Chaco War

Chaco War, Interwar Period
Bolivia and Paraguay before the 1932 War
Date 15 June 1932 – 10 June 1935 Location Gran Chaco region, South America Result Paraguayan victory Territorial changes Most of the Gran Chaco Region is awarded to Paraguay.
Belligerents
Bolivia	Paraguay Supported by: Argentina
Commanders and leaders
Daniel Salamanca Urey General Hans Kundt General Enrique Peñaranda	Eusebio Ayala Marshal José Félix Estigarribia
Strength
250,000	150,000
Casualties and losses
57,000 casualties	43,000 casualties

The Chaco War (1932–1935) was fought between Bolivia and Paraguay over control of the northern part of the Gran Chaco region (the Chaco Boreal) of South America, which was incorrectly thought to be rich in oil. It is also known as La Guerra de la Sed (Spanish for "War of Thirst") for being fought in the semi-arid Chaco. It was the bloodiest military conflict fought in South America during the 20th century. The war pitted two of South America's poorest countries both having previously lost territories to neighbors in 19th century wars. During the war both countries faced difficulties in obtaining arms and other supplies since their landlocked situation made their foreign trade and arms purchases dependent on the willingness of neighboring countries to let them pass by. In Particular Bolivia faced external trade problems coupled with poor internal communications. While Bolivia had income from lucrative mining and a better equipped and larger army than Paraguay, a series of factors turned the tide in favour of Paraguay which came by the end of the war to control most of the disputed zone, and was finally also granted the largest portion of the disputed territories in the peace treaties.

Origins

Though the region was sparsely populated, control of the Paraguay River running through it would have given one of the two landlocked countries access to the Atlantic Ocean. This was especially important to Bolivia, which had lost its Pacific Ocean coast to Chile in the War of the Pacific (1883).

In international arbitration, Bolivia argued that the region had been part of the original Spanish colonial province of Moxos and Chiquitos to which Bolivia was heir. Meanwhile, Paraguay had begun to colonize the region. Indeed, both Paraguayan and Argentinian planters already bred cattle and exploited quebracho woods in the area, while the small indigenous population of Guaraní-speaking tribes was related to that country's own Guaraní heritage.

File:Parag.136.Chaco Paraguayo.jpeg

Paraguayan stamp showing the Chaco

Furthermore, the discovery of oil in the Andean foothills sparked speculation that the Chaco itself might be a rich source of petroleum. Foreign oil companies were involved in the exploration: companies mainly descended from Standard Oil backed Bolivia, while Shell Oil supported Paraguay. Standard was already producing oil from wells in the high hills of eastern Bolivia, around Villa Montes.

Paraguay had lost almost half of its territory to Brazil and Argentina in the War of the Triple Alliance and was not prepared to see what it was perceived as its last chance for a viable economy fall victim to Bolivia.

Composition of the armies

Paraguay had a population only a third as large as that of Bolivia (880,000 versus 2,150,000), but its guerrilla style of fighting, compared to Bolivia's more conventional strategy, enabled Paraguay to take the upper hand. In June 1932, the Paraguayan army totaled about 4,026 men (355 combat officers, 146 surgeons and noncombatant officers, 200 cadets, 690 NCOs, and 2,653 soldiers). Both racially and culturally, the Paraguayan army was practically homogeneous. Almost all of the soldiers were Spanish-Guarani mestizos. In Bolivia, however, most of the soldiers were Altiplano Native Americans (90% of the infantry troops), the lower-ranking officers were of Spanish ancestry, and General Hans Kundt was German. In spite of the fact that the Bolivian army had many more soldiers, the Bolivian army never mobilized more than 60,000 men, and never more than two-thirds of the army were on the Chaco at one time, while Paraguay mobilized its entire army. City buses were confiscated, wedding rings were donated to buy rifles, by 1935 Paraguay had widened conscription to include 17 year-olds and policemen.

The Paraguayans took advantage of their ability to communicate over the radio in Guaraní, which was not intelligible to the typical Bolivian soldier. Paraguay had little trouble in mobilizing its troops in large barges on the Paraguay river right to the frontlines, whilst the majority of Bolivian soldiers came from the western highlands, some eight hundred kilometers away and with little or no logistic support. In fact, it took a typical Bolivian soldier about 14 days to traverse the distance, while a Paraguayan soldier only took about four. The heavy equipment of Bolivia's army made things worse. The supply of water, given the dry climate of the region, also played a key role during the conflict. There were thousands of non-combat casualties due to dehydration, mostly among Bolivian troops.

