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'''Operation Giant Lance''' was an undercover [[military operation]] by the [[United States]] in which the primary objective was to apply military pressure towards the [[Soviet Union]] during the [[Cold War]].<ref name="suri">{{cite web|title=The Nukes of October: Richard Nixon's Secret Plan to Bring Peace to Vietnam|url=https://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/16-03/ff_nuclearwar|author=Jeremi Suri|date=2008-02-25|publisher=[[Wired Magazine]]|access-date=2012-01-28}}</ref><ref name=":0">{{Cite book|last=Ventura|first=Jesse|title=63 Documents the Government Doesn't Want You to Read|url=https://archive.org/details/63documentsgover00vent|url-access=registration|publisher=Skyhorse|year=2011|isbn=978-1-61608-226-0|location=New York|pages=[https://archive.org/details/63documentsgover00vent/page/170 170]–174}}</ref>{{Better source needed|date=June 2020}}<ref name=":1">{{Cite journal|last1=Sagan|first1=Scott|last2=Suri|first2=Jeremi|date=2003|title=The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969|journal=International Security|volume=27|issue=4|pages=150–183|doi=10.1162/016228803321951126|jstor=4137607|s2cid=57564244}}</ref><ref name=":2">{{Cite journal|last1=Burr|first1=William|last2=Kimball|first2=Jeffrey|date=2003|title=Nixon's Nuclear Ploy|journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists|volume=59|issue=1|pages=28–73|doi=10.2968/059001011|via=Taylor & Francis Online}}</ref> Initiated on October 27, 1969, [[President of the United States|President]] [[Richard Nixon]] authorized a squadron of 18 B-52 bombers to patrol the Arctic polar ice caps and escalate the nuclear threat posed.<ref name=":0" /> The goal was to coerce both the Soviet Union and [[North Vietnam]] to agree on favourable terms with the US, and conclusively end the [[Vietnam War]].<ref name=":1" /> The operation's effectiveness was also largely built on Nixon's consistent [[madman theory]] diplomacy, in order to influence Moscow's decision even more.<ref name=":4" /> The operation was kept top secret from both the general public and higher authorities within the Strategic Air Command, intended to only be noticed by Russian intelligence.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3">{{Cite web|title=Nixon's Nuclear Ploy: The Vietnam Negotiations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test|url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB81/|last1=Burr|first1=William|last2=Kimball|first2=Jeffry|date=December 23, 2002|website=The National Security Archive}}</ref> The operation lasted one month before being called off.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":3" />{{Campaignbox Vietnam War}}
Giant Lance was the nickname for a [[Strategic Air Command]] airborne alert contingency plan that SAC put into effect for several days in late October 1969. It was an element of a secret alert of U.S. forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Readiness Test, that the Pentagon put into effect for several weeks during October 1969. With the support of National Security Adviser [[Henry Kissinger|Henry Kissinger,]] President [[Richard Nixon]] approved these military moves, which he wanted the Soviet Union to notice. This represented a practical application of his “Madman Strategy.” Seeking to strengthen his negotiating position to end the Vietnam War, Nixon was angry that Moscow was not supporting U.S. diplomacy and encouraging its North Vietnamese client to settle. The point, as National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger explained was to “jar” Moscow and Hanoi into taking a more cooperative attitude.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 17, 1969 |title=Entry from the Diary of H.R. Haldeman |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB81/nnp08.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref>


==Background==
Initiated on 12 October 1969, the JCS Readiness Test involved a variety of secret military moves around the world that Nixon wanted the Soviet Union to notice. They involved activities by U.S. air and naval forces from the U.S. to the North Atlantic and from the Middle East to the Western Pacific. The Readiness Test culminated in the Giant Lance airborne alert, which flew nuclear-armed B-52 bombers over Northern Alaska for several days. While the Soviet government was aware of the U.S.'s secret alert activities, Nixon and Kissinger efforts did not frighten them and had no discernible impact on the negotiations with North Vietnam in Paris. <ref>{{Cite book |last=Kimball |first=Jeffrey |title=Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War |last2=Burr |first2=William |publisher=University Press of Kansas |year=2015 |location=Lawrence, Kansas |pages=310}}</ref>


⚫
=== State of the Vietnam War ===
'''Contingency Planning and Origins of Giant Lance'''
Tensions from the Vietnam war remained high and served as a large catalyst behind Nixon's deployment of the operation.<ref name=":4">{{Cite book|last=Delpech|first=Therese|title=Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy|publisher=RAND Corporation|year=2012|location=Santa Monica|jstor=10.7249/mg1103rc|isbn=9780833059307}}</ref> The war was one of Nixon's primary objectives in his entrance to the office and led to Nixon devising a plan to both end the Vietnam war and gain international and domestic credibility for the United States as a result.<ref name=":4" /> By launching the Operation Giant Lance offensive, Nixon aimed to increase tensions within the war by raising the United States' nuclear threat through a "show of force" alert.<ref name=":1" /> These operations acted as a prequel to Nixon's eventual [[Duck Hook|Operation Duck Hook]], declassified in 2005.<ref name=":4" /> The primary goal of these operations was to pressure the Soviets in Moscow to call upon their North Vietnamese ally for favorable peace terms for the United States.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /> With Operation Duck Hook being declassified in 2005, it was revealed that the "show of force" alert, including Operation Giant Lance, was meant to prepare for any military confrontation from the Soviets.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":4" />


