Talk:Franco-Prussian War

Archives (Index)

1 2

This page is archived by ClueBot III.

The historical assessment of the Franco-Prussian war

I think that the historical significance of the Franco-Prussian war, its influence on the course of further history, is not sufficiently disclosed. The article lacks a historical assessment of this war. Meanwhile, in history, the topic of the consequences of this war was addressed very often. For example, in the conditions of peace in 1918, which ended world war 1, the President of USA directly assessed it. President Wilson directly evaluated it and argued that the actions were unfair on the part of Germany, which annexed Alsace-Lorraine. I think you need to add the following snippet to the article:

The historical assessment of the Franco-Prussian war can be seen  in the Fourteen Points of President Wilson in 1918. Paragraph 8 stated: "All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, should be righted, in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interest of all".

Why do you think a political document represents the "historical assessment"? Parsecboy (talk) 13:00, 6 November 2020 (UTC)

I think you are wrong:

“History is past politics and politics present history.” 

― Edward Augustus Freeman, Lectures to American Audiences 93.81.211.195 (talk) 18:50, 6 November 2020 (UTC)

I don't think you understand my question. That quote is not relevant to it. First, let's have you define the phrase "historical assessment". Parsecboy (talk) 19:05, 6 November 2020 (UTC)

I understand that you believe that politicians ' judgments do not contain historical assessments. But this is not how it seems to me. Because politics and history are interlinked. Historical assessment - if you want to know my opinion-is a judgment of justice and rightness. For example, was Germany right in its demands to France over Alsace-Lorraine? 93.81.211.195 (talk) 19:14, 6 November 2020 (UTC)

No, "historical assessment" means the consensus of historians on a given topic (assuming there is one). You seem to be under the misapprehension that historians try to determine rightness or wrongness; they do not. History is not a continuation of politics by other means (despite the multitude of politicians who try to spin history for their purposes).

For example: a broad "historical assessment" of Japan's efforts during WWII might be that they never really had a chance to defeat the United States. One might also make an assessment about why Japan went to war with the United States. But historians would not try to assign rightness or wrongness to Japan's decision to go to war in 1941. Parsecboy (talk) 21:36, 6 November 2020 (UTC)

I think your problem is that you understand "historical assessment" only in a limited sense, so to speak, in the direction of achieving the goal. "It led to the achievement of the goal or did not lead to it" - this is how you understand historical rightness. For you, the concept of morality does not seem to exist. In this case, we are talking primarily about the moral side. Were the Germans are right from a moral point of view, when they demanded Alsace-Lorraine? That's what we're talking about. Without moral evaluations, you will get a flawed story. 93.81.208.195 (talk) 05:56, 7 November 2020 (UTC)

By the way, Japan has never had a goal to defeat the United States, as you understand it-to raise its flag over Washington or at least occupy the West coast of the United States. Japan acted, as it seemed, rationally. And the Japanese thought that they would repeat their success in a war with a large and strong enemy, as in the war with Russia in 1904-1905. That is, to inflict a series of defeats, capture territories and repel the enemy's counterattack, so that the latter understands the futility of the war and goes to an unprofitable peace treaty. This was the main calculation of the Japanese. That the enemy will accept defeat. Here again, the moral side. The Americans in 1941 considered their position morally correct and were determined to fight to victory. The Russians, too, did not accept the defeat of 1905; they considered themselves morally right. They were just waiting for the moment to return what the Japanese had taken from them. And returned it in 1945. 93.81.208.195 (talk) 07:09, 7 November 2020 (UTC)

Ok, I'll stop beating around the bush. You are an amateur with an amateur's understanding of history (which is to say, what the discipline is and what it seeks to do), and it seems you lack the competence to grasp the points I've made. I'll be clear: Wilson was not a historian. Even if he was, a single individual does not represent the "historical assessment". Your addition is flatly wrong, conflates a politician making a political point with historians who seek to understand and explain events, and will not be added to the article. I'm done wasting my time with this discussion. Parsecboy (talk) 10:50, 7 November 2020 (UTC)

Well, your right to your opinion. I also have an opinion. And if you have expressed an opinion about me, then I will Express an opinion about you. Fair enough? You are passionate about the technical and material side of things. As you can see, this is evident even in your special love for armadillos, etc. After reading this article about the Franco-Prussian war, you can easily conclude that it is mainly devoted to the topic of the calendar sequence of events, issues of weapons, military tactics, etc. All this is necessary, but it is only the outer shell of the history, but not the history itself. 93.81.210.219 (talk) 12:15, 7 November 2020 (UTC)

