Talk:Air France Flight 447

Preliminary report due out

English Version of BEA release July 2, 2009, a direct link for a full Interim Report

• http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-cp090601e1.en/pdf/f-cp090601e1.en.pdf ...a table on page 67 needs translation from Frech. Patelurology2 (talk) 18:51, 4 July 2009 (UTC)Patelurology2 (talk) 05:47, 6 July 2009 (UTC)

According to Yahoo], the preliminary report into the accident should be out soon. Mjroots (talk) 05:58, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

Indeed, the report is now available. I have added a summary of this report at the bottom of the "Investigations" section. It seems to me that much of the earlier material contained in the article can now be delelted, but I don't like to delete what others have contributed. Maybe the authors of those parts can now remove them?--Gautier lebon (talk) 15:51, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

I have updated "news sources are saying" to "the BEA stated in an interim report" with a link to the summary of the aforementioned report available on the BEA website. AlexandrDmitri (talk) 21:55, 2 July 2009 (UTC)

I did not construct this sub-section, but it is still valid today with the interem report as it was back in early june.

French Transport Minister, Dominique Bussreau, said "Obviously the pilots [of Flight 447] did not have the right speed showing, which can lead to two bad consequences for the life of the aircraft: under-speed, which can lead to a stall, and over-speed, which can lead to the aircraft breaking up because it is approaching the speed of sound and the structure of the plane is not made for resisting such speeds".[107] On 11 June 2009, a spokesman from the BEA reminded that there was no conclusive evidence at the moment linking Pitot malfunction to the AF447 crash, and this was reiterated on 17 June 2009 by the BEA chief, Paul-Louis Arslanian.[85][108][109]

I see that somebody has added the following at the end of the paragraph that I added regarding the interim report: "However this conclusion contradicts the findings of autopsies conducted in Brazil on recovered passenger bodies, which indicated mid-air break up." I do not think that this statement is correct. The cited news reports (which I had added a couple of times a few weeks ago, and which got deleted each time) indicated that the bodies showed no signs of burns or explosion and showed fractures consistent with being ejected at altitude and hitting the water. I'm not a doctor, but I suppose that those types of fractures would also be consistent with being thrown out of an airplane when it disintegrates because it hits the water at high speed. The interim report includes a graph showing the distribution of the bodies and the debris. Both are closely grouped, which is consistent with the airplane breaking up on impact with the water, and not consistent with its breaking up at high altitude, in which case the debris and the bodies would be much more dispersed. Unlike others, I don't like to delete what others write, but I would like to invite the author of the statement cited above to remove it, because I don't think it adds to the article.--Gautier lebon (talk) 08:01, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

I don't understant the statement "(many bodies were found with minimal or no clothing, which suggests garment removal by wind, during fall from great height)". Terminal velocity for a human falling from great height is about 240 Km/h. I've done that (obviously with a parachute that opened after the free fall) and I can guarantee that your clothes are not torn off. Of course when you are ejected from a jet aircraft, you are going faster than that, say about 900 Km/h, but you rapidly declerate and I doubt that your clothes would be torn off. Maybe somebody with expertise in this area could comment on that?--Gautier lebon (talk) 08:21, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

I've read numerous reports on this from various airplane mid air breakups. It has been established by NASA research, which was used for the design of astronaut suits for the Space Shuttle, in case they had to bailout at high altitude. A notable example was the bailout of a USAF pilot during a high altitude air balloon flight, where his suit glove if I recall correctly was pulled off by air during the fall. Obviously your suit was designed so that it didn't fail during the fall, but it's not the same for everyday clothing. I'll go dig up some references and be back shortly.--Ferengi (talk) 08:45, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Regarding what I was wearing, it wasn't a suit at all. It was blue jeans, a T-shirt and non-laced shoes. During the fall, I started to worry that my shoes might be blown off, but they weren't.

