Hideki Tojo
Hideki Tojo | |
|---|---|
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| 40th Prime Minister of Japan | |
| In office October 18, 1941 – July 22, 1944 | |
| Deputy | Unknown |
| Preceded by | Fumimaro Konoe |
| Personal details | |
| Born | right December 30, 1884 Tokyo, Japan |
| Died | December 23, 1948 (aged 63) Tokyo, Japan thumb]] |
| Resting place | right 50px thumb]] |
| Parent |
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| Signature | File:Hideki Tojo signature.jpg |
Hideki Tojo (Kyūjitai: 東條 英機; Shinjitai: 東条 英機; ) (December 30 1884 – December 23 1948) was a General in the Imperial Japanese Army and the 40th Prime Minister of Japan during much of World War II, from October 18 1941 to July 22 1944. He was sentenced to death for war crimes after the war and executed by hanging after a vote by judges of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East.
Biography
Hideki Tojo was born in Tokyo, Japan in 1884. He was the third son of Hidenori Tojo, a Lieutenant General in the Imperial Japanese Army. Tojo's two older brothers died before his birth. In 1909 he married Katsuko Ito, with whom he had three sons and four daughters.
In 1905 he graduated from the Imperial Military Academy and entered service as a Second Lieutenant in the infantry. He rose through the ranks of the Army, graduating with top grades from the Army College in 1915. After graduation, he taught at the school and served as an infantry officer.
During the 1920s, Tojo was also member of the Tosei-Ha ("Control Group", so-called by its rivals) along with Kazushige Ugaki, Gen Sugiyama, Koiso Kuniaki, Yoshijiro Umezu, and Tetsuzan Nagata. They attempted to represent the more conservative moderates in opposition to the extremist group Kodaha (Imperial Benevolence Group) led by Sadao Araki. Both factions derived from the Double Leaf Society, a 1920s militaristic group with fanatical ultranationalistic beliefs.
By 1935, Tojo was a major general commanding the Kempeitai of the Kantogun (also known as the Kwantung Army) in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, and by 1937, he was Chief of Staff of that force. In 1938, Tojo served as Vice-Minister of War. From December of 1938 to 1940, Tojo was Inspector-General of Army Aviation. He was also in charge of the Japanese Secret Service before and during the Pacific War, and was in direct contact with Koki Hirota, leading the Black Dragons and other secret societies.
During the 2-26 Incident, Tojo and Shigeru Honjo, a noted supporter of Sadao Araki, came out against the Kodoha-inspired coup attempt. Emperor Hirohito himself was outraged at the attacks on his close advisors, and after a brief political crisis, and stalling on the part of a sympathetic military, the rebels were forced to surrender. In the aftermath, the Toseiha was able to purge the Army of radical officers, and the coup leaders were tried and executed. Following the purge, Tosei and Kodo elements were unified in their conservative but highly anti-political stance under the banner of the Kodoha military clique. With Tojo in a leadership position, Kodoha would help push Japan into the Second World War.
During Tojo's tenure at the Home Ministry, he led the Keishicho (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department). Appointed War Minister in 1940, he was instrumental in leading Japan into the Axis Alliance with Germany and Italy. In July 1940, he was appointed War Minister in the second Fumimaro Konoe Cabinet, and remained in that post in the third Konoe Cabinet. When Prime Minister Konoe was unable to secure an agreement with the United States, Tojo's faction drove him into retirement. In 1941, Tojo was appointed Prime Minister by Emperor Hirohito and took command of the entire Japanese military.
At various times during his premiership, Tojo held the portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Education, Home Affairs, Commerce and Industry, and Munitions. As Education Minister, he continued militaristic and nationalist indoctrination in the national education system, and reaffirmed illiberal policies in government, in accordance with outlines traced by Sadao Araki, his ideological and political precursor.
Late in the war, in February 1944, Tojo assumed the post of Chief of the Army General Staff. However, following a series of military disasters, culminating in the fall of Saipan, he was abandoned by his backers and forced to resign on July 18, 1944. He retired to the first reserve list and went into seclusion.
Tojo's nickname was "Razor" (Kamisori).
Military service
Tojo became the Commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade in August 1934; the Commanding General of the Military Police in the Kantogun in September 1935; Lieutenant General in December 1936; Chief of Staff of the Kantogun in March 1937; the Vice-Minister of War in May 1938 (during the first Konoe Cabinet); and the Inspector General of Army Aviation in December 1938.