Here's the thing: I have actual training as a historian; you appear to have watched some documentaries or read some pop history books and consider yourself an expert. Your opinion has about much weight as that of climate change deniers. You clearly do not understand what history is as a discipline, or what historians do. Parsecboy (talk) 12:34, 8 November 2020 (UTC)

You repeat yourself. I think it is enough to Express your opinion about the interlocutor once. I haven't changed my opinion of you. History is undoubtedly a science. People who don't have a degree in history are entitled to an opinion in it. Not because history is easy to learn, but because Historia est magistra vita. 93.81.208.171 (talk) 13:54, 8 November 2020 (UTC)

I can speak in more detail. After reading the article, it seems that "French revanchism" was the main problem in international politics that eventually led to the war of 1914. But this is a completely false impression. Historical scholarship is dominated by the historical assessment of Germany's greater guilt. Of course, the severity of the charges may differ, but the general opinion does not change.

"There was 'a far-reaching consensus about the special responsibility of the German Reich' in the writings of leading historians, though they differed in how they weighted Germany's role. .  

It was Germany, with its annexation of Alsace and Lorraine, that opened the way for history to 1914. And in this we can fully agree with President Wilson's assessment. 93.81.211.195 (talk) 19:46, 6 November 2020 (UTC)

From what I have seen on French history, the very bitter French resentment of the 1870s-1880s had largely faded away by 1910 and was not a major cause of the war in 1914. Rjensen (talk) 03:12, 7 November 2020 (UTC)

I think you could add your opinion to the article. This would eliminate the erroneous impression of "French revanchism" as the main negative consequence of the Franco-Prussian war. 93.81.208.195 (talk) 05:56, 7 November 2020 (UTC)

ok I added material. Wilson was indeed a historian but his 1918 14 points statement is not about the CAUSES of the war in 1914 but instead specified his peace terms in 1918. French revanchism about ALsace-Lorraine was not a major cause of war in 1914 because it faded after 1880. J.F.V. Keiger says, "By the 1880s Franco-German relations were relatively good." [see J.F.V. Keiger, France and the World since 1870 (2001) pp 112–120, quoting p 113] Rjensen (talk) 15:02, 7 November 2020 (UTC)

I agree with you. The causes of the war of 1914 are very complex. But I still agree with the opinion that "the normalization of Franco-German relations was unattainable without resolving the question of belonging of Alsace-Lorraine". The solution could have been reached in various ways, not necessarily by moving from Germany to France. Other options were also possible, for example, the organization of a neutral state like Luxembourg and Belgium. Or something else. But without this, reconciliation between the French and the Germans was unattainable. "The fear of war was stronger for the French than the desire to regain what was lost." But this fear did not make the French pacifists". . The French consensus was that war was inevitable. . — Preceding unsigned comment added by 93.81.208.243 (talk) 19:00, 7 November 2020 (UTC)

We should all read Annika Mombauer's Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred-Year Debate on the Origins of World War I available online. She presents an update, as of 2015, of the debate among historians on the origins of WWI. If you take the trouble to read the article, you will not fail to notice that France seldom comes up in the debate, let alone Alsace-Lorraine and French revanchism, which are not mentioned once. For modern historians, the causes of WWI are to be found elsewhere.--Lubiesque (talk) 13:16, 8 November 2020 (UTC)

The reference to Annika Mombauer's work was not on the subject of the Alsace-Lorraine problem, but on the topic of the consensus about the special responsibility of the Germany (in the beginning of the war 1914). Therefore, I do not accept your reproach. To deny the existence of the Alsace-Lorraine problem for the normalization of Franco-German relations is simply wrong. 93.81.208.147 (talk) 16:57, 8 November 2020 (UTC)

References

Regarding "guilt" for WW1--

• Germany talked big -- but actually de-fused several earlier crises that could easily have erupted into war
• Germany had major advantages at the time of the two Morocco crises, or after Russia lost to Japan, or when the UK and France almost went to war over Sudan, or the "pig war" between Austria and Serbia, or the coup d'etat that changed the Serbian govt., or the two Balkan wars. But in every case -- Germany talked big and then acted to de-escalate.
• France had the motivation -- to retrieve Alsace Lorraine.
• Russia had the motivation -- to be in the right place to undo the Crimean war restrictions on the straits -- to grab Turkish territory when the Ottomans collapsed (as they believed they soon would).
• Russia mobilized first -- lied about it / hid it for days -- in 1914. Germany mobilized last.

