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===Treaties===
===Treaties===

{{see|Boundary Treaty of 1866 between Chile and Bolivia}}
{{see|Boundary Treaty of 1866 between Chile and Bolivia}}
{{see|Treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia of 1873}}


No permanent [[Atacama border dispute|borders had been established between Bolivia and Chile]] until 1866. Bolivian and Chilean historians disagree on whether the territory of [[Charcas]], originally part of the [[Viceroyalty of Peru]], later of the [[Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata]] had access to the sea. Supporting their claims with different documents, Bolivians claim that it had while Chileans disagreed. Bolivia and Chile claimed its borders according to the [[uti possidetis]] principle.
No permanent [[Atacama border dispute|borders had been established between Bolivia and Chile]] until 1866. Bolivian and Chilean historians disagree on whether the territory of [[Charcas]], originally part of the [[Viceroyalty of Peru]], later of the [[Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata]] had access to the sea. Supporting their claims with different documents, Bolivians claim that it had while Chileans disagreed. Bolivia and Chile claimed its borders according to the [[uti possidetis]] principle.
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===Crisis===
===Crisis===
{{See also|Treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia of 1873}}

On 6th February 1873 Peru and Bolivia signed the Secret treaty of alliance. The treaty contains 11 articles in order to guarantee the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the contracting parties and an additional article for secrecy of the treaty. Although the name of Chile doesn't appear in the text of the treaty, she alone was in view. Both parties agreed to keep the pact secret, at least, toward Chile. Argentina was invited to join the alliance against Chile and the Chamber of Deputies approved the law but the Argentine Senate postponed the matter to 1874.

On November 27 of 1873 the ''Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company'' signed a contract with the Bolivian government in which it would have authorized to extract [[saltpeter]] duty-free for 15 years. In 1878, The Bolivian Congress and a [[National Constituent Assembly]] found the contract incomplete due to the fact that it had not been ratified by congress as required by the Bolivian Constitution of [[1871]]. Subsequently, the congress would approve the contract only if the company would pay a 10 cents tax per quintal of mineral extracted.<ref name="gumucio">[http://www.unirbolivia.org/images/stories/pdfs/revistalazos/Lazos%203.pdf] Retrospectiva del enclaustramiento maritimo. Una vision critica sobre como se inicio el conflicto. Jorge Gumucio. La Paz, Bolivia</ref><ref name="Valdivieso">[http://www.puc.cl/icp/eticapolitica/documentos/Relaciones%20Chile%20Bolivia%20Peru.PDF] Relaciones Chile-Bolivia-Peru: La Guerra del Pacifico. June 2004. Patricio Valdivieso. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile</ref>
On November 27 of 1873 the ''Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company'' signed a contract with the Bolivian government in which it would have authorized to extract [[saltpeter]] duty-free for 15 years. In 1878, The Bolivian Congress and a [[National Constituent Assembly]] found the contract incomplete due to the fact that it had not been ratified by congress as required by the Bolivian Constitution of [[1871]]. Subsequently, the congress would approve the contract only if the company would pay a 10 cents tax per quintal of mineral extracted.<ref name="gumucio">[http://www.unirbolivia.org/images/stories/pdfs/revistalazos/Lazos%203.pdf] Retrospectiva del enclaustramiento maritimo. Una vision critica sobre como se inicio el conflicto. Jorge Gumucio. La Paz, Bolivia</ref><ref name="Valdivieso">[http://www.puc.cl/icp/eticapolitica/documentos/Relaciones%20Chile%20Bolivia%20Peru.PDF] Relaciones Chile-Bolivia-Peru: La Guerra del Pacifico. June 2004. Patricio Valdivieso. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile</ref>
Chile claimed that the border treaty of 1874 did not allow for such a tax hike.<ref>{{es icon}}http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Tratado_de_l%C3%ADmites_de_1874_entre_Bolivia_y_Chile</ref> The company complained the increased payments were illegal. The company mounted significant pressure and demanded that the Chilean government intervene{{Facts|Date june 2009|date=June 2009}}.
Chile claimed that the border treaty of 1874 did not allow for such a tax hike.<ref>{{es icon}}http://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Tratado_de_l%C3%ADmites_de_1874_entre_Bolivia_y_Chile</ref> The company complained the increased payments were illegal. The company mounted significant pressure and demanded that the Chilean government intervene{{Facts|Date june 2009|date=June 2009}}.
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== Occupation of Antofagasta ==
== Occupation of Antofagasta ==

{{POV|date={{CURRENTMONTHNAME}} {{CURRENTYEAR}}}}
On [[February 14]], the day of the auction of ''Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company'', 2000 Chilean soldiers arrived, disembarked and occupied the port city of [[Antofagasta]] without a fight.
On [[February 14]], the day of the auction of ''Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company'', 2000 Chilean soldiers arrived, disembarked and occupied the port city of [[Antofagasta]] without a fight.