=== Preparation ===
After the January 1966 [[1966 Palomares B-52 crash|B-52 crash]] in [[Palomares, Almería|Palomares, Spain]], the Strategic Air Command started to look for alternatives to the continuous airborne alert posture that it had maintained since 1961. During 1967, SAC planners developed Selective Air and Ground Alert (SEAGA). Designed to be compatible with Single [[Single Integrated Operational Plan#:~:text=The Single Integrated Operational Plan,nuclear weapons would be launched.|Integrated Operational Plan]] (SIOP) targeting and to permit greater dispersal of bombers and tankers in a crisis, SEAGA could provide decision-makers with a bomber force that could make an “instant response to tactical warning” or put forces on higher alert during periods of world tension. When SAC created SEAGA, it gave the nickname “Giant Lance” to this new capability.<ref>{{Cite web |date=19 September 1973 |title=U.S. Strategic Air Command, History Study #129, The SAC Alert System 1956-1970 |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/20515404/doc-1-the_sac_alert_system_1956-197.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref>
[[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]] [[Earle Wheeler]] ordered the operation as a part of the raised nuclear alert.<ref name=":2" /> Under secrecy, Operation Giant Lance was a part of numerous escalations of nuclear threat, launched according to Nixon and Wheeler's decision to initiate a "Show of Force" alert on the 10th of October 1969.<ref name=":2" /> This was a series of operations to increase military pressure, including the airborne Operation Giant Lance.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":0" /> Initiated on October 13, eighteen B-52 bomber aircraft were deployed in preparation for the operation, requiring accompanying KC-135 tankers to refuel and support the extended patrol of the squadron.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /> To prepare for the operation, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) were used to collaboratively deploy the aircraft from air bases both in California and Washington State in secrecy.<ref name=":1" /> Further increasing the readiness of the bombers, the aircraft were checked throughout the day, standing by for immediate deployment.<ref name=":2" />


== Purpose ==
The [[1968 Thule Air Base B-52 crash|Thule Air Base B-52 crash]] on January 21,1968 brought airborne alert to an end and SAC replaced it with SEAGA. Strategic bombers remained on ground alert as they had since the 1950s. One element of SEAGA was a SHOW OF FORCE posture involving immediate launch of alert forces (“flush launch”) with airborne and ground alert bombers switching positions at regular intervals for up to 30 days. The SHOW OF FORCE posture would put airborne alert B-52 aircraft in a variety of “orbits,” or positions, over the Arctic Circle, the North Atlantic, Mediterranean, or the Pacific. SAC considered such a posture as a “visual deterrent,” a demonstration to an adversary of a “national determination to resist with every available resource.”<ref>{{Cite web |date=19 September 1973 |title=U.S. Strategic Air Command, History Study #129, The SAC Alert System 1956-1970 |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/20515404/doc-1-the_sac_alert_system_1956-197.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref>
The purpose of Operation Giant Lance was to intimidate the foreign contenders in the Vietnam War, primarily the Soviets through a display of radical military escalation. By using seemingly irrational actions as a part of Nixon's madman diplomacy, he aimed to push both the Soviet and the Vietnamese to end the war on favourable terms. This operation utilised a squadron of eighteen B-52 bomber aircraft which posed an extreme nuclear threat. These bombers were to patrol the Northern polar ice caps to survey the frozen terrain, whilst armed with nuclear weaponry.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":0" /> The patrols consisted of eighteen-hour long vigils, which were executed with the intention of appearing as suspicious movements from the US.<ref name=":2" /> These movements were kept secret from the public, whilst also remaining intentionally detectable to the Soviet Union's intelligence systems.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":2" /> The operation was also intended to be a precautionary measure boasting operational readiness in case of military retaliation from either East Asia or Russia.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":4" /><ref name=":3" /> The operation's intended goal was also to directly support project Duck Hook as a part of the 'Show of Force' alert. Nixon believed that this would indirectly coerce Moscow and Hanoi to enter a peace treaty through the Paris peace talks with the Soviets, on terms that were advantageous to the United States.<ref name=":2" /> This outcome was also thought to possibly benefit the United States as well by promoting the credibility of the United States intervention in the Sino-Soviet conflict to its general public in the war.<ref name=":5">{{Cite journal|last=Cressman|first=Dale|date=July 28, 2015|title=The Great Silent Majority: Nixon's 1969 Speech on Vietnamization|journal=Presidential Studies Quarterly|volume=45|issue=3|pages=144|doi=10.1111/psq.12214}}</ref>


