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Quiet "salami slicing” rather than overt aggression is China's favored strategy to gain strategic advantage by disregarding rule of law and risks of wider military escalation through "steady progression of small actions, none of which serves as a [[casus belli]] by itself, yet which over time lead cumulatively to a strategic transformation in China’s favor. China’s strategy aims to seriously limit the options of the targeted countries by confounding their deterrence plans and making it difficult for them to devise proportionate or effective counteractions."<ref name=japtime1>[China's salami-slice strategy Japan Times, 25 July 2013.</ref>
Quiet "salami slicing” rather than overt aggression is China's favored strategy to gain strategic advantage by disregarding rule of law and risks of wider military escalation through "steady progression of small actions, none of which serves as a [[casus belli]] by itself, yet which over time lead cumulatively to a strategic transformation in China’s favor. China’s strategy aims to seriously limit the options of the targeted countries by confounding their deterrence plans and making it difficult for them to devise proportionate or effective counteractions."<ref name=japtime1>[China's salami-slice strategy Japan Times, 25 July 2013.</ref>

Using salami slice by disrespecting international boundaries, China has incrementally grab the territories and expand its maritime EEZ, doubled its geographical area by annexing [[annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China|Tibet]] and [[Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China|Xinjiang]] in 1949, seized Switzerland-size [[Aksai Chin]] from India between 1954-1962, grabbed 130 [[Paracel Islands]] in 1974 with marine area of 15,000 square kilometres, [[Johnson Reef]] in 1988 from Philippines and Vietnam, [[Mischief Reef]] in 1995 from Philippines and Taiwan, and [[Scarborough Shoal]] in 2012 from Philippines.<ref name=japtime1/>


===Dimensions of Chinese salami slicing ===
===Dimensions of Chinese salami slicing ===
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{{see also | Territorial disputes in the South China Sea | Sino-Indian border dispute | Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China | Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China | l4= Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China }}
{{see also | Territorial disputes in the South China Sea | Sino-Indian border dispute | Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China | Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China | l4= Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China }}


''"China's territorial salami slicing strategy"'' has been used for territorial expansion against its neighbors like [[annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China|annexation of Tibet]] and [[Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China|Xinjiang]], [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea|territorial slicing in South China Sea]], [[Sino-Indian border dispute|annexation of Indian territories]] including [[Aksai Chin]], [[Japan]] and the [[Paracel Islands]].<ref>{{cite news |last= Dutta|first= Prabhash K|date=7 September 2017|title=What is China's salami slicing tactic that Army chief Bipin Rawat talked about?|url=https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/doklam-china-salami-slicing-army-chief-general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07|newspaper=India Today}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-salami-slicing-overdrive-66048/|title=China’s salami slicing overdrive|publisher=Observer Research Foundation}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last= Chellaney|first= Brahma|date=25 July 2013|title=China's salami-slice strategy|url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/07/25/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-salami-slice-strategy/#.Xu84jpozbIU|newspaper=The Japan Times}}</ref> China has used [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea|territorial slicing in South China Sea]] to expanding its [[Exclusive economic zone]] (EEZ) at the expense of other nations EEZ through its [[Nine-dash line]] claims by reclaiming reefs to build military infrastructure in the area resulting in disputes with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, North Korea, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. In case of Indonesia, with which it has no maritime dispute, this tactic is used by sending Chinese fishing militia to Indonesia EEZ by claiming historical Chinese fishing rights. China also has similarly used salami slice for land border disputes with Laos, Bhutan, Nepal, and in annexing Tibet.<ref name=terri1/>
''"China's territorial salami slicing strategy"'' has been used for territorial expansion against its neighbors like [[annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China|annexation of Tibet]] and [[Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China|Xinjiang]], [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea|territorial slicing in South China Sea]], [[Sino-Indian border dispute|annexation of Indian territories]] including [[Aksai Chin]], [[Japan]] and the [[Paracel Islands]].<ref>{{cite news |last= Dutta|first= Prabhash K|date=7 September 2017|title=What is China's salami slicing tactic that Army chief Bipin Rawat talked about?|url=https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/doklam-china-salami-slicing-army-chief-general-bipin-rawat-1039864-2017-09-07|newspaper=India Today}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-salami-slicing-overdrive-66048/|title=China’s salami slicing overdrive|publisher=Observer Research Foundation}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |last= Chellaney|first= Brahma|date=25 July 2013|title=China's salami-slice strategy|url=https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/07/25/commentary/world-commentary/chinas-salami-slice-strategy/#.Xu84jpozbIU|newspaper=The Japan Times}}</ref>
Using salami slice by disrespecting international boundaries, China has incrementally grab the territories and expand its maritime EEZ, doubled its geographical area by annexing [[annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China|Tibet]] and [[Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China|Xinjiang]] in 1949, seized Switzerland-size [[Aksai Chin]] from India between 1954-1962, grabbed 130 [[Paracel Islands]] in 1974 with marine area of 15,000 square kilometres, [[Johnson Reef]] in 1988 from Philippines and Vietnam, [[Mischief Reef]] in 1995 from Philippines and Taiwan, and [[Scarborough Shoal]] in 2012 from Philippines.<ref name=japtime1/>
China has used [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea|territorial slicing in South China Sea]] to expanding its [[Exclusive economic zone]] (EEZ) at the expense of other nations EEZ through its [[Nine-dash line]] claims by reclaiming reefs to build military infrastructure in the area resulting in disputes with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, North Korea, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. In case of Indonesia, with which it has no maritime dispute, this tactic is used by sending Chinese fishing militia to Indonesia EEZ by claiming historical Chinese fishing rights. China also has similarly used salami slice for land border disputes with Laos, Bhutan, Nepal, and in annexing Tibet.<ref name=terri1/>


