Talk:Operation Overlord

Infobox order

As there has been a bit of an edit-war going on, shall we discuss it? Per Template:Infobox military conflict, "combatant1/combatant2/combatant3 ... Combatants should be listed in order of importance to the conflict, be it in terms of military contribution, political clout, or a recognized chain of command. If differing metrics can support alternative lists, then ordering is left to the editors of the particular article."

The argument against the status quo has thus far been along the lines of the British engaged far more of the Germans than the Americans did, and the Germans were far more concerned with the British. We could debate strategy all day long, but working from the definition we have:

• military contribution: The US provided more manpower than the British, they even supplied most of the tanks in use by the British forces.
• political clout: The 1941-1944 period saw the British object to a cross-channel invasion due to a variety of reasons. The Americans were the ones who pressed for Overlord, over the British Balkan strategy.
• recognized chain of command: Monty and 21st Army Group may have had overall command of the ground forces, but they were under the command of SHAEF and Ike (who likewise was in overall command of the naval and air forces).

Opposing views? EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:24, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

Do you have some data on how many participants there were from each country? I can't seem to find those stats in the books I have here at home. — Diannaa 🍁 (talk) 03:44, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

Per the article, on July 25, 812,000 American troops and 640,000 British and Canadians were part of the campaign. Americans suffered 125,000 causalities compared to 83,000 British and Canadian. FWIW, I also agree with Enigma's point about putting the US first. Calidum T|C 03:53, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

Thanks for finding that, i must have been tired as I couldn't see it. I agree with "US first" for this article. -- — Diannaa 🍁 (talk) 15:38, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

I would like to thank everyone for the discussion and I am going to restate my points

• military contribution: Yes the US provided most of the British tanks but the British supplied many of the landing craft used to get Americans on shore. Yes the Americans had more men but isn't it more important to engage and defeat the enemy, not simply have more men. I have already said that the Germans placed the bulk of their forces in front of the British and Canadians not the Americans, is this really outweighed because the Americans had more troops?
• political clout: Yes the British opposed Normandy form 1941-1944 because they knew how dangerous an amphibious assault was (Gallipoli, Salerno, Anzio), they wanted to wait until the German forces were extremely weak. Had they listened to the Americans and invaded in 1942 or 1943 it would have most likely have been a disaster, I agree that Overlord is much better than the British Balkan Strategy in 1944 but postponing the Invasion until 1944 and conducting the North African and Italian campaigns to draw away German forces was great alternative then invading in 1942 or 1943. Also although the Americans pushed for D-day to happen it was mainly the British who planned the operation (Frederick E. Morgan) and it was the British and Canadians who took on the bulk of German forces in France especially armor and SS troops.
• recognized chain of command: Yes the supreme commander was Ike but the Ground Forces Commander (Monty), Air Forces Commander (Trafford Leigh Mallory), and Naval Forces Commander (Bertram Ramsay) were all British. During the Normandy campaign Ike did not dictate the Campaign, it was only on September 1st when Operation Overlord officially ended that he became Ground Forces Commander. Ike was a good guy but the Supreme Commander position was not the position that dictated the course of battle.

The main reason that is stated for the US doing more is that they had more soldiers and took more casualties. For the casualties please read about the American replacement system and it’s putting of green young men in the front line of battle. As for having more soldiers I thought a campaign would be dictated by doing damage to the enemy whether it’s tactical or strategic. Having more Americans does not change the fact that the Germans placed far fewer of their soldiers in the American sector. The British and Canadians had a much tougher time against the best the Germans had to offer in France, I think that doing more to damage the enemy is more important than having more soldiers. For me the British where more important to the victory in Normandy because even though they had less troops they did far more damage to the Germans (which is how you win a campaign) while the Americans who had more troops did less to the overall defeat of the Germans in Normandy. So which is more important to winning a campaign having more soldiers then your ally or doing more damage to your enemy?-Colonialmarine9

The Allied strategy was one of teamwork; pinning down the Germans in the east to allow an encircling battle to fought. Not to mention, the western terrain (centered in bocage) was easier to defend than the largely open farmland to the east; German dispositions should take this into effect as well.