After the Chilean occupation of Antofagasta, [[Hilarion Daza]] issued a presidential decree which demanded the expulsion of Chileans and the nationalization of Chilean private property. Due to its aggressiveness, the Chilean government understood the decree as a [[declaration of war]]. Although both nations had already taken aggressive actions, in reality no war had yet been formally declared by either side.<ref>[http://books.google.es/books?id=ewQVh_YtBToC&pg=PA65&dq=declaracion+de+guerra+bolivia+chile+1+de+marzo&ei=cLT5SdODJZ3AzASGsPGHBw#PPA65,M1 History of the borders of Chile. Guillermo Lagos Carmona]</ref><ref>[http://www.la-razon.com/versiones/20080220_006188/nota_246_551329.htm The occupation of Antofagasta. Ramiro Prudencio Lizon]</ref><ref>[http://www.archive.org/stream/storiadellaguer00caivgoog/storiadellaguer00caivgoog_djvu.txt History of the American war between Chile, Peru and Bolivia, page 66. Tommaso Caivano]</ref> Bolivia requested that Peru activate the secret [[Treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia of 1873|treaty of 1873]]. An additional article declared the pact secret:<ref name="alliance_1873">(See full english version of the treaty in Gonzalo Bulnes, [http://www.archive.org/details/chileperucauseso00bulnuoft Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879], Imprenta Universitaria. Santiago de Chile.
After the Chilean occupation of Antofagasta, [[Hilarion Daza]] issued a presidential decree which demanded the expulsion of Chileans and the nationalization of Chilean private property. Due to its aggressiveness, the Chilean government understood the decree as a [[declaration of war]]. Although both nations had already taken aggressive actions, in reality no war had yet been formally declared by either side.<ref>[http://books.google.es/books?id=ewQVh_YtBToC&pg=PA65&dq=declaracion+de+guerra+bolivia+chile+1+de+marzo&ei=cLT5SdODJZ3AzASGsPGHBw#PPA65,M1 History of the borders of Chile. Guillermo Lagos Carmona]</ref><ref>[http://www.la-razon.com/versiones/20080220_006188/nota_246_551329.htm The occupation of Antofagasta. Ramiro Prudencio Lizon]</ref><ref>[http://www.archive.org/stream/storiadellaguer00caivgoog/storiadellaguer00caivgoog_djvu.txt History of the American war between Chile, Peru and Bolivia, page 66. Tommaso Caivano]</ref> Bolivia requested that Peru activate the secret [[Treaty of alliance between Peru and Bolivia of 1873|treaty of 1873]]. An additional article declared the pact secret:<ref name="alliance_1873">(See full english version of the treaty in Gonzalo Bulnes, [http://www.archive.org/details/chileperucauseso00bulnuoft Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879], Imprenta Universitaria. Santiago de Chile. Additional Article:
''The present treaty of Defensive Alliance between Bolivia and Peru shall be secret until the two high contracting parties by common accord consider its publication necessary.''
: ''"Additional Article:
</ref>
: ''The present treaty of Defensive Alliance between Bolivia and Peru shall be secret until the two high contracting parties by common accord consider its publication necessary."''</ref>

But six years after the signing of the secret pact, the military balance between Chile and the countries of the pact had changed in favour of Chile and Peru now preferred a peaceful resolution and attempted to mediate by sending Jose Antonio Lavalle, a senior diplomat, to negotiate with the Chilean government in order to request the withdrawal of Chilean forces from Antofagasta<ref>See [[New York Times]] on August 1, 1879, Wednesday: ''"Chili's hostile neighbors"''</ref>. The Lavalle mission arrived to Valparaiso on [[March 4]] 1879.


Peru attempted to mediate by sending Jose Antonio Lavalle, a senior diplomat, to negotiate with the Chilean government in order to request to Chile deoccupation of Antofagasta. The Lavalle mission arrived to Valparaiso on [[March 4]] 1879. On [[March 14]] the Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Alejandro Fierro sent a telegram to the Chilean representative in Lima, Joaquin Godoy, requesting immediate neutrality from the Peruvian government.<ref name=causesofwar>{{cite book |title=Chile and Peru : the causes of the war of 1879 |last=Bulnes |first=Gonzalo |authorlink= |coauthors= |year= |publisher= |location= |isbn= |page= |pages=147 |url= |accessdate=}}</ref>
On [[March 14]] the Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Alejandro Fierro sent a telegram to the Chilean representative in Lima, Joaquin Godoy, requesting immediate neutrality from the Peruvian government.<ref name=causesofwar>{{cite book |title=Chile and Peru : the causes of the war of 1879 |last=Bulnes |first=Gonzalo |authorlink= |coauthors= |year= |publisher= |location= |isbn= |page= |pages=147 |url= |accessdate=}}</ref>


On [[March 17]], Godoy, requested neutrality from the Peruvian Government<ref>[http://www.memoriachilena.cl//temas/documento_detalle.asp?id=MC0007407] Bulnes Gonzalo, Guerra del Pacífico, Tomo 1: De Antofagasta a Tarapacá. Page 148</ref>. [[President of Peru|Peruvian President]] [[Mariano Ignacio Prado]] told Godoy, that there was a treaty allying Peru with Bolivia in the event of such a conflict.<ref name="machuca">[www.laguerradelpacifico.cl/Libros/Tomo%20I%20Tarapaca%20-%20Machuca.doc La Guerra del Pacífico. Francisco A. Machuca. Valparaíso]
On [[March 17]], Godoy, requested neutrality from the Peruvian Government<ref>[http://www.memoriachilena.cl//temas/documento_detalle.asp?id=MC0007407] Bulnes Gonzalo, Guerra del Pacífico, Tomo 1: De Antofagasta a Tarapacá. Page 148</ref>. [[President of Peru|Peruvian President]] [[Mariano Ignacio Prado]] told Godoy, that there was a treaty allying Peru with Bolivia in the event of such a conflict.<ref name="machuca">[www.laguerradelpacifico.cl/Libros/Tomo%20I%20Tarapaca%20-%20Machuca.doc La Guerra del Pacífico. Francisco A. Machuca. Valparaíso]

Revision as of 15:33, 30 June 2009

War of the Pacific

Map showing changes of territory due to the war
Date1879-1883
Location
Peru and Bolivia in Pacific coast of South America
Result Chilean victory
Territorial
changes
Belligerents
Peru Peruvian Republic
Bolivia Republic of Bolivia
Chile Republic of Chile
Commanders and leaders
Peru Miguel Grau /-,
Peru Juan Buendia,
Bolivia Narciso Campero,
Peru Pedro Silva,
Peru Andres A. Caceres
Chile Manuel Baquedano,
Chile Patricio Lynch,
Chile Juan Williams
Strength
1878
Bolivian Army: 2,300 soldiers
Bolivian Navy: None
Peruvian Army: 4,700 soldiers
Remington and Minie rifles. Blakely cannon
Peruvian Navy: 2 ironclad, 1 corvette, 1 gunboat
1881
Peruvian Army: 28,000 soldiers[1]
Peruvian Navy: None
1878
Chilean Army: 4,000 soldiers
Comblain rifle. Krupp cannon
Chilean Navy: 2 battleships, 4 corvettes, 2 gunboats
1881
Chilean Army: 45,000 soldiers
Chilean Navy: 2 battleships, 1 ironclad, 4 corvettes, 2 gunboats
Casualties and losses
35,000 Peruvians killed or wounded
5,000 Bolivians killed or wounded
Pisagua, Iquique, Mollendo, Supe, Chorrillos, Miraflores, Concepcion, San Pablo, bombed or burned
15,000 killed or wounded

The War of the Pacific, occurring from 1879-1883, was a conflict between Chile and the joint forces of Bolivia and Peru. Also known as the "Saltpeter War", the war arose from disputes over the control of territory that contained substantial mineral-rich deposits. It ultimately led to the Chilean annexation of the Peruvian Tarapaca department and Arica province, as well as the Bolivian department of Litoral, leaving Bolivia as a landlocked country.