==== Economic slicing through BRI debt trap ====
==== Economic slicing through BRI debt trap ====
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{{see also | Debt-trap diplomacy | l1= China's Debt-trap diplomacy | United Front Work Department | Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China | Sinicization of Tibet | Foreign electoral intervention }}
{{see also | Debt-trap diplomacy | l1= China's Debt-trap diplomacy | United Front Work Department | Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China | Sinicization of Tibet | Foreign electoral intervention }}


''"China's sovereignty slicing strategy"'' through debt trap and invasion of institutes dilutes the sovereignty of the target nations mainly using the debt trap, Beijing pressured a debt trapped Tajikistan to handover 1,158 sq km territory which still owes China US$1.2b out of total $2.9b debt. Other nation at the similar risk of sovereignty slicing are Pakistan, Madagascar, Mongolia, Maldives, Kyrgyzstan Montenegro and Laos which are heavily in Chinese debt trap.<ref name=terri1/> [[Western world|Western governments]] have accused the Belt and Road Initiative of being neocolonial due to what they allege is China's practice of [[debt trap diplomacy]] to fund the initiative's infrastructure projects.<ref name="dmav">{{cite web |url=https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-21-iss-today-lessons-from-sri-lanka-on-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/ |title=ISS Today: Lessons from Sri Lanka on China's 'debt-trap diplomacy' |last=Today |first=ISS |date=21 February 2018 |website=Daily Maverick |accessdate=15 September 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180915231046/https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-21-iss-today-lessons-from-sri-lanka-on-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/ |archive-date=15 September 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref> China contends that the initiative has provided markets for commodities, improved prices of resources and thereby reduced inequalities in exchange, improved infrastructure, created employment, stimulated [[industrialization]], and expanded [[technology transfer]], thereby benefiting host countries.<ref name="blan-revisit">{{cite news |last1=Blanchard |first1=Jean-Marc F. |title=Revisiting the Resurrected Debate About Chinese Neocolonialism |url=https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/revisiting-the-resurrected-debate-about-chinese-neocolonialism/ |work=The Diplomat |date=8 February 2018 |accessdate=23 November 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181123195340/https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/revisiting-the-resurrected-debate-about-chinese-neocolonialism/ |archive-date=23 November 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>
''"China's sovereignty slicing strategy"'' through debt trap and invasion of institutes dilutes the sovereignty of the target nations mainly using the debt trap, Beijing pressured a debt trapped Tajikistan to handover 1,158 sq km territory which still owes China US$1.2b out of total $2.9b debt. Other nation at the similar risk of sovereignty slicing are Pakistan, Madagascar, Mongolia, Maldives, Kyrgyzstan Montenegro and Laos which are heavily in Chinese debt trap.<ref name=terri1/> [[Western world|Western governments]] have accused the Belt and Road Initiative of being neocolonial due to what they allege is China's practice of [[debt trap diplomacy]] to fund the initiative's infrastructure projects.<ref name="dmav">{{cite web |url=https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-21-iss-today-lessons-from-sri-lanka-on-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/ |title=ISS Today: Lessons from Sri Lanka on China's 'debt-trap diplomacy' |last=Today |first=ISS |date=21 February 2018 |website=Daily Maverick |accessdate=15 September 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180915231046/https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-02-21-iss-today-lessons-from-sri-lanka-on-chinas-debt-trap-diplomacy/ |archive-date=15 September 2018 |url-status=live}}</ref>