Conflict

A machine gun manned by Paraguayan soldiers.

Border skirmishes throughout the late 1920s culminated in an all-out war in 1932.

Laguna Pitiantuta Incident

On June 15 of 1932 Bolivian military captured Fortín Carlos Antonio López at Laguna Pitiantuta (fortín was the name used for the often small pillbox and trench like fortifications in the Chaco) explicitely disobeying orders by Bolivian President Daniel Salamanca to avoid provocations in the Chaco region. The next day, on June 16, a Paraguayan detachment recovered the fortification. After the initiall incident Salamaca then changed his status quo policy over the disputed area and ordered the fortifications (fortínes) of Corrales, Toledo and Boquerón to be captured. The three fortines were soon captured and in response to Paraguayan protests to return them, Salamanca demanded them to be included in a "zone of dispute". On a memorandum directed to President Salamanca on August 30 Bolivian general Filiberto Osorio expressed his concerns over the lack of a plan of operations and attached a plan of operations focusing on a offensive from the north. At the same time Bolivian General Quintanilla asked for permission to capture two additional Paraguayan fortines; Nanawa and Rojas Silva. During August Bolivia slowly reinforced its 4,000 men strong First Bolivian Army located in the zone of conflict with 6,000 men.

The breaking of the fragile status quo in the disputed areas of the Chaco by Bolivians convinced Paraguay that a diplomatic solution in agreeable terms was not possible. Paraguay gave its army general staff orders to recapture the three forts. During August Paraguay mobilized over ten thousand men into the Chaco region. Paraguayan general José Félix Estigarribia prepared for a large offensive before the Bolivians would have mobilized their whole army.

First Paraguayan Offensive

Fortín Boquerón was the first target of Paraguayan Offensive. The Boquerón complex, guarded by 619 Bolivians resisted a 22-day siege against 5,000 Paraguayan troops. An additional 2,500 Bolivians attempted to relieve the siege but were fought back by 2,200 Paraguayans that defended the accesses to the siege area. A few Bolivian units managed to enter Fortín Boquerón with supplies and the Bolivian Air Force dropped food and ammunition to the besieged soldiers. Having begun on September 7, Fortín Boquerón finally fell on September 29, 1932.

After the fall of Fortín Boquerón, the Paraguayans continued their offensive and made a pincer movement, which forced fractions of the Bolivian army to surrender. While the Paraguayans had expected a new siege on Fortín Arce, the most advanced Bolivian fortín in the Chaco, they found it in ruins. The 4,000 Bolivians that defended it had relocated to Fortín Alihuatá.

Bolivian Offensive

On December 1932, the Bolivian war mobilization had concluded. In terms of weaponry and manpower, the army was ready to virtually overpower the Paraguayans. General Hans Kundt, a Eastern Front veteran, was called by President Salamanca to lead the Bolivian counteroffensive. Hans Kundt had previously dedicated his time in service of the Bolivian army to the training of Bolivian Army and enjoyed great prestige in Bolivia for having, to some extent, shaped the Bolivian Army, in addition to being German and his services in the army of the German Empire.

The Paraguayan Fortín Nanawa was chosen as the main target of the Bolivian offensive since the capture of it and then the Paraguayan command centre at Isla Poí would allow Bolivia to reach the Paraguay River, putting the Paraguayan city of Concepción in danger. The capture of the fortines of Corrales, Toledo and Fernández by the Second Bolivian Corps were also part of Kundt's offensive plan.

On January 1933, the First Bolivian Corps began its attack on Fortín Nanawa. This stronghold was considered by the Paraguayans to be the backbone of their defenses. Former Imperial Russian officers Ivan Belaieff and Nicolas Ern (who were anti-communist Russians under the service of the Paraguayan army as the Head of the General Staff and frontline commander respectively) had focused greatly on the fortification of this fortín. It had zig-zag trenches, miles of barbed wire, and many machine gun nests (some in the trees). On January 20, 1933, Kundt, in personal command of the Bolivian force, launched six to nine aircraft and 6,000 unhorsed cavalry, supported by twelve Vickers guns. The cavalry unit's horses had previously died because of dehydration. However, the Bolivians failed to capture the fort and instead formed a defensive amphitheater in front of it. The Second Bolivian Corps managed to capture Fortín Corrales and Fortín Platanillos but failed to do so with Fortín Fernández and Fortín Toledo. After a siege that lasted from February 26 to March 11 of 1933, the Bolivian Second Corps aborted their attack on Fortín Toledo and withdrew to a defensive line built 15 km from Fortín Corrales.