Origins of the War of the Pacific

The War of the Pacific grew out of the initial dispute between Chile and Bolivia for control over a part of the Atacama desert that lies between the 23rd and 25th parallels on the Pacific coast, a territory that contained valuable mineral resources amid a period of worldwide economic recession.

Natural resources

The dry climate of Peruvian and Bolivian coast had permitted the accumulation and preservation of vast amounts of high-quality nitrate deposits - guano and saltpeter over many thousands of years. The discovery during the 1840s of the use of guano as a fertilizer and saltpeter as a key ingredient in explosives made the area strategically valuable. Bolivia and Peru suddenly found themselves sitting on the largest reserves of a resource that the world needed, and caused the population of the Atacama desert with Chilean operators backed by European capital.

From 1864 to 1866, Peru and Chile fought as allies against former colonial power Spain in the Chincha Islands War. It began with Spain's seizure of the guano-rich Chincha Islands and continued with bombing of Valparaíso and El Callao, but Spain was repulsed by the combined forces of Peru and Chile.

Heavy British capital investment drove development through the area, although Peru nationalized the guano exploitation during the 1870s.

Treaties

No permanent borders had been established between Bolivia and Chile until 1866. Bolivian and Chilean historians disagree on whether the territory of Charcas, originally part of the Viceroyalty of Peru, later of the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata had access to the sea. Supporting their claims with different documents, Bolivians claim that it had while Chileans disagreed. Bolivia and Chile claimed its borders according to the uti possidetis principle.

In 1866, the two countries had negotiated a treaty[2] (commonly referred to as the Treaty of Mutual Benefits) that established the 24th parallel as their boundary, and entitled Chile the right to share in the tax revenue on mineral exports from the territory between the 23rd and 25th parallels. Within this zone, Chile and Bolivia were provided equal rights.

On 6th February 1873 Peru and Bolivia signed the treaty of alliance. The treaty contains 11 articles in order to guarantee the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the contracting parties and an additional article for secrecy of the treaty. Although the name of Chile doesn't appear in the text of the treaty, she alone was in view. Both parties agreed to keep the pact secret, at least, toward Chile. Argentina was invited to join the alliance against Chile and the Chamber of Deputies approved the law but the Argentine Senate postponed the matter to 1874.

In 1874, second treaty superseded that one, granting Bolivia the authority to collect full tax revenue between the 23rd and 24th parallels, fixed the tax rates on Chilean companies for 25 years, and called for Bolivia to open up.[2] Most of the exploitation of the coastal region of Atacama was to be conducted by Chilean companies and British interests.

Crisis

On 6th February 1873 Peru and Bolivia signed the Secret treaty of alliance. The treaty contains 11 articles in order to guarantee the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the contracting parties and an additional article for secrecy of the treaty. Although the name of Chile doesn't appear in the text of the treaty, she alone was in view. Both parties agreed to keep the pact secret, at least, toward Chile. Argentina was invited to join the alliance against Chile and the Chamber of Deputies approved the law but the Argentine Senate postponed the matter to 1874.

On November 27 of 1873 the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company signed a contract with the Bolivian government in which it would have authorized to extract saltpeter duty-free for 15 years. In 1878, The Bolivian Congress and a National Constituent Assembly found the contract incomplete due to the fact that it had not been ratified by congress as required by the Bolivian Constitution of 1871. Subsequently, the congress would approve the contract only if the company would pay a 10 cents tax per quintal of mineral extracted.[3][4] Chile claimed that the border treaty of 1874 did not allow for such a tax hike.[5] The company complained the increased payments were illegal. The company mounted significant pressure and demanded that the Chilean government intervene[citation needed].

When the Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company refused to pay, the Bolivian government under President Hilarion Daza threatened to confiscate its property. Chile responded by sending a warship to the area in December 1878. Bolivia announced the seizure and auction of the company on February 14, 1879. Chile, in turn, threatened that such action would render the border treaty null and void.

Occupation of Antofagasta

On February 14, the day of the auction of Antofagasta Nitrate & Railway Company, 2000 Chilean soldiers arrived, disembarked and occupied the port city of Antofagasta without a fight.

After the Chilean occupation of Antofagasta, Hilarion Daza issued a presidential decree which demanded the expulsion of Chileans and the nationalization of Chilean private property. Due to its aggressiveness, the Chilean government understood the decree as a declaration of war. Although both nations had already taken aggressive actions, in reality no war had yet been formally declared by either side.[6][7][8] Bolivia requested that Peru activate the secret treaty of 1873. An additional article declared the pact secret:[9]

But six years after the signing of the secret pact, the military balance between Chile and the countries of the pact had changed in favour of Chile and Peru now preferred a peaceful resolution and attempted to mediate by sending Jose Antonio Lavalle, a senior diplomat, to negotiate with the Chilean government in order to request the withdrawal of Chilean forces from Antofagasta[10]. The Lavalle mission arrived to Valparaiso on March 4 1879.

On March 14 the Chilean Foreign Affairs Minister Alejandro Fierro sent a telegram to the Chilean representative in Lima, Joaquin Godoy, requesting immediate neutrality from the Peruvian government.[11]

On March 17, Godoy, requested neutrality from the Peruvian Government[12]. Peruvian President Mariano Ignacio Prado told Godoy, that there was a treaty allying Peru with Bolivia in the event of such a conflict.[13]

The Battle of Topater, on 23 March, 1879 was the first battle of the war. On their way to occupy Calama, north of 25th parallel, 554 Chilean troops and cavalry were opposed by 135 Bolivian soldiers and civilian residents led by Dr. Ladislao Cabrera, dug in at two destroyed bridges; calls to surrender were rejected before and during the battle. Outnumbered and low on ammunition, most of the Bolivian force withdrew, except for a small group of civilians led by Colonel Eduardo Abaroa, who fought to the end. Further land battles would not take place until the war at sea was resolved. [14]

On March 24, Peru responded to Chile and Bolivia, by proposing consideration in Congress of April 24of both the Chilean request for neutrality and the Bolivian request for alliance. [15]. On March 31, Peru's Lavalle then read the whole treaty to Chile's Fierro and told him that it was not offensive to Chile.[13]

Chile acknowledge its awareness of the Bolivia-Peru alliance and responded by breaking diplomatic ties and formally declaring war on both countries on April 5, 1879.[13] On April 6, Peru declared casus foederis of the Alliance treaty, stating that it had come into effect. [16]

The Argentine Position

In 1873 and 1879, Argentina had began talks with Perú and Bolivia in order to join the secret alliance, since it had a territorial dispute with Chile regarding the region of Patagonia,[17] Indeed, on 24 September, 1873 the Argentine Chamber of Deputies had approved the (secret) law, but the Argentine Senate postponed the matter to 1874[18].