==== Technology slicing through theft ====
==== Technology slicing through theft ====
{{see also | Debt-trap diplomacy | l1= China's Debt-trap diplomacy | Territorial disputes in the South China Sea | Chinese espionage in the United States | United Front Work Department | Chinese intelligence activity abroad }}
{{see also | Debt-trap diplomacy | l1= China's Debt-trap diplomacy | Territorial disputes in the South China Sea | Chinese espionage in the United States | United Front Work Department | Chinese intelligence activity abroad }}


''"[[Chinese espionage in the United States|China's technology salami slicing strategy]]"'' entails the theft of "cutting-edge technology from global leaders in diverse fields. FBI is investigating more than 1,000 cases of Chinese theft of US technology. The threat from China is real, it’s persistent, it’s well orchestrated, it’s well resourced, and it’s not going away any time soon. The thefts are not necessarily carried out by launching major espionage operations, but it’s more by spreading the Chinese net far and wide into every sector to include research, commercial, government, non-government, defense, in fact, every possible establishment. They scope out small slices bit-by-bit and then put the relevant details together to pose a greater threat."<ref name=terri1/> [[China]] is said to have begun a widespread effort to acquire U.S. [[military technology]] and [[classified information]] and the [[trade secret]]s of U.S. companies.<ref name=reuters>Finkle, J. Menn, J., Viswanatha, J. [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybercrime-usa-china/u-s-accuses-china-of-cyber-spying-on-american-companies-idUSKCN0J42M520141120 ''U.S. accuses China of cyber spying on American companies.''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141006151936/http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/19/us-cybercrime-usa-china-idUSBREA4I09420140519 |date=October 6, 2014 }} Reuters, Mon 19 May 2014 6:04pm EDT.</ref><ref name=csmonitor>Clayton, M. [https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2014/0519/US-indicts-five-in-China-s-secret-Unit-61398-for-cyber-spying-on-US-firms ''US indicts five in China's secret 'Unit 61398' for cyber-spying.''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140520075207/http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Cyber-Conflict-Monitor/2014/0519/US-indicts-five-in-China-s-secret-Unit-61398-for-cyber-spying-on-US-firms |date=May 20, 2014 }} Christian Science Monitor, May 19, 2014</ref> China is accused of stealing trade secrets and technology, often from companies in the United States, to help support its long-term military and commercial development.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Bpq2DwAAQBAJ|title=Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer|last1=Mattis|first1=Peter|last2=Brazil|first2=Matthew|date=2019-11-15|publisher=Naval Institute Press|isbn=978-1-68247-304-7|language=en}}</ref> China has been accused of using a number of methods to obtain U.S. technology (using U.S. law to avoid prosecution), including [[espionage]], exploitation of commercial entities, and a network of scientific, academic and business contacts.<ref>deGraffenreid, p. 30.</ref>
''"[[Chinese espionage in the United States|China's technology salami slicing strategy]]"'' entails the theft of "cutting-edge technology from global leaders in diverse fields. FBI is investigating more than 1,000 cases of Chinese theft of US technology. The threat from China is real, it’s persistent, it’s well orchestrated, it’s well resourced, and it’s not going away any time soon. The thefts are not necessarily carried out by launching major espionage operations, but it’s more by spreading the Chinese net far and wide into every sector to include research, commercial, government, non-government, defense, in fact, every possible establishment. They scope out small slices bit-by-bit and then put the relevant details together to pose a greater threat."<ref name=terri1/>
[[China]] is said to have begun a widespread effort to acquire U.S. [[military technology]] and [[classified information]] and the [[trade secret]]s of U.S. companies.<ref name=reuters>Finkle, J. Menn, J., Viswanatha, J. [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybercrime-usa-china/u-s-accuses-china-of-cyber-spying-on-american-companies-idUSKCN0J42M520141120 ''U.S. accuses China of cyber spying on American companies.''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141006151936/http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/19/us-cybercrime-usa-china-idUSBREA4I09420140519 |date=October 6, 2014 }} Reuters, Mon 19 May 2014 6:04pm EDT.</ref><ref name=csmonitor>Clayton, M. [https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2014/0519/US-indicts-five-in-China-s-secret-Unit-61398-for-cyber-spying-on-US-firms ''US indicts five in China's secret 'Unit 61398' for cyber-spying.''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140520075207/http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/Cyber-Conflict-Monitor/2014/0519/US-indicts-five-in-China-s-secret-Unit-61398-for-cyber-spying-on-US-firms |date=May 20, 2014 }} Christian Science Monitor, May 19, 2014</ref>
China is accused of stealing trade secrets and technology, often from companies in the United States, to help support its long-term military and commercial development.<ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Bpq2DwAAQBAJ|title=Chinese Communist Espionage: An Intelligence Primer|last1=Mattis|first1=Peter|last2=Brazil|first2=Matthew|date=2019-11-15|publisher=Naval Institute Press|isbn=978-1-68247-304-7|language=en}}</ref> China has been accused of using a number of methods to obtain U.S. technology (using U.S. law to avoid prosecution), including [[espionage]], exploitation of commercial entities, and a network of scientific, academic and business contacts.<ref>deGraffenreid, p. 30.</ref>