I agree 100 percent that the overwhelming number of western historians in the first 60-70 years after the war assessed the "cause" or "guilt" of starting WW1 to the Central Powers...and specifically Germany. However, the modern assessments -- with the opening of Russian/Soviet archives and a look at the long view of history -- are more forgiving. The Great Powers generally did not talk to each other daily. No hotlines. Aloof leaders. UK especially seemed oblivious to its (slowly increasing) military obligations to France. UK gave mixed signals to the Central Powers. The UK/France/Russia did not allow Austria the space to deal with terrorist attacks from the post-1903 Serbian govt. All of this -- means the modern view is far more balanced. Chesspride216.144.161.51 (talk) 22:47, 20 January 2023 (UTC)

IMHO it is important to add that FRANCE declared war FIRST. Yes, Bismarck wanted the war -- to complete the unification of Germany/Prussia -- but FRANCE declared war first and mobilized. So we should take talk about how Prussia/Germany did France a "wrong" with a grain of salt. France lost. Napoleon III was removed. Many losing counties cede small bits of territory. France LOST but never accepted the loss. It seethed and raged and plotted for decades to return to Great Power status. It allied itself with Russia -- because as the late 19th century unfolded and the 20th century began, France had decided that war with Germany was the only way to get the territory back.

All of this matters because Wilson's words ring hollow -- France started the war that Bismarck wanted. What was missing -- was the US/Britain rebuff of later French attempts to rehabilitate its status as Great Power/dominant power on the Continent. France was allowed -- encouraged -- to talk big.

As in the article itself: According to some historians, Prussian chancellor Otto von Bismarck deliberately provoked the French into declaring war on Prussia in order to induce four independent southern German states—Baden, Württemberg, Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt—to join the North German Confederation; other historians contend that Bismarck exploited the circumstances as they unfolded. All agree that Bismarck recognized the potential for new German alliances, given the situation as a whole.[13]

France mobilised its army on 15 July 1870, leading the North German Confederation to respond with its own mobilisation later that day. On 16 July 1870, the French parliament voted to declare war on Prussia; France invaded German territory on 2 August. Chesspride216.144.161.51 (talk) 22:30, 20 January 2023 (UTC)

The regime of the Turkish Straits was defined in the London Convention of 1841 and Russia was generally satisfied with it, Russia without war and voluntarily took part in this convention. By the way, this speaks in favor of the statement that Russia did not have any aggressive expansionist plans in the direction of the Mediterranean. According to the results of the Crimean War, the so-called "neutralization of the Black Sea" was determined. Such a regime was abolished by the action of Russia in 1870 and enshrined in the London Convention of 1871 . 178.155.64.26 (talk) 06:16, 17 April 2023 (UTC)

The historical assessment of the Franco-Prussian war-2

As it was pointed out here, President Wilson is a historian by training. But nevertheless, his views on the historical assessment of the Franco-Prussian 1870-71 war are considered unworthy of mention by local interlocutors. A strange, very strange opinion, as I think. However, there are opinions of other historians who in fact largely coincide with the opinion of Wilson. We can cite this opinion, so that a historical assessment of the Franco-Prussian war can still be given. I think that after pointing out that" French revanchism " was not the main negative consequence of the Franco-Prussian war, it is necessary to say about the impact of this war on the history of Germany, because the main negative consequence was the conservative and militaristic reaction in Germany.This is written by the historian Wawro.

Were the seeds of World War I planted with Bismarck’s decision to take Alsace-Lorraine? Had the Germans, as Tsar Alexander II declared in 1870, “created an inexpugnable hatred between the peoples?” (...) 

By forging a German nation and realizing the idealistic hopes of 1848 – when German liberals had tried and failed to create a German nation-state – the Prussian king and Junkers had grafted themselves tightly on to the German state. The war thus empowered a whole class of militarists who linked Germany’s health to war and expansion. Clear-headed Germans recognized this even in 1870 when one commentator deplored Wilhelm I’s creation of a “warrior state . . . based on the permanent use of war” to achieve political objectives. (...) 

