Jump to content

Mau Mau rebellion

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Pabailie (talk | contribs) at 01:41, 8 February 2007 (removed some emotive language; some errors of fact corrected). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Mau Mau redirects here. For other possible meanings, see Mau Mau (disambiguation).
Mau Mau Uprising
Date1952 - 1960
Location
Kenya
Result British military victory but eventual Kenyan independence.
Belligerents
Mau Mau British Empire
Commanders and leaders
Waruhiu Itote
Dedan Kimathi
Stanley Mathenge		 Evelyn Baring(Governor)
General Sir George Erskine
Strength
Unknown 10,000 regular troops (British and African) 21,000 police, 25,000 home guard[1]
Casualties and losses
10,527 KIA, 2633 captured in action, 26,625 arrested, 2714 surrendered, 70,000 - 100,000 interned [2] African civilians killed 1826 (recorded, but most unrecorded), African civilians wounded 918; Asian civilians killed 26, Asian civilians wounded 36; European civilians killed 32, European civilians wounded 26; African security forces killed 534, African security forces wounded 465; Asian security forces killed 3, Asian security forces wounded 12; European security forces killed 63, European security forces wounded 102.[3]
Map of Kenya

The Mau Mau Uprising was an insurgency by Kenyan rebels against the British colonial administration that lasted from 1952 to 1960. The core of the resistance was formed by members of the Kikuyu tribe, along with smaller numbers of Embu and Meru. The uprising did not succeed militarily, but did create a rift between the white settler community in Kenya and the Home Office in London that set the stage for Kenyan independence in 1963. It is sometimes called the Mau Mau Rebellion or the Mau Mau Revolt, or in official documents, the Kenya Emergency.

The name Mau Mau for the rebel movement wasn't coined by the Kikuyu; instead they called it Muingi ("The Movement"), Muigwithania ("The Understanding"), Muma wa Uiguano ("The Oath of Unity") or simply "The KCA", after the Kikuyu Central Association that created the impetus for the insurgency.

Etymology

The meaning of the term Mau Mau is much debated. Proffered etymologies include:

  • it is the name of a range of hills
  • it was a nonsense word created by British settlers to demean the rebels and simplify their complicated organizational structure
  • it is an acronym for "Mzungu Aende Ulaya — Mwafrika Apate Uhuru". This Swahili phrase translates in English to, "Let the white man go back abroad so the African can get his independence."
  • it is a mistransliteration of "Uma Uma" which translates in English to "Get out Get out"

Origins of the Mau Mau uprising

The Uprising occurred as a result of long simmering political, economic and racial tensions coupled with the apparent lack of peaceful political solutions.

Economic deprivation of the Kikuyu

For several decades prior to the eruption of conflict, the occupation of land by European settlers was an increasingly bitter point of contention. Most of the land appropriated was in the central highlands of Kenya, which had a cool climate compared to the rest of the country and was inhabited primarily by the Kikuyu tribe. By 1948, 1.25 million Kikuyu were restricted to 2000 square miles (5,200 km²), while 30,000 settlers occupied 12,000 square miles (31,000 km²). The most desirable agricultural land was almost entirely in the hands of settlers.

During the course of the colonial period, European colonizers allowed about 120,000 Kikuyu to farm a patch of land on European farms in exchange for their labour. They were, in effect, tenant farmers who had no actual rights to the land they worked, but had previously called home. Between 1938 and 1946, settlers steadily demanded more days of labour, while further restricting Kikuyu access to the land. It has been estimated that the real income of Kikuyu squatters fell by 30% to 40% during this period and fell even more sharply during the late 1940s. This effort by settlers, which was essentially an attempt to turn the tenant farmers into agricultural labourers, exacerbated the Kikuyus' bitter hatred of the white settlers. The Kikuyu later formed the core of the highland uprising.

As a result of the poor situation in the highlands, thousands of Kikuyu migrated into cities in search of work, contributing to the doubling of Nairobi's population between 1938 and 1952. At the same time, there was a small, but growing, class of Kikuyu landowners who consolidated Kikuyu lands and forged strong ties with the colonial administration, leading to an economic rift within the Kikuyu. By 1953, almost half of all Kikuyus had no land claims at all. The results were worsening poverty, starvation, unemployment and overpopulation. The economic bifurcation of the Kikuyu set the stage for what was essentially a civil war within the Kikuyu during the Mau Mau Revolt.