==== Cultural slicing through 5th generation warfare ====
==== Cultural slicing through 5th generation warfare ====
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| location =Melbourne
| location =Melbourne
| pages =376
| pages =376
| isbn =978-1743794807 }}</ref> Consequently, Australian Coalition Government announced plans to ban foreign donations to Australian political parties and activist groups.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/dec/05/coalition-to-ban-foreign-donations-to-political-parties-and-activist-groups|title=Coalition to ban foreign donations to political parties and activist groups|last=Murphy|first=Katharine|work=The Guardian|date=5 December 2017|accessdate=21 February 2018}}</ref> Australian govt has formed task force comprised of spy agency [[Australian Security Intelligence Organisation|ASIO]], [[Australian Federal Police]]] (AFP) and Attorney-General’s Department to target the Chinese-linked entities and people under the "antiforeign interference laws" to combat the anti-war and anti-government political activity that aids foreign" powers such as China.<ref name=OzChi1/> This "$90 million police and intelligence task force" aimed at prosecuting foreign agents "will focus on Confucius Institutes operating at some Australian universities and groups linked to Beijing’s [[United Front Work Department]] (UFWD)."<ref name=OzChi1>[https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/03/18/fori-m18.html Australian government to use “foreign interference” laws against China-linked targets], WSWS, 18 March 2020.</ref> UFWD gathers intelligence on, manages relations with, and attempts to influence elite individuals and organizations inside and outside China.<ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=May 1957|title=The United Front in Communist China|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R000600210003-9.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170123040110/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R000600210003-9.pdf|archive-date=January 23, 2017|access-date=June 9, 2020|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency|pages=1–5}}</ref> The UFWD focuses its work on people or entities that are outside the Party proper, especially in the [[overseas Chinese]] community, who hold social, commercial, or academic influence, or who represent interest groups.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Brady|first=Annie-Marie|authorlink=Anne-Marie Brady|date=2017-09-18|title=Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weapons-chinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190825065248/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weapons-chinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping|archive-date=2019-08-25|access-date=2019-10-09|publisher=[[Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars]]|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web|last=Joske|first=Alex|date=June 9, 2020|title=The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party's united front system|url=https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200609000729/https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you|archive-date=June 9, 2020|access-date=June 9, 2020|publisher=[[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]]|language=en}}</ref> Through its efforts, the UFWD seeks to ensure that these individuals and groups are supportive of or useful to Chinese Communist Party interests and potential critics remain divided.<ref>{{Cite book|url=|title=Silent invasion : China's influence in Australia|title-link=Silent Invasion (book) | last1=Hamilton|first1=Clive|last2=Joske|first2=Alex|publisher=|year=2018|isbn=9781743794807|location=Richmond, Victoria|pages=|oclc=1030256783|author-link=Clive Hamilton|lay-url=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Oo91AAAAMAAJ|title=The People's Republic of China's united front tactics in the United States, 1972-1988|last=Miller|first=William J|date=1988|publisher=C. Schlacks, Jr.|location=Bakersfield, Calif. (9001 Stockdale Hgwy., Bakersfield 93311-1099)|language=English|oclc=644142873}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fitzgerald|first=John|date=October 1, 2019|title=Mind your tongue: Language, public diplomacy and community cohesion in contemporary Australia—China relations|url=|journal=|publisher=[[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]]|volume=|pages=5|jstor=resrep23070}}</ref>