The British roles at the head of the various forces is another example of the political situation. A British commander was (during the war) never going to be at the top because the Americans took leadership of the alliance due to the men they could field bolstered by their political and industrial strength to the other powers.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 18:12, 6 January 2016 (UTC)

I agree 100% it was teamwork, the British Commonwealth couldn't have done it without the Americans and the Americans couldn't have done it without the British Commonwealth. Ike was the perfect man for the job of Supreme Commander as he got along with everyone and kept the allied team together. I understand it was a political situation but the facts are that although Ike was American his position was not to dictate the course of battle that was the job of his subordinates on the ground, air, and sea which were all British. My argument is that the British and Canadian role in tying up and wearing down the bulk of the German forces (thus allowing the American breakout) is more important than the Americans having more soldiers than their ally or having a supreme commander of their nationality.-Colonialmarine9

Alternately, it could be said that the British became bogged down around Caen due to a series of bungled battles and the poor performance of some units, and the Americans played the more significant role in winning the campaign - and there are any number of works which support such an interpretation of events. It seems more sensible to stick to an ordering based on the size of the forces and the casualties they incurred. Nick-D (talk) 07:32, 7 January 2016 (UTC)

That is true, and has been one of the major controversies surrounding the campaign for about as long as it has been studied (and one could probably argue, while it was underway).EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 13:22, 7 January 2016 (UTC)

"All through the fierce fighting which took place in Normandy, there was never any intention of breaking out on the eastern flank towards the Seine; reference to all the orders and instructions which I issued makes that abundantly clear. This false conception existed only at Supreme Headquarters, and none of the senior officers responsible for the conduct of the actual fighting in Normandy, Bradley included, had any doubt about the true plan. The misconception led to much controversy and those at Supreme Headquarters who were not very fond of me took advantage of it to create trouble as the campaign developed." - Montgomery (my italics)

Montgomery's plan was to tie-down most of the German armour - 7 1/2 Panzer Divisions - and destroy it while preventing it and its reserves being re-deployed against Bradley in the west. This Montgomery successfully did. The most Bradley ever had to face was 2 divisions, and that was after many of the panzer units had already suffered a mauling by the British.

Before D-Day Hitler had ordered all the Panzer reserves to be deployed half-way between the suspected two invasion areas, Pas-de-Calais and Normandy - Montgomery knew this due to Ultra and photo-reconnaissance. This meant that all the panzer reserves had to pass through Caen first to get to Bradley in the west. Montgomery stopped them around Caen. That's why the fighting there was so prolonged. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.145.115.106 (talk) 11:54, 8 January 2017 (UTC)

The German panzer reserves had to pass through Caen as the Allied Tactical Air Forces were - as-per Montgomery's plan - repeatedly bombing and rocketing all the road and rail networks in the area and only allowing the Germans to repair the ones leading to Caen.

BTW, of the several thousand ships used in the invasion only around 100 were supplied by the US. The rest were supplied by the British. The latter also supplied the two Mulberry harbours and the PLUTO pipeline which later transported most of the fuel to the invasion forces. They also supplied almost all of the Intelligence and much of the photo-reconnaissance, as well as supplied the COPP parties, and the X-craft that guided-in the invasion fleet on the morning of D-Day. The British also did most of the planning - all the original plans for the operation are held in TNA at Kew or at the Naval Museum in Portsmouth. The ones in the US are copies. The first ship of the invasion fleet to open fire on D-Day was FYI, HMS Belfast. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.247.55 (talk) 11:19, 20 January 2017 (UTC)

I nearly forgot. The British didn't refer to anything smaller than an A/S Trawler as a "ship", so the British figures for the number of 'ships' involved would not include ancillary vessels such as landing craft, MTB's, etc., as they were not 'ships'. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.173.25 (talk) 11:15, 25 January 2017 (UTC)

