||The neutrality of this article is disputed. (March 2013)|
Private police are law enforcement bodies that are owned and/or controlled by non-governmental entities.
These can be firms to which the government contracts out police work (e.g. the 1975–1977 Oro Valley, Arizona-Rural/Metro contract, the 1980 Reminderville, Ohio-Corporate Security contract, the 1976 Indian Springs, Florida-Guardsmark contract, and the 1976 Buffalo Creek, West Virginia-Guardsmark contract), or they can be officers who contract with various firms to patrol the area, as in the case of the San Francisco Patrol Specials.
A specific type of private police is company police, such as the specialized railroad police or mall security. In some cases, private police are sworn in as government employees in order to ensure compliance with the law, as in the Kalamazoo, Michigan-Charles Services contract, which lasted 3½ years. Private police services are sometimes called "Subscription-Based Patrol."
Private security firms in the U.S. employ more security guards, patrol personnel and detectives than the U.S. federal, state and local governments combined, fulfilling many of the beat-patrol functions once thought central to the mission of public police. It has been argued that the private police market furnishes tangible evidence about what people want but are not receiving from public police. The growth of private policing is a phenomenon that is occurring all over the world. In Australia, private and public police have conventionally been considered parallel systems, with private security as very much the lesser or junior entity.
Private police typically focus on loss instead of crime; preventive methods rather than punishment; private justice (such as firing embezzlers or issuing no trespassing warnings to shoplifters) rather than public court proceedings; and private property rather than public property. Most do not have the ability to arrest civilians, unless they are also peace officers.
"Policing" and "private policing" are somewhat elusive concepts. "Private sector" police have been described as "any individual or group involved with law enforcement or security, but lacking official police authority." At the core of the policing concept, though, is the combating of crime. Patrick Tinsley writes:
|“||Enforcement of law is a phenomenon that admits of infinite degrees and permutations. Take the case of a jewelry store. The theft of its wares is a crime under the law. But the jewelry store does not rely exclusively— or even primarily —on the majesty of the state’s enforcement of that law for its own security. The jewelry store engages the services of manifold private protection outfits: it takes out an insurance policy on its gems, which are kept under a locked glass display case, which can only be opened by an employee, who is under the ever-vigilant eye of video monitoring equipment, and who watches the customers with the aid of convex mirrors, and keeps the store’s cash in a locked vault, which is in a back room, which is in turn locked at closing time, and the store’s alarm activated as the employees leave and the armed night watchmen arrive. All of these are provided by private companies in the business of providing “security,” and all of which should give pause to those who consider the enforcement of law uniquely the franchise of the government.||”|
United States 
In South Carolina, all Security Officers have the same authority and power to make an arrest as Sheriff's Deputies. In Spring Valley HOA in Columbia, South Carolina, Private Officers respond to calls for service, run traffic radar, make arrests and use blue lights. They are Law Enforcement under state law, case law and Attorney General’s opinions, and are authorized by the state to issue Uniform Traffic Tickets to violators. Security Officers in some cases are also considered Police Officers.
In Boston, Massachusetts, more than 100 housing projects and low-income apartment buildings are patrolled by private security. One firm, Naratoone Security Corporation, fields 122 traditional security officers in those locations, as well as 43 “special police officers,” who are armed and licensed by the Boston Police Department and have limited arrest powers.
South Africa 
An increasing number of South Africans are using private security companies to protect themselves and their assets. The broad private security industry is employing over 200,000 security guards throughout the country, of which the guarding industry is the largest, with 125,000 guards working for approximately 3,200 security companies. Many of the larger South African private security companies have expanded their operations into other countries in Southern Africa. Private security companies have even involved themselves in political conflicts that are occurring on the subcontinent. In South Africa, private companies that make use of guards are regulated by a statutory body, the Security Officers' Board. The Board polices the regulations that govern the private security industry and sets minimum training standards for security guards.
Relationship to anarcho-capitalism 
Private police figures prominently in anarcho-capitalist theory and, along with advocacy of private defense agencies, dispute resolution organizations, and private production of law, distinguishes it from minarchism. Since complete privatization of the police function (with funding, control, ownership, etc. of all police forces passing to private entities) would eliminate the ability of the state to forcibly collect taxes, arguably the only way it could work would be within the context of a society in which all other services were privatized as well. Moreover, the state would lose the ability to intervene to enforce its concept of justice; this factor also tends to make it incompatible with the idea of a night watchman state that could take action to protect liberty.