Paraguayan troops in Alihuatá, 1932.

After the attack on Nanawa, in which Fernández and Toledo had been repelled, Kundt ordered an attack on Fortín Alihuatá. The attack on this fortín overwhelmed its few defenders. The capture of Alihuatá allowed the Bolivians to cut the supply route of the First Paraguayan Division. When the Bolivians were informed of the isolation of the First Paraguayan Division, they launched an attack on it. This attack led to the Battle of Campo Jordán, which concluded in the retreat of the First Paraguayan Division.

On July 1933, Kundt resumed the aim of capturing Nanawa and launched a massive frontal attack on the fortín. Kundt had prepared for the second attack in detail, using artillery, airplanes, tanks, and novel flamethrowers to overcome Paraguayan fortifications. The Paraguayans, however, had improved and built new fortifications since the first battle of Nanawa. While the Bolivian units' attack managed to capture parts of the defensive complex, they were retaken by Paraguayan counterattacks made by reserves. The Bolivian army lost more than 2,000 men injured and killed in the second battle of Nanawa while Paraguay lost only 559 men injured and dead. The failure to capture Nanawa and the heavy loss of lives led president Salamanca to criticize the Bolivian high command, ordering them to spare more men. The defeat seriously damaged Kundt's prestige. In September, Kundt resigned his charge as commander in chief, but his resignation was not accepted by the president. This fortín was later nicknamed the "Verdun of South America."

Second Paraguayan Offensive

Further information: [[:Siege of Campo Vía]]

In August, Paraguay began a new offensive in the form of three separate encirclement movements in the Alihuatá area. The Alihuatá area was chosen because Bolivian forces there had been weakened by the transfer of soldiers to attack Fortín Nanawa. As a result of the encirclement campaign, the Bolivian regiments Loa and Ballivían, totaling 509 men, surrendered. The regiment Junín suffured the same fate but the regiment Chacaltaya was able to escape encirclement due to intervention of two other Bolivian regiments.

The success of the Paraguayan army led Paraguayan president Eusebio Ayala to travel to the Chaco to promote José Félix Estigarribia to the rank of general. In that meeting, the president approved Estigarribia's new offensive plan. On the other side, the Bolivians gave up their initial plan of reaching the Paraguayan capital Asunción and moved on to defensive and attrition warfare.

The Paraguayan army moved on to perform a large scale pincer movement against Fortín Alihuatá, repeating the previous success of these operations. 7,000 Bolivians had to evacuate Fortín Alihuatá. On December 10 of 1933, the Paraguayan army finished the encirclement of the 9th and 4th divisions of the Bolivian Army. After unsuccessful attempts to break through Paraguayan lines, 2,600 Bolivian soldiers had died and 7,500 Bolivian soldiers surrendered. Paraguayans obtained 8,000 rifles, 536 machine guns, 25 mortars and 20 artillery pieces from the surrendered Bolivians.

Curfew

The massive defeat at Campo de Vía forced the Bolivians near Fortín Nanawa to withdraw northwest to form a new defensive line. Paraguayan colonel Franco proposed to launch a new attack against Ballivían and Villa Montes, but was turned down as Paraguayan President Eusebio Ayala thought Paraguay had already won the war. A 20 days curfew war agreed between the warring parties on December 19 of 1933. On January 6 of 1934 when the armistice expired Bolivia had reorganized its eroded army, having assembled a larger force than the one involved in the first Bolivian offensive.

Third Paraguayan Offensive

After the armistice that ended the Paraguayan Army continued its advance capturing the fortines of Platanillos, Loa, Esteros, Jayucubás and Muñoz. After the battle of Campo de Vía in December the Bolivian Army built up a defensive line at Magariños-La China. The Magariños-La China line was carefully built and was considered one of the finest defensive lines of the Chaco War. A minor attack by Paraguayans on February 11 of 1934 managed to the surprise of the Paraguayan command to breach the line forcing the abandonement of the whole defensive line. A Paraguayan offensive towards Cañada Tarija managed to surround and neutralize 1,000 Bolivian soldiers on March 27.