| isbn =978-1743794807 }}</ref> Consequently, Australian Coalition Government announced plans to ban foreign donations to Australian political parties and activist groups.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/dec/05/coalition-to-ban-foreign-donations-to-political-parties-and-activist-groups|title=Coalition to ban foreign donations to political parties and activist groups|last=Murphy|first=Katharine|work=The Guardian|date=5 December 2017|accessdate=21 February 2018}}</ref> Australian govt has formed task force comprised of spy agency [[Australian Security Intelligence Organisation|ASIO]], [[Australian Federal Police]]] (AFP) and Attorney-General’s Department to target the Chinese-linked entities and people under the "antiforeign interference laws" to combat the anti-war and anti-government political activity that aids foreign" powers such as China.<ref name=OzChi1/> This "$90 million police and intelligence task force" aimed at prosecuting foreign agents "will focus on Confucius Institutes operating at some Australian universities and groups linked to Beijing’s [[United Front Work Department]] (UFWD)."<ref name=OzChi1>[https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2020/03/18/fori-m18.html Australian government to use “foreign interference” laws against China-linked targets], WSWS, 18 March 2020.</ref>
UFWD gathers intelligence on, manages relations with, and attempts to influence elite individuals and organizations inside and outside China.<ref>{{Cite web|last=|first=|date=May 1957|title=The United Front in Communist China|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R000600210003-9.pdf|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170123040110/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP78-00915R000600210003-9.pdf|archive-date=January 23, 2017|access-date=June 9, 2020|publisher=Central Intelligence Agency|pages=1–5}}</ref> The UFWD focuses its work on people or entities that are outside the Party proper, especially in the [[overseas Chinese]] community, who hold social, commercial, or academic influence, or who represent interest groups.<ref>{{Cite web|last=Brady|first=Annie-Marie|authorlink=Anne-Marie Brady|date=2017-09-18|title=Magic Weapons: China's political influence activities under Xi Jinping|url=https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weapons-chinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190825065248/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/magic-weapons-chinas-political-influence-activities-under-xi-jinping|archive-date=2019-08-25|access-date=2019-10-09|publisher=[[Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars]]|language=en}}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web|last=Joske|first=Alex|date=June 9, 2020|title=The party speaks for you: Foreign interference and the Chinese Communist Party's united front system|url=https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you|url-status=live|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200609000729/https://www.aspi.org.au/report/party-speaks-you|archive-date=June 9, 2020|access-date=June 9, 2020|publisher=[[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]]|language=en}}</ref> Through its efforts, the UFWD seeks to ensure that these individuals and groups are supportive of or useful to Chinese Communist Party interests and potential critics remain divided.<ref>{{Cite book|url=|title=Silent invasion : China's influence in Australia|title-link=Silent Invasion (book) | last1=Hamilton|first1=Clive|last2=Joske|first2=Alex|publisher=|year=2018|isbn=9781743794807|location=Richmond, Victoria|pages=|oclc=1030256783|author-link=Clive Hamilton|lay-url=}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=Oo91AAAAMAAJ|title=The People's Republic of China's united front tactics in the United States, 1972-1988|last=Miller|first=William J|date=1988|publisher=C. Schlacks, Jr.|location=Bakersfield, Calif. (9001 Stockdale Hgwy., Bakersfield 93311-1099)|language=English|oclc=644142873}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last=Fitzgerald|first=John|date=October 1, 2019|title=Mind your tongue: Language, public diplomacy and community cohesion in contemporary Australia—China relations|url=|journal=|publisher=[[Australian Strategic Policy Institute]]|volume=|pages=5|jstor=resrep23070}}</ref>