== Madman theory ==
⚫
'''Nixon and the Vietnam War, 1969'''
President Richard Nixon was infamous for his radical measures which heavily influenced his diplomatic course of actions.<ref name=":5" /> The radicality of sending eighteen armed bombers on patrol stemmed from Nixon's intention to pressure foreign forces by displaying extreme military prowess.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":1" /> [[Henry Kissinger]], the national security advisor, was advised by Nixon at this time about Nixon's willingness to use nuclear weapons in order to end the war.<ref name=":4" /> This madman theory attributed president Nixon with a type of diplomacy in which he would often take irrational options, even to the United States' own authorities.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":0" /> This perception allows foreign forces to be unable to predict Nixon's intended motives or whether he would execute his actions, allowing Nixon to have a unique strategic advantage.<ref name=":6">{{Cite journal|last=McManus|first=Roseanne|date=September 13, 2019|title=Revisiting the Madman Theory: Evaluating the Impact of Different Forms of Perceived Madness in Coercive Bargaining|journal=Security Studies|volume=28|issue=5|pages=976–1009|doi=10.1080/09636412.2019.1662482|s2cid=203470748}}</ref> This diplomacy served as an indirect threat coupled with Nixon's decision to raise the nuclear alert, as the Soviets would not be able to completely understand his course of action.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":2" /> Nixon used this unpredictable diplomacy in a failed attempt to end the war in Vietnam, specifically constructing the impression he was willing to take desperate measures and irrationally threaten enemy forces with the United States' excessive nuclear threat.<ref name=":2" /> This would result in an increased possibility that they may abide by the United States' demands on the basis that Nixon would declare nuclear warfare if his threats were not complied with.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":1" /><ref name=":6" /> The operations elevating the nuclear threat would also act as a display of Nixon's reputability as a tough and "mad" leader.<ref name=":2" /> This was intended to lead both the North Vietnamese and Soviets that he was indeed an irrational leader, capable of escalating the nuclear threat.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":4" /> The policy failed to produce the concessions desired by the United States.


Due to Nixon's history of enacting this diplomacy such as the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]], the threat of his "madman" actions served as a real warning as he was socially recognized as a madman figure.<ref name=":1" /> This diplomacy was in effect briefly during the Vietnam war due to the growing fear over the usage of nuclear warfare, amplified by the numerous 'Show of Force' operations.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":6" /> Although this diplomacy could have been passed off to foreign forces as a bluff, the risk of uncertainty to them is much larger than the risk to the United States.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":4" /> Ultimately, Nixon possessed an objective advantage as the US could gauge the effectiveness of their threats based on the reactionary implications of both the Soviets and Vietnamese.<ref name=":6" />
When Richard Nixon became president in January 1969 one of his top priorities was ending the war in Vietnam. He was determined that the war would not end his presidency as it had Lyndon Johnson’s. Nixon and Kissinger were also committed to giving the [[Nguyễn Văn Thiệu|Nguyen van Thieu]] regime in South Vietnam the support it needed to to stay in power, or at least long enough to survive once the United States had negotiated a mutual withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese forces from the South.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Herring |first=George |title=America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 |publisher=McGraw Hill |year=2002 |edition=4th |location=New York |pages=271-279}}</ref> Privately committed to what became known as the “Madman Strategy,” Nixon believed that threats of massive force could coerce North Vietnam into becoming more cooperative at the [[Paris Peace Accords|Paris Peace Talks]].<ref name=":02">{{Cite book |last=Kimball |first=Jeffrey |title=Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War |last2=Burr |first2=William |publisher=University Press of Kansas |year=2015 |location=Lawrence, Kansas |pages=265-309}}</ref> Several years into the administration, Kissinger privately described Nixon's approach in this way: "the president’s strategy has been (in the mid-East crisis, in Vietnam, etc.) to ‘push so many chips into the pot’ that the other side will think we might be ‘crazy’ and might really go much further."<ref>{{Cite web |date=10 August 1972 |title=Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of Defense Gardner Tucker, “Kissinger” |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/30133-document-22-memorandum-kissinger-files-gardner-tucker-assistant-secretary-defense |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> Optimistically believing that the Soviet government had great influence with North Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger concluded that it would be possible to induce Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi to take a more conciliatory negotiating position. According to Kissinger, Moscow should see risks in not helping Washington: "we must worry the Soviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get out of control.”<ref>{{Cite web |date=22 March 1969 |title=Henry Kissinger to Richard Nixon, "Vietnam Papers" |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/doc%203%20K%20to%20Nixon%203-21-69%20out%20of%20control.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref>


== Implications ==
During the spring and summer of 1969, Nixon and Kissinger made various low-level threats and feints to warn Hanoi and its Soviet patron of the risk of escalation. With the White House supporting a ruse to create apprehension in Hanoi that the United States was going to mine [[Haiphong]] Harbor, the US Navy conducted secret and elaborate mining exercises in Manila Bay, P.I.<ref>{{Cite web |date=11 April 1969 |title=Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to Dr. Henry Kissinger, enclosing memorandum to Laird from JCS Chairman Wheeler, and paper, subj: Plan for a Mining Feint of Haiphong Harbor |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/Doc%204%204-11-69%20Laird%20proposal%20on%20mining%20feint.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=8 August 1969 |title=U.S. Embassy Philippines telegram 8452 to State Department, subj: Pincus/Paul Visit, |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/doc%209%20telegram%20on%20Pincus-Paul%20visit%20August%201969.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> Moreover, through a French intermediary Kissinger sent a threatening statement to North Vietnamese negotiators, informing them of the risk that the U.S. would take "measures of great consequence and force," using "any means necessary if they did not accept U.S. negotiating positions.<ref>{{Cite web |date=July 16, 1969 |title=Memorandum by Tony Lake, July 16, 1969, enclosing statement to be used by Jean Sainteny |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/doc%208%20Sainteny%20memo.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> More or less simultaneously, Kissinger was presiding over contingency planning for bombing raids and mining operations. U.S. Navy planners developed a mining plan, codenamed [[Duck Hook]], which was soon folded into ongoing work at the National Security Council and the Pentagon.<ref>{{Cite web |date=21 July 1969 |title=Chief of Naval Operations, "Duck Hook" |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/doc%207%20duck%20hook.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> With Kissinger’s threats to North Vietnamese negotiators focusing on November 1, 1969 as a deadline, the escalation plans became known as the “November Option. Nixon and Kissinger, however, had overestimated Moscow’s clout with Hanoi and the threats failed. Determined to keep their forces in the South and refusing to recognize the South Vietnamese regime, Hanoi ignored the threats and made no concessions.<ref name=":02" /><ref>{{Cite book |last=Herring |first=George |title=America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 |publisher=McGraw Hill |year=2002 |edition=4th |location=New York |pages=275}}</ref>