In July 1937, he personally led the units of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade in Operation Chahar. When the China Incident occurred, the section stationed in Manchukuo moved to Hopei and fought near Peking against Chinese forces. Then the Brigade was ordered to participate in the offensive in Chahar Province. The Brigade marched via Chengde and Dolonnor and reached Zhangbei in five days. The distance of this march was 700 km. Units were assigned to certain infantry divisions.
Rise to office of Prime Minister
 | The neutrality of this section is disputed. |
As Nazi Germany forces surged through Europe, the Japanese Army likewise pushed for war. The signal for war in the Pacific was given on August 26 1941, at a session of the Black Dragon Society in Tokyo. At this meeting, War Minister Hideki Tōjō ordered that preparation be made to wage a total war against the Armed Forces of the United States, and that Japanese guns be mounted and supplies and munitions concentrated in the Marshall and Caroline Islands (Japanese mandates since World War I) by November, 1941. Approving Tōjō's war orders, former Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, head of the Black Dragons' secret service, discussed the advantages and consequences of a conflict with the United States. Many of those at the meeting considered December 1941, or February 1942, the most suitable time for Japan to attack.[citation needed]
Japan had invaded Indochina in July 1941 and, on August 1, the U. S. had in response imposed economic sanctions, freezing Japan's assets in the U. S. and imposing a total embargo on oil and gasoline exports. Tōjō was one of the advocates of war with the West, but Emperor Showa preferred to keep negotiating with the U. S. in hopes of avoiding conflict. The prevailing opinion within the Japanese Army at that time was that continued negotiations could be dangerous but Hirohito thought that he might be able to control extreme opinions in the army by using the charismatic and well-connected Tōjō, although the emperor himself was skeptical. On October 13, he declared to Koichi Kido: '"There seems little hope in the present situation for the Japan-U. S. negotiations. This time, if hostilities erupt, I might have to issue a declaration of war."[1]
On September 6, a deadline of early October was fixed in Imperial conference for negotiations. On October 14, the deadline had passed with no progress. Prime minister Konoe then held his last cabinet meeting, where Tōjō did most of the talking:
For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations. Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked...The heart of the matter is the imposition on us of withdrawal from Indochina and China...If we yield to America's demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China incident. Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea undermined.[2]
On October 16, Konoe, politically isolated and convinced that the emperor no longer trusted him, resigned. Later, he justified himself to his chief cabinet secretary, Kenji Tomita:
Of course his majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt he wished to avoid war. When I told him that to initiate war is a mistake, he agreed. But the next day, he would tell me: "You were worried about it yesterday, but you do not have to worry so much." Thus, gradually, he began to lead toward war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more toward war. In short, I felt the Emperor was telling me: "My prime minister does not understand military matters, I know much more." In short, the Emperor had absorbed the views of the army and navy high commands.[3]
At the time, Prince Higashikuni was said to be the only person who could control the Army and the Navy and was recommended by Konoe and Tōjō. Hirohito rejected this option, arguing that a member of the imperial family should not have to eventually carry the responsibility for a war against the Occident. Following the advice of Koichi Kido, he chose instead Tojo, who was known for his devotion to the imperial institution.[4] The Emperor summoned Tōjō to the Imperial Palace one day before Tōjō took office.
Tōjō wrote in his diary, "I thought I was summoned because the Emperor was angry at my opinion." He was given one order from the Emperor: To make a policy review of what had been sanctioned by the Imperial conferences. Tōjō, who was on the side of the war, nevertheless accepted this order, and pledged to obey. According to colonel Akiho Ishii, a member of the Army General Staff, the prime minister showed a true sense of loyalty to the emperor performing this duty. For example, when Ishii received from Hirohito a communication saying the Army should dropped the idea of stationning troops in China to counter military operations of occidental powers, he wrote a reply for the prime minister for his audience with the emperor. Tojo then replied to Ishii : «If the emperor said it should be so, then that's it for me. One cannot recite arguments to the emperor. You may keep your finely phrased memorandum.» [5]
On November 2, Tōjō and Chiefs of Staff Hajime Sugiyama and Osami Nagano reported to Hirohito that the review had been in vain. The Emperor then gave his consent to war.[6]
On November 3, Nagano explained in detail the Pearl Harbor attack to Hirohito.[7]. The eventual plan drawn up by Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff envisaged such a mauling of the Western powers that defense perimeter lines--operating on interior lines of communications and inflicting heavy Western casualties--could not be breached. In addition, the Japanese fleet which attacked Pearl Harbor was under orders from Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto to be prepared to return to Japan on a moment's notice, should negotiations succeed.