The most cherished prerogative of the Prussian monarchs was their ability to command and organize armed forces and wage war without parliamentary oversight. This prerogative was the one most strongly reinforced by the Franco-Prussian War, which slid the keystone into a national mythology of struggle and conquest, whose first plastic manifestation was the victory column or Siegessaule erected after the war in Berlin. (...) One of the crowning panels, which depicts the king bravely enduring a French fusillade, encapsulated the German belief that strong armed forces wielded by a despotic monarch were a forgivable sin. The German liberals, who had unanimously deplored the illegal financing of the Prussian army by Bismarck, Roon, and Moltke in the 1860s, quickly forgave the “militarists” after Sedan (,,,) Against faint opposition like this, Kaiser Wilhelm II had far less difficulty than might otherwise have been expected driving Germany toward a catastrophic war in the years 1890–1914.(...) 
Who won the Franco-Prussian War? The answer to that question was never as obvious as it seemed. Just hours after Sedan – the greatest victory of the modern age – Vienna’s Neue Freie Presse reminded Bismarck that “nations tend to slip on the blood that they have shed. Victory is a poor advisor”.

93.81.210.171 (talk) 19:59, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

Here's a hint: a hundred-plus political document is not representative of the historical consensus on this particular issue. Given your clear lack of understanding about any of the issues at play here, I suggest you find something else to do. Parsecboy (talk) 20:20, 13 November 2020 (UTC)

I think that you show a clear bias towards the interlocutor, already for the 3rd time allowing yourself to express your opinion about him. Why do you repeat yourself? For my part, I encourage you to consider the topic more broadly. And not just limited to military-technical issues. 93.81.210.51 (talk) 05:46, 14 November 2020 (UTC)

I have a "bias" against you because you clearly don't know what you're talking about. I don't know how to weld. I also don't go into the local metal shop and tell them what they should be doing. As to the matter at hand, let me break it down for you:

1. A political document is not even necessarily representative of what Wilson himself thought as a historian, only what Wilson the politician thought most expedient at the time. If you are aware of Wilson and his relationship to the war, you will be familiar with why he brought the United States into the war, and what he was trying to accomplish in the peace negotiations. That should give you pause over using the Fourteen Points in the way that you suggest.
2. Even further, a historian from more than a century ago != a historian of today. Just as you would not trust a doctor trained in the 1880s to treat a cancer patient today, we do not accept the assessments of long-dead historians as equal to modern historians. There are many reasons for this. Chief among them is that history is always being revised, as more evidence is unveiled. Think of the histories of World War II written in the 1950s and 1960s that did not include Allied codebreaking efforts, because the historians were not aware. Further, and certainly applicable in this case, the way we do history is different; Wilson long predates the advent of interdisciplinary methods like social or cultural history. Go find an undergraduate historiography class to take, and it'll barely scratch the surface of all of this.
3. Even if we assume that the Fourteen Points is an accurate representation of what Wilson personally thought about the legacy of the war, and we set aside #2 for the sake of argument, he is but one person. There are hundreds, if not thousands, of historians who have written histories of World War I, its origins, and so forth. Picking one out of that pile and claiming it represents the "historical assessment" is patently absurd.
4. What you're trying to "prove" is inherently subjective. Whether Prussia was wrong in 1871 to take Alsace-Lorraine depends necessarily on whether you sympathize with France or with Prussia. You might as well ask whether it was wrong for France to take Alsace-Lorraine from the Holy Roman Empire. We're not going to grind any axes here, I'm afraid. Parsecboy (talk) 11:03, 14 November 2020 (UTC)

First of all, thank you for the detailed presentation of your position. As for your appeal to welding specialists, I can quote a Russian proverb, maybe it will be interesting. "The guy is gray (in the sense of not educated), but the Gray wolf did not eat his mind". In my opinion, history and politics are such things that you need to have your own opinion on, and not trust this topic to "experts". Like, "they know better". Here again, it is appropriate to repeat the saying "history is the teacher of life". I don't know if I've convinced you. To make this even clearer, I will quote a statement from the historian. "Military history was too serious a matter to be left to the military historians" . Perhaps this is so, that one opinion is not enough for a full presentation of the historical assessment. But if one opinion is deep enough and true, then this is already quite a lot. Although, of course, you can give more. But you, in the article we are talking about, have nothing at all. Nothing but military-technical details. Which, of course, are important, I repeat, but this is not enough. My main idea, which I consider important, is the main and negative consequence of this war-first of all for Germany. Because it led to the triumph of reaction, conservatism, and militarism. And since Germany began to play a huge role in world politics, it affected the entire world, the entire world history. I have already quoted the opinion of the Wawro historian. Here is another opinion - Howard.