=== Giant Lance's success ===
While it was developing plans for military escalation, Kissinger's White House staff considered risky and dangerous options such as ground incursions into North Vietnam and tactical nuclear weapons use, but they did not survive further scrutiny.<ref>{{Cite web |date=13 September 1969 |title=Vietnam Contingency Planning, Concept of Operations |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/doc%2011A%20Concept%20of%20Op%209-13-69.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=17 September 1969 |title=Initial Comments on Concepts of Operations |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/doc%2011B%20Initial%20comments%209-17-69.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> Subsequent planning focused on conventional military operations, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff directing military officials in Saigon and the Western Pacific to develop a parallel bombing-mining plan nicknamed “Pruning Knife.”<ref>{{Cite web |date=15 September 1969 |title=Message, Rear Admiral Frederic A. Bardshar to JCS Chairman Wheeler, subj: PRUNING KNIFE Status Report No. 1 |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/doc%2012%20PrunKnife%20no%201.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> By late September, however, 1969 Nixon and Kissinger reluctantly set aside escalation proposals. With major national anti-war demonstrations scheduled for mid-October and mid-November, Nixon was concerned that major escalation could exacerbate civil unrest and produce “horrible results” domestically.<ref name=":22">{{Cite book |last=Kimball, Jeffrey & |first=Burr, William |title=Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The Secret Alert of 1969, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War |publisher=University Press of Kansas |year=2015 |location=Lawrence, KS |pages=297}}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Wells |first=Tom |title=The War Within: America’s Battle over Vietnam |publisher=University of California Press |year=1994 |location=Berkeley, CA |pages=347-355}}</ref> Top advisers such as Secretary of Defense [[Melvin Laird]] shared those concerns, also observing that the U.S. could not point to any “provocative” action by North Vietnam to justify an attack.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 8, 1969 |title=Secretary of Defense Laird Memorandum for the President, "Air and Naval Operations Against North Vietnam" |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/Doc%2014%20laird%20to%20Nixon%2010-8-69.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref>
The operation did not directly cause any obvious, significant change due to its cancellation; the impact it may have had on the Soviets or the Vietnamese cannot be accurately measured.<ref name=":2" /> The operation was terminated on October 30 suddenly without any known reason.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":0" /> The abrupt halt to the operation may have been due to the fact that the Soviets did not show any significant changes in their actions, which could be speculated that the Soviets suspected Nixon of his bluffs, thus undermining the overall success of the operation.<ref name=":6" /><ref name=":2" /> However, other historians have argued that the sudden withdrawal of the SAC's squadron was an intentional effort to display the maneuverability and freedom the US possessed when it came to nuclear warfare.<ref>{{Cite news|last=Suri|first=Jeremi|date=25 February 2008|title=The Nukes of October: Richard Nixon's Secret Plan to Bring Peace to Vietnam|magazine=WIRED|url=https://www.wired.com/2008/02/ff-nuclearwar/}}</ref>


Operation Giant Lance would later be revealed to be a tool in terms of escalating the nuclear threat towards the Soviets and North Vietnamese.<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /> Giant Lance was intended to jar foreign forces into favourable diplomatic agreements to end the war, before it led to Nixon's decision to carry out Operation Duck Hook.<ref name=":1" /><ref name=":2" /> Despite the operation ending as a bluff tactic, the operation served to add credibility both to Nixon's madman threats and the proactiveness of the US.<ref name=":2" /> Despite this, this may have not amounted to much success due to the large anti-war movement at the time, which served as a large catalyst to the reprieve of the nuclear operations.<ref name=":7">{{Cite book|last1=Stone|first1=Oliver|title=The untold history of the United States|last2=Kuznick|first2=Peter|publisher=Gallery Books|year=2012|location=New York|pages=364}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> Seymour Hersh, a modern journalist, believed that the operation also served as an underlying offensive to Operation Duck Hook, in case Nixon decided to carry out the mining and bombing operation.<ref name=":2" />
As a fallback to the November Option, Nixon chose to signal his resentment toward Moscow through the application of the "madman" approach by raising military alert and readiness levels. Kissinger’s military assistant, Colonel [[Alexander Haig]], requested and received Pentagon officials for proposals on higher alert levels, which Haig and Kissinger packaged into a report to Nixon on measures to “convey the impression of increased US readiness to the Soviets.”<ref>{{Cite web |date=9 October 1969 |title=Kissinger to Nixon, "Military Alerts," |url=https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/20796-18 |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> Nixon and Kissinger may have seen this as a way to lend credibility to the prior warnings to Moscow and Hanoi. While the Pentagon's instructions to top commanders emphasized military measures that would be "discernible" to Moscow, they were "not to be threatening," apparently so as not to spark a crisis. Kissinger had written about threats and bluffs in the past<ref>{{Cite book |last=Burr |first=William |title=Nixon's Nuclear Specter: The October Alert, Madman Diplomacy, and the Vietnam War |last2=Kimball |first2=Jeffrey |publisher=University Press of Kansas |year=2015 |location=Lawrence, Kansas |pages=59}}</ref> and may have hoped that the Soviets perceived the readiness measures as a threat, even if they were only a bluff. Several days in the readiness test, on October 17, 1969, Kissinger explained to White House Chief of State [[H. R. Haldeman]] that the United States had all "sorts of signal-type activity going on around the world to jar Soviets + NVN." <ref>{{Cite web |date=October 17, 1969 |title=Entry in the diary of H.R. Haldeman |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB81/nnp08.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> Nixon and Kissinger shared with only a few their purposes in ordering the readiness activities, although some SAC officers suspected that they had to do with Vietnam.<ref name=":12">{{Cite web |date=April 20, 1971 |title=History of Strategic Air Command FY 1970 Historical Study No. 117 |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/Doc%2020%20SAC%20history%20fy%201970%20excerpt.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref>


