf to permit a 180 degree course reversal and because the plane did not have enuf power and time to climb above the altitude of the mountain peaks ahead. He had "some" control, but not enuf to prevent the inevitable crash ahead.

Anyway, thanks for pointing that out. Helps one to sharpen his thoughts and words a bit, in the future. EditorASC (talk) 05:32, 26 December 2009 (UTC)

This article is flawed. I personally read the recorder and it did not say the things the NTSB and FAA reported. The actions of the aircraft are incorrect. it went right wing down, the pilot overcompensated and leveled. The aircraft again went right wing down and again the pilot overcompensated and could not recover the aircraft inverted left wing down and crashed.

There was no icing sensor on this aircraft, I worked on it I know. 47.216.149.213 (talk) 22:28, 18 September 2024 (UTC)

Aftermath

Citations were requested for this section. I revised this section to show that although the de-icing boots were extended back further on the chord, by order of the FAA, that amounted to little more than a cosmetic/political band aid, since the icing tests revealed that those planes could ice up all the way back to 23% of the wing chord and to 30% of the tail-plane chord (there have been numerous crashes over the years because of icing on the tail-plane).

I lifted quotations from my own article, at my own website, which is based a lot on the excellent and very detailed research data found in Stephen Fredrick's book. Thus, I posted citations to both my article and to his book. I own that website and the copyright on the article, and hereby grant Wiki the GFDL license to use it. I am not sure if I also need to fill out some kind of form, to make the license legal for Wiki. I will appreciate any help on that point, if this is not sufficient. It is difficult to email my website, due to the spam problem there, so contact me at b o b 9 3 2 at g m a i l dot c o m, if I need to change or add anything, to comply with Wiki rules. Thanks much. EditorASC 03:37, 4 December 2007 (UTC)

Opening Style

Considering the fact that the opening doesn't exactly impugn anyone, why does it go out of its way to avoid mentioning the acting parties? "control was lost" is needlessly passive. How 'bout "Pilots lost control," or something similar? It would just sound better. Or less evasive, at least. Just bringing it up in case I'm missing something. J.M. Archer (talk) 19:15, 23 March 2009 (UTC)

I agree, that much more needs to be said about who was really culpable in this crash, that should never have happened. It wasn't the pilots. The NTSB makes that very clear. It was the plane's manufacturer (ATR), and the French govt and our own FAA, all of which played their respective parts in covering up the anti-icing deficiencies of that aircraft, so that they could continue to sell that plane to unsuspecting companies, that really didn't know how dangerous it might become, in prolonged icing conditions. That is why I am in the process now of replacing the "Cause" statement, with the entire "Probable Cause" statement (unabridged), which is found in the NTSB accident report. I think it essential that the NTSB's finding be stated in this article, WORD-FOR-WORD. Anything less tends to distract attention away from the real culprits, who have been exposed by the very thorough investigation of the NTSB. EditorASC (talk) 05:55, 26 December 2009 (UTC)

The NTSB did not blame the manufacturer. The crash was blamed on the weather; specifically the aircraft encountered icing conditions that exceeded the aircraft's certification envelope. The NTSB noted in the contributing factors section that previous ATR 42/72 aircraft had encountered control problems and recommended that the regulations themselves be strengthened and the aircraft type and others like it updated. The fact remains that FAA AC 91-74A recommends pilots exit icing conditions as soon as possible whether the airplane is approved for flight in known icing conditions or not. However, this recommendation is not law. There was no cover-up; the airplane passed the FAA icing standard and had it encountered icing conditions equal to the standard it would have flown just fine. The aircraft encountered severe icing, which no airplane is certified for flight within. I do however agree that the word-for-word NTSB probable cause statement is the proper statement for the "cause" section. (Brief Note to EditorASC: I very much appreciate your extensive airline experience; I simply disagree with the notion of a cover-up) (N419BH (talk) 20:29, 12 April 2010 (UTC))

While the NTSB did not specifically use the phrase "cover up," it did in fact blame ATR, DGAC and our FAA for their failures to carry out their safety duties. That is consistent with the story, in great detail, in the Stephen Fredrick book "Unheeded Warning." Please read the actual NTSB Probable Cause statement (not the one changed in wording, by ASN). To avoid POV, I put in the actual word-for-word NTSB Probable Cause finding. That is the best source of all. Here are some additional statements, by the NTSB in that accident report:

"9. The flightcrew’s actions were consistent with their training and knowledge.

"10. PIREPs [pilot reports] of icing conditions, based on the current icing severity definitions, may often be misleading to pilots, especially to pilots in aircraft that may be more vulnerable to the effects of icing than other aircraft.

"13. The 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 25, Appendix C, envelope is limited and does not include conditions of freezing drizzle or freezing rain; thus, the current process by which aircraft are certified using the Appendix C icing envelope is inadequate and does not require manufacturers to sufficiently demonstrate the airplane's capabilities in all the possible icing conditions that can, and do, occur in nature.

"15. If the FAA had acted more positively upon the Safety Board's aircraft icing recommendations issued in 1981, this accident may not have occurred.