Let me clarify the difference, when an AC undergoes mid-air disintegration there has to be a break in the pressure hold that initiates the disintegration. At 35,000 feet an AC has the pressure of less than 15,000 feet. about 3/4 to 2/3rds of an atmosphere, at 35,000 feet its is 1/3rd of an atmosphere. Therefore there is almost 1/2 of an atmosphere or 7 lbs/square inch of differential pressure. In that immediate instance as the crack first forms air rushes toward the back of the aircraft, clothes are immediately blown open and the force of the air is capable of ripping peoples clothes off close to the breach, immediately. Secondarily, as people are ejected from the Aircraft, the aircraft is not moving at terminal velocity (between 80 and 120kts) but is moving between 250 and 290 kts. KE = 1/2 mv² 275²/100² = 8 times the kinetic energy. IOW you have two sets off forces acting at once, one air expanding under peoples clothes, and two a very fast wind blowing them off. IIRC during the pressure hull break that occurred at the rear of the airplane (china air 113 or something) people had their clothes removed and were still attached to their seats.PB666 ^yap

Ok, I found it: read section 3.2.3 Aircraft in-flight breakup case studies (starting at page 3-44), of the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report by NASA, it will answer all your questions. --Ferengi (talk) 08:56, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Thank you for this. The relevant part says:

• Air India Flight 182 was flying at 31,000 feet over the Atlantic Ocean on June 23, 1985 when a terrorist bomb exploded in the baggage compartment. The Boeing 747 aircraft broke up in flight, and at least 21 of the 131 recovered bodies were denuded.

• Iran Air Flight 655 was mistakenly shot down by a U.S. Navy ship on July 3, 1988 while flying over the Persian Gulf. After missiles hit it, the Airbus A300 aircraft broke up in flight at an altitude of 13,500 feet. The denuded bodies of the passengers were recovered from the Persian Gulf waters.

• Pan Am Flight 103 was blown up by a terrorist bomb over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988. The bomb went off when the Boeing 747 aircraft was at roughly 31,000 feet and 313 knots airspeed; numerous passengers who had separated from the aircraft prior to ground impact were denuded.

• COPA Flight 201 broke up over the jungle in Panama on June 6, 1992. The Boeing 737 aircraft broke up at approximately 13,000 feet while in a high-speed dive (the pilots entered the dive because of a faulty attitude indication that was due to a wiring problem). Many of the passengers’ bodies were denuded.

The first three cases involve a bomb. It is well known that the shock wave from a bomb tends to blow people's clothes off, so I would surmise that the bodies in that case lost their clothes because of the bomb blast, not the fall.

The last case presents some similarities to the BEA's preliminary findings: a steep, high-speed dive. Maybe the shock wave induced when the aircaft breaks up (either in-air or when hitting the surface) can also denude the bodies. In any case, there is nothing in the citation that contradicts the BEA's preliminary conclusion, even taking into account the denuded state of the bodies. Also, the BEA didn't have access to the autopsies, but they did have access to the state of the bodies, the same as we do. So I think that we have to presume that they took that into account and that their preliminary conclusion is valid even given that the bodies were naked.--Gautier lebon (talk) 09:23, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Woah, stop it right there :) You are starting to dig deep into original research territory. Our task as wikipedia editors is to report what reliable sources are reporting. Don't confuse verifiability with truth. Also we are simply reporting a contradiction, which has been aknowledged by the BEA as well. It does not necessarily mean that the BEA report is inaccurate, and our task is not to decide either way, but let the reader have what reliable sources are reporting. --Ferengi (talk) 09:31, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

I beg to disagree. The BEA does not acknowlege any contradiction at all. They merely said that they didn't have access to the autopsies. You are suggesting that there is a contradiction because (1) news reports indicate that some bodies were naked and (2) some sources have said that this indicates that the clothes were blown off during the fall. I can accept that a body ejected from a plane at 500 knots will likely have it's clothes blown off. But there is nothing to indicate that this happened at high altitude or that a fall from altitude will result in clothes being blown off. It seems to me that part of what you added is speculation, but maybe I don't understand the meaning of that term in the Wikipedia context. After all, I am a newcomer, and I'm trying to learn the Wikipedia conventions.--Gautier lebon (talk) 09:39, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Fact:An official report by NASA attributes denuding to fall from great height due to aircraft breakup, establishing a scientific cause-effect link. Fact:Bodies were found denuded. Fact:The BBC reports: The French investigation appears to contradict earlier reports attributed to Brazilian pathologists. They said last month that the injuries sustained by the passengers whose bodies had been found suggested the plane had been in pieces before it hit the sea. Fact:The BEA does not deny, nor confirm that there is a contradiction.

