Talk:Western world

Orthodox Eurasia

The Orthodox world is Eurasian, not purely European. DxRxXxZx (talk) 22:03, 23 December 2020 (UTC)

The article is only a society, cultural and pollitical level but not geographicaly. --Terlines (talk) 21:05, 25 December 2020 (UTC)

That doesn't affect the issue as it's the same result either way. On the grounds mentioned, Eurasia is also the preferred term, note also, the growing Eurasian Union. DxRxXxZx (talk) 21:37, 25 December 2020 (UTC)

I think you are confusing politics with culture. The culture of Russia belongs to the culture of Eastern Europe (Orthodox Christianity). Politically, no country in the Eurasian Union is in Western politics. In addition, there are countries of Muslim Turkic culture (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) that are part of this organization. In NATO, for example, Turkey is a member of the organization but is not included in the Western world since it is a Muslim Turkic country. --Terlines (talk) 00:04, 26 December 2020 (UTC)

Russia's culture is not solely descendent of Europe (noting as well that Europe and Western are not equivalent, tho often Europe only refers to Western Europe.) Moreover, if this is the argument then the Americas should be revised and labelled Europe. As this doesn't make any sense however, Eurasia is the more appropriate term for a transcontinental stretch. Vladivostok and Novosibirsk are obviously not Europe, and don't identify as Europe any more than America does. Russia as well is in both European and Asian organizations, highlighting it's transcontinental status. So politically and geographically, there is no difference. Eurasian is the concise and appropriate term choice. Lets leave the discussion here however, and allow others to comment. DxRxXxZx (talk) 00:37, 26 December 2020 (UTC)

I think Terliners has the point here. Regardless geographically Russia's larger part lies in Asia, the European cultural/social/political scope is meant. However, we have to know how the source/author expressed exactly this, and there may not be confusion, since we have to represent that interpretations that are in the given sources.(KIENGIR (talk) 01:02, 26 December 2020 (UTC))

Huntington???

Huntington's nomination for the National Academy of Sciences was rejected after he was accused of misusing mathematics and engaging in pseudo-science. Therefore his views should neither be given such prominence, nor used as the basis for a map.Leutha (talk) 11:37, 25 February 2021 (UTC)

Leutha, even through Huntington's ideas are philosophical or pseudoscience he is influential. I think the main problem of the article is more that there is plenty of undue weight given to him. Its almost as if he is given the right here to define the issue here. He should be mentioned among a series of philosophers and thinkers who have provided their views on the Western world, for example Miguel de Unamuno. Dentren | ^Talk 15:16, 31 March 2021 (UTC)

Wikipedia elevating Huntington's dated and lowly-regarded map

Why is Samuel Huntington's map being given such prominence by Wikipedia at the top of this page ? He's generally not well-regarded by international relations experts, either in his conclusions or in his methodology. Not only that, but his supposedly 'epochal' map is rooted in and dated by a very specific historical time and place. Writing almost thirty years ago, he saw the Yugoslavian war as being the barometer of allegiances in Europe, for instance. He probably expected that ex-communist South Eastern European countries would not join the EU, as they did. This is highly dated and very specifically of its time, and should not be at the top of the page.

I am removing it, just for the moment, pending any convincing refutation of these points, or particular reason to keep.

Jeremiad469 (talk) 01:53, 25 March 2021 (UTC)

Hi Jeremiad, I have reverted your edits which removed the world map. There has been a lot of conversation & consensus-building preceding this map. This conversation can be re-opened of course, but I recommend we avoid unilateral changes until a new consensus is reached. Morgengave (talk) 14:02, 25 March 2021 (UTC)

Hello Morgengave, I understand your objections but I believe there is good reason to challenge the inclusion of the map urgently. It has been quoted often and in many sources online from wikipedia, but is not considered academically credible by most researchers, so I think the benefit of the doubt should be against it unless proved otherwise. I will seek to sum up the reasons below.

Jeremiad469 (talk) 15:41, 25 March 2021 (UTC)

Fuller explanation of removal

While I still have a little time, and the topics are still fresh, some thoughts to put some flesh on the bones of the points above.

The most fundamental and simple point, that Huntington has gone from being a lowly regarded thinker many of whose predictions were uncertain, to being simultaneously an academically lowly regarded thinker many of whose predictions have specifically been proven wrong, still stands on its own as a doubled up reason for removing the map, but there are several more detailed points to be made.

The map should be understood in its context. As a scion of the US Cold War foreign policy establishment, Huntington and the institutions he was associated with were very worried by two particular developments at the moment of writing in 1993.

At the end of the Cold War, and the turn of the 1990s, the US, and George Bush Sr's administration in particular, had assumed, roughly, a unipolar liberal democratic order with the US as the head and exemplar - pace Fukuyama.