For a generation that saw a weak country (Germany) ravaged by endless civil strife become a powerful power solely because of its military power, it was easy to determine priorities and realize that it was military power that should become the dominant factor in the nation's self – preservation, and the military caste, later, should dominate society. It was it is too easy to ignore the mistakes and problems that accompanied the German victories, the goddess of fortune who made them happen, and the political sobriety that made it possible to benefit from them. And it would be too easy to believe that the new German Empire, a country with magnificent and carefully preserved cultural traditions, a country that has something to show the world in the field of science, Commerce and industry, will switch to the language of guns in communication just by preserving and building up its military power with your neighbors and enemies. For this generation, the war of 1870-1871 was a heroic era, the deeds of those days are worthy of memory, admiration and, if necessary, it is not a sin to repeat them. It was this rhetoric that determined the way popular historians presented events, despite the truly academic and self-critical monographs that came out of the pen of the military themselves a decade after the end of the war, which preserved and multiplied the best traditions of education and erudition, towering over the prevailing in historical science empty chatter, distortion of facts, etc. a romantic dreaminess with a decidedly militaristic bent to it. German historians were later to realize the full significance of that war: how it brought to light the very "sinister problem of modern national war, which in turn gave rise to the most terrible of the catastrophes of our era, and into the abyss of which we are already twice in the XX century were overthrown». This is what turns the Franco-Prussian war into an event that goes far beyond the scope of purely military-historical research, and indeed historical research of events in Europe of the XIX century. Germany's magnificent and well-deserved victory was, in a profound and unpredictable sense, a disaster both for itself and for the rest of the world . 93.81.208.51 (talk) 19:38, 14 November 2020 (UTC)

That you would quote Howard's statement on military history, clearly not knowing at all what he's talking about, is representative of your whole problem. It has literally nothing to do with what you're trying to use it to support (in fact, the implications of the statement are quite the opposite). If you had even the slightest inkling of the development of the field of military history as a discipline, you would know what point he's making.

On not trusting experts; tell me why you don't go into hospitals and tell surgeons how to do an open-heart surgery.

As for your assertions about the effects of the war on Germany, even those are controversial. The Sonderweg is not without its critics. Parsecboy (talk) 20:23, 14 November 2020 (UTC)

When you said "you would quote Howard's statement on military history, clearly not knowing at all what he's talking about", it is only your opinion. You postulate it, and then give some analogies on the topic of appeal of technical specialists. Like, "they know better". I will quote Howard in more detail.

Like most neophyte military historians, at least of those days, I expected to be able to explain the war`s through events on the battlefields themselves; the skills of the commanders, the nature of the armaments, the efficiency of the supply systems, the discipline and courage of the troops. But it rapidly became clear that these explanations were not in themselves enough. Certainly the German - or more specifically, the Prussian - armies were better commanded, better disciplined, and better supplied; but why? What had happened within Germany itself during past fifty years to make this possible? Conversely, what had happened, or failed to happen, to France since the days of Napoleon to produce an army that turned so quickly into such a rabble? Gradually I came to realise, as I expressed it on the first page of the book, that the outcome of the war was 'the result not simply of faulty command but of faulty military system; and the military system of a nation is not an independent section of the social system but an aspect of it in its totality'. So a study of the war, indeed of any war, had to be rooted in a study, not simply of the armies, but of the societies that fought it. Military history was too serious a matter to be left to the military historians.

I wrote to you about this from the very beginning, that we should not limit ourselves to the consideration of military-technical issues only. And of course, a historical assessment of the war is necessary. 93.81.209.171 (talk) 08:05, 15 November 2020 (UTC)

You still don't get it, because you lack the contextual knowledge. Look at when Howard wrote the book: 1961. The 1960s was the beginning of a revolution in how military history was practiced. Before that, almost all military historians wrote was is now referred to as "drum and trumpet" military histories, that is, those that focused exclusively on weapons, tactics, and the course of a given battle. Most popular military history is still this way. Since the 1960s, academic military historians have incorporated many of the frameworks from social history to try to explain events. That is what Howard is talking about. And this is exactly why you don't just "have your own opinion" on something you read, because as this demonstrates, you don't what Howard is actually talking about, and you don't even know that you don't know.