According to Peruvian sources, prior the Chilean declaration of war, the Argentine President asked to Peruvian minister in Buenos Aires if Peru could be prepared to render assistance to Argentina in the event of a break with Chile. At the time, the Peruvian minister had not received instructions of any kind.[19].

According to Argentine sources, prior to the Argentine declaration of neutrality, Peruvians offered to Argentina an access to the Pacific Ocean through the Bolivian territories in order to join the alliance against the Chilean government. However, the offer was so vague in its formulation, that the Argentine foreign minister and the representative in Bolivia thought it did not deserve consideration.[20]

On May 20, 1879 the Argentine Foreign Minister Montes de Oca declared the neutrality of Argentina[21]. Despite this, when war broke out Argentina sent a naval squadron to Rio Negro menacing Chilean dominion over the Straits of Magellan.[22] John Crow, in his book "The Epic of Latin America", argues that the Chilean naval superiority was the main factor preventing Argentina from taking part in the war.[23]

The War

Bolivia, after several short-lived governments, stood unprepared to face the Chilean army by itself. From the beginning of the war it became clear that, in a difficult desert terrain, control of the sea would prove to be the deciding factor.

Bolivia had no navy and Peru faced an economic collapse that left its navy and army without proper training or budget. Most of its warships were old and unable to face battle, leaving only the ironclads Huascar and Independencia ready. In contrast, Chile - although in the middle of its own economic crisis - was better prepared, counting on its modern navy supplemented by a well-trained and equipped army.

Naval Campaign

Naval Battle of Iquique: the Esmeralda versus the Huascar‎.
File:Buque de Torre Huascar.jpg
The Peruvian ship Huascar

Under the direction of Rear Admiral Juan Williams, the Chilean navy and its ironclad frigates - Almirante Cochrane and Blanco Encalada - started to operate on the Bolivian and Peruvian coast. The port of Iquique was blockaded, while Huanillos, Mollendo, Pica, and Pisagua were bombarded and port facilities burned. Rear Admiral Williams hoped that, by disrupting commerce, especially the saltpeter exports and weapons imports, the Allies' war effort would be weakened and the Peruvian navy thus forced into a decisive showdown.

The smaller Peruvian navy did not oblige. Under the command of Admiral Miguel Grau aboard Huascar, Peru staged a series of effective blockade runs and harassment raids deep into Chilean waters. The plan was to disrupt Chilean operations, draw the enemy fleet back to the south while avoiding a fight against superior forces; as a consequence the Chilean invasion would be delayed, the Allies would be free to supply and reinforce their troops along the coast, and weapons would still flow into Peru from the north.

The Naval Battle of Chipana, the first of the war at sea, took place off Huanillos on 12 April 1879, as Peruvian corvettes Union and Pilcomayo found Chilean corvette Magallanes on its way to Iquique. After a two-hour running artillery duel, Union suffered engine problems; the pursuit was called off and Magallanes escaped with minor damage.

In the Naval Battle of Iquique of 21 May 1879, Peruvian ironclad ships Huascar and Independencia lifted the blockade of Iquique by Esmeralda and Covadonga, two of Chile's oldest wooden vessels. Huascar sank Esmeralda, while Covadonga forced the larger Independencia to run aground at Punta Gruesa (some historians consider this a different engagement and call it the Battle of Punta Gruesa).

The Chilean navy lost a wooden corvette and elevated Captain Arturo Prat of Esmeralda as a martyr to their cause: he died leading a handful of sailors boarding the ironclad after it had rammed his ship. The Peruvian navy lost a powerful ironclad frigate and saw Admiral Miguel Grau's renown grow among friend and foe as a result of his actions: he rescued the survivors of Esmeralda after the battle and wrote condolences to the widow of Captain Prat. Significantly, Huascar remained the only Peruvian vessel capable of holding off the invasion.

For six months, Huascar roamed the seas and effectively cut off the Chilean supply lines. In an impressive display of naval mastery, Captain Grau was able to hold off the entire Chilean navy, recover captured Peruvian vessels and severely damage many ports used by the Chileans. These actions are known as the "Correrias del Huascar" (Huascar's Exploits) and as a result Grau was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral.

On 8 October of 1879 during the Naval Battle of Angamos it took the Chilean navy a full day of sailing with six ships in order to corner the Huascar, and then, nearly two hours of bloody combat and nearly 76 hits with artillery before with vessels Blanco Encalada, Covadonga and Cochrane could capture the Huascar. The dead of this battle include Admiral Grau.

With the capture of Huascar, the naval campaign was over, and, local skirmishes notwithstanding, Chile would control the sea for the duration of the war.

Land Campaign and Invasion

Chileans operations in the war.

Having gained control of the sea, Chile sent its army to invade Peru. Bolivia, unable to recover the Litoral Department, joined the Peruvian defense of Tarapaca and Tacna.

Campaign of Tarapaca

On 2 November 1879, naval bombardment and disembark assaults were carried out at the small port of Pisagua and the Junin Cove, –some 500 km North of Antofagasta. At Pisagua, several landing waves totaling 7,000 Chilean troops attacked beach defenses held by 1,160 Allies commanded by Isaac Recavarren, and took the town. By the end of the day, General Erasmo Escala and a Chilean army of 10,000 were ashore and moving inland.

The Chileans marched south towards the city of Iquique with 6,000 troops, commanded by Emilio Sotomayor. The Allies gathered 7,400 troops in Agua Santa, commanded by Juan Buendia. On 19 November, both armies met in Battle of San Francisco, with high casualties to both sides. Bolivians forces retreated to Oruro and Peruvians to Tiliviche. Four days later, the Chilean army captured Iquique without resistance.

A detachment of 3,600 Chilean soldiers, commanded by Luis Artega, cavalry and artillery, was sent to face the Peruvian forces in Tarapaca. Juan Buendia, with Peruvian forces, started a march towards Arica in order to found Bolivian troops led by Hilarion Daza. Daza departed from Arica towards Tarapaca but in Camarones he decided to return towards Arica. The Battle of Tarapaca, on 27 November, took place between Chilean and Peruvian forces. After the Peruvian victory at Tarapaca General Buendia's army, down to 4,000, retreated further north to Arica by 18 December.