All of the above facts lead me to conclude that this is a worthy addition to the article. I don't really have anything more to say on the subject, other than that all data I have added conforms to wikipedia policies on sources and verifiability. Let me add, since I feel you might have some understandable personal interest in this due to nationality (french I presume?), that I have absolutely no doubt that the BEA will conduct its investigation in the most professional manner possible. I'm also confident that the final report will look into this issue in depth. --Ferengi (talk) 10:11, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

(outdent). No offense meant to some of the contributors in this section, but this discussion is getting into Wikipedia is not a forum. We only include reported information, from reliable sources. Whilst your experiences are highly interesting, we are here to create an encyclopedia, not speculate and hypothesise about what may or may not have happened (even if it is based on your own personal experience, or previous accidents). The BEA Interim Report is out as of 2 July 2009, which is an authoritive source of information. Let's let them do the expert analysis (the Interim Report is over 200 pages), whilst we relay what they have said.AlexandrDmitri (talk) 11:46, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

I agree with you. It seems to me that the most authoritative and reliable facts and conclusions available at this time are those reported by the BEA. We should quote that, and nothing else, since everything else is less reliable. Since Ferengi questions my personal interest due to nationality, I have to state that I am not French although I do speak fluent French. My nationalities are US, Italian and Swiss. French is spoken elsewhere than France and by people who are not French.--Gautier lebon (talk) 12:55, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

Apologies for presuming, and yes, I'm aware of the multitude of French speakers around the world. --Ferengi (talk) 17:36, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

I removed the section on the informal Brazialian report more than a week ago. One report was a reporters synthesis of unverified facts. The other report came from an embalmer, who actually got it right, the bodies were damaged by sudden deceleration. These speculative conclusions should be removed from the article, the BEA even claims that the aircraft hit the water so hard that the verticle stabilizer was thrown forward and torn off, this means it was still attached to a functioning pressure hull on AC impact. Since I anticipated this finding I had previously removed the statements bout the VS being torn off by high speed or over-rudder. Most of the speculation people have placed on the main has been wrong and this is the reason it should be removed. There are two probable sources of failure with the AC, the failing ADR, the failing IR, both of which are in the ADIRU, and the secondary faults in a number of other systems. The primary faults are in the airspeed measuring equipment which are part of EFCS1, EFCS2, and EFCS3. Consequently precedences in these systems may be related.

I will remove the subsection again. And by the way, if we are to engage in OR or speculation, it should be here rather than the mainpage.PB666 ^yap 13:44, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

" this means it was still attached to a functioning pressure hull on AC impact." I disagree. This really means it was still attached to something on impact. Why do you assume it was attached to a functioning pressure hull? It may have been attached to a broken off section of the hull.

Arydberg (talk) 12:38, 7 July 2009 (UTC)

I have no problem with the section being removed, if you are certain about your sources which discredit the story. Could you please provide them for verifiability's sake? --Ferengi (talk) 17:36, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

We should not use 'disprove this can't be true' as a logic for inclusion. The BEA is an excellent source of information and as of yet no official investigative team other than the BEA has come up with a different conclusion. It fits the facts, it is consistent with a malfunction in speed indicator with at least some parallels with aircraft of the same type, and it fits the sudden impact damage that was evident in at least some of the bodies. Its the speculators responsibility to come up with an official source that supports their point of view. As far as I am concerned the page has a fitting primary hypothesis (failure of at least one pitot tube as an initiating event) and a major minor hypothesis (failure of one or more ADIRU) and if we wanted to, now we could add that the backup (low tech IAS indicator that was part of the ISIS) may have also failed. But that is it, we have no contrary evidence that contradicts the involvement of airspeed sensing, determination or FMGEC equipment involvement of these systems and the possibility of pilot error. There is no evidence of bomb blast, terrorist activity, mid-air explosion, windforce stripping people limbs off, etc. Pretty much many here have desired to place BS media speculation from the get-go and it has been a constant process of removing this speculation from the article. Most of what the media has said except their reporting of the BEA has been wrong, that is the precedence these informal reports have been background.PB666 ^yap

1.12.3 Visual inspection. The tail fin was damaged during its recovery and transport but the photographs available made it possible to identify the damage that was not the result of the accident. The middle and rear fasteners with the related fragments of the fuselage hoop frames were present in the fin base. The distortions of the frames showed that they broke during a forward motion with a slight twisting component towards the left.p.35

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information. Sailors from the Frigate Ventôse recovered about thirty bodies. A visual examination of the bodies showed that they were clothed and relatively well preserved. All of them were handed over to the Brazilian Navy to be transferred to the Recife morgue. At this stage of the investigation, the BEA has not yet had access to the autopsy data.p.37