And all of this also makes clear that you haven't actually read this article, and are merely here to insert a paragraph about how evil Prussia was for stealing Alsace-Lorraine, you haven't noticed that this article incorporates exactly the kind of material Howard talks about (in large part because it's quarried from Howard's book). There are sections that deal with assessments of various aspects of the war. Just not the specific one you demand. Parsecboy (talk) 11:39, 15 November 2020 (UTC)

I don't impose my opinion on anyone. But I also believe that the definition "drum and trumpet" military histories" applies to the article "Franco-Prussian war" in its current form. Some of the military technical details, a list of battles. Well, in the end, mention "the Crown Prince's marriage with the daughter of Queen Victoria". I think this is completely weak. 93.81.211.75 (talk) 14:24, 15 November 2020 (UTC)

As you clearly have not bothered to read the article, I'll treat your continued argumentation with the contempt it deserves: go troll somewhere else. Parsecboy (talk) 15:26, 15 November 2020 (UTC)

I assure you that I have carefully read the article "Franco-Prussian war". This topic is interesting to me, so I decided to get acquainted with the view of it abroad. And this completely disappointed me. 93.81.209.195 (talk) 16:22, 15 November 2020 (UTC)

Clearly you didn't. The Opposing forces section touches on some of the things Howard talks about, which the Aftermath section discusses in greater detail. What you are looking for, I'll reiterate, is text that blames Germany for taking Alsace-Lorraine and effectively causing World War I, but that is ahistorical nonsense. Parsecboy (talk) 17:43, 15 November 2020 (UTC)

Obviously, detailed quotes from 2 authoritative sources did not serve as an argument for you. You continue to think narrowly. To this end, for example, you suggested that the question of the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to France from the Holy Roman Empire should be considered at all. Ridiculously. In this case, we are not talking about technical details (the mitrailleuse, Chassepot rifle and so on) or even about Alsace-Lorraine, but about the negative impact of the Franco-Prussian war. Specifically, the situation in Germany and world politics. 93.81.208.51 (talk) 19:08, 15 November 2020 (UTC)

Go read the Dunning-Kruger effect article I linked earlier and then look in the mirror. The quotes from Howard do not say what you think they say; I've already explained what he meant.

Why do you think I am referring to the paragraph in that section that discusses weaponry? Why are you cherry-picking the one paragraph that supports your point and ignoring the ones that directly contradict it? Is it because you're a tendentious troll? 19:37, 15 November 2020 (UTC)

You continue to express your opinion of the other person in the form of me with a tenacity that is worthy of a better application. Really, I don't see any reason for such provocative statements and I suggest that we speak only in essence. Specifically, about the negative impact of the Franco-Prussian war on the situation in Germany and, consequently, on the entire world politics, since Germany after the victory in that war became the leading world power, or at least in Europe. I think that you will not dispute the statement that this (negative impact on the situation in Germany) in the article does not say anything at all. I think this should be reflected. 2 authoritative sources (that I have quoted) say exactly this. I would be satisfied by quoting a small fragment from an electronic resource.

The Germans’ crushing victory over France in the war consolidated their faith in Prussian militarism, which would remain a dominant force in German society until 1945. 

If you don't mind, it would be possible to add this snippet in the article. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 05:56, 16 November 2020 (UTC)

Anyone who suggests that Prussian militarism wasn’t cemented before 1870 is not a person who should be taken seriously. What a patently nonsensical statement. Parsecboy (talk) 10:09, 16 November 2020 (UTC)

Any person who, among the consequences of the Franco-Prussian war, did not indicate a negative consequence in the form of increased reaction in Germany, increased militarism and conservatism, cannot be taken seriously as a historian. What do you mean, my dear fellow, that we should not talk about the strengthening of conservatism, reaction and militarism in Germany after 1870? This is not serious. I have a strong impression that you don't want to say this. Probably, you like German battleships better than the truth (my joke). 178.155.64.30 (talk) 10:25, 16 November 2020 (UTC)

Ok, tell me what characterized Prussia under Fredrick Wilhelm I, if not conservatism, reaction, and above all else, militarism. Again, if you think this particular war had any transformative effect on Prussia, you have no clue what you’re talking about. Parsecboy (talk) 10:36, 16 November 2020 (UTC)