In response to the patrols from Giant Lance, the Soviets showed no clear reactionary actions.<ref name=":2" /> Whilst there may not have been a direct response to Operation Giant Lance, there was a reaction from the Soviet intelligence due to the sudden heightened nuclear alert.<ref name=":1" /> This was effectively the goal of the operation, to remain publicly secretive but expose the movements purposely to the Soviet intelligence.<ref name=":3" /><ref name=":2" /> Moscow did not undertake any steps towards the US despite this.<ref name=":2" /> Roger Dingman speculated that whilst the Soviets showed no reaction, the threat and Nixon's madman diplomacy may have impacted both the decisions of the Soviets and Vietnamese. The lack of any retaliation may be due to Nixon's history of his bluffs attributed to the madman diplomacy, in which previous nuclear alert threats such as the DEFCON alert initiated during the Cuban Missile Crisis served as a missile scare.<ref name=":2" /> In October 1973, a Soviet official exclaimed that "Mr. Nixon used to exaggerate his intentions regularly. He used alerts and leaks to do this", which may have driven the avoidance of the US operational threat.<ref name=":2" />
'''The Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test'''


=== Social perception to nuclear warfare ===
At the request of the White House, the Pentagon's Joint Staff worked up the details of a secret plan, which was called the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test. The readiness test involved military operations around the world, from the continental United States and the Atlantic to the Middle East and the Western Pacific. Carried out between October 13th and 30th, the activities included higher readiness levels for SAC bombers, tactical air, and air defenses, and a variety of naval maneuvers, from sudden movements of aircraft carriers and ballistic missile submarines to the shadowing of Soviet merchant ships sailing toward Haiphong.<ref name=":02" /> For example, SAC stood down B-52 bombers at their bases, placing them on expanded ground alert, with no flights for about a week, and then after allowing flights resumed the stand-down on 23 October 1969.<ref name=":12" /> Some of the activities, such as the abrupt sailing of ships were unusual and unexplained and noticed by the media. For example, the sudden departure of the aircraft carrier [[USS Yorktown (CV-10)]] from Rotterdam leaving 200 baffled sailors behind, was hard to overlook.<ref>{{Cite news |date=October 20, 1969 |title=U.S. Won't Explain Warship Movement |work=The New York Times}}</ref> Also difficult to keep secret were the stand-downs at SAC bomber bases; people in residential areas nearby quickly noticed that bomber flights had suddenly stopped and then restarted.<ref name=":22" />
Although both Moscow and Hanoi did not show any reaction or impact of Operation Giant Lance, the uncertainty of Nixon's nuclear power posed a significant threat.<ref name=":2" /><ref name=":6" /> As Nixon was socially recognised as a "madman", the risk of Nixon's continuous nuclear threat towards Hanoi was undermined by the anti-war sentiment on US home soil.<ref name=":7" /> This implied to Hanoi that the US did not wish for further war, or risk of nuclear warfare.<ref name=":7" /> The heightened fear of nuclear warfare brought upon a shared parity of nuclear avoidance across all participants of the war.<ref name=":1" /> Neither participant willed a military confrontation that would escalate to that level, exemplifying the significance and extreme measures of Nixon's "mad" actions in social perceptions at the time.<ref name=":1" />