KCA begins to organize the central highlands

While historical details remain elusive, sometime in the late 1940s the General Council of the banned Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) began to make preparations for a campaign of civil disobedience involving all of the Kikuyu in order to protest the land issue. The members of this initiative were bound together through oath rituals that were traditional among the Kikuyu and neighbouring tribes. Those taking such oaths often believed that breaking them would result in death by supernatural forces. The original KCA oaths limited themselves to civil disobedience, but later rituals obliged the oath taker to fight and kill Europeans.

These oath rituals, which often included animal sacrifice or the ingestion of blood, would certainly have seemed bizarre to the settlers. However, the oaths became the focus of much speculation and gossip by settlers. There were rumors about cannibalism, ritual zoophilia with goats, sexual orgies, ritual places decorated with intestines and goat eyes, and that oaths included promises to kill, dismember and burn settlers. While many of these stories were possibly exaggerated for effect, they helped convince the British government to send assistance to the settlers.

East African Trades Union Congress and the "Forty Group"

While the KCA continued its oath rituals and creation of secret committees throughout the so-called White Highlands, the centre of the resistance moved towards the still-forming trade union movement in Nairobi. On 1 May 1949, six trade unions formed the East African Trades Union Congress (EATUC). In early 1950 the EATUC ran a campaign to boycott the celebrations over the granting of a Royal Charter to Nairobi, because of the undemocratic white-controlled council that ran the city. The campaign proved a great embarrassment to the colonial government. It also led to violent clashes between African radicals and loyalists.

Following a demand for Kenyan independence on 1 May 1950, the leadership of the EATUC was arrested. On 16 May, the remaining EATUC officers called for a general strike that paralyzed Nairobi for nine days and was broken only after 300 workers had been arrested and the British authorities made a show of overwhelming military force. The strike spread to other cities and may have involved 100,000 workers; Mombasa was paralyzed for two days. Nevertheless, the strike ultimately failed and the EATUC soon collapsed after its senior leadership was imprisoned.

Following this setback, the remaining union leaders focused their efforts on the KCA oath campaign to set the basis for further action. They joined with the "Forty Group", which was a roughly cohesive group mostly composed of African ex-servicemen conscripted in 1940 that included a broad spectrum of Nairobi from petty crooks to trade unionists. In contrast to the oaths used in the highlands, the oaths given by the Forty Group clearly foresaw a revolutionary movement dedicated to the violent overthrow of colonial rule. Sympathizers collected funds and even acquired ammunition and guns by various means.

The closing of political options and the Central Committee

In May 1951, the British Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, visited Kenya, where the Kenya African Union (KAU) presented him with a list of demands ranging from the removal of discriminatory legislation to the inclusion of 12 elected black representatives on the Legislative Council that governed the colony's affairs. It appears that the settlers were not willing to give in completely, but expected Westminster to force some concessions. Instead, Griffith ignored the KAU's demands and proposed a Legislative Council in which the 30,000 white settlers received 14 representatives, the 100,000 Asians (mostly from South Asia) got six, the 24,000 Arabs one, and the five million Africans five representatives to be nominated by the government. This proposal removed the last African hopes that a fair and peaceful solution to their grievances was possible.

In June 1951, the urban radicals captured control of the formerly loyalist Nairobi KAU by packing KAU meetings with trade union members. They then created a secret Central Committee to organize the oath campaign throughout Nairobi. The Central Committee quickly formed armed squads to enforce its policies, protect members from the police, and kill informers and collaborators.

In November 1951 the Nairobi radicals attempted to take control of the national KAU at a countrywide conference, but were outmanoeuvred by Jomo Kenyatta, who secured the election for himself. Nevertheless, pressure from the radicals forced the KAU to adopt a pro-independence position for the first time.