Instead, the US foreign policy establishment was suddenly faced with two very nasty surprises, for a group of people for whom great-power and balance-of-power theories were lifeblood ; Yugoslavia had suddenly descended into war, apparently entirely on religious-historical grounds , and simultaneously the US was suddenly becoming more aware of strategic errors it had made in the Middle East during the Cold War. At the time Huntington first started the article, in 1993 , the Serbo-Croat conflict, dating in reality as much to European strategic realpolitik of pre-World War I as to religious differences it capitalised on, had just spiralled further out of control, to take in a disastrous Christian-Muslim clash in Bosnia, which would go on to spread out further to Kosovo. American officials and policymakers, as well a broad mass of more radical post-modern thinkers at the time generally, believed they had underestimated the power of religion after the fall of communist ideology in Europe. Considering Russia's position in this, the most urgent strategic corollary and lesson, for the US in Europe at least, seemed to be that Russia may have been at the start of a process of pulling the Orthodox world back into its orbit , *despite* the end of communism.

At exactly the same time, in the wake of the defeat of the Communist government in Afghanistan partly by US-backed islamists, the Peshawar cross-community accords had just failed, and Islamists had just emerged as a distinct force in what had been previously been considered mainly a central theatre of the Cold War since the Russian invasion. The US foreign policy establishment was shocked by its errors in failing to predict the long-term consequences of supporting islamist forces against communism, as well as at other times against various secular-left and republican forces in other parts of the Middle East. This was relevant to the US position not only in Afghanistan, but crucially with Saudi Arabia, both as a monarchy and a conduit to Islamist influence all over the Sunni world at least. In the period Huntington was finishing the book three years later, thousands of people had been killed in Bosnia and the Taliban were about to take Kabul.

Part of the point so far is that there's no reason his thesis should not be understood as much, if not more, as an urgent manual for how a disorientated superpower should think in the world, at a particular time and place, and by a particular foreign policy functionary of 30 years - than any disinterested external academic analysis.

The framework was widely challenged and even mocked outside state-sponsored academic circles in the US in the mid-1990s, until one event revived it - September 11. Afghanistan, and the general rise of Islamism, had been major US foreign policy worries in 1993 when Huntington wrote his first article, and suddenly a Saudi islamist had launched a catastrophically destructive attack on US soil, from Afghanistan. There were plenty of US officials and policymakers who believed that not only the central concept of Huntington's prediction of a civilisational clash, but also the delineations of it, had been proven right. This also went on to inform George Bush Jr's actions in Afghanistan and Iraq. A number of neoconservatives believed that they were first bowing to the inevitable in his clash of civilisations, but then could also overcome this process by re-imposing the unipolar liberal democratic order, which transcended cultural boundaries, as a result of the conflict. This might have been a type of Hegelian thinking you could expect from previously Marxist thinkers.

To move back to Huntington, what has happened since then is the story of the gradual unravelling of various parts of his thesis.

For instance and to begin with, in his hierarchy of existential conflict, Huntington said that Muslim-Christian conflict would be a dominant organising principle, not intra-religious conflict. Because of the US invading Iraq and deposing a Sunni dictator, by the 2010s Iran had developed a sphere of influence stretching from the border with Afghanistan to Irag and Syria, through to Lebanon on the Mediterranean coast. This bloc then formed one half of the supply network for the catastrophic conflict in Syria and Yemen against the Sunni Muslim world, which has killed hundreds of thousands of people, with Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and also Turkey going on to champion the other side. The conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular is genuinely perceived by both sides as an existential fight for civilisational survival, which explains the ferocity of the conflict still going on in Yemen. In this conflict, Saudi Arabia not only cleaves closer to the West, but even Israel, than fellow Muslims, and Iran not only cleaves closer, but actually depends for its survival on the supposedly civilisationally and axiomatically opposed, according to Huntington's thesis, powers of Orthodox Russia and "Sinic" China.