In Great Britain, the police function was historically performed by private watchmen (existing from 1500 on), thief-takers, and so on. The former were funded by private individuals and organizations and the latter by privately funded rewards for catching criminals, who would then be compelled to return stolen property or pay restitution.
In 1737, George II began paying some London and Middlesex watchmen with tax moneys, beginning the shift to government control. In 1750, Henry Fielding began organizing a force of quasi-professional constables. The Macdaniel affair added further impetus for a publicly salaried police force that did not depend on rewards. Nonetheless, In 1828, there were privately financed police units in no fewer than 45 parishes within a 10-mile radius of London.
Perceived advantages 
One of the alleged benefits of such arrangements is the potential for competition. If government contracts out to a private police company, then different contractors may compete to offer the highest quality and/or lowest price.
If individual firms and households can choose their own police company, then competition may have even greater benefits for the citizens, as contractors seek to serve various niche markets. Under that system, individual citizens, firms, homeowners associations, etc. can choose a service that they perceive as providing the right quality/price mix for them, and concentrating on the security needs that are more important to them.
There is evidence that private police can provide services more cheaply than public police. The cost of San Francisco's private patrol specials is $25–30/hour, compared to $58/hour for an off-duty police officer. In Reminderville, Corporate Security outbid the Summit County Sheriff Department's offer to charge the community $180,000 per year for 45-minute response time emergency response service by offering a $90,000 contract for twice as many patrol cars and a 6-minute response time.
This system might also better prevent poor service and other abuses, as citizens could unilaterally fire their police company, rather than having to lobby the government to do so, an effort that many would be relatively disinclined to pursue, due to the uncertainty as to whether it would be successful, and the time consumed.
Homeowners associations and landlords would have a stronger incentive to monitor the activity of private police they hire for their neighborhood, as nearby neighborhoods with better or cheaper police services could gain a competitive advantage in attracting residents and remaining profitable. Reputation could be an additional safeguard, as companies that gain a poor reputation would likely have more difficulty attracting new customers.
The ability of people to sue private police could be another safeguard. Companies would have an incentive to carefully screen applicants and fire abusive employees, in order to avoid costly lawsuits that could cause their liability insurance premiums to rise.
Public police, by contrast, are covered by sovereign immunity in many situations; and in any case, the public police lack an owner whose potential to suffer financially from lawsuits would provide a strong incentive to take action. Theoretically, the citizens as a whole might be considered the "owner" of government; but the difference is that these owners lack a means of selling their investment if their fellow owners refuse to cooperate in taking action to avoid losses; and there is less potential for hostile takeover or bankruptcy to affect a change in control, as the government can simply raise taxes (or print money, in some cases) to compensate for financial losses.
There are the usual public choice issues involved that can thwart public sector reform, such as the fact that citizens realize their individual votes have little chance of affecting the outcome. As Bruce L. Benson notes, "Many people are very concerned about what the government is doing for (or to) them, but they rationally choose not to invest in information about candidates or to vote because they recognize that the costs of doing so exceed the benefits."
Another advantage cited by Benson is that private police would have a contractual responsibility to protect their customers. In Warren v. District of Columbia, the court found that public police have no such responsibility. Thus, they cannot be sued if they fail to respond to calls for help, for instance.
James F. Pastor addresses such disadvantages by analyzing a number of substantive legal and public policy issues which directly or indirectly relate to the provision of security services. These can be demonstrated by the logic of alternative or supplemental service providers. This is illustrated by the concept of "para-police." Para-police is another name for private police officers. Many public safety agencies use auxiliary police officers, who are part-time sworn police officers. Some also use reserve police officers, who are hired on an "as needed" basis, with limited police powers. These officers are typically called to duty for special details or events. In contrast to auxiliary and reserve officers, private policing is a relatively new and growing phenomenon.
There are several key distinctions between these options. Briefly, the distinctions relate to the level of police powers associated with the officer, the training levels required for each officer, the funding sources for the service provision, and the contractual and liability exposures related to each supplemental arrangement. Each alternative or supplemental service has its own strengths and weaknesses. The use of private police, however, has particular appeal because property or business owners can directly contract for public safety services, thereby providing welcome relief for municipal budgets. Finally, private police functions can be flexible, depending upon the financial, organizational, political, and situational circumstances of the client.
Perceived disadvantages 
Problems within the industry include the possibility of criminals setting up their own firms, misuse of surveillance devices, the proliferation of weapons, and strained relationships between the public and private police.