Tanks destroyed by aircraft

On 29 July, RAF 121 Wing launched 99 sorties with rocket firing Typhoons scoring only two tanks destroyed.(Copp, Montgomery's Scientists, pp. 167-171) On 7 August, and the following days in the Mortain area, over 700 sorties were flown by Anglo-American planes (a mixture of bombs and rockets split between the American and British aircraft) only seven tanks were confirmed to have been destroyed by rockets and a further two by bombs.(pp. 173-175) Of the 90 tanks found abandoned or destroyed within the Falaise Pocket, only four were confirmed to have been destroyed by rockets and a further two by bombs.(p. 183) Moving ahead to the Ardennes, the air force claimed 324 tanks destroyed. Out of 101 German armor vehicles examined, only four tanks were suspected of being destroyed by air attack.(p. 207)

I think the following diff needs a little more evidence considering it is claiming around 10 per cent of the tanks destroyed.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 00:05, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

The problem is that you seem to be just taking a small set of actions and assuming that the source must be wrong based on them. Unless those account for literally every single tank kill at Normandy, this is not really logical. You also seem to be ignoring how incredibly heavy the bombardment was at Normandy, when compared to the Ardennes. On the other hand, the source I cited (which is also cited on the rest of the page as an RS) gives an overall total for the number of tanks killed by aircraft. I would actually assert that stronger evidence than that would be needed (it seems you're relying on extrapolation and supposition) to just throw away information given in one of this page's main sources. Unless you have a more reliable source that explicitly contradicts it?--Nihlus1 (talk) 07:34, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

I would really like to know where they get there figure from, what is there source? The air force, granted made extreme numbers of sorties but they also made claims that were not supported in the ground. The examples given, from the operational research, were from several areas were the heaviest concentration of direct support had came from the air force in attacking German tanks. The operational research, at least what is printed, highlighted just how over the top the claims were and just how few tanks were being taken out.

Additional sources talk about the issue: here, here, here etc (there are lots more, that is just a quick sample).

The simple point being, we should use caution despite the claim being made in a RSEnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:45, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

The sentence mentioning 100 tank kills is in the context of pointing out that AFV kills were over claimed. It is also below what aircraft claim to have destroyed in a single day. Therefore "AFV kills were over claimed" isn't really sufficient ground to throw away information given by one of this page's main RSs. I again ask if you have any evidence proving it wrong (that is, a statement from a reliable historian or the militaries themselves saying that substantially less than 100 were destroyed), because three picked handful of engagements in a three month operation involving some of the heaviest bombardment of the war really isn't it.--Nihlus1 (talk) 22:07, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

Absolutely agree. It is well known that there was gross over-claiming of AFV kills by aircraft. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:44, 25 February 2016 (UTC)

I have been doing some additional reading on the subject, and it seems that the 100 figure is quite common and people do not really have qualrms with it. As noted, yes the Allied bombing was quite heavy and it would seem that most of the figure could be attributed to Operation Goodwood, then the various isolated incidents (such as the ones examined in the German counterattack and retreat) just pile up in the end.

With so much information out there on the over-estimates etc, I was just wanting to ensure this figure was accurate so to avoid possibly perputating a myth. I withdraw my (in good faith) objection.EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 09:25, 26 February 2016 (UTC)

Tanks may well be 'knocked out' and abandoned by their crews only to be recovered for repair or for use of as spare parts later, so figures given for aircraft attacks may come down some time after the battle, when Allied intelligence teams have access to the battlefield and come across vehicles abandoned by their owners as not worth repairing. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.144.50.229 (talk) 10:08, 25 May 2017 (UTC)

Quotation requested for troop evacuation at Dunkirk

A quotation was requested for the data on troops evacuated from Dunkirk. The source for this is Churchill, Winston (1949). Their Finest Hour. The Second World War. Vol. II. Boston; Toronto: Houghton Mifflin. p. 115. OCLC 396145.. The source is a table, so it's not appropriate to add it to the citation so I am reproducing it here. — Diannaa 🍁 (talk) 13:32, 22 April 2017 (UTC)

