Second Battle of Passchendaele
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Second Battle of Passchendaele | |||||||
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Part of the Third Battle of Ypres of World War I | |||||||
Troops carry a wounded man to the aid post. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
United Kingdom France | German Empire | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Herbert Plumer Hubert Gough Arthur Currie | Friedrich Bertram Sixt von Armin | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
4 Canadian Divisions 6 British Divisions 1 Australian Division 2 French Divisions | 6 Divisions | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
15,654 Canadian[1] 15,000+ other[2] | unknown |
The Second Battle of Passchendaele was the culminating and final attack during the Third Battle of Ypres of World War I. The battle took place in the Ypres Salient area of the Western Front, in and around the Belgian town of Passchendaele, between 26 October 1917 and 10 November 1917. The Canadian Corps was tasked with relieving the exhausted II Anzac Corps, continuing the advance started with the First Battle of Passchendaele and ultimately capturing the town of Passchendaele itself.[3] Beyond gaining favorable observation positions, the battle was intended to gain dryer winter positions on higher ground.[4]
The assault position was directly south of the inter-army boundary between the British Fifth Army and Second Army. As a result the Canadian Corps was to attack with support of formations from the British Fifth Army to the north and I Anzac Corps to the south. The offensive was executed in series of attacks each with limited objectives, delivered at intervals of three or more days. The execution dates of the phases were tentatively given as 26 October, 30 October and 6 November with a final smaller action on 10 November.[5] To permit time to facilitate inter-divisional reliefs, there was a planned seven day pause between the second and third stage during which time British Second Army was ordered to take over the section of the British Fifth Army front adjoining the Canadian Corps, so that the central portion of the assault could proceed under a single command.[6]
The attack was successful in capturing the German-held high ground along the Passchendaele-Westrozebeke ridge but the campaign was forced to end just short of Westrozebeke itself. No further attempt was made to build on the momentum of the attack. The significant victory of the Austro-German forces against the Italian Army at the Battle of Caporetto and the upcoming Battle of Cambrai ultimately forced the British to divert resources away from the sector and end all offensive actions in the Ypres Salient.
Background
In July 1917, British Field Marshal Douglas Haig launched a massive offensive, the Third Battle of Ypres, in an attempt to break out of the Ypres Salient. Although initial successes had been achieved at the Messines, complete stalemates occurred in the subsequent Battles of Pilckem Ridge and Langemarck.[7] In view of the failure of the British Fifth Army to make any appreciable headway, Haig decided to transfer the weight of the offensive towards to the south-east along the southern half of Passchendaele Ridge.[8] The main offensive was therefore switched to the British Second Army under command of General Herbert Plumer. Plumber abandoned tactics focused on achieving a major break-through and instead intended to launch a succession of attacks, each with strictly limited objectives, in a strategy known as bite and hold.[8] Successful limited actions at the Battles of Menin Road, Polygon Wood, Broodseinde and Gravenstafel Ridge produced a 4,000 yards (3,700 m) advance in two weeks.[9]
In the low ground west of the Passchendaele Ridge, three months of constant shelling had blocked the watercourses that normally provided drainage. When rain began falling on the night of 4 October—which continued intermittently for the next three days—the battlefield was once again transformed into a quagmire of mud, making movement extremely difficult.[4] Two army commanders told Haig that they favored ending the campaign on account of the change in the weather and general state of the battlefield, however the decision was made to continue the offensive in order to gain more favorable winter positions on higher ground.[4] The Battle of Poelcappelle and First Battle of Passchendaele both resulted in significant casualties and failed to achieve any appreciable strategic gain. The only possible exception being that they did provide a better starting line for a subsequent attack on Passchendaele.[10][11] The four divisions of the Canadian Corps were transferred from the Lens sector to the Ypres Salient, and tasked with making additional advances on Passchendaele.[3] The Canadian Corps relieved the II Anzac Corps on 18 October, from its position along the valley between Gravenstafel Ridge and the heights at Passchendaele, and immediately began planning for the offensive.[12] Interestingly, it was virtually the same front as had been occupied by the 1st Canadian Division back in April 1915.[12]
Tactical plan and preparations