Newspapers have estimated that China may have up to 1,000 spies in Canada.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=ca90416e-fe77-4b8d-ae59-a4e9f55b6441&k=26688 |title=Canwest News Service, Government vows to curb Chinese spying on Canada, 16 April 2006 |publisher=Canada.com |date=16 April 2006 |accessdate=25 August 2014 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20141004005118/http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=ca90416e-fe77-4b8d-ae59-a4e9f55b6441&k=26688 |archivedate=4 October 2014 }}</ref><ref>
Newspapers have estimated that China may have up to 1,000 spies in Canada.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=ca90416e-fe77-4b8d-ae59-a4e9f55b6441&k=26688 |title=Canwest News Service, Government vows to curb Chinese spying on Canada, 16 April 2006 |publisher=Canada.com |date=16 April 2006 |accessdate=25 August 2014 |url-status=dead |archiveurl=https://web.archive.org/web/20141004005118/http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=ca90416e-fe77-4b8d-ae59-a4e9f55b6441&k=26688 |archivedate=4 October 2014 }}</ref><ref>

Revision as of 19:23, 6 November 2020

Salami tactics, also known as the salami-slice strategy or salami attacks,[1] is a divide and conquer process of threats and alliances used to overcome opposition. With it, an aggressor can influence and eventually dominate a landscape, typically political, piece by piece. In this fashion, the opposition is eliminated "slice by slice" until it realizes, usually too late, that it is virtually gone in its entirety. In some cases it includes the creation of several factions within the opposing political party and then dismantling that party from the inside, without causing the 'sliced' sides to protest. Salami tactics are most likely to succeed when the perpetrators keep their true long-term motives hidden and maintain a posture of cooperativeness and helpfulness while engaged in the intended gradual subversion.

Origins

It was commonly believed that the term salami tactics (Hungarian: szalámitaktika) was coined in the late 1940s by Stalinist dictator Mátyás Rákosi to describe the actions of the Hungarian Communist Party in its ultimately successful drive for complete power in Hungary.[2][3] Rákosi claimed he destroyed the non-Communist parties by "cutting them off like slices of salami."[3] By portraying his opponents as fascists (or at the very least fascist sympathizers), he was able to get the opposition to slice off its right-wing, then its center, then most of its left-wing, so that only fellow travellers willing to collaborate with the Communist Party remained in power.[3][4]

However, no verified source for the origins of the "salami tactics" term has ever been discovered. According to historian Norman Stone, the term might have been invented by the leader of the Hungarian Independence Party Zoltán Pfeiffer, a hardline anti-communist opponent of Rákosi[5].

China's salami slice strategy

Gainful strategic slow slicing

"China's salami slice strategy" has many dimensions, including combining soft and hard power for coercive diplomacy or population control, tactical territorial slicing of neighboring nations, economic slicing of target nations through debt trap, sovereignty slicing, technology slicing by stealing technology across diverse range of technologies, making cultural inroads into other nation and international organisations like the World Health Organization to influence their values and think tanks to provide strategic advantage to China (also called 5th and 6th Generation warfare), demographic change, etc.[6]

Quiet "salami slicing” rather than overt aggression is China's favored strategy to gain strategic advantage by disregarding rule of law and risks of wider military escalation through "steady progression of small actions, none of which serves as a casus belli by itself, yet which over time lead cumulatively to a strategic transformation in China’s favor. China’s strategy aims to seriously limit the options of the targeted countries by confounding their deterrence plans and making it difficult for them to devise proportionate or effective counteractions."[7]