Campaign of Tacna

Oil Painting by Juan Lepiani which represents the battle of Arica on June 7, 1880‎.

A new Chilean naval expedition left Pisagua and on 24 February 1880 disembarked nearly 12,000 soldiers at Pacocha Bay (near Ilo). Commanded by General Manuel Baquedano, this force isolated the provinces of Tacna and Arica, destroying any practical hope for reinforcements from Peru. On the outskirts of Tacna combatants from the three contending countries met on what would later be known as the Battle of El Alto de la Alianza. Commanding the allied army was Narciso Campero, the Bolivian president. In the subsequent carnage Chilean artillery proved superior, and as a result most of Peru's professional army was destroyed. After the battle Bolivia withdrew completely from the war.

On 7 June, some 4,000 Chilean forces backed by the Navy successfully attacked a Peruvian garrison in Arica, which was under the command of Colonel Francisco Bolognesi. Chilean forces, directed by Colonel Pedro Lagos, had to run up the Morro de Arica (a steep and tall seaside hill) facing 2,000 Peruvian troops.

The assault became known as the Battle of Arica, which turned out to be one of the most tragic and, at the same time, most emblematic events of the war: Chile suffered 479 mortal casualties, while almost 900 Peruvians lost their lives, including Colonel Bolognesi. This battle was especially bloody since most Chileans died because of landmines; and with bullets running low most of the Peruvian deaths were at the hands of Corvo-wielding Chileans. The multiple cuts on the corpses made many speculate that the execution of prisoners had taken place, but most authors say that the captains were actually holding back the enraged Chileans to prevent the deaths of routed soldiers.[24]

Other high ranking Peruvian officers who also perished were Colonel Alfonso Ugarte, Colonel Mariano Bustamante and his Chief of Detail. These three Peruvian officers belonged to the group that, on the eve of battle, had gallantly rejected an offer to deliver the doomed garrison to the Chileans in an honourable surrender; Colonel Bolognesi bore out his famous vow to the Chilean emissary that he would defend Arica "to the last cartridge." Bolognesi vow goes as: "Tengo deberes sagrados que cumplir y los cumplire hasta quemar el ultimo cartucho." ("I have sacred duties to fulfill, and I will fulfill them until I fire the last round"). The expression "hasta quemar el ultimo cartucho" ("Until the last round is fired") has passed into the Spanish language.

Since the Morro de Arica was the last bulwark of defence for the allied troops standing in the city, its occupation by Chile has been of utmost historical relevance for both countries.

In October 1880, the United States unsuccessfully mediated in the conflict aboard USS Lackawanna at Arica Bay, attempting to end the war through diplomacy. Representatives from Chile, Peru, and Bolivia met to discuss the territorial disputes; yet both Peru and Bolivia rejected the loss of their territories to Chile and abandoned the conference.

Lynch's Expedition

To show Peru the futility of further resistance againt Chilean forces, the Chilean government dispatched an expedition under the command of Captain Patricio Lynch to northern Peru to collect taxes. [25]

A division consisting of 1900 soldiers, 400 cavalrymen, 3 cannons and a field hospital - all in all 2600 men - was put aboard two troopships and, guarded by warships O'Higgins and Chacabuco, sent to Chimbote. The convoi set off from Arica on 4 September 1880 and arrived in Chimbote on the morning of 10 September. During the disembarkment in Chimbote, Supe, Paita and the occupation of Viru, Chiclayo and other cities and ports, no resistance was encountered.

Lynch levied taxes of $100,000 in Chimbote, $10,000 in Piata, $20,000 in Chiclayo and $4,000 in Labayeque in local currencies. As the Peruan government heared of the levies, it decreed on 11 September not to pay taxes to the Chilean Army. Noncompilance was declared an act of treason and was to be punished with the confiscation of all remaining assets. Despite this threat, most land owners payed and followed the at this time prevalent opinion that denizens of occupied areas were relieved of duties to the former government and to comply with the occupying army.[26] Those who did not comply had their property impounded or destroyed.

The expedition also found and destroyed 300 crates with 200,000 rounds of ammunition in the Hacienda San Nicolas near Supe. The british Ship Islai was stopped and searched on 18 September and 28 crates of it's freight impounded. Four of them contained Peruan postage stamps with the total value of $375,000, printed in the US, the other 24 inclosed $7,290,000 in freshly printed bills.

The expedition also recruited 400 chinese peons, who were working on the haciendas, as an auxilliary force and brought them back to Chile.

Lynchs expedition returned to Arica on 26 and 27 October 1880.

Campaign of Lima

Chilean charge during the Battle of San Juan‎.

19 November 1880 the Chilean army landed in Pisco, and by January 1881, the Chileans were marching towards the Peruvian capital, Lima. Regular Peruvian forces together with poorly armed people, set up to defend Lima. With little effective Peruvian central government remaining, Chile pursued an ambitious campaign throughout Peru, especially along the coast and in the central Sierra, penetrating as far north as Cajamarca, seeking to eliminate any source of resistance. Peruvian forces were decisevely defeated in the battles of San Juan and Miraflores, and Lima fell in January 1881 to the forces of General Baquedano.
The southern suburbs of Lima, including the upscale beach area of Chorrillos, were looted and every inhabitant was forced to surrender valuables or suffer a bitter end. This desperate order was issued to raise money to pay the late wages of the Chilean soldiers and prevent an uprising.

Occupation of Lima

Chilean army entering Lima.

During the occupation of Lima, Chilean troops pillaged Peruvian public buildings, turned the old University of San Marcos into a barracks, raided medical schools and other institutions of education, and stole a series of monuments and artwork that had adorned the city.[27] As war booty, Chile confiscated the contents of the Peruvian National Library in Lima and transported thousands of books (including many centuries-old original Spanish, Peruvian and Colonial volumes) to Santiago de Chile, along with much capital stock. These books were partially returned (4,000 of 30,000) to the National Library of Peru in November 2007.[28]

Campaign of the Sierra

The Peruvian resistance continued for three more years, with apparent U.S. encouragement[citation needed]. The leader of the resistance was General Andres Caceres (nicknamed the Warlock of the Andes), who would later be elected president of Peru. Under his leadership, the Peruvian militia forces strengthened with Indian montoneras inflicted several painful[citation needed] blows upon the Chilean army in small battles such as Marcavalle, Concepcion and San Pablo, forcing Colonel Estanislao del Canto's division to return to Lima on 1882. However, Caceres was conclusively defeated by Colonel Alejandro Gorostiaga at Battle of Huamachuco on July 10, 1883. After this battle, there was little further resistance. Finally, on 20 October 1883, Peru and Chile signed the Treaty of Ancon, by which Peru's Tarapaca province was ceded to the victor; on its part, Bolivia was forced to cede Antofagasta.