There also existed the political danger of nuclear reliance in terms of war, with increased usage of nuclear weaponry as a threat, other international governments would begin to accept this as the norm.<ref name=":8">{{Cite book|last=Schelling|first=Thomas|title=The Strategy of Conflict|publisher=Harvard University Press|date=May 15, 1981|isbn=9780674840317|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|pages=187–203}}</ref><ref name=":1" /> Nuclear fear would bring the possibility of increased nuclear use both offensively and defensively as a means of protecting themselves, engaging or retaliating in military engagements.<ref name=":7" /><ref name=":1" /> Continual development of nuclear technology and reliance would inevitably lead to increasing overall paranoia and risk of danger.<ref name=":1" /> Military escalation could lead to catastrophic implications, as the presence of nuclear warfare allows for “the threat that leaves something to chance”.<ref name=":8" /><ref name=":1" />
During the course of the month, the Joint Chiefs asked top commanders for more suggestions, and they were added to the mix. One was a suggestion from SAC’s commander-in-chief to implement the SEAGA Show of Force plan for nuclear armed airborne alert flights. The Joint Chiefs incorporated this proposal into the Readiness Test and SAC's Commander-in-Chief directed the 92nd Strategic Aerospace Wing to implement it.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 23, 1969 |title=Message from Strategic Air Command Headquarters to 12 Air Division et al., "Increased Readiness Posture," |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB81/nnp11.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> Accordingly, beginning on 27<sup>th</sup> October, SAC put 6 B-52s in the air over Northern Alaska for 18 hour stretches, each day for 3 days in a row, a total of 18 sorties. This was the first time that nuclear-armed alert flights had been launched since the nuclear accident at Thule, Greenland in January 1968. This was the last major move in the Readiness Test, which Joint Chiefs instructed the commands to end on 30 October 1969.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 28, 1969 |title=Message from JCS to all Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands, "Increased Readiness Posture" |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB81/nnp12.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref>

'''Tracking Soviet Reactions'''

Higher U.S. alert levels and unusual military actions, even if not designed to be threatening, bore the risk that they could provoke a Soviet military reaction and an unwanted, spiraling crisis.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sagan |first=Scott Douglas |last2=Suri |first2=Jeremi |author-link2= |date=Spring 2003 |title=The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969 |journal=International Security |volume=27 |issue=4 |pages=180}}</ref> To keep track of the Soviet military posture, early in the readiness test Kissinger tasked the intelligence agencies to keep their antennae up by monitoring Soviet reactions. As part of an "all source" intelligence watch, both the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] and the [[Defense Intelligence Agency]] turned in reports,<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 27, 1969 |title=Possible Communist Reactions to US Military Readiness Tests |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/doc%2021A%20%20CIA%20report%2010-27-69.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref> with DIA preparing a series, “Summary of Soviet Reactions to U.S. Operations.” One of the DIA reports, dated 28 October 1969, with "HK's” initials on it, has been massively excised, probably because its contents draw on from highly secret communications intelligence.<ref>{{Cite web |date=28 October 1969 |title=Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Intelligence Report, Summary of Soviet Reactions to US Operations, #9 |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/doc%2021B%2017%20B%20%20DIA%20report.pdf |website=National Security Archive}}</ref>  This document and others in the "Special Intelligence" series is located in the Vietnam files at the [[Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum]], further indicating the readiness test's connection to White House Vietnam strategy.

From the Soviet side, evidence concerning their awareness of the JCS Readiness Test and its elements, such as the "Giant Lance" SEAGA operation, has yet to surface. Because the readiness measures were relatively low key and non-threatening, Soviet officials probably downplayed them. Years later, former Foreign Minister [[Andrei Gromyko]] recalled that "the Americans put forces on alert so often it is hard to know what it meant." Another Soviet diplomatic expert, Aleksandr Kislov stated, "Mr. Nion used to exaggerate his intentions regularly" by using alerts, an approach that was the opposite of Moscow's, which was to "understate our military intentions." Given such perceptions, the Soviets probably saw the October 1969 alert as the bluff that it was.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lebow |first=Richard Ned |title=We All Lost the Cold War |last2=Stein |first2=Janice Gross |publisher=Princeton University Press |year=1994 |location=Princeton, New Jersey |pages=488, note 38}}</ref> Notwithstanding Nixon and Kissinger's hopes that their threats could persuade North Vietnamese negotiators to accept U.S. positions, Hanoi made no change in its approach. The North Vietnamese leadership believed that they would reach an agreement once they had changed the facts on the ground in the South and when Washington could no longer withstand domestic pressures to withdraw from South Vietnam.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Goscha |first=Christoper |title=Vietnam: A New History |publisher=Basic Books |year=2016 |location=New York |pages=335-336}}</ref>


==References==
==References==

Revision as of 18:20, 11 July 2023

Operation "Giant Lance"
Part of the Cold War
DateOctober 10–30, 1969
Location
Over Arctic Ocean
Result Inconclusive
Belligerents
 United States  Soviet Union  North Vietnam
Commanders and leaders
United States Richard Nixon Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev

Operation Giant Lance was an undercover military operation by the United States in which the primary objective was to apply military pressure towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War.[1][2][better source needed][3][4] Initiated on October 27, 1969, President Richard Nixon authorized a squadron of 18 B-52 bombers to patrol the Arctic polar ice caps and escalate the nuclear threat posed.[2] The goal was to coerce both the Soviet Union and North Vietnam to agree on favourable terms with the US, and conclusively end the Vietnam War.[3] The operation's effectiveness was also largely built on Nixon's consistent madman theory diplomacy, in order to influence Moscow's decision even more.[5] The operation was kept top secret from both the general public and higher authorities within the Strategic Air Command, intended to only be noticed by Russian intelligence.[4][6] The operation lasted one month before being called off.[4][6]