1.16.2.4 Analysis of the messages received on 1st June from 2 h 10 onwards. the gap observed between the message sent at 2 h 13 min 14 s and the one sent at 2 h 13 min 45 s is due, at least in part, to a temporary interruption in the communication link between the aircraft and the satellite,p.46

PB666 ^yap 20:39, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

I had read 1.12.3 but there still was the possibility that bodies could have been sucked out of an opening (regardless of cause; I'm not a fan of the explosion/bomb/terrorism theory) that would not have compromised the overall integrity of the plane (most notable example being Aloha Airlines Flight 243, but also United Airlines Flight 811). Regrettably I missed 1.13, since I read the report in haste and in French, which I do not know in depth. Had I seen it, I would have indeed not added the BBC comment. Not sure how 1.16.2.4 is relevant to the present discussion. --Ferengi (talk) 21:10, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

With respect to the comments above questioning one's nationality, let us remind ourselves, if this is not germane to the Wikipedia mission, it should not be questioned; we all belong to Wikipedia Nation.Patelurology2 (talk) 19:27, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

I've already apologized for this higher up and I acknowledge I should have applied more good faith. However the reality is that I have seen more than my fair share of people trying to push their agendas in covert fashion, and my suspicious side got the better of me. Again my apologies. --Ferengi (talk) 21:10, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

No apologies required, no offense was taken. But I do appreciate your apology and I thank your for that. As a newcomer, I have to say that I am very favorably impressed by this process. Within one day, we have come to a consensus and now offer to the public what appears to be very reliable information. I am impressed and I thank all involved.--Gautier lebon (talk) 22:05, 3 July 2009 (UTC)

With respect to release of bodies 50 kms apart, a possible explanation may be intial tail or body breach and release of some passengers and subseuqent separation on impact in confirmation of findings in the following posted by PB666, an offocial BEA news release included again in block quote below posted initially on User:AlexandrDmitri while posting regarding a spate of questions of nationality of someone who posted on Talk:Air France page(AlexandrDmitri was chosen for possible interest in the matter as such; nationality is best left at the border of Wikipedia as mentioned similarly by another of our active contributor on AF447 on the user page with symbolics describing the user's nationality and multi ancestory; ancestry best left at the national border in that case) and seeing some AF447 sub-section activity; work is being discarded from AF 447 discussion page because supposedly is a forum activity, could find a repository. This comes from a beginner.

When BEA mentioned finding pieces from all over the plane, that was not easily acceptable; separation of bodies and parts in two main locations 50 kms apart can possibly be explained if tail or some section opened and released intial passengers and parts. With the tail or the opened section still attached only to breakup(with impact damage as attached vs free falling which would not have much spash damage) on impact could be in an explanation of above and the news on July 2, 2009 about high speed belly contact.

The following found on discussion page where points to look for are even being disregarded as speculation or forum activity. What information to look for and meaning behind all this should be part of discussion in order to improve the main page of anything in wikipedia; a writeup on this is needed so that when such points are presented, this should not be discarded as forum activity. Anyway, the following in block quote comes from posting by PB666 on talk page and seems to be a part of BEA official release. The content of the block quote seems to be in confirmation with tail release of bodies in air at a distance from location of separation on impact. This was originally posted on page User:AlexandrDmitri.

1.12.3 Visual inspection. The tail fin was damaged during its recovery and transport but the photographs available made it possible to identify the damage that was not the result of the accident. The middle and rear fasteners with the related fragments of the fuselage hoop frames were present in the fin base. The distortions of the frames showed that they broke during a forward motion with a slight twisting component towards the left.p.35

Patelurology2 (talk) 04:59, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

English Version of BEA release July 2, 2009, a direct link ...a table on page 67 needs translation from French. Patelurology2

The French version is on AF447 main page in references; the English version in External links. ... Requesting PB666, who has given this link in several paces in this section but without mention of the link being BEA release of July 2, 2009, to help clear confusion and delete redundant link. This direct link has the contents that all contributors on this page would benefit for further study. Patelurology2 (talk) 18:34, 4 July 2009 (UTC)Patelurology2 (talk) 05:47, 6 July 2009 (UTC)

English Version of BEA release July 2, 2009, a direct link ...a table on page 67 needs translation from Frech. Patelurology2 Patelurology2 (talk) 05:47, 6 July 2009 (UTC)