Dimensions of Chinese salami slicing

Power and control slicing

"China's power and control salami slicing strategy" combines aspects of both soft and hard power including "coercive diplomacy, cartographic aggression, saber-rattling, gunboat diplomacy, population-control measures, loans, project funding leading to debt traps, educational programs and incentives." Examples include Tibet, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, as well as propping up amenable regimes in North Korea and Pakistan.[6]

Territory slicing

"China's territorial salami slicing strategy" has been used for territorial expansion against its neighbors like annexation of Tibet and Xinjiang, territorial slicing in South China Sea, annexation of Indian territories including Aksai Chin, Japan and the Paracel Islands.[8][9][10]

Using salami slice by disrespecting international boundaries, China has incrementally grab the territories and expand its maritime EEZ, doubled its geographical area by annexing Tibet and Xinjiang in 1949, seized Switzerland-size Aksai Chin from India between 1954-1962, grabbed 130 Paracel Islands in 1974 with marine area of 15,000 square kilometres, Johnson Reef in 1988 from Philippines and Vietnam, Mischief Reef in 1995 from Philippines and Taiwan, and Scarborough Shoal in 2012 from Philippines.[7]

China has used territorial slicing in South China Sea to expanding its Exclusive economic zone (EEZ) at the expense of other nations EEZ through its Nine-dash line claims by reclaiming reefs to build military infrastructure in the area resulting in disputes with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, North Korea, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. In case of Indonesia, with which it has no maritime dispute, this tactic is used by sending Chinese fishing militia to Indonesia EEZ by claiming historical Chinese fishing rights. China also has similarly used salami slice for land border disputes with Laos, Bhutan, Nepal, and in annexing Tibet.[6]

Economic slicing through BRI debt trap

"China's economic slicing strategy" works through Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which has pushed Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia and other nations which face Chinese debt trap where these nations are unable to repay loans and have to handover their infrastructure and resources to China.[6] Studies of economic experts in the practices of China found the patterns of China's bank lending purposefully trap governments to gain strategic opportunities for China.[11] According to Chellaney, this "clearly part of China's geostrategic vision".[12] China's overseas development policy has been called debt-trap diplomacy because once indebted economies fail to service their loans, they are said to be pressured to support China's geostrategic interests.[13] [14]

The Federal Ministry of the Interior estimates that Chinese economic espionage could be costing Germany between 20 and 50 billion euros annually.[15] Spies are reportedly targeting mid- and small-scale companies that do not have as strong security regimens as larger corporations.[16]

Sovereignty slicing

"China's sovereignty slicing strategy" through debt trap and invasion of institutes dilutes the sovereignty of the target nations mainly using the debt trap, Beijing pressured a debt trapped Tajikistan to handover 1,158 sq km territory which still owes China US$1.2b out of total $2.9b debt. Other nation at the similar risk of sovereignty slicing are Pakistan, Madagascar, Mongolia, Maldives, Kyrgyzstan Montenegro and Laos which are heavily in Chinese debt trap.[6] Western governments have accused the Belt and Road Initiative of being neocolonial due to what they allege is China's practice of debt trap diplomacy to fund the initiative's infrastructure projects.[17]

Technology slicing through theft

"China's technology salami slicing strategy" entails the theft of "cutting-edge technology from global leaders in diverse fields. FBI is investigating more than 1,000 cases of Chinese theft of US technology. The threat from China is real, it’s persistent, it’s well orchestrated, it’s well resourced, and it’s not going away any time soon. The thefts are not necessarily carried out by launching major espionage operations, but it’s more by spreading the Chinese net far and wide into every sector to include research, commercial, government, non-government, defense, in fact, every possible establishment. They scope out small slices bit-by-bit and then put the relevant details together to pose a greater threat."[6]

China is said to have begun a widespread effort to acquire U.S. military technology and classified information and the trade secrets of U.S. companies.[18][19]