Background

State of the Vietnam War

Tensions from the Vietnam war remained high and served as a large catalyst behind Nixon's deployment of the operation.[5] The war was one of Nixon's primary objectives in his entrance to the office and led to Nixon devising a plan to both end the Vietnam war and gain international and domestic credibility for the United States as a result.[5] By launching the Operation Giant Lance offensive, Nixon aimed to increase tensions within the war by raising the United States' nuclear threat through a "show of force" alert.[3] These operations acted as a prequel to Nixon's eventual Operation Duck Hook, declassified in 2005.[5] The primary goal of these operations was to pressure the Soviets in Moscow to call upon their North Vietnamese ally for favorable peace terms for the United States.[2][3] With Operation Duck Hook being declassified in 2005, it was revealed that the "show of force" alert, including Operation Giant Lance, was meant to prepare for any military confrontation from the Soviets.[4][5]

Preparation

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Earle Wheeler ordered the operation as a part of the raised nuclear alert.[4] Under secrecy, Operation Giant Lance was a part of numerous escalations of nuclear threat, launched according to Nixon and Wheeler's decision to initiate a "Show of Force" alert on the 10th of October 1969.[4] This was a series of operations to increase military pressure, including the airborne Operation Giant Lance.[4][2] Initiated on October 13, eighteen B-52 bomber aircraft were deployed in preparation for the operation, requiring accompanying KC-135 tankers to refuel and support the extended patrol of the squadron.[2][3] To prepare for the operation, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) were used to collaboratively deploy the aircraft from air bases both in California and Washington State in secrecy.[3] Further increasing the readiness of the bombers, the aircraft were checked throughout the day, standing by for immediate deployment.[4]

Purpose

The purpose of Operation Giant Lance was to intimidate the foreign contenders in the Vietnam War, primarily the Soviets through a display of radical military escalation. By using seemingly irrational actions as a part of Nixon's madman diplomacy, he aimed to push both the Soviet and the Vietnamese to end the war on favourable terms. This operation utilised a squadron of eighteen B-52 bomber aircraft which posed an extreme nuclear threat. These bombers were to patrol the Northern polar ice caps to survey the frozen terrain, whilst armed with nuclear weaponry.[4][5][2] The patrols consisted of eighteen-hour long vigils, which were executed with the intention of appearing as suspicious movements from the US.[4] These movements were kept secret from the public, whilst also remaining intentionally detectable to the Soviet Union's intelligence systems.[6][4] The operation was also intended to be a precautionary measure boasting operational readiness in case of military retaliation from either East Asia or Russia.[4][5][6] The operation's intended goal was also to directly support project Duck Hook as a part of the 'Show of Force' alert. Nixon believed that this would indirectly coerce Moscow and Hanoi to enter a peace treaty through the Paris peace talks with the Soviets, on terms that were advantageous to the United States.[4] This outcome was also thought to possibly benefit the United States as well by promoting the credibility of the United States intervention in the Sino-Soviet conflict to its general public in the war.[7]

Madman theory

President Richard Nixon was infamous for his radical measures which heavily influenced his diplomatic course of actions.[7] The radicality of sending eighteen armed bombers on patrol stemmed from Nixon's intention to pressure foreign forces by displaying extreme military prowess.[5][3] Henry Kissinger, the national security advisor, was advised by Nixon at this time about Nixon's willingness to use nuclear weapons in order to end the war.[5] This madman theory attributed president Nixon with a type of diplomacy in which he would often take irrational options, even to the United States' own authorities.[5][2] This perception allows foreign forces to be unable to predict Nixon's intended motives or whether he would execute his actions, allowing Nixon to have a unique strategic advantage.[8] This diplomacy served as an indirect threat coupled with Nixon's decision to raise the nuclear alert, as the Soviets would not be able to completely understand his course of action.[5][4] Nixon used this unpredictable diplomacy in a failed attempt to end the war in Vietnam, specifically constructing the impression he was willing to take desperate measures and irrationally threaten enemy forces with the United States' excessive nuclear threat.[4] This would result in an increased possibility that they may abide by the United States' demands on the basis that Nixon would declare nuclear warfare if his threats were not complied with.[4][3][8] The operations elevating the nuclear threat would also act as a display of Nixon's reputability as a tough and "mad" leader.[4] This was intended to lead both the North Vietnamese and Soviets that he was indeed an irrational leader, capable of escalating the nuclear threat.[4][5] The policy failed to produce the concessions desired by the United States.

Due to Nixon's history of enacting this diplomacy such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the threat of his "madman" actions served as a real warning as he was socially recognized as a madman figure.[3] This diplomacy was in effect briefly during the Vietnam war due to the growing fear over the usage of nuclear warfare, amplified by the numerous 'Show of Force' operations.[3][8] Although this diplomacy could have been passed off to foreign forces as a bluff, the risk of uncertainty to them is much larger than the risk to the United States.[8][5] Ultimately, Nixon possessed an objective advantage as the US could gauge the effectiveness of their threats based on the reactionary implications of both the Soviets and Vietnamese.[8]

Implications

Giant Lance's success

The operation did not directly cause any obvious, significant change due to its cancellation; the impact it may have had on the Soviets or the Vietnamese cannot be accurately measured.[4] The operation was terminated on October 30 suddenly without any known reason.[4][2] The abrupt halt to the operation may have been due to the fact that the Soviets did not show any significant changes in their actions, which could be speculated that the Soviets suspected Nixon of his bluffs, thus undermining the overall success of the operation.[8][4] However, other historians have argued that the sudden withdrawal of the SAC's squadron was an intentional effort to display the maneuverability and freedom the US possessed when it came to nuclear warfare.[9]