The Central Committee also began to extend its oath campaign outside of Nairobi. Their stance of active resistance won them many adherents in committees throughout the White Highlands and the Kikuyu reserves. As a result, the KCA's influence steadily fell until by the start of the actual Uprising it had authority only in Kiambu District. Central Committee activists grew bolder — often killing opponents in broad daylight. The houses of Europeans were set on fire and their livestock hamstrung. These warning signs were ignored by the Governor, Sir Philip Mitchell, who was only months away from retirement, and Mau Mau activities were not checked.

The first reaction against the uprising

In June 1952, Henry Potter replaced Mitchell as Acting Governor. A month later. he was informed by the colonial police that a Mau Mau plan for rebellion was in the works. Collective fines and punishments were levied on particularly unstable areas, oath givers were arrested and loyalist Kikuyu were encouraged to denounce the resistance. Several times in mid-1952 Jomo Kenyatta, who would go on to become independent Kenya's first President, gave in to the pressure and gave speeches attacking the Mau Mau. This prompted the creation of at least two plots within the Nairobi Central Committee to assassinate Kenyatta as a British collaborator before he was saved through his eventual arrest by the colonial authorities, who believed that Kenyatta was the head of the resistance.

On 17 August 1952, the Colonial Office in London received its first indication of the seriousness of the rebellion in a report from Acting Governor Potter. On 6 October, Sir Evelyn Baring arrived in Kenya to take over the post of Governor. Quickly realizing that he had a serious problem, on 20 October 1952 Governor Baring declared a State of Emergency.

State of Emergency

On the same day as the Emergency was declared, troops and police arrested nearly 100 leaders, including Jomo Kenyatta, in an operation named Jock Scott. Up to 8,000 people were arrested during the first 25 days of the operation. It was thought that Operation Jock Scott would decapitate the rebel leadership and that the Emergency would be lifted in several weeks. The amount of violence increased, however; two weeks after the declaration of the Emergency the first European was killed.

While much of the senior leadership of the Nairobi Central Committee was arrested, the organization was already too well entrenched to be uprooted by the mass arrests. Local rebel committees took uncoordinated decisions to strike back over the next few weeks and there was an abrupt rise in the destruction of European property and attacks on African loyalists. Also, a section of settlers had treated the declaration of Emergency as a license to perpetrate excesses against suspected Mau Mau.

British military presence

One battalion of the Lancashire Fusiliers was flown from the Middle East to Nairobi the first day of Operation Jock Scott. The 2nd Battalion of the King's African Rifles, already in Kenya, was reinforced with one battalion from Uganda and two companies from Tanganyika, part of current day Tanzania. The Royal Air Force sent pilots and Handley Page Hastings aircraft. The cruiser Kenya came to Mombasa harbor carrying Royal Marines. During the course of the conflict, other British units such as the Black Watch served for a short time. The British fielded 55,000 troops in total over the course of the conflict, although the total number did not exceed more than 10,000 at any one time. The majority of the security effort was borne by the kenya Police and the Tribal Police / Home Guard.

Initially, British forces had little reliable intelligence on the strength and structure of the Mau Mau resistance. Senior British officers thought that the Mau Mau Uprising was a sideshow compared to the Malayan Emergency. Over the course of the conflict, some soldiers either could not or would not differentiate between Mau Mau and non-combatants, and reportedly shot innocent Kenyans. Many soldiers were reported to have collected severed rebel hands for an unofficial five-shilling bounty, although this was done to identify the dead by their fingerprints. It is also alleged that some kept a scoreboard of their killings, but this practice was forbidden by the General Officer Commanding. Allegations of excesses by the Army and Police led General Hinde, officer in charge of all security forces, to issue stern warnings against any misbehaviour.

The Council of Freedom declares war

By January 1953, the Nairobi Central Committee had reconstituted its senior ranks and renamed itself the Council of Freedom. In a meeting it was decided to launch a war of liberation. In contrast to other liberation movements of the time, the urban Kenyan revolt was dominated by the blue-collar class and mostly lacked a socialist element. The network of secret committees was to be reorganized into the Passive Wing, and tasked with supplying weapons, ammunition, food, money, intelligence and recruits to the Active Wing, also known as the Land and Freedom Armies or, less accurately, the Land Army.