Troops landed from Dunkirk
27 May – 4 June

Date	Beaches	Harbour	Total
27 May	–	7,669	7,669
28 May	5,390	11,874	17,804
29 May	13,752	33,558	47,310
30 May	29,512	24,311	53,823
31 May	22,942	45,072	68,014
1 June	17,348	47,081	64,429
2 June	6,695	19,561	26,256
3 June	1,870	24,876	26,746
4 June	622	25,553	26,175
Totals	98,671	239,555	338,226

Help needed please

Please help. I am working on building up the article for Battle for Caen, which was obviously part of Overlord. I started on the controversy about the fact that Montgomery failed to achieve some D-Day objectives, specifically capturing Caen, and then pretended that everything went according to his “real” original plan after all. Another editor is fiercely defending Montgomery, ruling that actual correspondence from Eisenhower and other commanders of the time are “primary sources” that must take second place to the secondary sources, even though the actual correspondence from Eisenhower and other commanders are presented in secondary sources, and that all the secondary sources which criticize Montgomery were written by people who simply failed to understand Monty’s genius plans, and who were part of a 1970’s conspiracy. It’s getting to be a bit of an alt-truth situation. Please could some other editors who are knowledgeable on the subject, assist on the Battle for Caen article? Wdford (talk) 21:23, 29 May 2017 (UTC)

The original COSSAC plan for Overlord called for a breakout in the East but Montgomery hadn't liked that plan so he had changed it.

Perhaps his critics ought to have taken the time and trouble - as Bradley did (see quote below) - to update their knowledge of what was actually planned and not rely on one what had been made long obsolete by 6th June.

Montgomery's British and Canadian forces were between the German panzer reserves and Bradley's US forces. To get to Bradley the German armour had to pass through Caen first. How difficult is that to grasp. Montgomery knew where the panzer reserves were stationed, as he had access before D-Day to ULTRA reports telling him exactly where the reserves were before D-Day even started. So he planned what happened.

Montgomery knew that for the Germans Caen was too important for them to give up, so they would fight for it. This he wanted, as they would keep pouring their panzer reserves in to the area around Caen rather than sending them on to face Bradley. In the fighting in and around Caen these panzer reserves were slowly being destroyed.

In order for the Germans to think they were doing the correct thing in tenaciously holding on to Caen - and keep their armour there - Montgomery could not be seen to be uninterested in taking Caen. It had to look like he wanted it. That's called Psychology.

Some 70 years on and his critics still can't see what Montgomery did, the simplicity of it, the cleverness. That doesn't say much about the critics, does it.

BTW, in military staff colleges it is usually reckoned to require a superiority in numbers of 300% in order to successfully carry out a land invasion. Montgomery did an amphibious one - far more difficult - with a numerical superiority of only 25%.

I nearly forgot. In the period immediately after the war, before the founding of NATO, the British asked the remnants of the German high command, including senior officers who had fought the Allies, who they would prefer to be in command of the British forces responsible for defending Germany against the looming threat from the Soviets. They unanimously asked for Montgomery. Not one of his critics.

"The containment mission that had been assigned Monty was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishment of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. By the end of June, Rommel had concentrated seven panzer divisions against Monty’s British Sector. One was all the enemy could spare for the US front." - Omar Bradley.

FYI the only US commanders in Europe aware of ULTRA in 1944 were Marshall and Eisenhower, together with a few US personnel stationed at Bletchley Park. The existence of ULTRA was only officially revealed in the 1970's.

IIRC, the only commanders on the British side who knew were Montgomery and, if my memory serves me correctly, Alexander.

