Battle of Longewala

Battle of Longewala
	Part of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971
	; Tank tracks at Longewala. PR photo taken at the time showing the desperate last minute maneuveres by Pakistani tanks in the Longewala sector. Circles show destroyed Pakistani tanks.
Date	December 5th - 6th, 1971
Location	Approx 30 Km from Ramgarh, Rajasthan, India
Result	Decisive Indian victory
Belligerents
A Coy, 23 Bn Punjab Regiment, Indian army; later ; No 122(ad-hoc) Squadron, Indian Air Force	51st Infantry Brigade, Pakistan Army
Commanders and leaders
Major Kuldip Singh Chandpuri; Wg Cdr M.S. Bawa	Brigadier Tariq Mir
Strength
120 troops ; 2 Recoilless Guns ; 4 Hawker Hunters	2000+ troops; 65 Tanks ; 5 Field guns ; 3 Anti-aircraft guns; 138 Military vehicles
Casualties and losses
2 men, 1 jeep mounted recoiless gun	200 soldiers. 50 tanks destroyed/abandoned; 40 APCs and 50 other vehicles.

The Battle of Longewala December 5 - December 6 1971 was one of the first major battles in the Western Sector during the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, fought between assaulting Pakistani forces and Indian defences at the Indian border post of Longewala, in Thar Desert of the Rajasthan state in India. It is generally regarded to be one of the decisive battles in the two week long war.

Against considerable odds, the Indian 'A' company of 120 odd soldiers of the 23rd Bn, Punjab Regiment, managed to hold a 2000-3000 strong assault force of the 51st Infantry Brigade of the Pakistani Army- backed by the 22nd Armoured Regiment- before the Indian Air Force flew in two decisive days against the invading force to dent and ultimately thwart the Pakistani assault. The Indian victory in this battle ensured that Pakistan had no way of countering the Indian Army in the west and eventually succumbed to a swift defeat in the war.

Background

The main thrust of the Indian Army's might during the 1971 war was directed towards the eastern theatre, with the western sector envisaged as a holding operation to prevent the Pakistan Army from achieving any success that would allow Yahya Khan any bargaining tool to trade against the captured territories in the east. By the last week of November 1971, the Indian Army had launched offensive manouvres at Atgram against Pakistani border posts and communications centres along the eastern border. The Mukti Bahini also launched an offensive on Jessore at this time.^[1] It was clear to Islamabad by this time that open conflict was inevitable, and that East Pakistan was indefensible in the long run.^[2] Yahya Khan chose at this point to try to protect Pakistan's integrity and to hold India by Ayub Khan's strategy - "The defence of East Pakistan lies in the West".^[3]

The Western sector

Khan's policy made the assumption that an open conflict with India would not last long due to International pressure, and where East Pakistan was undefendable, the war-effort should be concentrated on occupying as large an area of Indian territorry as possible as a bargaining tool at the negotiating table. To this end, Gen Tikka Khan had proposed an offensive into India, and the PAF's "overriding priority was to give maximum support to this offensive".^[4] The initial plans for the offensive called for at least a temporary cover of air dominance by the PAF under which Khan's troops could conduct a lightning campaign deep into Western India before digging in and consolidating their positions. To support Khan's troops, the PAF had launched pre-emptive strikes on the evening of 3rd December that led to the formal commencement of hostillities. In the western theatre, the town of Rahim Yar Khan, close to the international border, formed a critical communication centre for Khan's forces and, situated on the Sind-Punjab railway, remained a vulnerable link on Khan's logistics. The fall of Rahimyar Khan to Indian forces would cut off the rail as well as road link between Sind and Punjab, starving Khan's forces of fuel and ammunitions delivered to Karachi.

Indian battle plans called for a strike across the international border with 12 Indian divisions towards Islamgarh through Sarkari Tala, subsequently advancing through Baghla to secure Rahim Yar Khan, which would not only destabillise the Pakistani defences in Punjab, but also in Jammu Kashmir, allowing the planned Indian offensive in the Shakargarh sector to sweep the Pakistani forces trapped there.^[5]

Pakistan, which envisaged Punjab as an operational centre, had a strong intelligence network in the area and planned to counter its own comparatively weak strength on the ground with a pre-emptive strike through Kishangarh towards the divisional headquarters south of Ramgarh^[5] Paksitani intelligence did a very good job infiltrating the operations area posing as local people and passing on information. However, these sources failed to pass on information on the Longewala post which, originally a BSF post, was now held by a company of the Punjab Regiment. Longewala formed a strategic point en route to capturing vast tracts of land and also a pivotal theatre of war in engaging India on the western front. Pakistan's battle plan was based on the assumption that an attack in the area would help Pakistan’s 1st Armoured Divisions task in Ganganagar area. Pakistan High command also felt that it was important to protect the North-South road link which they felt was vulnerable as it was close to the border. A Combined Operations Plan was decided upon. This involved two Infantry Brigades and two Armoured Regiments. A separate division, the 18 Division, was formed for this purpose. 18 Division Operation Orders required one Infantry Brigade (206) with an Armoured Regiment (38 Cavalry) to capture and establish a firm base at Longanewala, a junction on the Indian road system and another Infantry Brigade (51) with an Armoured Regiment (22 Cavalry) to operate beyond Longanewala to capture Jaisalmer.^[6]

The Pakistani plan was lauded in the words of Brigadier Tariq Mir as "Insha Allah (God willing) we will have breakfast at Longewala, lunch at Ramgarh and dinner at Jaisalmer". The ambition was far-fetched from the start. And as the day unfolded, Longewala would stand out as one of the biggest routs in a battle for Pakistan despite overwhelming superiority before commencement of the battle.