Sorry, I am travelling and had limited access to the web. The table in question is the action list that the crew should take in case of inconsistency in indicated air speed. It is highly technical, so I don't thik that I can provide a meaningful translation. "Poussee" means thrust. "Assiette" means horizontal position (nose up or down). Basically, they appear to be instructions to ensure straight and level flight. The bit at the end says that, once straight and level flight has been achieved, the pilot should turn to the emergency procedure on how to fly in case of reported inconsistency in air speed indication. Clearly the black boxes would be very helpful in this context, because presumably the voice recording would indicate whether or not the pilots executed the procedures in question.--Gautier lebon (talk) 12:12, 9 July 2009 (UTC)

The codes, translated by BEA

BEA interim report of 07-02-2009 on F-GZCP

SPECIAL FOREWORD TO ENGLISH EDITION: This interim report has been translated and published by the BEA to make its reading easier for English-speaking people. As accurate as the translation may be, the original text in French should be considered as the work of reference.

Just to reiterate I did find a number of translation errors in the English document.PB666 ^yap

I replaced the codes here with a table.

ACARS Messages during final 4 minutes of flight.
Time (UTC)	Code1	Message	Source and/or Meaning	Δt sec
2:10:10	2210 020	AUTO FLT AP OFF	Autoflight system - autopilot spontaneously shut off	0
2:10:16	2262 010	AUTO FLT REAC W/S DET FAULT	Autoflight system - unavailability of the reaction to wind shear detection function6	-
2:10:23	2791 005	F/CTL ALTN LAW	Flight control - switching [from normal law] to alternate flight control law.'	-
2:10:29 2:10:41	2283 002 2283 012	FLAG ON CAPT PFD SPD LIMIT FLAG ON F/O PFD SPD LIMIT	Disappearance of the display of the characteristic speeds (in particular VLS [low speed limit] and green dot [most economical speed]) on the Captain and First Officer [primary flight displays] PFDs, with display of the SPD LIM flag at the bottom of the speed scales. This message indicates the unavailability of the [flight management and guidance envelope computer] FMGEC’s characteristic speed calculation function.	-3
2:10:34	#0210/+2.98-30.59		At 2:10 the the geographic coordinates of F=GZCP was N2.98 W30.59	-3
2:10:47	2230 025	AUTO FLT A/THR OFF	Autoflight system - autothrust spontaneously shut off	-
2:10:54	3443 005	NAV TCAS FAULT	Navigation system - indicates that the [Terrain crash avoidance system] TCAS is inoperative.4	-
2:11:00 2:11:15	2283 001 2283 011	FLAG ON CAPT PFD FD FLAG ON F/O PFD FD	Disappearance of the Flight Director on the PFDs, Captain and First Officer sides, and display of the red FD flag	-5
2:11:21	2723 020	F/CTL RUD TRV LIM FAULT	..unavailability of the rudder deflection limitation calculation function. The limitation value remains frozen at the current value at the time of the failure.	-
2:11:49	3411 15*	EFCS2 1, EFCS1, AFS... PROBE-PITOT 1X2 / 2X3 / 1X3 (9DA), HARD	..transmitted by the FCDC2 (EFCS2), means that the FCPCs (or PRIMs) triggered one of the speed monitoring processes: they have detected a decrease of more than 30 kt in one second of the “polled” speed value. The three ADRs were considered valid by the EFCS2 at the time the monitoring was triggered, because the prior rejection of an ADR would have generated a class 2 fault message and there would therefore have been an asterisk in front of the source. In this case, the “polled” value is the median value. Flight control systems are now operating under 'alterate law 2'.	99
2:11:55	2793 34*	EFCS1 X2, EFCS2X... FCPC2 (2CE2)/ WRG:ADIRU1 BUS ADR1-2 TO FCPC2,HARD	Source:Captain's Electronic Flight Control System (EFCS 1). indicates that [First Officer's flight control primary computer] FCPC 2 no longer considers as valid the information that is delivered to it by ADR 1 (via bus 2).4	-
2:12:10 2:12:16	3412 001 3412 011	FLAG ON CAPT PFD FPV FLAG ON F/O PFD FPV	Disappearance of the FPV (bird) on the PFDs, Captain and First Officer sides, and display of the red FPV flag.	-5
2:12:51	3410 400	NAV ADR DISAGREE	the EFCSs have rejected an ADR, and then identified an inconsistency between the two remaining ADRs on one of the monitored parameters.	161
2:13:08	3422 00*	ISIS 1... ISIS(22FN - 10FC) SPEED OR MACH FUNCTION	Source: integrated standby information system (ISIS). internal failure at the level of the CAS or Mach elaboration function or CAS or Mach values that are outside certain limits.	178
2:13:14	3412 34*	IR2 1, EFCS1X, IR1, IR3... ADIRU2	Source: inertia reference 2 (A component of the First Officer's ADIRU).4	-
2:13:45	2790 025	F/CTL PRIM 1 FAULT	Flight control - This message indicates that FCPC1 (PRIM 1) has stopped functioning. This shutdown could be the result of a command or of a failure.	2157
2:13:51	2790 004	F/CTL SEC 1 FAULT	Flight control - This message indicates that [Captain's flight control secondary computer] FCSC1 (SEC 1) has stopped functioning. This shutdown could be the result of a command or of a failure.	-
2:14:14	3410 360	MAINTENANCE STATUS ADR 2	Source: First officer's Air data reference which is part of ADIRU-2	244
2:14:20	2283 34*	AFS 1... FMGEC1(1CA1), INTERMITTENT	Autoflight system - an intermittent fault in the captain's flight manangement guidance envelope computer, occurs for less than 2.5 seconds.4	-
2:14:26	2231 002	ADVISORY CABIN VERTICAL SPEED	Cabin Airhandling system - Flashing of the cabin vertical speed indicator on the SD’s PRESS page. .. indicates a cabin altitude variation greater, as an absolute value, than 1,800 ft/min for five seconds.	-
*Failures appear on gold background
1The last two numbers of the all codes, not shown, are "06" and refer to warnings or failures that occurred above 800ft MSL. The WN########## and FLR########## date and time stamps were removed as the times are given by the satellite that received the transmission from F-GZCP. 2The messages were at least five or six seconds apart, which can be explained by the limited rate of communication by satellite. 3Note: A position report message (AOC type) was received at 2 h 10 min 34 s, between two maintenance messages. 4According to BEA the message is not fully explained. 5There are two possible reasons for the longer gaps: either the aircraft did not have any messages to transmit, or it no longer had the means for doing so (loss of satellite communication performance, for example).. 6Italicised text are quotes from the 07-02-2009 BEA Interim report. 7The gap observed between the message sent at 2 h 13 min 14 s and the one sent at 2 h 13 min 45 s is due, at least in part, to a temporary interruption in the communication link between the aircraft and the satellite