None of these officer's subordinates (except for those liaison officers who's job it was to distribute it) in either army knew anything about ULTRA. And neither did any of the published authors writing before 1973. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.150.10.249 (talk) 09:37, 3 December 2017 (UTC)

Why aren’t the lower German casualty estimates shown

I honestly suspect this article of bias. It currently shows the absolute highest estimates of German casualties but doesn’t show the lower estimates too, which are in most cases below 300,000. This should be reflected on here. Roddy the roadkill (talk) 00:39, 19 November 2017 (UTC)

Thank you for your suggestion. When you believe an article needs improvement, please feel free to make those changes. Wikipedia is a wiki, so anyone can edit almost any article by simply following the edit this page link at the top.
The Wikipedia community encourages you to be bold in updating pages. Don't worry too much about making honest mistakes—they're likely to be found and corrected quickly. If you're not sure how editing works, check out how to edit a page, or use the sandbox to try out your editing skills. New contributors are always welcome. You don't even need to log in (although there are many reasons you might want to). Nick-D (talk) 01:01, 19 November 2017 (UTC)

Oh, I see that you did provide a figure. The source says that it's the casualties for the Westheer, so may not include the casualties suffered by German air force and navy units. I note also that the work given as a reference isn't about the Battle of Normandy: it's a specialist work on the German response to Operation Market Garden. What other sources provide figures under 300,000? Nick-D (talk) 01:16, 19 November 2017 (UTC)

"What other sources provide figures under 300,000?" The Imperial War Museum, for one. --Roddy the roadkill (talk) 05:48, 24 November 2017 (UTC)

Tamelander and Zetterling provide a figure under 300,000. However, their book on Operation Overlord is written in Swedish, but I have a copy and can provide quotations. Kindest /EriFr (talk) 15:49, 24 November 2017 (UTC)

Those two chappies are already used in the article: "German forces in France reported losses of 158,930 men between D-Day and 14 August, just before the start of Operation Dragoon in Southern France.[202]"EnigmaMcmxc (talk) 21:45, 24 November 2017 (UTC)

I've been reading Niklas Letterling's book "Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness". On page 77, he points out that in British literature German casualties in Normandy are often put at 450,000 (210,000 prisoner and 240,000 killed/wounded) and that this seems to come from Montgomery and his book "From Normandy to the Baltic". Zetterling states:"Probably they are nothing more than wartime estimates, a notoriously unreliable source"(frankly, Monty was notoriously self-important anyways)"There are, however, German documents that provide a better picture. The following casualties were recorded during the summer of 1944 for OB West:

Date	Killed in Action	Wounded	Missing
June	4,975	14,631	15,848
July	10,839	38,824	55,135
August	7,205	13,605	127,633
Total	23,019	67,060	198,616

These figures have been compared to by-name lists of killed soldiers and found to be very reliable." To add, he says these figures include the entire western theater to August 31, and so they include losses from Operation Dragoon. So total German casualties in the west were 288,695(the number of missing obviously includes captured as the Germans wouldn't know the whereabouts of those soldiers) in this period. Admittedly, I haven't read either of the currently cited books for the absurd estimate of German casualties in Normandy. But considering that they are named "D-Day in Photographs" and "Eyewitness D-Day: Firsthand Accounts from the Landing at Normandy to the Liberation of Paris" respectively, does anyone actually think that they should be favored over a specialized history on German forces in Normandy when it comes to German casualties in Operation Overlord? As far as I'm concerned, the two former books are discredited in this regard, and the estimate should be replaced with 288,000. That's the same number I cited from a different source and just like I suspected it was in Zetterling's book too.--Roddy the roadkill (talk) 08:22, 29 November 2017 (UTC)

Just one more thing, off-topic from German casualties. Zetterling states on page 34 of this same book: “Clearly the method used here to calculate German overall strength in Normandy is approximate. However, since the vast majority of German manpower was employed in divisions and GHQ combat units, there is no room for significant errors. Thus it seems safe to conclude that not many more than 640,000 Germans may have fought in Normandy or supported those operations.” Read the entirety of “4 — Number of Soldiers Employed in Normandy”(its only 8 pages) to see how he got to that estimate of German strength in Normandy. Does anyone think the second number given for German manpower should be changed, at least to include this as a lower-end figure for the total estimate of German forces in Normandy?—Roddy the roadkill (talk) 17:55, 29 November 2017 (UTC)