The Land and Freedom Armies, named after the two issues that the Kikuyu felt were most important, were mostly equipped with spears, simis (short swords), kibokos (rhino hide whips) and pangas (a type of machete made of soft iron). The panga, a common agricultural tool, was most widely used. Some rebels also tried to make their own guns, to add to the 460 precision made firearms they already possessed, but many of the homemade guns exploded when fired.

Mount Kenya

This declaration may be seen as a strategic mistake that the Council of Freedom was pushed into by its more aggressive members. The resistance did not have a national strategy for victory, had no cadres trained in guerrilla warfare, had few modern weapons and no arrangements to get more, and had not spread beyond the tribes of the central highlands most affected by the settler presence.

Nevertheless, the lack of large numbers of initial British troops, a high degree of popular support, and the low quality of colonial intelligence gave the Land and Freedom Armies the upper hand for the first half of 1953.

Large bands were able to move around their bases in the highland forests of the Aberdare mountain range and Mount Kenya killing Africans loyal to the government and attacking isolated police and Home Guard posts.

Over 1800 loyalist Kikuyu ( Christians, landowners, government loyalists and other Mau Mau opponents) were killed. The Mau Mau, operating from the safety of the forests, attacked mostly by night. They attacked isolated farms, but occasionally also households in suburbs of Nairobi. Only the lack of firearms prevented the rebels from inflicting severe casualties on the police and settler community, which may have altered the eventual outcome of the Uprising.

The Land and Freedom Armies had lookouts and stashes for clothes, weapons and even an armoury. Still they were short of equipment. They used pit traps to defend their hideouts in Mount Kenya forests. The rebels organized themselves with a cell structure but many armed bands also used British military ranks and organizational structures. They also had their own judges that could hand out fines and other penalties, including death. Associating with non-Mau Mau was punishable by a fine or worse. An average Mau Mau band was about 100 strong. The different leaders of the Land and Freedom Armies rarely coordinated actions, reflecting the lack of cohesion to the entire rebellion. Three of the dominant Active Wing leaders were Stanley Mathenge; Waruhiu Itote (known as General China), leader of Mount Kenya Mau Mau; and Dedan Kimathi, leader of Mau Mau of Aberdare forest.

Response of the settlers and government

On 24 January 1953 Mau Mau, possibly former servants, killed settlers Mr. and Mrs. Ruck, as well as their six-year-old son, on their farm with pangas. White settlers reacted strongly to the insecurity. Many of them dismissed all of their Kikuyu servants because of the fear that they could be Mau Mau sympathizers. Settlers, including women, armed themselves with any weapon they could find, and in some cases built full-scale forts on their farms. Many white settlers also joined auxiliary units like the Kenya Police Reserve (which included an active air wing), and the Kenya Regiment, a territorial army regiment.

British colonial officials were also suspicious of the Kikuyu and took measures. They initially thought the Kikuyu Central Association was the political wing of the resistance. They made carrying an illegal gun and associating with Mau Mau capital offences. In May 1953, the Kikuyu Home Guard became an official part of the security forces. It became the significant part of the anti-Mau Mau effort. Most Home Guard were members of the Kikuyu tribe ( the Home Guard was subsequently re-named the Kikuyu Guard) especially those converted to Christianity. They organized their own intelligence network and made punitive sweeps into areas that were suspected of harbouring or supporting Mau Mau.

On 25 March–26 March, 1953 nearly 1,000 rebels attacked the loyalist village of Lari, where about one hundred and seventy non-combatants were hacked or burnt to death. Most of them were the wives and children of Kikuyu Home Guards serving elsewhere. This raid was widely reported in the British media, contributing greatly to the notion of the Mau Mau as bloodthirsty savages. In the weeks that followed, some suspected rebels were summarily executed by police and loyalist Home Guards, and many other Mau mau implicated in the Lari massacre were subsequently brought to trial and hanged.

The urban resistance spreads

In April 1953, a Kamba Central Committee was formed. The Kamba rebels were all railwaymen and effectively controlled the railway workforce, and the Kamba were also the core of African units in the Army and Police. Despite this, only three acts of sabotage were recorded against the railway lines during the emergency.

At the same time rebel Maasai bands became active in Narok district before being crushed by soldiers and police who were tasked with preventing a further spread of the rebellion.