The Canadian Corps operation was to be executed in series of three attacks each with limited objectives, delivered at intervals of three or more days. As the Canadian Corps position was directly south of the inter-army boundary between British Fifth and Second Army, the British Fifth Army would mount subsidiary operations on the Canadian Corps' left flank while the I Anzac Corps would advance to protect the right flank.[5] Canadian Corps commander Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie submitted his provisional operational plan on 16 October and recommended the attack be executed on the 29 October, in order to move sufficient artillery forward.[5] However, Haig was anxious to avoid any unnecessary delays, particularly given that he wished to assist in some capacity with the Second Battle of the Aisne and the French attack on Mailmaison, which was due to start on the 23 October.[3][13] Currie and the British Second Army commander, Herbert Plumer, re-examined the situation and finally set the attack for 26 October. The dates for the subsequent phases were tentatively given as 30 October and 6 November.[5]
Extensive preparations were needed before any advance could be made. A number of problems were found with the artillery and positions transfered over from the Australians. Of the 250 heavy howitzers that existed on paper, only 227 could be found and of these 89 were out of action. Of the 306 18 pounder field guns, less than half were in action.[14] The problem of mobility caused by the mud also resulted in the Australian artillery being badly bunched in two main clusters, thereby furnishing the Germans with easy targets. Furthermore, the Australians had been unable to send damaged artillery pieces for repair because the provost had ordered that no guns use the roads for fear of blocking traffic.[14] The sitaution was considerably improved by the arrival of the Canadian divisional level artilleries which placed an additional 210 18-pounder field guns, 190 howitzers and 26 heavy guns at the Canadian Corps disposal.[15]
As early as the 17 October, assaulting units were given all available details about the German defenses in their respective sectors, in order to facilitate early assault planning. Intelligence officers and artillery observers worked jointly in observation posts recording newly build German fortifications as well so those that had previously escaped notice, permitting the artillery to take necessary actions before the offensive.[5] To improve the logsitical movement or artillery and supplies an extensive program of road building was started. Ten field companies, seven tunnelling companies, four army troop companies and nine battalions were put to work repairing or extending existing plank roads. From the middle of October until the end of the offensive, a total of 2 miles (3.2 km) of double plank road and more than 4,000 yards (3,700 m) of heavy tram line were constructed in the Canadian Corps area.[5] Brigadier General Edward Morrison, commander of the artillery, also secured permission to use the roads to the rear for getting disabled guns back for repair.[5]
Moving troops to the front ahead of the attack was nonetheless a major logistical issue as the only means of approaching the front lines were narrow boardwalks made of wood planking which wound between the shell-holes. Slipping off the duckboards would often be deadly with unfortunate soldiers often drowning in mud under the weight of their own equipment. On account of the harsh physical demands the trip often entailed, the leading assault units entered the support line four days before the battle to ensure soldiers would be as fresh as possible for the attack.[15]
Battle
Opposing forces
The Canadian Corps, under Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie, was the principal attacking formation. Immediately to the north, the Canadian Corps was initially supported by XVIII Corps and, after an inter-army boundary shift, II Corps of Second Army.[16] To the extreme north, the advance was supported by XIV Corps and two divisions for the French First Army. To the south, the advance was supported by I Anzac Corps. Further south, X Corps supported the operation by executing diversionary activities.[16]
Passchendaele Ridge and the area surrounding the town was defended by Gruppe Ypres organized under Guard Corps commander General der Kavallere Alfred Graf zu Dohna-Schlobitten.[17] Defending German units changed throughout the battle and, at various points, consisted of the 11th Bavarian Division, 39th Infantry Division, 11th Division, 44th Reserve Division, 4th Division and 238th Division.[18]
First stage
The first stage was planned as a two-prong offensive. The constant shelling had blocked the Ravebeek stream, creating an impassible swamp directly between the boundary of the 3rd Canadian Division and 4th Canadian Division, necessitating a two-prong attack.[15] The 3rd Canadian Division was assigned the wider advance on the left, which included the sharply rising ground of the Bellevue spur. In the more restricted ground south of the Ravebeek stream, the 4th Canadian Division would occupy advanced positions on no man's land before the start of the offensive and take the Decline Copse, which straddled the Ypres-Roulers railway.[15] Currie planned the attack with extensive depth in resources. The remaining units of the 8th, 9th and 10th Canadian Infantry Brigades were placed in support, while the 7th, 11th and 12th Canadian Infantry Brigades were held in divisional and corps reserve. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions were likewise held in army level reserve.[15]