Operation Giant Lance would later be revealed to be a tool in terms of escalating the nuclear threat towards the Soviets and North Vietnamese.[2][3][4] Giant Lance was intended to jar foreign forces into favourable diplomatic agreements to end the war, before it led to Nixon's decision to carry out Operation Duck Hook.[3][4] Despite the operation ending as a bluff tactic, the operation served to add credibility both to Nixon's madman threats and the proactiveness of the US.[4] Despite this, this may have not amounted to much success due to the large anti-war movement at the time, which served as a large catalyst to the reprieve of the nuclear operations.[10][3] Seymour Hersh, a modern journalist, believed that the operation also served as an underlying offensive to Operation Duck Hook, in case Nixon decided to carry out the mining and bombing operation.[4]

In response to the patrols from Giant Lance, the Soviets showed no clear reactionary actions.[4] Whilst there may not have been a direct response to Operation Giant Lance, there was a reaction from the Soviet intelligence due to the sudden heightened nuclear alert.[3] This was effectively the goal of the operation, to remain publicly secretive but expose the movements purposely to the Soviet intelligence.[6][4] Moscow did not undertake any steps towards the US despite this.[4] Roger Dingman speculated that whilst the Soviets showed no reaction, the threat and Nixon's madman diplomacy may have impacted both the decisions of the Soviets and Vietnamese. The lack of any retaliation may be due to Nixon's history of his bluffs attributed to the madman diplomacy, in which previous nuclear alert threats such as the DEFCON alert initiated during the Cuban Missile Crisis served as a missile scare.[4] In October 1973, a Soviet official exclaimed that "Mr. Nixon used to exaggerate his intentions regularly. He used alerts and leaks to do this", which may have driven the avoidance of the US operational threat.[4]

Social perception to nuclear warfare

Although both Moscow and Hanoi did not show any reaction or impact of Operation Giant Lance, the uncertainty of Nixon's nuclear power posed a significant threat.[4][8] As Nixon was socially recognised as a "madman", the risk of Nixon's continuous nuclear threat towards Hanoi was undermined by the anti-war sentiment on US home soil.[10] This implied to Hanoi that the US did not wish for further war, or risk of nuclear warfare.[10] The heightened fear of nuclear warfare brought upon a shared parity of nuclear avoidance across all participants of the war.[3] Neither participant willed a military confrontation that would escalate to that level, exemplifying the significance and extreme measures of Nixon's "mad" actions in social perceptions at the time.[3]

There also existed the political danger of nuclear reliance in terms of war, with increased usage of nuclear weaponry as a threat, other international governments would begin to accept this as the norm.[11][3] Nuclear fear would bring the possibility of increased nuclear use both offensively and defensively as a means of protecting themselves, engaging or retaliating in military engagements.[10][3] Continual development of nuclear technology and reliance would inevitably lead to increasing overall paranoia and risk of danger.[3] Military escalation could lead to catastrophic implications, as the presence of nuclear warfare allows for “the threat that leaves something to chance”.[11][3]

References

  1. ^ Jeremi Suri (2008-02-25). "The Nukes of October: Richard Nixon's Secret Plan to Bring Peace to Vietnam". Wired Magazine. Retrieved 2012-01-28.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i Ventura, Jesse (2011). 63 Documents the Government Doesn't Want You to Read. New York: Skyhorse. pp. 170–174. ISBN 978-1-61608-226-0.
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Sagan, Scott; Suri, Jeremi (2003). "The Madman Nuclear Alert: Secrecy, Signaling, and Safety in October 1969". International Security. 27 (4): 150–183. doi:10.1162/016228803321951126. JSTOR 4137607. S2CID 57564244.
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac ad ae Burr, William; Kimball, Jeffrey (2003). "Nixon's Nuclear Ploy". Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 59 (1): 28–73. doi:10.2968/059001011 – via Taylor & Francis Online.
  5. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Delpech, Therese (2012). Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. ISBN 9780833059307. JSTOR 10.7249/mg1103rc.
  6. ^ a b c d e Burr, William; Kimball, Jeffry (December 23, 2002). "Nixon's Nuclear Ploy: The Vietnam Negotiations and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test". The National Security Archive.
  7. ^ a b Cressman, Dale (July 28, 2015). "The Great Silent Majority: Nixon's 1969 Speech on Vietnamization". Presidential Studies Quarterly. 45 (3): 144. doi:10.1111/psq.12214.
  8. ^ a b c d e f g McManus, Roseanne (September 13, 2019). "Revisiting the Madman Theory: Evaluating the Impact of Different Forms of Perceived Madness in Coercive Bargaining". Security Studies. 28 (5): 976–1009. doi:10.1080/09636412.2019.1662482. S2CID 203470748.
  9. ^ Suri, Jeremi (25 February 2008). "The Nukes of October: Richard Nixon's Secret Plan to Bring Peace to Vietnam". WIRED.
  10. ^ a b c d Stone, Oliver; Kuznick, Peter (2012). The untold history of the United States. New York: Gallery Books. p. 364.
  11. ^ a b Schelling, Thomas (May 15, 1981). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. pp. 187–203. ISBN 9780674840317.
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