Despite a police roundup in April 1953, the Nairobi committees organized by the Council of Freedom continued to provide badly needed supplies and recruits to the Land and Freedom Armies operating in the central highlands.

Realizing that the blue-collar unions were a hotbed of rebel activity, the colonial government created the Kenya Federation of Registered Trade Unions (KFRTU) for white-collar unions as a moderating influence. By the end of 1953, it had gained a Luo general secretary who was a nationalist, but also opposed the revolt. Early in 1954 the KFRTU undermined a general strike that was called by the Central Committee.

The British gain the initiative

In June 1953 General Sir George Erskine arrived and took up the post of Director of Operations, where he revitalized the British effort. A military draft brought in 20,000 troops who were used aggressively. The Kikuyu reserves were designated "Special Areas", where anyone failing to halt when challenged could be shot. This was often used as an excuse for the shooting of suspects, so this provision was subsequently abandoned.

The Aberdares Range and Mount Kenya were declared "Prohibited Areas", within which no person could enter without governemnt clearance. Those found within the Prohibited Area could be shot on sight.

The colonial government created so-called pseudo-gangs composed of de-oathed and turned ex-Mau Mau and allied Africans, sometimes headed by white officers. They infiltrated Mau Mau ranks and made search and destroy missions. Pseudo-gangs also included white settler volunteers who disguised themselves as Africans. the Pseudo-gang concept was a highly successful tactic against the Mau Mau.

In late 1953 security forces swept the Aberdare forest in the Operation Blitz and captured and killed 125 guerrillas. Despite such large-scale offensive operations, the British found themselves unable to stem the tide of insurgency.

It was not until the British realized the extent of the rebel organization, and the importance of the urban rebel committees and unions, that they gained a strategic success. On 24 April 1954, the Army launched "Operation Anvil" in Nairobi and the city was put under military control. Security forces screened 30,000 Africans and arrested 17,000 on suspicion of complicity, including many people that were later revealed to be innocent. The city remained under military control for the rest of the year. About 15,000 Kikuyu were interned and thousands more were deported to the Kikuyu reserves in the highlands west of Mount Kenya. However, the heaviest weight fell on the unions.

While the sweep was very inefficient, the sheer number was overwhelming. Entire rebel Passive Wing leadership structures, including the Council for Freedom, were swept away to detention camps and the most important source of supplies and recruits for the resistance evaporated.

Having cleared Nairobi, the authorities repeated the exercise in other areas so that by the end of 1954 there were 77,000 Kikuyu in detention camps. About 100,000 Kikuyu squatters were deported back to the reserves. In June 1954, a policy of compulsory villagization was started in the reserves to allow more effective control and surveillance of pro-Mau Mau civilians and to better protect pro-government civilians. When the program reached completion in October 1955, 1,077,500 Kikuyu had been resettled in 854 villages.

The beginning of the end

File:IanHenderson 1964.jpg
Ian Henderson was one of the colonial police officers credited with capturing Kimathi and suppressing the Uprising. He was deported from Kenya after its independence.

The inability of the rebels to protect their supply sources marked the beginning of the end. The Passive Wing in the cities had disintegrated under the roundups and the rural Passive Wing was in state of siege on the central highlands and reserves. Forced to spend all their energy to survive, and cut off from sources of new recruits, the Land and Freedom Armies withered.

In 1953 some 15,000 Mau Mau guerrillas were at large. In January 1954 the King's African Rifles began Operation Hammer. They combed the forests of Aberdare mountains but met very little resistance; most guerrillas had already left. Eventually the operation was moved to the Mount Kenya area. There they captured substantial numbers of guerrillas and killed 24 of 51 band leaders. The Mau Mau were forced deeper into forest. By September 1956, only about 500 rebels remained.

In 1955, an amnesty was declared. It both absolved Home Guard members from prosecution and gave rebel soldiers a chance to surrender. Peace talks with the rebels collapsed on May 20, 1955 and the Army began its final offensive against the Aberdare region. Pseudo-gangs were used heavily in the operation. By this time Mau Mau were low on supplies and practically out of ammunition.