If you move over to Europe, you're immediately struck again at how much Huntington's thesis has gone wrong. Because he was writing at the peak of the Yugoslav war for instance, he clearly imagined that Russia was at the start of exerting an ever-greater pull-factor in South-Eastern Europe by virtue of religion. Instead, not only have Bulgaria and Romania joined Nato and the EU, but now North Macedonia, Albania and even Montenegro are NATO members, too. Looking further afield, instead of feeling the inexorable pull of Russia, as in Huntington's model, Greece, as the only non ex-communist country Huntington characterised as part of the Eastern-Orthodox bloc, has clearly opted to bind itself into the Eurozone and the core of the mediterranean and north-west european EU, actually at any cost. In the process, during the Eurozone crisis, it also became even more obvious that the political economy and political culture of Greece, as by way of example a country with a strong grassroots and anarchist left, high regulation and a large public sector, had more in common, in a number of key respects, with Spain and Portugal, than its immediate neighbours. Without this, the Left mediterranean ( or Euro-atlantic, in the case of Portugal) parties of those countries would not have made, or been able to make, common cause against the EU north-western centre during the height of the Eurozone crisis, in the way they did. Cultural patterns related to this were already so obvious before the crisis, that Nicolas Sarkozy, with France itself in the conflicted position at the EU north-western centre but also as a Mediterranean nation sharing some of the characteristics, had attempted to found a "Mediterranean Union" around 2007-8, running along Spain, France, Italy and Greece, with Turkey and countries in North Africa on the balance of probability to be made next-tier members, on the strength of differences in their political and institutional set-up. This was actually an embryonic EU on a different geo-cultural basis, to be helped into being by French administrators once again. Instead, the real EU paid the ultimate tribute to it, and to how threateningly plausible the cultural substance of it actually was, by being extremely careful to knock it entirely on the head, and carefully broadened it into the essentially meaningless advisory talking shop of the "Union for the Mediterranean" , which has ended up having little influence, by including all of the EU and large parts of North Africa and the middle east.

It's too exhaustive to outline every area, but now let's have a look at South-East Asia. There are again clearly either major methodological errors, outdated research on the ground, or more probably both. When Huntington began writing in 1993, China was still an emergent middle-ranking power, not a superpower, and India was only recently emerging from a politically non-aligned status with the West - as well as negligible spheres of economic and political influence. India has now entirely moved away from a non-aligned position, but is also in simultaneous increasing conflict with China. Looking further around again, the idea that Myanmar is not now more heavily in the 'Sinic' sphere of influence than the "Buddhist Bloc" Huntington instinctively puts it in would be considered odd by many analysts today. This is because China has outgrown the political, economic and cultural role Huntington put it in.

Finally, let's have a look at Latin America. Huntington's thesis, that the entirety of Latin America is non "Western", is strikingly less nuanced, more broadbrush, and immediately more odd than for any other continent. This is probably why it was one of the most immediately questioned, contested and even ridiculed when it first came out. Chomsky's thoughts on it are useful, because they relate to points made earlier. Taking into account Huntington's personal and historical background, his account could easily be described as reflecting the history and justifications of US foreign policy, and a mandate for more in the future ; or a mandate "for the US to interfere or invade as often, or over as large an area as possible", as I think Chomsky more straightforwardly put it.

It's mentioned above, but it bears repeating : Huntington was not some random disinterested academic observer. He was an absolute stalwart of US Cold War total-realpolitik, who had been so obsessive about winning against Vietnam in 1968 for geo-strategic reasons, for instance, that he suggested deporting the entire Vietnamese population to the countryside if it was necessary to win the conflict, but without any of the underlying moral or cultural anger of later conservative strategists. He influenced ultra-realpolitik in the region throughout the '70s, which by the turn of the 1980s had culminated in one of the most astonishing moves in the history of US foreign policy, with both Reagan ( and Thatcher) ending up covertly supporting the genocidal Marxist-Leninist party of Pol Pot in exile purely on the grounds of Vietnamese policy. The point here, is that Huntington was almost as pragmatically opportunistic, rather than culturally driven, a thinker as you could possibly imagine, but here was giving a cultural analysis simply because it seemed contingent at the particular time, and was also influenced by post-modern trends of that time .

If you work from this starting-point, it's quite hard to discount anyone saying that there are good personal, professional-historical or bureaucratic reasons to be most suspicious of all of Huntington's Latin American continental characterisation, which is also the most immediately unorthodox and blanket continental characterisation of all of them. Purely because of geographical proximity, the US intervened more directly, widely and almost uniformly, and over a longer period of time, across the whole of the Latin American continent than anywhere else in the world.

An objection to all this might run : "OK, there a few errors here and there, but aren't the rough contours of the characterisation "roughly about right" ? Doesn't someone in Scotland still have more in common with someone in Germany than in Saudi Arabia ? Haven't we seen Christian-Muslim conflict" ?

The problem is that Huntington's analysis is *not* a quantitative analysis of trends, charting the balance of historical and cultural push-and-pull factors in certain places, a spectrum of more-or-less : it's qualitative and deterministic. All countries are fundamentally bound by the same equivalent historical forces, to organise themselves into the same equivalent historical groups, to fight their most existential and defining conflicts. If some of this doesn't work, none of it works. Jeremiad469 (talk) 15:45, 25 March 2021 (UTC)

@Jeremiad469: Criticism to Huntington's Clash of Civilizations theory is not new (already existed in the 1990s). And there is also a list of arguments in favor. I believe many contributors to this article are aware of both. I think it's valid to re-open the conversation on the map, and enlist other users in it. I however don't see any urgent need to remove the consensus map at this moment, and I don't think you should unilaterally. Also, consider that the consensus map was reached after lengthy conversations involving many contributors. Morgengave (talk) 18:07, 25 March 2021 (UTC)