My dear friend, this war 1870-71 has had an impact not even on Prussia, but on the whole of Germany. I can't make you think like me. You can continue to think that this war had no meaning for Germany. But this is ridiculous. Like your proposal to consider the transfer of Alsace-Lorraine to France from the Holy Roman Empire. 178.155.64.30 (talk) 10:43, 16 November 2020 (UTC)

You’re basically trying to argue that a drop of yellow paint might somehow have fundamentally altered the color of a banana. If Germany had been United under different circumstances (i.e., not a Prussia-dominated Kleindeutschland) then yes, European history would have been different. But the very fact that Germany was effectively absorbed into Prussia, under Prussian leadership, necessarily meant that Germany would be a reactionary, militarist state. How could it possibly not? Seriously, answer me this question: in what world would a Prussia-dominated Germany not be a militarist state?

As for the history of Alsace and Lorraine, nonsense. If you want to discuss the legitimacy or morality of conquest, one cannot in good faith limit it to the one that you believe supports your position. If the German conquest of Alsace and Lorraine in 1870 “disturbed the peace”, how then did not the French seizure from the Holy Roman Empire? A major driving force behind German annexation was the nationalist desire to unite all German speaking people, after all. A direct parallel to the French desire to reclaim what they saw as their French brethren. That you pretend not to understand this is evidence of your bad faith argumentation here. Parsecboy (talk) 11:20, 16 November 2020 (UTC)

My expectations were met 100%. Obviously, you absolutely do not want to take into account references to authoritative sources (historians Wawro and Howard) that directly pointed to the negative consequences of the war of 1870-71 for Germany. Well, it's your choice. So you think you're right. But others don't have to share your point of view. In my opinion, that your point of view can be called "germanophilia". When the negative aspects of German history are hushed up in every possible way. You can even give an example here. As the negative consequences of the war of 1870-71, "French revanchism" is indicated, but for Germany there were no negative consequences. The question remains, where did the war of 1914 come from and why are historians unanimous on the question of Germany's primary responsibility? I also gave a quote on this topic. But I guess you don't have an answer to that question. I dare repeat my joke that you love German battleships more than the truth. 178.155.64.30 (talk) 11:47, 16 November 2020 (UTC)

The fact that you think you can make a determination about my beliefs based on a picture on my user page, without knowing at all why it's there, is a perfect encapsulation of your problem here. As an aside, French revanchism isn't a negative consequence for France. It is a negative consequence for Germany. But we are surprised you lack the ability to comprehend that? Parsecboy (talk) 13:05, 16 November 2020 (UTC)

French revanchism was a misfortune not only for Germany, but for France itself, and for the whole world. Fortunately, as indicated here, it was overcome and by 1914 did not play an important role in the aggravation of world politics, which resulted in the war of 1914. Victory of prussian militarism was a misfortune primarily for Germany itself. Both for Germany's neighbors and for the rest of the world. Here I agree with the historian Howard.

Germany's magnificent and well-deserved victory was, in a profound and unpredictable sense, a disaster both for itself and for the rest of the world.

I do not draw conclusions about you based on the image of your page. This is just a joke. But a joke always contains a grain of truth. I am very skeptical of you as a historian. Well, if only in fact, limited to the issues of armadillos and guns. 178.155.64.30 (talk) 13:22, 16 November 2020 (UTC)

References

Common name?

Going through the sources, and doing a quick google search, it seems that the WP:COMMONNAME might actually be "Franco-German War" (this would be in line with the names in German and French, incidentally); before starting a RM I would like to hear some more opinions, though. Lectonar (talk) 15:05, 19 January 2023 (UTC)

I've always known it as the Franco-Prussian War. DuncanHill (talk) 17:07, 13 June 2023 (UTC)

Germany in 1871 became united in the form of an "expanded Prussia". So the name "Franco-Prussian War" is correct. 178.155.64.26 (talk) 10:00, 20 June 2023 (UTC)

Undefined references in Eastern campaign and Siege of Paris

The Eastern campaign section includes references <ref>Howard, p.429</ref> and <ref>Howard, p.421</ref> , and in Siege of Paris <ref>Howard, p. 286.</ref>. There are at least three works by a Howard already called, and these could be to any one of them or indeed to a work that is not already listed. This is a common error with shortened citations. DuncanHill (talk) 17:17, 13 June 2023 (UTC)