"16. ATR 42 and 72 ice-induced aileron hinge moment reversals, autopilot disconnects, and rapid, uncommanded rolls could occur if the airplanes are operated in near freezing temperatures and water droplet median volume diameter (MVDs) typical of freezing drizzle.

"17. At the initiation of the aileron hinge moment reversal affecting flight 4184, the 60 pounds of force on the control wheel required to maintain a wings-level-attitude were within the standards set forth by the Federal Aviation Regulations. However, rapid, uncommanded rolls and the sudden onset of 60 pounds of control wheel force without any warning to the pilot, or training for such unusual events, would most likely preclude a flightcrew from making a timely recovery.

"19. The French Directorate General for Civil Aviation (DGAC) and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) failed to require the manufacturer to provide documentation of known undesirable post- SPS [stall protection system] flight characteristics, which contributed to their failure to identify and correct, or otherwise properly address, the abnormal aileron behavior early in the history of the ATR icing incidents.

"21. Prior to the Roselawn accident, ATR recognized the reason for the aileron behavior in the previous incidents and determined that ice accumulation behind the deice boots, at an AOA sufficient to cause an airflow separation, would cause the ailerons to become unstable. Therefore, ATR had sufficient basis to modify the airplane and/or provide operators and pilots with adequate, detailed information regarding this phenomenon.

"22. The 1989 icing simulation package developed by ATR for the training simulators did not provide training for pilots to recognize the onset of an aileron hinge moment reversal or to execute the appropriate recovery techniques.

"23. ATR’s proposed post-Mosinee AFM/FCOM changes, even if adopted by the DGAC and the FAA, would not have provided flightcrews with sufficient information to identify or recover from the type of event that occurred at Roselawn, and the actions taken by ATR following the Mosinee incident were insufficient.

"24. The 1992 ATR All Weather Operations brochure was misleading and minimized the known catastrophic potential of ATR operations in freezing rain.

"25. ATR failed to disseminate adequate warnings and guidance to operators about the adverse characteristics of, and techniques to recover from, ice-induced aileron hinge moment reversal events; and ATR failed to develop additional airplane modifications, which led directly to this accident.

"26. The DGAC failed to require ATR to take additional corrective actions, such as performing additional icing tests, issuing more specific warnings regarding the aileron hinge moment reversal phenomenon, developing additional airplane modifications, and providing specific guidance on the recovery from a hinge moment reversal, which led directly to this accident.

"27. The FAA's failure, following the 1994 Continental Express incident at Burlington, Massachusetts, to require that additional actions be taken to alert operators and pilots to the specific icing-related problems affecting the ATRs, and to require action by the manufacturer to remedy the airplane's propensity for aileron hinge moment reversals in certain icing conditions, contributed to this accident.

"28. The FAA Aircraft Evaluation Group (AEG) did not receive in a timely manner, from all sources, pertinent documentation (such as the ATR analyses) regarding the previous ATR icing incidents/accidents that could have been used to monitor the continued airworthiness of the airplane.

"29. The ability of the FAA's AEG to monitor, on a real-time basis, the continued airworthiness of the ATR airplanes was hampered by the inadequately defined lines of communication, the inadequate means for the AEG to retrieve pertinent airworthiness information, and the DGAC's failure to provide the FAA with critical airworthiness information, because of the DGAC's apparent belief that the information was not required to be provided under the terms of the Bilateral Airworthiness Agreement (BAA). These deficiencies also raise concerns about the scope and effectiveness of the BAA.

"35. Because the DGAC did not require ATR, and ATR did not provide to the operators of its airplanes, information that specifically alerted flightcrews to the fact that encounters with freezing rain could result in sudden autopilot disconnects, aileron hinge moment reversals, and rapid roll excursions, or guidance on how to cope with these events, the crew of flight 4184 had no reason to expect that the icing conditions they were encountering would cause the sudden onset of an aileron hinge moment reversal, autopilot disconnect, and loss of aileron control.

"37. The flightcrew’s failure to increase the propeller RPM to 86 percent and activate the Level III ice protection system in response to the 1533:56 caution alert chime was not a factor in the accident.

"38. Had ice accumulated on the wing leading edges so as to burden the ice protection system, or if the crew had been able to observe the ridge of ice building behind the deice boots or otherwise been provided a means of determining that an unsafe condition was developing from holding in those icing conditions, it is probable that the crew would have exited the conditions.

"43. Although both crew members of flight 4184 were certified flight instructors, this was probably the first time they had experienced such unexpected and excessive roll and pitch attitudes in the ATR 72. If the operators had been required to conduct unusual attitude training, the knowledge from this training might have assisted the flightcrew in its recovery efforts and might have prompted the captain to provide useful information to the first officer to facilitate a timely recovery of the airplane."

There is much more in that report which makes it abundantly clear that the NTSB laid the blame on the FAA, DGAC and ATR, and not on the pilots. While it is true that the French objected to the NTSB findings and then filed those objections, it is also true that the NTSB rejected their objections, and with very good reasons.