China is accused of stealing trade secrets and technology, often from companies in the United States, to help support its long-term military and commercial development.[20] China has been accused of using a number of methods to obtain U.S. technology (using U.S. law to avoid prosecution), including espionage, exploitation of commercial entities, and a network of scientific, academic and business contacts.[21]

Cultural slicing through 5th generation warfare

"China's cultural salami slicing strategy" entails influencing culture and values of other nations or organisations to china's advantage by gaining access to policy makers, politicians, think tanks, universities, NGOs, and organisations, etc. China has "established 550 Confucius Institutes and 1,172 Confucius Classrooms (CCs) housed in foreign institutions, in 162 countries" including 100 such institutes in US universities alone and 100 teachers sent to 85 institutions in Nepal to taught.[6] China has attempted foreign electoral intervention in the domestic political elections of other nations, including USA,[22][23][24][25][26] Taiwan,[27][28][29] and Australia.[30][31][32]

Relations between China and Australia deteriorated after 2018 due to growing concerns of Chinese political influence in various sectors of Australian society including the Government, universities and media as well as China's stance on the South China Sea dispute.[33][34] Consequently, Australian Coalition Government announced plans to ban foreign donations to Australian political parties and activist groups.[35] Australian govt has formed task force comprised of spy agency ASIO, Australian Federal Police] (AFP) and Attorney-General’s Department to target the Chinese-linked entities and people under the "antiforeign interference laws" to combat the anti-war and anti-government political activity that aids foreign" powers such as China.[36] This "$90 million police and intelligence task force" aimed at prosecuting foreign agents "will focus on Confucius Institutes operating at some Australian universities and groups linked to Beijing’s United Front Work Department (UFWD)."[36]

UFWD gathers intelligence on, manages relations with, and attempts to influence elite individuals and organizations inside and outside China.[37] The UFWD focuses its work on people or entities that are outside the Party proper, especially in the overseas Chinese community, who hold social, commercial, or academic influence, or who represent interest groups.[38][39] Through its efforts, the UFWD seeks to ensure that these individuals and groups are supportive of or useful to Chinese Communist Party interests and potential critics remain divided.[40][41][42]

Newspapers have estimated that China may have up to 1,000 spies in Canada.[43][44] The head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Richard Fadden in a television interview implied that various Canadian politicians at provincial and municipal levels had ties to Chinese intelligence, a statement which he withdrew few days later.[45]

Demography and mindset slicing through 6th generation warfare

"China's demographic and tradition slicing strategy" is to alter the demography and traditions through sinicization, ethnic unity law, forcing millions into re-education or concentration camps, running antireligious campaigns in China and Freedom of religion in China and by flooding Han Chinese of into Tibet and Xinjiang or mainlanders in Hong Kong. Examples include Sinicization of Tibet, Uyghur genocide, Xinjiang re-education camps, reversal of de-sinicization of Hong_Kong.[6]

China officially promotes state atheism and persecutes people with spiritual or religious beliefs.[46][47][48] Antireligious campaigns began in 1949, after the Chinese Communist Revolution, and continue today in Buddhist, Christian, Muslim, and other religious communities.[49] State campaigns against religion have escalated since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.[50]

In 2006 allegations emerged that the vital organs of non-consenting Falun Gong practitioners had been used to supply China's organ tourism industry.[51] The Kilgour-Matas report[52][53] stated in 2006, "We believe that there has been and continues today to be large scale organ seizures from unwilling Falun Gong practitioners". Ethan Gutmann interviewed over 100 witnesses and alleged that about 65,000 Falun Gong prisoners were killed for their organs from 2000 to 2008.[54][55][56] In 2008, two United Nations Special Rapporteurs reiterated their requests for "the Chinese government to fully explain the allegation of taking vital organs from Falun Gong practitioners".[57]

Cultural references

In television

Salami tactics are discussed by the British Chief Scientific Adviser in the Yes, Prime Minister episode, "The Grand Design".[58]

In film

In the 2016 film Arrival, Agent Halpern mentions a Hungarian word meaning to eliminate your enemies one by one. It is thought that this alludes to szalámitaktika.[59][60] Indeed, this is cited in Amazon Prime X-Ray (1:07:50).

See also

References

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Further reading