The assault began at 5:40 am on the morning of 26 October.[19] The assaulting troops was preceded by a rolling barrage, edging forward in lifts of 50 yards every four minutes, permitting the the infantry to keep up while negotiating the mud.[20] On the left flank, the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade captured the Wolf Copse and secured its objective line but was ultimately forced to drop a defensive flank 300 yards (270 m) back to link up with the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division, the flanking division of the British Fifth Army. In the middle, the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade found the German barbed wire to be well cut by the preliminary artillery bombardment and, within an hour of the attack commencing, cleared and captured the Bellevue pillboxes. However, the Germans brought down heavy artillery fire on their abandoned positions, and by 9:00am the brigade's right flank had retreated towards its starting line.[20] One the far right, the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade initially captured all its objectives as did the 1st Australian Division on its southern flank. However, as the first day wore on, the positions in the Decline Copse—a joint Canadian-Australian objective on the Canadian Corps' southern boundary—were gradually abandoned due to German counterattacks and mis-communications between the Canadian and Australian units.[21]
The 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade's right flank had consolidated its position and, by the morning on the 27 October, had gained or established outposts only 300 yards (270 m) short its fist stage objectives line. The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade captured the Decline Copse on the night of the 27 October . The German 238th Division attacked and briefly captured the copse the following night, only to be quickly repelled by a Canadian counterattack. When the first stage ended on 28 October, the Canadian Corps had suffered 2,481 casualties.[22] On the flanks of the Canadian Corps, the simultaneous advance had not gone well. XVIII Corps suffered 2,310 casualties, the XIV Corps 3,092 casualties and the diversionary activities of X corps resulted in 3,321 casualties.[16] Though the first stage was not completely successful, the operation had placed the Canadians on higher ground and in a good tactical position for the second stage.[21]
Second stage
The second stage was intended to capture the positions the Canadian Corps had failed to capture during the previous stage and gain a base for the final assault on Passchendaele.[21] The objective line (Blue Line) was approximately 600 yards (550 m) east of the objective line of the previous stage. The advance was meant to capture the strongly held Crest Farm on the southern end of the advance, and in the northern sector the hamlet of Meetcheele and the Goudberg area near the corps' northern boundary.[23] The northern flank of the Canadian Corps advance was to link up outside of Goudberg at Vapour Farm with the British Fifth Army, which would be advancing with the 58th Division and 63rd (Royal Naval) Division along both sides of the swamped Lekkerboterbeek creek. The southern advance was to link up with the I Anzac Corps along the Ypres-Roulers railway line south of Vienna Cottage.[23] The southern flank of the main assault would once again be the responsibility of the 4th Canadian Division, which planned to attack with the 12th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Likewise, the northern flank continued to be the responsibility of the 3rd Canadian Division, which would advance with the 7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Brigades.[23]
The night before the attack, a battalion-sized assault by the Canadians captured a particularly troublesome German pillbox on the northern bank of Ravebeek creek, which had held up the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade during the first stage. The action advanced the southern edge of the 3rd Canadian Division 500 yards (460 m) in parity with the line of the 4th Canadian Division to the south. The main attack began at 5:50 am on 30 October and was preceded by a rolling barrage with a preliminary artillery bombardment directed largely at pillboxes.[23] The southern flank quickly captured Crest Farm and had begun sending patrols beyond its objective line and into Passchendaele, which they found the Germans evacuating. By 8:30 am, the 4th Canadian Division commander Major-General David Watson reported that all objectives between the Ypres-Roulers railway and the Ravebeek creek had been taken. However, northwest of Crest Farm was so badly flooded that consolidation had to be carried out short of the objective line.[23]
On the northern flank, the 3rd Canadian Division was again met with exceptional German resistance. The 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade managed to capture Source Farm and later Vapour Farm at the corps boundary, just short of the objective line. However, the brigade had difficulty getting through the swampy ground in the Woodland Plantation, resulting in a division in the line. The 58th Division and 63rd (Royal Naval) Division made only slight progress and were unable to reach their rendezvous objectives, leaving the Canadian troops at Source Farm and Vapour Farm in precarious and largely unsupported positions.[6] In the center of the assault was the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Advancing between Ravebeek creek and the roadway to Meetcheele, one section of the brigade captured its intermediary objective, a pillbox known as Duck Lodge, by 7:00am. To the west of the roadway and Meetcheele, the advance captured Furst Farm albeit with heavy casualties.[23] Later in the afternoon, the brigade succeeded in overcoming a number of pillboxes and captured the crossroads at Meetcheele. However, the Germans continued to hold a strong position at Graf House along the bank of the Ravebeek creek, producing a salient in the Canadian line directly between the two Canadian divisions.[24]