Numerous theories about political forces at work during this process include conspiracy theories about a concerted effort within the military-industrial complex of Japan and the right wing to derail negotiations and forge ahead with plans for colonialism and war.
On November 5, Hirohito approved in Imperial conference the operations plan for a war against the West and had many meetings with the military and Tōjō until the end of the month. On December 1, another imperial conference finally sanctioned the "War against the United states, England and Holland".[8]
Tojo did his best to keep negotiating. However, the results were not encouraging. For Japan, the Hull Note was the last straw. On the night of December 7, Tojo was said to have sat on a futon with his back straight and his knees together, sobbing. He might have regretted his move to go to war, or his failure to obey the Emperor. [citation needed]
General Tojo, diplomatic actions and politics
Japanese leaders had come to believe that the wars in Europe had so weakened Western Imperial forces that the Japanese Empire could expand into East Asia at will. The Japanese military hierarchy planned a line of defense based on islands stretching from Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago to the Kuriles north of Japan, intending to swallow the insular possessions of France, Britain, Netherlands, Australia, the Portuguese, and the United States, while also forcing China's acquiescence in the decades-long conflict that began with the notorious "Twenty-One Demands".
The East Indies were central to the Japanese strategy. Without it, embargoes would bankrupt the country. Japan only had two years' worth of oil reserves for non-military use, one year's worth if she went to war.
As prime minister, Tojo was firmly convinced of the importance of maintaining the "superiority" of the Japanese race. He thus authorized laws ordering the sterilization of "inferior" citizens and appointed his wife Katsuko as the promoter of natality programs for the production of perfect warriors.
Capture, trial and execution
After Japan's unconditional surrender in 1945, U. S. General Douglas MacArthur issued orders for the arrest of the first forty alleged war criminals, including Tojo. Soon, Tojo's home in Setagaya was besieged with newsmen and photographers. Inside, a doctor named Suzuki had marked Tojo's chest with charcoal to indicate the location of his heart. When American military police surrounded the house, they heard a muffled shot from inside. It was September 8, 1945, 4:17 pm. Major Paul Kraus and a group of military police burst in, followed by George Jones, a reporter for The New York Times. Tojo had shot himself in the chest with a .32-caliber Colt, but despite shooting directly through the mark, the bullet missed his heart. At 4:29, now disarmed and with blood spreading on his shirt, Tojo began to talk, and two Japanese reporters recorded his words. "I am very sorry it is taking me so long to die," he murmured. "The Greater East Asia War was justified and righteous. I am very sorry for the nation and all the races of the Greater Asiatic powers. I wait for the righteous judgment of history. I wished to commit suicide but sometimes that fails."[9]
He survived and was arrested. After recovering from his injuries, Tojo was moved to the Sugamo Prison. He was tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East for war crimes and found guilty of the following crimes:
- count 1 (waging wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of international law)
- count 27 (waging unprovoked war against the Republic of China)
- count 29 (waging aggressive war against the United States)
- count 31 (waging aggressive war against the British Commonwealth (Hong Kong))
- count 32 (waging aggressive war against the Netherlands (Indonesia))
- count 33 (waging aggressive war against France (Indochina))
- count 54 (ordering, authorizing, and permitting inhumane treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) and others)
Hideki Tojo accepted full responsibility in the end for his actions during the war. Here is passage from his statement, which he made during his war crimes trial. :
It is natural that I should bear entire responsibility for the war in general, and, needless to say, I am prepared to do so. Consequently, now that the war has been lost, it is presumably necessary that I be judged so that the circumstances of the time can be clarified and the future peace of the world be assured. Therefore, with respect to my trial, it is my intention to speak frankly, according to my recollection, even though when the vanquished stands before the victor, who has over him the power of life and death, he may be apt to toady and flatter. I mean to pay considerable attention to this in my actions, and say to the end that what is true is true and what is false is false. To shade one's words in flattery to the point of untruthfulness would falsify the trial and do incalculable harm to the nation, and great care must be taken to avoid this.