Characteristics of the War

Strategic control of the sea

The theatre of war between 1879 and 1881 was a large expanse of desert, sparsely populated and far removed from major cities or resources; it is, however, close to the Pacific Ocean. It was clear from the beginning that control of the sea would be the key to an inevitably difficult desert war: supply by sea, including water, food, ammunition, horses, fodder and reinforcements, was quicker and easier than marching supplies through the desert or across the Bolivian high plateau.

While the Chilean Navy started an economic and military blockade of the Allies' ports, Peru took the initiative and utilized its smaller but effective navy as a raiding force. Chile was forced to delay the ground invasion for six months, and to shift its fleet from blockading to hunting Huascar until she was captured.

With the advantage of naval supremacy, Chilean ground strategy focused on mobility: landing ground forces in enemy territory in order to raid Allied ground assets; landing in strength to split and drive out defenders and leaving garrisons to guard territory as the war moved north. Peru and Bolivia fought a defensive war: maneuvering along long overland distances; relying where possible on land or coastal fortifications with gun batteries and minefields; coastal railways were available to Peru, and telegraph lines provided a direct line to the government in Lima. When retreating, Allied forces made sure that little if any assets remained to be used by the enemy.

Sea mobile forces proved to be, in the end, an advantage for desert warfare on a long coastline. Defenders found themselves hundreds of kilometers away from home; invading forces were usually a few kilometers away from the sea.

Occupation, resistance and attrition

The occupation of Peru between 1881 and 1884 was a different story altogether. The war theatre was the Peruvian Sierra, where Peruvian resistance had easy access to population, resource and supply centres further from the sea; it could carry out a war of attrition indefinitely. The Chilean army (now turned into an occupation force) was split into small garrisons across the theatre and could devote only part of its strength to hunting down rebels without a central authority.

After a costly occupation and prolonged anti-insurgency campaign, Chile sought to achieve a political exit strategy. Rifts within Peruvian society provided such an opportunity after the Battle of Huamachuco, and resulted in the peace treaty that ended the occupation.

Participation of Chinese immigrants

According to "Chinese Migration into Latin America – Diaspora or Sojourns in Peru?" some Chinese supported the Chilean army against their plantation owners[29].

Technology

The war saw the use by both sides of new, or recently introduced, late 19th century military technology such as breech-loading rifles & cannons, remote-controlled land mines, armor-piercing shells, naval torpedoes, torpedo boats, and purpose-built landing craft.

The second-generation of ironclads (i.e. designed after the Battle of Hampton Roads) were employed in battle for the first time. That was significant for a conflict where a major power was not directly involved, and it drew the attention of British, French, and U.S. observers of the war.

During the war, Peru developed the Toro Submarino ("Submarine Bull"). Though completely operational, she never saw action, and she was scuttled at the end of the war to prevent her capture by Chilean forces.

The U.S.S. Wachusett with Alfred Thayer Mahan in command, was stationed at Callao, Peru, protecting American interests during the final stages of the War of the Pacific. He formulated his concept of sea power while reading a history book in an English gentleman’s club in Lima, Peru. This concept became the foundation for his celebrated The Influence of Sea Power upon History[30][31].

Aftermath

Peace terms

Under the terms of the Treaty of Ancon,[5] Chile was to occupy the provinces of Tacna and Arica for 10 years, after which a plebiscite was to be held to determine nationality. The two countries failed for decades to agree on the terms of the plebiscite. Finally in 1929, through the mediation of the United States under President Herbert Hoover, an accord was reached by which Chile kept Arica. Peru reacquired Tacna and received some concessions in Arica.

In 1884, Bolivia signed a truce that gave control to Chile of the entire Bolivian coast, the province of Antofagasta, and its valuable nitrate, copper, and other mineral deposits, and a further treaty in 1904 made this arrangement permanent. In return, Chile agreed to build a railroad connecting the capital city of La Paz, Bolivia with the port of Arica, and Chile guaranteed freedom of transit for Bolivian commerce through Chilean ports and territory.

Bolivia has also negotiated treaties of commercial access to the oceans via Brazil, Argentina, etc.

Long-term consequences

The War of the Pacific left traumatic scars on all societies involved in the conflict. For Bolivians, the loss of the territory which they refer to as the Litoral (the coast) remains a deeply emotional issue and a practical one, as was particularly evident during the internal natural gas riots of 2003. Popular belief attributes much of the country's problems to its landlocked condition; accordingly, recovering the seacoast is seen as the solution to most of these difficulties. However, the real issue is the fear of being dependent on Chile or Peru.[citation needed] In 1932, this was a contributing factor in the failed Chaco War with Paraguay, over territory controlling access to the Atlantic Ocean through the Paraguay River. In recent decades, all Bolivian Presidents have made it their policy to pressure Chile for sovereign access to the sea. Diplomatic relations with Chile have been severed since 17 March 1978, in spite of considerable commercial ties. Currently, the leading Bolivian newspaper "El Diario" [6] still features at least a weekly editorial on the subject, and the Bolivian people annually celebrate a patriotic "Dia del Mar" (Day of the Sea) to remember the crippling loss.[32]

Picture from Bolivia, 1992. It says: "What once was ours, will be ours once again", and "Hold on rotos (Chileans), because here come the Colorados of Bolivia"

Peruvians developed a cult for the heroic defenders of the patria (nation, literally fatherland), such as Admiral Miguel Grau Seminario, Colonel Francisco Bolognesi, Colonel Alfonso Ugarte, who were killed in the war, and General Andres Avelino Caceres who went on to become a leading political figure and symbol of resistance to the occupying Chilean Army. Peruvian heroes of the war are buried in the "Cripta de los Heroes" in Presbitero Maestro cemetery in Lima, Peru. This mausoleum is the largest in the cemetery, and its entrance reads "La Nacion a sus Defensores" (From the nation, to its defenders). The defeat engendered a deep revenge desire among the ruling classes, which also led to a skewed view of the role of the armed forces; this attitude dominated society throughout the 20th century. War honors are also held to Vice Admiral Abel-Nicolas Bergasse Dupetit Thouars, French commander, that after the Battle of Miraflores, he prevented the destruction and looting of Lima by threatening to engage and destroy the Chilean Navy with a French naval force under his command.