The advance appeared to have reached its limit by late afternoon, and reports of a large number of Germans concentrating north of Mosselmarkt indicated the potential of a major counterattack. As a result, the 3rd Canadian Division—although not having achieved all its objectives—was ordered to consolidate its positions and patrol, rather than occupy, the Woodland Plantation swamp between the 7th and 8th Canadian Infantry Brigades.[11] There was some question as to whether the positions at Source Farm and Vapour Farm could be maintained without the support of the 63rd (Royal Naval) Division. Currie with General Plumer ultimately decided that every effort should be made to hold the line in the hopes of not having to retake the positions before the assault on Passchendaele.[6] The night ultimately passed without any major counterattacks taking place, permitting the Canadians to consolidate their positions. When the second stage ended on 30 October, the Canadian Corps had suffered 2,321 casualties, consisting of 884 killed, 1429 wounded and eight taken prisoner.[6]
Temporary pause
To permit time to facilitate inter-divisional reliefs, there was a planned seven day pause between the second and third stage. The British Second Army was ordered to take over a section of the British Fifth Army front adjoining the Canadian Corps, so that the central portion of the assault might proceed under a single command. On 2 November, General Plumer relieved the XVIII Corps of the British Fifth Army with II Corps.[6] The role of II Corps in the upcoming stage would be largely limited, providing the Canadian Corps with artillery support. Three consecutive rainless days between 3 and 5 November aided logistical preparations and reorganization of the troops for the next stage.[25] In an effort to resupply front line units, hundreds of pack animals were utilized to bring supplies forward, including gun ammunition.[26] The 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions moved forward by rail from their reserve area east of Cassel to take over from the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions respectively. The reliefs were completed by the morning of 5 November.[6] To the south of the Canadian Corps, the I Anzac, IX and VIII Corps were to simulate attacks along a 4 miles (6.4 km) front extending south to Zandvoorde. During the night of the 5 November, the assault units moved into their jumping off positions and were all in place by 4:00 am on 6 November.[6] The Germans took advantage of the break in fighting to relieve exhausted units. The 11th Division had arrived from the Champagne sector on 3 November to relieve the 39th Division between the Ypres-Roulers railway and the Mosselmarkt road.[27]
Third stage
The corps objectives for 6 November lay along the Green Line, a rough semicircle that ran 1,000 yards (910 m) from Graf House—the center of the salient in the Canadian line. Besides Passchendaele, it encompassed the hamlets of Mosselmarkt and Goudberg to the northwest.[27] The 2nd Canadian Division would send the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade to attack Passchendaele from the north side and one battalion from the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade to attack it from the south. In the 1st Canadian Division sector, the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade would advance on either side of the Meetcheele-Mosselmarkt road and, along the northern corps boundary, one battalion was to execute a subsidiary operation against Vine Cottages, a strong-point which the Germans were holding 350 yards (320 m) south-east of Vapour Farm.[27]
The third stage began at 6:00 am on 6 November, with a preliminary bombardment under largely clear skies. The German retaliatory artillery fire which followed a few minutes after that of the Canadians fell mainly behind the advancing troops. Almost everywhere the attack went well for the Canadians.[27] The 2nd Canadian Division encountered its chief opposition from pillboxes at the north end of Passchendaele, but less than three hours after the start of the battle the village had been fully secured. The 1st Canadian Division encountered stiff resistance from defenders of Vine Cottages, however by 8:00 am the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade had reached and consolidated the Green Line.[28]
Final attack