The last Mau Mau leader, Dedan Kimathi, was captured by Kikuyu Tribal Police on 21 October 1956 in Nyeri with 13 remaining guerrillas, and was subsequently hanged in early 1957. His capture marked the effective end of the Uprising, though some Mau Mau remained in the forests until 1963 and the the Emergency remained in effect until January 1960.

Political and social concessions by the British

Despite the fact that the British military had won a clear victory, Kenyans had been granted nearly all of the demands made by the KAU in 1951 as the carrot to the military's stick. In June 1956, a program of villiagisation and land reform consolidated the land holdings of the Kikuyu, a popular reform thereby expanding the number of Kikuyu allied with the colonial government. This was coupled with a relaxation of the ban on Africans growing coffee, a primary cash crop, leading to a drastic rise in the income of small farmers over the next ten years.

In the cities the colonial authorities decided to dispel tensions after Operation Anvil by raising urban wages, thereby strengthening the hand of moderate union organizations like the KFRTU. By 1956, the British had granted direct election of African members of the Legislative Assembly, followed shortly thereafter by an increase in the number of African seats to fourteen. A Parliamentary conference in January 1960 indicated that the British would accept "one person — one vote" majority rule.

These political measures were taken to end the instability of the Uprising by appeasing Africans both in the cities and country and encouraging the creation of a stable African middle class, but also required the abandonment of settler interests. This was possible because while the settlers dominated the colony politically, they owned less than 20% of the assets invested in Kenya. The remainder belonged to various corporations who were willing to deal with an African majority government as long as the security situation stabilized. The choice that the authorities in London faced was between an unstable colony, which was costing a fortune in military expenses, run by settlers who contributed little to the economic growth of the Empire, or a stable colony run by Africans that contributed to the coffers of the Empire. The latter option was the one, in effect, taken.

Casualties

The official number of Kenyan rebels killed has been estimated at 11,503, but David Anderson places the actual number at higher than 20,000, and Caroline Elkins claims it is probably at least as high as 70,000, perhaps much higher.

For security force casualties, see the information box at the top of the article.

Of particular note is the number of executions authorized by the courts. In the first eight months of the Emergency, only 35 rebels were hanged, but by November 1954, 756 had been hanged, 508 for offenses less than murder, such as illegal possession of firearms. By the end of 1954, over 900 rebels and rebel sympathizers had been hanged, and by the end of the Emergency, the total was over 1,000.

Look up Mau mau in Wiktionary, the free dictionary.
  • As a result of the events in Kenya, the verb "to mau mau" meaning "to menace through intimidating tactics; to intimidate, harass; to terrorize," entered English usage, especially in a political and/or racial context.
  • The 1955 novels Something of Value and Uhuru by Robert Ruark are written from the perspective of Dedan Kimathi and his friend Peter. Something of Value was made into a 1957 movie.
  • A gang in late 1950s New York City known for their violent attacks named themselves the Mau Maus, apparently after the fearsome reputation of the Kenyan rebels.
  • The Mau Maus were also a fictitious political hip-hop group in the 2000 Spike Lee film Bamboozled.
  • The black radical hip-hop group The Coup reference the Mau Mau Revolt in many of their songs, such as "Kill My Landlord" and "Dig It"

Bibliography

  • David Anderson. Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. ISBN 0-393-05986-3.
  • Caroline Elkins. Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain's Gulag in Kenya. ISBN 0-8050-8001-5.
  • Wunyabari O. Maloba. Mau-Mau and Kenya: An Analysis of a Peasant Revolt. ISBN 0-253-21166-2.
  • Zoe Marsh & G.W. Kingsnorth (1972). A History of East Africa. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-08348-6.
  • Ngugi wa Thiong'o (1967). A Grain of Wheat. ISBN 0-435-90987-8.
  • Henderson, Ian (1958). The Hunt for Kimathi. London: Hamish Hamilton. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)

Notes

  1. ^ Malcom Page "KAR: a history of the King's African Rifles" (London: Leo Cooper, 1998) p206
  2. ^ Malcom Page "KAR: a history of the King's African Rifles" (London: Leo Cooper, 1998) p206
  3. ^ Malcom Page "KAR: a history of the King's African Rifles" (London: Leo Cooper, 1998) p206

See also

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Mau_Mau_rebellion&oldid=106465905"