Chile fared better, gaining a lucrative territory with major sources of income, including nitrates, saltpeter and copper. The national treasury grew by 900% between 1879 and 1902 due to taxes coming from the newly acquired Bolivian and Peruvian lands. [33] Victory was, however, a mixed blessing. During the war Chile waived most of its claim over the Patagonia in the Boundary treaty of 1881 between Chile and Argentina, in order to ensure Argentina's neutrality; Chilean popular belief sees this as a territorial loss of almost half a million square miles. After the war Puna de Atacama dispute grew until it was solved in 1899, since both Chile and Argentina claimed former Bolivian territories. British involvement and control of the nitrate industry rose significantly after the war,[34] leading them to meddle in Chilean politics and ultimately to back an overthrow of the Chilean President in 1891.[citation needed] High nitrate profits lasted for only a few decades and fell sharply once synthetic nitrates were developed during World War I. This led to a massive economic breakdown (known as the nitrate crisis), since many industrial factories around the country had closed in the early 1880s to free up labor for the then rising and now dead extraction business, dramatically slowing the country's industrial development. When the saltpeter mines closed or proved no longer profitable, the British companies left the country, leaving a large number of unemployed behind. Currently, the former Bolivian region is still the world's richest source of copper and its ports move trade between nearby countries and the Pacific Ocean; the former Peruvian region faces more problematic issues since no new sources of richness have been discovered since the Nitrate Crisis, but at least on 28 August 1929, Chile returned the province of Tacna to Peru.

The war consolidated the Chilean navy as an institution, just as the war of independence and the 1836 war against the Santa Cruz confederation consolidated the Chilean Army.

In 1999, Chile and Peru at last agreed to complete the implementation of the last parts of the Treaty of Lima, providing Peru with a port in Arica. [35]

Prominent military commanders

Bolivia

  • Mr. Eduardo Abaroa /-, an engineer, was killed leading a group of civilian defenders at the Battle of Topater
  • Dr. Ladislao Cabrera, organizing the defense of Calama
  • General Narciso Campero, military President of Bolivia (1880-1884)
  • General Hilarion Daza, military President of Bolivia (1876-1879)

Chile

Peru

  • Colonel Francisco Bolognesi /-, was killed while leading the defense of the Arica garrison
  • General Andres Caceres, led the guerilla war during the occupation of Peru, was elected President of Peru after the war
  • Rear Admiral Miguel Grau /-, commander of Huascar and widely known as the gentleman of the seas, was killed at the Naval Battle of Angamos
  • Colonel Leoncio Prado /-, the son of former President Mariano Ignacio Prado, chose duty as a soldier over an oath not to fight, was captured and executed by a Chilean firing squad after the Battle of Huamachuco
  • Colonel Alfonso Ugarte /-, Bolognesi's top lieutenant, a rich saltpeter entrepreneur and former mayor of Iquique, was killed during the Battle of Arica, believed to have jumped off a cliff on his horse to save the flag from capture.

Other nationalities

  • Rear Admiral Abel Bergasse Dupetit-Thouars, French commander, after the Battle of Miraflores, he prevented the destruction and looting of Lima by threatening to engage and destroy the Chilean Navy with a French naval force under his command.
  • Colonel Robert Souper Howard /-, a British soldier who served in the Chilean Army in nearly every battlefield of the war, was killed at the Battle of San Juan.
  • Lt. Colonel Roque Saenz Pena, an Argentine lawyer who served as an officer in the Peruvian Army during the battles of Tarapaca and Arica, was later elected President of Argentina.

Bibliography

  • Gonzalo Bulnes(1851-1936), "Chile and Peru : the causes of the war of 1879", Publisher Imprenta Universitaria, Santiago de Chile, in english Language (Download here)
  • Diego Barros Arana Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879-1880), Publisher: "librería central de servat i c", Esquina de Huerfanos i Ahumada, Santiago, Chile, 1881 , 2 Vols. (Download Vol.1 and Vol.II) in Spanish Language