A small final action to gain a nearby crossroad and the remaining high ground north of the village, in the vicinity of Hill 52, was set to be launched 10 November. The road junction was 1,000 yards (910 m) north of Passchendaele along the highway to Westrozebeke.[28] Hill 52, the highest point on the northern end of the Passchendaele Ridge, was 500 yards (460 m) beyond the crossroad. Possession of both positions would permit observation over German positions to the north-east. The attack was made the responsibility of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade, with support from one battalion of the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade.[28] The Germans had, however, taken advantage of the break in fighting to relieve exhausted units. Regiments from the 4th Division and 44th Reserve Division replaced those of the 11th Division on 9 November.[29] Nevertheless, the assault was launched from the Green Line, north and north-east of Mosselmarkt, on the morning of 10 November. The assault made good initial progress, capturing the crossroad, overrunning Venture Farm and capturing four 77 mm field guns. However, north of the Canadian Corps boundary, the supporting advance by the British 1st Division ran into difficulties when a German counterattack got between two diverging battalions.[29] This permitted the Germans to fire against the British inner flanks, resulting in significant casualties and forcing both units to withdraw. As a result, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade was forced to fill the gap and throw back a defensive flank along the corps boundary ending any further progress. The action of 10 November brought to an end the long drawn-out Third Battle of Ypres. Though Haig had hoped to have the entire Passchendaele-Westrozebeke ridge as a winter position, the line was still short of Westrozebeke village.[29]
Aftermath
On 24 October, The Austro-German 14th Army under General der Infanterie Otto von Below achieved a significant victory against the Italian Army at the Battle of Caporetto. In fear that Italy might be put out of the war, the French and British Governments each promised to send six divisions of men to the Italian Front.[30] All troops were rapidly and efficiently transferred between 10 November and 12 December, due to good administrative preparations made by the French Commander-in-Chief Ferdinand Foch, who had been sent to Italy in April 1917 to plan for just such an emergency.[31] The Third Battle of Ypres as a result came to an unsatisfactorily close, with Haig being forced to end his advance just short of Westrozebeke.[32]
On 14 November, the gradual relief of the Canadian divisions by the VIII Corps began, and on the 20 November, Currie resumed command along the Lens-Vimy front.[1]
Nine Victoria Crosses, the highest military decoration for valour awarded to British and Commonwealth forces, were awarded for actions during the battle:[33]
- Acting Captain Christopher O'Kelly of the 52nd (New Ontario) Battalion
- Sergeant Robert Shankland of the 43rd (Cameron Highlanders of Canada) Battalion
- Private Thomas William Holmes of the 4th Canadian Mounted Rifles Battalion
- Private Cecil John Kinross of the 49th (Edmonton) Battalion
- Sergeant George Mullin of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
- Acting Major George Pearkes of the 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles Battalion
- Lieutenant Hugh McKenzie of the 7th Canadian Machine Gun Company
- Corporal Colin Fraser Barron 3rd (Toronto) Battalion
- Private James Peter Robertson 27th (City of Winnipeg) Battalion
Commemoration
For the Canadian Corps, participation in the Second Battle of Passchendaele is commemorated with the Passchendaele Memorial located at the former site of the Crest Farm on the southwest fringe of Passchendaele village.[34]
Notes
- ^ a b Nicholson p. 327
- ^ Wolff p. 248
- ^ a b c Bean p. 929
- ^ a b c Nicholson p. 311
- ^ a b c d e f g Nicholson 314 Cite error: The named reference "nicholson 314" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ a b c d e f g Nicholson 323 Cite error: The named reference "nicholson 323" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ Nicholson p. 306
- ^ a b Nicholson p. 308
- ^ Nicholson p. 310
- ^ Bean p. 926
- ^ a b Nicholson p. 311 Cite error: The named reference "nicholson" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
- ^ a b Nicholson p. 312
- ^ Jukes p. 32
- ^ a b Nicholson p. 313
- ^ a b c d e Nicholson p. 318
- ^ a b c ":: CWGC :: Second Passchendaele - 26 October". The Ypres Salient. Commonwealth War Graves Commission. n.d. Retrieved 2009-02-08.
- ^ Nicholson p. 316
- ^ Nicholson pp. 316–327
- ^ Wolff p. 246
- ^ a b Nicholson p. 319
- ^ a b c Nicholson p. 320
- ^ Wolff p. 247
- ^ a b c d e f Nicholson p. 321
- ^ Nicholson p. 322
- ^ ":: CWGC :: Second Passchendaele - 6 November". The Ypres Salient. Commonwealth War Graves Commission. n.d. Retrieved 2009-02-08.
- ^ Edmonds pp. 353–354
- ^ a b c d Nicholson p. 324
- ^ a b c Nicholson p. 325
- ^ a b c Nicholson p. 326
- ^ Bean pp. 935–936
- ^ Nicholson p. 331
- ^ Bean p. 936
- ^ Leach p. 80
- ^ Vance p. 66
References
- Bean, C.E.W. (1941). The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918: Volume IV: The A.I.F. in France 1917 (11th ed.). Sydney: Halstead Press Pty Limited.
- Edmonds, James (1948). France and Belgium 1917. Vol II. 7th June - 10th November. Messines and Third Ypres (Passchendaele). London: Imperial War Museum and Battery Press.
- Jukes, Geoffrey; Simkins, Peter; Hickey, Michael (2003), The First World War: The Western Front 1917-1918, London: Taylor & Francis, ISBN 0415968437
- Leach, Norman (2009). "'Passchendaele - Canada's Other Vimy Ridge". Canadian Military Journal. 9 (2). Department of National Defence: 73–82.
- Nicholson, Gerald W. L. (1962). Official History of the Canadian Army in the First World War: Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914–1919. Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary.
- Vance, Jonathan Franklin (1997). Death So Noble: Memory, Meaning, and the First World War. Vancouver: UBC Press. ISBN 0774806001.
- Wolff, Leone. In Flanders Fields, Passchendaele 1917