On May 1934 the Paraguayan Army detected a gap the Bolivian defenses that would allow to isolate the Bolivian stronghold of Ballivían and force its surrender. The Paraguayan Army worked at night to open a new route in the forests to make the attack possible. When Bolivian aviation noticed this new path being opened in the forest a plan was set up to let the Paraguayans enter halfway the path to then attack them from the rear. The Bolivian operation resulted in the battle of Cañada Strongest between May 18 and 25. Bolivians managed to capture 67 Paraguayan officials and 1,389 Paraguayan soldiers. After their defeat at Cañada Strongest the Paraguayan Army continued to attempt to capture Ballivían. The Ballivían was considered a key stronghold among Bolivians mostly for its symbolic position as the most southeastern Bolivian position left after the Second Paraguayan Offensive.

On November 1934 Paraguayan forces once again managed to surround a Bolivian division at El Carmen. The Bolivian disaster at El Carmen forced the Bolivians to abandon Ballivían and form a new defensive line at Villa Montes. On November 27, 1934, Bolivian generals, frustrated by the progress of the war, arrested President Salamanca while he was visiting their headquarters in Villa Montes and replaced him with the vice-president, José Luis Tejada. On November 9 of 1934 the 12,000 men strong Bolivian Cavalry Corps managed to capture Yrendagüé and begun to persecute Paraguayan forces in the area. Yrendagüé was one of the few places with freshwater in this part of the Chaco and while being away from Yrendagüé Paraguayans managed to destroy all wells in the area so that on return the exhausted Bolivian Cavalry Corps found themselves without water and disbanded being many captured. The Bolivian Cavalry Corps had previously been considered one of the best Bolivian units of the new army formed after during the armistice.

Last battles

After the collapse of the northern and northeastern Bolivian front, Bolivian defenses focued on the south to avoid the fall their war headquarters, and supply base of Villa Montes. The Paraguayans launched an attack towards Ybybobó closing off a porting of the Bolivian Army against Pilcomayo River. The battle begun on December 28 of 1934 and lasted until the early days of January 1935. 1.200 Bolivians surrendered and 200 died in the combat while Paraguay only lost a few dozens among injured and killed. Some Bolivian soldiers were reported to have jumped into the fast-flowing waters of Pilcomayo River.

After this defeat the Bolivian Army prepared for a last stand at Villa Montes. The loss of Villamontes would allow the Paraguayans to reach the proper Andes. The colonels Bernardino Bilbao Rioja and Moscoso were left in chage of the defense of Villa Montes after other military leaders declined. On January 11 of 1935 Paraguayans encircled and forced the retreat of two Bolivian regiments. Paraguayans also managed in January to cut off the road between Villa Montes and Santa Cruz.

Paraguayan general José Félix Estigarribia decided then to launch a final assault on Villa Montes. On February 1935 5,000 Paraguayans attacked the heavily fortified Bolivian lines near Villa Montes, and laid siege to it after have been repelled. On June 1935 850 Paraguayans defeated 3,000 Bolivians at Ingavi in the northern Chaco. On June 12 the day the peace agreement was signed Paraguayans advanced to only 15 km from the Bolivians oil fields in Cordillera Province.

While the military conflict ended with a comprehensive Paraguayan victory, from a wider point of view it was a disaster for both sides. Bolivia's European elite forcibly enlisted the large indigenous population into the army, though they felt little connection to the nation-state, while Paraguay was able to foment nationalist fervour among its predominantly mixed population. On both sides, but more so in the case of Bolivia, soldiers were ill-prepared for the dearth of water or the harsh conditions of terrain and climate they encountered. The effects of the lower altitude climate had maimed the Bolivian army: most of the indigenous soldiers lived on the cold Altiplano at altitudes of over 12,000 feet (3,700 m). They found themselves at a physical disadvantage when called upon to fight in sub-tropical temperatures at almost sea level. In fact, of the war's 100,000 casualties (about 57,000 of the total were Bolivian), more died from diseases such as malaria and other infections than from the actual fighting. At the same time, the war brought both countries to the brink of economic disaster.

Signatories of the 1938 Peace Treaty gather in Buenos Aires.

Foreign involvement

Arms embargo and commerce

Since both countries were landlocked, imports of arms and other supplies from outside were limited to what the neighboring countries considered convenient or appropriate.

The Bolivian army was dependent on food supplies that entered south-eastern Bolivia from Argentina through Yacuíba. The Bolivian army had great difficulty importing arms purchased at Vickers since both Argentina and Chile were reluctant to let war material pass through their ports. The only remaining options were the port of Mollendo in Peru and Puerto Suárez at the Brazilian border. Eventually, Bolivia had partial success after Vickers managed to persuade the British government to request that Argentina and Chile ease the import restrictions imposed on Bolivia. Internationally the neighboring countries of Peru, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina tried to avoid being accused of fueling the conflict and therefore limited the imports of arms to both Bolivia and Paraguay. Although Argentina behind the neutrality façade supported Paraguay. Paraguay received military supplies and intelligence from Argentina. Argentina provided Paraguay with critical economic and military backing throughout the war.