See also

References

  1. ^ 19,000 in San Juan, 4,000 in Lima, 1,000 in El Callao (Pierola letter to Julio Tenaud) 4,000 in Arequipa, Col. Jose de la Torre[1]
  2. ^ a b Tratado de limites de 1866 entre Bolivia y Chile Template:Es icon
  3. ^ [2] Retrospectiva del enclaustramiento maritimo. Una vision critica sobre como se inicio el conflicto. Jorge Gumucio. La Paz, Bolivia
  4. ^ [3] Relaciones Chile-Bolivia-Peru: La Guerra del Pacifico. June 2004. Patricio Valdivieso. Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile
  5. ^ Template:Es iconhttp://es.wikisource.org/wiki/Tratado_de_l%C3%ADmites_de_1874_entre_Bolivia_y_Chile
  6. ^ History of the borders of Chile. Guillermo Lagos Carmona
  7. ^ The occupation of Antofagasta. Ramiro Prudencio Lizon
  8. ^ History of the American war between Chile, Peru and Bolivia, page 66. Tommaso Caivano
  9. ^ (See full english version of the treaty in Gonzalo Bulnes, Chile and Peru: the causes of the war of 1879, Imprenta Universitaria. Santiago de Chile. Additional Article: The present treaty of Defensive Alliance between Bolivia and Peru shall be secret until the two high contracting parties by common accord consider its publication necessary.
  10. ^ See New York Times on August 1, 1879, Wednesday: "Chili's hostile neighbors"
  11. ^ Bulnes, Gonzalo. Chile and Peru : the causes of the war of 1879. p. 147. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  12. ^ [4] Bulnes Gonzalo, Guerra del Pacífico, Tomo 1: De Antofagasta a Tarapacá. Page 148
  13. ^ a b c [www.laguerradelpacifico.cl/Libros/Tomo%20I%20Tarapaca%20-%20Machuca.doc La Guerra del Pacífico. Francisco A. Machuca. Valparaíso] "Mientras el señor Lavalle gozaba de relativa tregua, y estudiaba las causas de la poca prisa del Gobierno chileno para continuar las negociaciones, éste, en constante comunicación con nuestro Ministro Godoy, quedaba impuesto el 18 de Marzo, por comunicación del día anterior, 17, de la existencia del pacto secreto, y de una nota clara y terminante de nuestro Ministro al Gobierno de Lima...Por fin, el 31 de Marzo, el señor Lavalle se apersonó al señor Ministro de Relaciones y le dió conocimiento del tratado secreto, que acababa de recibir de Lima, en circunstancia que hacía días, el general Prado le había confesado su existencia a nuestro Ministro Godoy, en una conferencia tenida en Chorrillos."
  14. ^ Jorge Basadre, Historia de la Republica del Peru, vol. VI, p. 40.
  15. ^ Peruvian Congress March, 24 1879
  16. ^ Vicuna Mackena. Campana de Tarapaca. Santriago de Chile
  17. ^ http://www.jstor.org/stable/2510820?seq=6
  18. ^ See http://www.argentina-rree.com/6/6-066.htm "Sarmiento y Tejedor proponen al Congreso la adhesión al tratado secreto peruano-boliviano del 6 de febrero de 1873":
    el 24 de septiembre el presidente Sarmiento firmara el pedido de autorización al Congreso para la adhesión al tratado de alianza peruano-boliviano. El asunto fue aprobado en la Cámara de Diputados por 48 a 18 votos…
    El tratamiento del tema en el Senado sufrió sucesivos aplazamientos hasta finalmente quedar para las sesiones ordinarias del año siguiente
  19. ^ See La actitud de la Argentina. Jorge Basadre:
    el 26 me pidió una conferencia S. E. el Presidente y habiendo tenido lugar comprendí que su objeto había sido conocer la actitud que adoptaríamos en la cuestión que se ventilaba entre Chile y Bolivia y quizás aun si estaríamos dispuestos al fin a prestar auxilio a la Argentina en caso de un rompimiento con Chile. En esa conferencia me dijo que tenía noticia de que la mediación del Perú no sería admitida. Como ya no había recibido instrucciones de ninguna clase, bien a mi pesar tuve que eludir la respuesta que él esperaba, perdiendo de nuevo la oportunidad que se me presentaba para conseguir la alianza, sin solicitarla, lo que a mi juicio habría sido muy fácil entonces..."
    (Translation:
    On 26 asked me a conference the President and having been understood that its purpose had been to know the attitude taken in the matter was ventilated between Chile and Bolivia, and perhaps even be prepared to render assistance to Argentina in the event of a break with Chile. At that conference told me that he had news that the mediation of Peru would not be admitted. As I had not received instructions of any kind, I had to evade the answer he expected, again losing the opportunity that I had to get the alliance, without asking
  20. ^ See La misión Balmaceda: asegurar la neutralidad argentina en la guerra del Pacífico:
    …[Peru] había instruido inicialmente a su ministro en Buenos Aires, Aníbal Víctor de la Torre, a ofrecer a la Argentina los territorios bolivianos situados entre los 24º y 27º de latitud en la costa oeste, a cambio del ingreso argentino en el conflicto contra el gobierno de Chile...Además, el canciller Montes de Oca creyó que el plan era "tan vago en la formulación que del mismo se hacía en la correspondencia de Uriburu que no merecía consideración"
    (Translation:
    …[Peru] had given instructions to his minister in Buenos Aires, Aníbal Víctor de la Torre, to offer to Argentina the Bolivian territories located between the 24°S and 27°S of the west coasts, in exchange of Argentine participation in the conflict against the government Chile...In addition, Foreign Minister Montes de Oca believed the plan was "so vague in the formulation, that did not deserve consideration according to Uriburu correspondence"
  21. ^ See http://www.argentina-rree.com/6/6-081.htm "La misión Balmaceda: asegurar la neutralidad argentina en la guerra del Pacífico":
    Paradójicamente, una semana después, el ministro de relaciones exteriores Montes de Oca proclamó oficialmente la neutralidad argentina…
  22. ^ The role of Jose Balmaceda in preserving Argentine neutrality
  23. ^ Crow, John. The Epic of Latin America. pp. 182–183. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  24. ^ Actual number of casualties taken from http://www.soberaniachile.cl/norte3_6.html (in spanish)#sub11
  25. ^ Diego Barros Arana, Historia de la guerra del Pacífico (1879-1880), vol. 2, page 98: [El gobierno chileno] Creía entonces que todavía era posible demostrar prácticamente al enemigo la imposibilidad en que se hallaba para defender el territorio peruano no ya contra un ejército numeroso sino contra pequeñas divisiones. Este fué el objeto de una espedicion que las quejas, los insultos i las lamentaciones de los documentos oficiales del Perú, i de los escritos de su prensa, han hecho famosa.
  26. ^ Diego Barros Arana quotes Johann Caspar Bluntschli: Bluntschili (Derecho internacional codificado) dice espresamente lo que sigue: Árt. 544. Cuando el enemigo ha tomado posesión efectiva de una parte del territorio, el gobierno del otro estado deja de ejercer alli el poder. Los habitantes del territorio ocupado están eximidos de todos los deberes i obligaciones respecto del gobierno anterior, i están obligados a obedecer a los jefes del ejército de ocupación.
  27. ^ Hugh Chisholm. "Encyclopedia Brittanica: Lima". Google Books. Retrieved 2008-12-04.
  28. ^ Dan Collyns. "Chile returns looted Peru books". BBC. Retrieved 2007-11-10.
  29. ^ http://www.history.appstate.edu/ConferencePapers/dorotheamartinpaper.pdf
  30. ^ See "The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan" by Richard W. Turk; Greenwood Press, 1987. 183 pgs. page 10
  31. ^ See Larrie D. Ferreiro 'Mahan and the "English Club” of Lima, Peru: The Genesis of The Influence of Sea Power upon History', The Journal of Military History - Volume 72, Number 3, July 2008, pp. 901-906
  32. ^ El dia del mar se recordara con mas que un tradicional desfile civico
  33. ^ Crow, The Epic of Latin America, p. 180
  34. ^ Foster, John B. & Clark, Brett. (2003). "Ecological Imperialism: The Curse of Capitalism" (accessed September 2 2005). The Socialist Register 2004, p190-192. Also available in print from Merlin Press.
  35. ^ Dominguez, Jorge et al. 2003 Boundary Disputes in Latin America. United States Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace.

External links