14 people were charged with violating the [[Smith Act]] for being members of the [[Communist Party USA]] in California. The Smith Act made it unlawful to advocate or organize the destruction or [[Coup d'état|overthrow]] of any government in the United States by force. Yates claimed that her party was engaged in passive actions and that any violation of the Smith Act must involve ''active'' attempts to overthrow the government.
14 people were charged with violating the [[Smith Act]] for being members of the [[Communist Party USA]] in California. The Smith Act made it unlawful to advocate or organize the destruction or [[Coup d'état|overthrow]] of any government in the United States by force. Yates claimed that her party was engaged in passive actions and that any violation of the Smith Act must involve ''active'' attempts to overthrow the government.cheese
77 S. Ct. 1064; 1 L. Ed. 2d 1356; 1957 U.S. LEXIS 657
Case history
Prior
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Holding
The Court held that for the Smith Act to be violated, people must be encouraged to do something, rather than merely to believe in something. The Court drew a distinction between a statement of an idea and the advocacy that a certain action be taken.
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States involving free speech and congressional power. It ruled that the First Amendment protected radical and reactionary speech, unless it posed a "clear and present danger."
Background
14 people were charged with violating the Smith Act for being members of the Communist Party USA in California. The Smith Act made it unlawful to advocate or organize the destruction or overthrow of any government in the United States by force. Yates claimed that her party was engaged in passive actions and that any violation of the Smith Act must involve active attempts to overthrow the government.cheese
Opinion
The Supreme Court of the United States first narrowly construed the Smith Act, stating that the term "organize" meant to form a new organization, not any subsequent organizational acts. Then, the Court drew a distinction between actual advocacy to action and mere belief. The Court ruled that the Smith Act did not prohibit “advocacy of forcible overthrow of the government as an abstract doctrine.” This does not mean that actual advocacy to action is permitted - merely expression of the abstract idea. Tellingly, the Court recognized that actual "advocacy to action" circumstances would be "few and far between." In Justice Black's opinion, he wrote of the original Smith Act trials:
"The testimony of witnesses is comparatively insignificant. Guilt or innocence may turn on what Marx or Engels or someone else wrote or advocated as much as a hundred years or more ago.[...] When the propriety of obnoxious or unfamiliar views about government is in reality made the crucial issue, [...] prejudice makes conviction inevitable except in the rarest circumstances."
The convictions of the indicted members were reversed and the case was remanded to District Court for a retrial.