He was sentenced to death on November 12, 1948 and executed by hanging on December 23, 1948. In his final statements he apologized for the atrocities committed by the Japanese military and urged the American military to show compassion and repentance toward the Japanese people, who had suffered devastating air attacks and the two atomic bombs.[10]
Tōjō is often considered responsible for authorizing the murder of more than 8 million civilians in China, Korea, the Philippines, Indochina, and other Pacific island nations, as well tens of thousands of Allied POWs. Tojo is also implicated in government-sanctioned experiments on POWs and Chinese civilians (see Unit 731). Like his German colleagues, Tōjō often claimed to be carrying out the orders of the Emperor, who was granted immunity from war crimes prosecution. The culpability of the Showa Emperor himself is a subject of some controversy.
Many historians criticize the work made by MacArthur and his staff to exonerate Emperor Showa and all members of the imperial family from criminal prosecutions. According to them, MacArthur and Brigadier-general Bonner Fellers worked to protect the Emperor from the role he had played during and at the end of the war and attribute ultimate responsibility to Tojo.[11]
According to the written report of Shuichi Mizota (Mizota Shūichi), the interpreter of admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, Fellers met the two men at his office on 6 March 1946 and told Yonai that : "it would be most convenient if the Japanese side could prove to us that the Emperor is completely blameless. I think the forthcoming trials offer the best opportunity to do that. Tojo, in particular, should be made to bear all responsibility at this trial."[12]
The sustained intensity of this campaign to protect the Emperor was revealed when, in testifying before the tribunal on 31 December 1947, Tojo momentarily strayed from the agreed-on line concerning imperial innocence and referred to the Emperor's ultimate authority. The American-led prosecution immediately arranged that he be secretly coached to recant this testimony. Ryukichi Tanaka, a former general who testified at the trial and had close connections with chief prosecutor Joseph Keenan, was used as an intermediary to persuade Tojo to revise his testimony.[13]
Legacy
Tojo's commemorating tomb is located in a shrine in Hazu, Aichi, and he is one of those enshrined at the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. He was survived by a number of his descendants, including his granddaughter, Yuko Tojo, a right-wing activist and political hopeful who claims Japan's was a war of self-defense and that it was unfair that her grandfather was judged a Class-A war criminal. Tojo's second son, Teruo Tojo, who designed fighter and passenger aircraft during and after the war, eventually served as an executive at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.
See also
- Japanese war crimes
- Militarism-Socialism in Showa Japan
- Second Sino-Japanese War
- Eugenics in Showa Japan
Notes
- ^ Kido Koichi nikki, Bungei Shunjûsha, 1990, p.914
- ^ (Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, 2000, p.417, citing the Sugiyama memo)
- ^ Akira Fujiwara, Shôwa tennô no ju-go nen sensô (The Shôwa Emperor's Fifteen Years War), Aoki Shoten, 1991, p.126
- ^ Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan, Harper Collins, 2000, p.418, Terasaki Hidenari,Shôwa tennô dokuhakuroku, Bungei Shunjûsha, 1991, p.118
- ^ Peter Wetzler, Hirohito and War, 1998, p.51,52
- ^ (Peter Wetzler, Hirohito and war, University of Hawai'i press, 1998, p.47-50, Bix, ibid. p.421)
- ^ (Wetzler, ibid. p. 29, 35)
- ^ (Wetzler, ibid. p.28-30, 39)
- ^ (John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945, Random House, 1970, p. 871-2))
- ^ (Toland, ibid, p. 873))
- ^ Herbert Bix, Hirohito and the making of modern Japan, 2000, p.583-585, John Dower, Embracing defeat, 1999, p.324-326
- ^ Kumao Toyoda, Sensō saiban yoroku, Taiseisha Kabushiki Kaisha, 1986, p.170-172, Bix, ibid. p.584
- ^ Dower, ibid. p.325, 604-605
External links
- Template:Japanese prime ministers-NDL
- Hideki Tojo Biography.
- Hideki Tojo Quotes
- Trial Watch
- Address by Tojo Hideki, Premier of Japan
Template:Japanese prime ministers