On the Indian side, the Longewala post was held by the A company of the 23rd Punjab Regiment, led by Major K S Chandpuri. The rest of the battalion was located at Sadhewala, 17 km north-east of the Longewala post. Chandpuri had under him a section each of MMGs and 80mm Mortars, and one Jeep-mounted RCL. His two recoilless gun detachments were under training at the battalion headquarters. Major Chandpuri also had under his command a four-personnel detachment of the BSF camel division.^[7]. However, the Longewala post had no armour although artillery support was available by one battery of 170 Field Regt (Veer Rajput) which was the battery in direct support to the batallion and 168 Fd Regt which had been deployed in the shadow of the node a day earlier. The direct support battery was made a part of 168 Field Regiment and served as its "Sierra" Battery. The defences were sited on a high sand dune. Immediately after PAF strikes on Indian airfields on December 3, Chandpuri dispatched a 20 man strong patrol under Lieutenant Dharam Vir to Boundary Pillar (BP) 638, erected right on the international border. This patrol was to play an important part in detecting the Pakistani forces.

The battle

On the morning of the 5th, Lt. Vir's patrol detected noises across the border that suggested massive armour movements. These were soon followed by reports confirming large scale tank and troop movements advancing in the general direction of the Longewala post. Directing Lt Vir's patrol to trail the advancing armoured column, Chandpuri got in touch with the battalion headquarters requesting urgent reinforcements and armour and artillery support. The reply from battalion HQ gave him the choice of staying put and containing the attack as much as possible, or carrying out a strategic retreat of the 23rd to Ramgarh. Chandpuri decided stay put.

As the offensive approached the lone outpost, Pakistani artillery opened up across the border with medium artillery guns, killing five camels from the BSF detachment. Now, as the column of 60 tanks neared the post, Indian defences lacking the time to lay a minefield managed to knock out two tanks with their jeep mounted recoilless guns. Though jolted, the Pakistani advance managed to surround the post two hours later trying to soften up the Indian defenders before attacking. Although massively outnumbered and surrounded, the Indians never gave up, which confused the invading troops. Dawn arrived, and the Pakistan forces had still not taken the post.

The Indian Air Force Hawker Hunter aircraft were not outfitted with night vision equipment, and thus were delayed from deployment until dawn rose. With daylight however, the IAF was able to operate effectively. Without support from the Pakistan Air Force which was busy elsewhere, the tanks and other armoured vehicles were easy targets for the IAF's Hunters. The range of the anti-aircraft guns mounted on the tanks was limited and thus were ineffective against the Indian jets. By noon the next day, the assault had cost Pakistan dearly as more than 40 tanks and a total of 100 vehicles lay shattered on the desert. The Pakistani attack was first dented, then forced to withdraw when Indian troops launched their counter-offensive; Longewala had proved to be one of the defining moments in the war.

Aftermath

File:Longewala Tank.jpg

A burnt out Paksitani Tank hit during the Battle.

Notwithstanding the Indian victory, there were intelligence and strategic failures on both sides. India's intelligence failed to forecast such a huge invading tank column in the western sector. Moreover the defending post was not heavily armed to neutralise the enemy. Finally, they didn't push home the advantage by finishing more tanks when the IAF had the Pakistan tanks on the run. They did, however destroy nearly 50 tanks, remaining one of the largest disproportionate tank casualties for one side in a single battle after WWII.

Invading Pakistan troops meanwhile, had over-estimated the Longewala post due to the stiff resistance encountered there. Attacking with virtually no air cover, they waited too long to deliver the lethal blow, and failed to anticipate an Indian counter-attack from the skies. Given that Pakistan's T-59/Type 59 Chinese and Sherman tanks were slow on the sandy Thar desert, some military analysts have opined that the attack may have been an overly aggressive move on the terrain. Some Pakistan tanks had suffered engine failures due to the harsh conditions and were abandoned. The open desert battleground provided little to no cover for the tanks and infantry in case of an aerial assault. The plan to capture Longewala may have been good in conception, but was let down by poor air support.

For his part, the Indian company commander Major (later Brigadier) Kuldip Singh Chandpuri was decorated with India's second highest gallantry award, the Maha Vir Chakra. Several other awards were earned by members of the defending battalion. On the other hand, the Pakistani Divisional Commander was sacked. However the commander of the Pakistani 51 Brigade who mounted the daring attack and crossed into Indian territory was later awarded Pakistan's high award of the Sitara-e-Imtiaz.

A significant tribute was paid by the British media to the defenders of Longewala by James Hatter who described the Battle of Longewala as equivalent to Battle of Thermopylae in his article 'TAKING ON THE ENEMY AT LONGEWALA' & described it as the deciding moment of the 1971 war. Similarly Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshall RM Carver visited Longewala a few weeks after the war to learn from Chandpuri as to how 120 men overcome all odds against a tank battalion & infantry column of the Pakistan army^[8].