As to the FAA's icing certification standards (FAR part 25, appendix C), they were clearly archaic at the time of the accident, being based largely on information from NACA (predecessor to NASA), formulated in 1949, when the certification standards were concerned with DC-3s, Connies and DC-6s. Fredrick's book has a very extensive discussion on just how archaic they were. You also can find how ludicrous those standards were, in a very comprehensive study by the Flight Safety Foundation (Protection Against Icing: A Comprehensive Overview -- 248 pages) at http://flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_jun-sep97.pdf I recommend you start reading at page 155 in that report. The archaic nature of those FAA regs, was precisely why the NTSB kept prodding the FAA to revise and update its certification standards, for so many years before this tragic accident. But, as par-for-the-FAA-course, the NTSB's recommendations were ignored by the FAA, until after this accident report.

I suggest you read the entire NTSB report and also Fredrick's book. EditorASC (talk) 02:28, 27 April 2010 (UTC)

FAR part 25, appendix C

I have restored the word "archaic," since it is a proper word to describe the FAA's terribly outdated icing certification rules. The NTSB has used that word in the past, when it feels some of the FAA's regs are out of date. Additionally, that word is used in the Fredrick book too, as part of a very extensive discussion on that issue. And finally, it is used by the Flight Safety Foundation (Protection Against Icing: A Comprehensive Overview -- 248 pages) at http://flightsafety.org/fsd/fsd_jun-sep97.pdf, in its discussion of how unrealistic and old and outdated those certification regs really were. EditorASC (talk) 02:56, 27 April 2010 (UTC)

Requested move

The following discussion is an archived discussion of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

No consensus to move. Vegaswikian (talk) 19:28, 10 October 2010 (UTC)

American Eagle Flight 4184 → Simmons Airlines Flight 4184 — Should be moved to Simmons Airlines Flight 4184, since Simmons Airlines operated the aircraft, not American Eagle. --Whoop whoop pull up (talk) 14:40, 3 October 2010 (UTC)

• Oppose. "American Eagle..." seems to be the common name according to both Goolge and Google news archive. It also appears to be how the flight was branded adding support to this being the common name. Technically from an aviation industry point of view it might have been "Simmons Airlines ..." but we use common names on wikipedia and so it should stay where it is. Dpmuk (talk) 21:19, 3 October 2010 (UTC)
• Weak Oppose. I guess here on Wikipedia, it seems we always use the common name, even when it would not be consistent with other article on plane crashes, like Gol Transportes Aéreos Flight 1907. [|Retro00064|☎talk|✍contribs|] 17:54, 7 October 2010 (UTC)

The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Lawsuit

The article states that a lawsuit was brought, but was settled for a large amount of money. But it never says who was sued. American Eagle? Simmons? ATR? --Golbez (talk) 18:22, 25 February 2011 (UTC) And it says for the victims. All the victims of that crash died! — Preceding unsigned comment added by 76.205.52.105 (talk) 16:33, 10 August 2011 (UTC)

External links modified

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Article may be outdated

I just reworded the article, removing the claim about a "lack of further ATR icing accidents". Most of this article was written before 2010, when Aero Caribbean Flight 883 crashed due to icing. There have mostly been maintenance edits since then. In light of that, I believe that this article could use an overhaul that goes beyond what I did. I will put a request for update box into the article. Renerpho (talk) 04:20, 16 February 2020 (UTC)

It also does not mention TransAsia Airways Flight 791, another ATR 72 that crashed in 2002 due to icing. Renerpho (talk) 04:30, 16 February 2020 (UTC) That's included now. Renerpho (talk) 04:42, 16 February 2020 (UTC)

Number 9 in the references

Sends you to 404 error, "Sorry, we can't find what you're looking for" at Chicago Tribune website. 155.186.172.220 (talk) 04:20, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

It's a dead url. I've repaired it. Do it yourself! see WP:DEADLINK for how to fix this issue. Dora the Axe-plorer (explore the morgue) 04:43, 29 March 2022 (UTC)

Way too much detail

Is it really necessary to break the entire loss of control down second by second, complete with exact control surface angles and individual control forces applied? It just makes the whole thing confusing to read, it's not a training manual for accident investigators, it's an encyclopedia. I just want to know generally what happened, and after carefully reading though that long description several times and trying to parse out what's actually happening from exactly how many pounds the copilot and pilot are putting on their yokes, and I'm still not sure what the plane was actually doing. I know very exactly what sort of control inputs they put in, but not why it's relevant or what significance it has the that pilots negative force reduced as the copilots positive stick increases. I gather it started rolling to the right, it's not clear if that's because of or in spite of what the controls are doing, and then somehow rolled completely. Then it's level and the pilot says "okay", then is banked 30 degrees, then suddenly it's crashing inverted into a field. So basically "roll control was lost and the aircraft went into an uncontrolled descent and crashed inverted into a field". Why can't it just say that? Or say that, and then break it down in excruciating detail for those who really feel like they need to know all that stuff? 2600:1000:B114:CF4:C506:210B:A50F:A036 (talk) 11:08, 9 September 2024 (UTC)