Under anarcho-capitalism, taxpayers would not be forced to fund police services; these transactions would be voluntary. One argument against such a policy is that it would disadvantage the poor, who could not afford to spend much money on police. Thus, some more moderate libertarians favor issuing police vouchers to each citizen, granting them a certain amount of money to hire a private police company of their choice at taxpayer expense.
Murray Rothbard notes, "police service is not 'free'"; it is paid for by the taxpayer, and the taxpayer is very often the poor person himself. He may very well be paying more in taxes for police now than he would in fees to private, and far more efficient, police companies. Furthermore, the police companies would be tapping a mass market; with the economies of such a larger-scale market, police protection would undoubtedly be much cheaper."
Public police, by contrast, are limited in size by the political jurisdiction; although some local public police forces already contract with national private firms for specialty services, such as maintenance of communications equipment, for which it would not be economical for them to hire a full-time government employee.
Ultimately, some people see the potential for a “dual system” of policing—one for the wealthy and one for the poor—and others see the provision of private security as the primary protective resource in contemporary America.
In Florida, Critical Intervention Services patrols neighborhoods and has used lethal force before. They have limited power, like other private security agencies in the state, regulated by Florida Statute 493.
See also 
- Privatization in criminal justice
- Special police
- Auxiliary Police
- Security Police
- Mall cop
- Security guard
- Watchman (law enforcement)
- Gil Guillory and Patrick C. Tinsley (2009), The Role of Subscription-Based Patrol and Restitution in the Future of Liberty
- Sklansky, David A. (1998–1999), Private Police, The 46, UCLA L. Rev., p. 1165
- Philip C. Stenning (September 2000), "Powers and Accountability of Private Police", European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research (European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research) 8 (3): 325, doi:10.1023/A:1008729129953
- Rick Sarre; Tim Prenzler Dr. (2000), Relationship Between Police and Private Security: Models and Future Directions
- Joh, Elizabeth E. (2005), Conceptualizing the Private Police 2005, Utah L. Rev., p. 573
- Private Sector — Private Spies, Rent-a-Cops, and the Prison-Industrial Complex, 1978
- Tinsley, Patrick (1999), Private Police: A Note, Journal of Libertarian Studies
- South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 40, Chapter 18
- South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 56, Chapter 5 Section 170
- South Carolina, Attorney General's Opinion: Aug 01,1978; Apr 30, 1987; May 23, 1995; Aug 30, 2001; Oct 15, 2004 and State V. Brant (S.C.1982) 278 S.C. 188,293 SE2d 703
- South Carolina, Attorney General's Opinion: Aug 01,1978 and South Carolina Code of Laws, Title 56, Chapter 5 Section 420
- Operation Partnership: Trends and Practices in Law Enforcement and Private Security Collaborations, Law Enforcement-Private Security Consortium
- Jenny Irish (1999), Policing for Profit: The Future of South Africa's Private Security Industry, Institute for Security Studies
- Office of International Criminal Justice (1995), Readings: Paper presented at the Ninth Annual Futures Conference on Privatization in Criminal Justice: Public and Private Partnerships, University of Chicago, March 13–15
- Gage, Theodore J. (1982), Cops, Inc, Reason
- Benson, Bruce L., To Serve and Protect, p. 180
- Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d. 1 (DC Ct. of Ap. 1981)
- Pastor, James F. (2003), The Privatization of Police In America: An Analysis and Case Study, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, ISBN 978-0-7864-1574-8
- H Draper (1978), Private Police
- Murray N. Rothbard. (1985), "The Public Sector, III: Police, Law, and the Courts", For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, New York: Libertarian Review Foundation, p. 220, ISBN 0-930073-02-9
- Benson, Bruce L. (1998), "Potential Benefits and Pitfalls of Contracting Out for Criminal Justice", To Serve and Protect: Privatization and Community in Criminal Justice, New York: New YorK Univ. Press, p. 34, ISBN 0-8147-1327-0
- Pastor, James F. (2003), The Privatization of Police In America: An Analysis and Case Study, Jefferson, NC: McFarland, ISBN 978-0-7864-1574-8
- Guard shoots, kills man who pointed pellet gun, Herald Tribune, Wednesday, November 30, 2005
- Joseph N. Boyce (September 16, 1996), Landlords Turn to ‘Commando’ Patrols, The Wall Street Journal