Hello Morgengave. Criticism of Huntington's schema certainly isn't new, but nearly all the points above effectively are, as they explicitly relate to specific disconfirmations of his scheme over the last ten years, when academic discussion of his work has already gone out of fashion. Although I think removing the header map is— a priority, both on the grounds of the prevailing academic view and recent disconfirmation, I do agree it is reasonable to ask for broader democratic consensus here before permanently removing. I would be interested in hearing others' views on some of the points above. Jeremiad469 (talk) 18:14, 25 March 2021 (UTC)

I suppose that the more recent elements you bring are mostly relevant for the "Clash of Civilizations" article, yet not so much for this one. This is because the map uses his civilizational classification and not his quasi-deterministic thesis on clashes between these civilizations. Secondly, the map uses his classification including his nuance and reflections on the Latin-American and Orthodox areas, which explains why they are colored along. This fits with the trends you refer to such as the EU/NATO integration realizations/aspirations in many Orthodox countries. Also, take into account that some of the consensus-like criticism on Huntington has been included, which explains why Papua New Guinea f.e. is not part of the Western World on the map, whereas in Huntington's thinking it was. Morgengave (talk) 09:56, 26 March 2021 (UTC)

Morgengave, is that a consensus map or map for which there is no consensus to remove? These are two different things. "Consensus map" imply some legitimacy. Dentren | ^Talk 16:42, 31 March 2021 (UTC)

Dentren, the former. The current map came after lots of discussions and voting involving ultimately ~30 editors. See one of the earlier conversations on this talk page. This then led to the current/established map. I am open to re-opening this conversation. I just don't think (seen this context/background) that the unilateral action of one (well-intentioned/good-faith) editor is the right way forward. The best next step may be to formally re-open the conversation (with a formal proposal such as "remove the map" or "proposal to change the map into <option>" and involve a wider group of editors. Morgengave (talk) 17:21, 31 March 2021 (UTC)

Morgengave, I saw the discussion. Given that the map and the undue wieght given to Huntington continues to be a source of contention, shouldnt it be wiser to begin thinking about creating a new map for the top of the page, one with multiple definitions represented, and not only based on Huntingtons reflections. Meanwhile the present consensus map could be moved down a bit in the article. Dentren | ^Talk 18:45, 31 March 2021 (UTC)

Dentren: It's not up to me individually - I am just one of many contributors. I do think the right way forward is to involve the wider community of editors first, amongst others because the previous conversations and alignments were explicitly about what map to put in the lede. I still fail to see why the normal process (i.e. formally reopening the conversation, coming with new proposals and sources, involving the community) wouldn't be appropriate. If you have multiple reliable sources pointing to a different map, it shouldn't be too controversial or cumbersome to get support for it anyway. I am in any case personally interested in learning more. Morgengave (talk) 19:09, 31 March 2021 (UTC)

you are correct in that that is the right way to go. Since it would consume more time than I am willing to waste now I wont push much further. for now I intend to probe opinions in the topic. You answer has been vary helpful. Dentren | ^Talk 19:12, 31 March 2021 (UTC)

Dentren: I understand. But even if you don't want to pursue it yourself, it may still be useful to share the sources or authors you had in mind so someone else could pick it up. Morgengave (talk) 19:25, 31 March 2021 (UTC)

Jeremiad469, your view is certainly interesting, although there are few things that are at least debatable (China as a superpower, etc.). Your problem with the article could have several solutions; 1) if you provide relevant sources, another better picture could be created to replace this one in the introduction, Huntington's view could move elsewhere, or 2) we could have here two pictures, 3) Huntington's picture can be changed to include other people's opinions, 4) below the image it is possible to add some clarification to the caption, like that his view does not represent the definitive classification of the West (or something similar). Anyway, you should have a broader consensus on any changes first, as this topic has been previously exhaustively consulted. You could start by listing exactly what changes you want in the image and why, and listing all the relevant sources. Jirka.h23 (talk) 05:09, 4 April 2021 (UTC)

Europe and Albania

Albania needs to be included as part of the Western world. Even though the designation "Western World" is not precise by any stretch of the imagination, exhibiting levels of fluidity and being under continual renegotiation, considering the origins of the West conceived initially as a self-defined Graeco-Roman identity, and the re-circumscription of that identity under the overarching realm of Christendom, the region, the peoples, and the ethnicity that constitute Albania have very much been a part of all these currents, from antiquity through medieval Christendom, and despite later being conquered by the Ottomans, Albania today stands closer to a European identity than any other. From any which way you slice it, the arguments in favour of including Albania as part of the West far outweigh any arguments against. Please be serious and edit the article to make this correction. 75.119.238.209 (talk) 20:08, 11 April 2021 (UTC) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.119.238.209 (talk) 02:17, 9 April 2021 (UTC)