Advisers, mercenaries and volunteers

A number of volunteers and hired personnel from different countries participated in the war on both sides. The high staff of both countries was at times dominated by Europeans. In Bolivia General Hans Kundt, a First World War Eastern Front veteran, was in command from the beginning of the war until 1933, when he was relieved due to a series of military setbacks. Apart from Kundt Bolivia had also advice from military personnel of Chilean and Czech origin. Paraguay had advice from two White Russian generals Ern and Belaieff, the later was once part of general Wrangel's staff during the Russian Civil War. In the later phase of the war Paraguay would receive training from a large-scale Italian mission.

107 Chileans fought on behalf of Bolivia. The Chileans involved in the war enroled privately and were mostly military and police officers. These officers were partly motivated by the unemployment caused by both the Great Depression and the turbulent conflicts in Chile in the early 1930s. Some of the Chileans officers went after the Chaco War to fight for in the International Brigades during the Spanish Civil War. The arrival of the first group of Chilean combatants to La Paz sparkled protests from Paraguay and led the Chilean Congress on September 7 of 1934 to approve a law that made it illegal to join the countries in war. This did however not stop the enrolment of Chileans in the Bolivian army and it has been argued that president Arturo Alessandri Palma secretly consented the enrolment to get rid of unwanted elements of the military.

The enrolment of Chilean military personnel in the Bolivian army caused surprise in Paraguay since Chilean president and general Carlos Ibáñez del Campo had in 1928 supported Paraguay in an incident with Bolivia in the Chaco. The Paraguayan press denounced the Chilean government as not being neutral and went on to claim the Chilean soldiers were mercenaries. On August 12 of 1934 the Chilean ambassador in Asunción was called back in response to a official Paraguayan backing of the accusations against the Chilean government in the press.

Aftermath

By the time a ceasefire was negotiated for noon June 10, 1935, Paraguay controlled most of the region. In the last half hour there was a senseless shoot-out between the armies. This was recognized in a 1938 truce, signed in Buenos Aires, Argentina, by which Paraguay was awarded three-quarters of the Chaco Boreal, 20,000 square miles (52,000 km²). Two Paraguayans and three Bolivians died for every square mile. Bolivia did get the remaining territory, that bordered the Paraguay's River Puerto Busch. Some years later it was found that there were no oil resources in the Chaco Boreal kept by Paraguay, yet the territories kept by Bolivia were, in fact, rich in natural gas and petroleum, these being at the present time the country's largest exports and source of wealth.

Paraguay captured 21,000 soldiers and 10,000 civilians (1% of Bolivians); many chose to stay after the war. 10,000 Bolivian troops had run away to Argentina or self-mutilated. Paraguay also took 2,300 machine guns, 28,000 rifles and ammunition worth $10 million (enough to last 40 years).

Bolivia's stunning military blunder during the Chaco War led to a mass movement known as the Generación del Chaco, away from the traditional order, which was epitomised by the MNR-led Revolution of 1952.

A final treaty clearly marking the boundaries between the two countries was not signed until April 28, 2009.

Cultural references

File:Parag.629.Chaco Peace.jpeg

Chaco Peace. The stamp is Scott no. 629

Some aspects of the Chaco War are the inspiration for Tintin's comic book adventure The Broken Ear by Hergé, which began publication in 1935.

The conflict inspired Lester Dent to write the Doc Savage adventure The Dust of Death, also in 1935.

The Chaco War formed the backdrop for the 1935 film Storm Over the Andes, by Christy Cabanne, and the 2006 minimalist film Hamaca paraguaya, by Paz Encina.

One of the masterpieces of Paraguayan writer Augusto Roa Bastos, the 1960 novel Hijo de Hombre, describes in one of its chapters the carnage and harsh war conditions during the siege of Boquerón. The author himself took part in the conflict, joining the army medical service at the age of 17. The Argentine movie Hijo de Hombre, directed by Lucas Demare in 1961 is based on this part of the novel.

Howard Chaykin’s 2009 mini-series Dominic Fortune begins with the title character working as a mercenary pilot in the Chaco War.

In Pablo Neruda's poem, Standard Oil Company, Neruda refers to the Chaco War in the context of the influences that oil companies had on the existence of the war.

External links

• The White Russian contribution in the Chaco War