Note: Since BEA combined information from the satellite to generate times, but also information from Airbus on the meaning of codes the above table would fit under the investigation section, not automated message section at the top of the article.PB666 ^yap

With respect to the English translated verison of BEA report, a table is still in French for translation; copying for pasting for auto-translation programs was unsuccessful. Assistance needed for this. Also, reliability of traslation and especially omissions need close scrutiny; early warning has already been expressed as above.Patelurology2 (talk) 01:55, 6 July 2009 (UTC)

The missense is in the FC system translation or meaning. There are three Flight Control laws are 'Normal law', 'Alternate law 1' (Normal), 'Alternate law 2', 'Direct law' and 'mechanical law' as these are the words used by Airbus to describe the flight control behaviors and protections. Alt 2 occurs when: Double engine failure, Double IR failure, Double ADR failure, ADR disagree, All spoilers fault, etc. This questions a little bit the translation (Δt = 99) because the ADR DISAGREE message is found in a later packet (Δt = 161) of transmissions. IOW, to go into alternate law 2 at least aspects of two ADIRU, under these circumstances, must have failed. Either that or the BEA has not fully explained the message. To avoid synthesis I did not mark that passage as According to BEA the message is not fully explained..Flight controls p 1.27.30. There is evidence that both ADIRU 1 and 2 have faulted in different ways but that is clear in later transmission packets. (i.e. ADR 1 faulted as a consequence of Pitot 1 failure and EFCS 1 has faulted, IR 2 has faulted ADR 2 had a maintenance message sent, ADIRU-2 ergo it has all but faulted, and the ISIS system which contains the non-electronic airspeed indicator has a speed outside limit fault),

ATC transcript

Any objections to adding this info from the BEA report of 2 July 2009 to the investigation section?

Transcript of communications with Air France Flight 447
23:19:27	AFR 447	Recife Center good evening, Air France 447 level 350.
23:19:34	ACC-RE	447 good evening, squawk ident maintain 350 under radar surveilance.
23:19:43	AFR 447	350 squawk ident Air France 447.
23:28:41	ACC-RE	Air France 447, Air France 447 say me your mach number, speed and selcal code.
23:28:52	AFR 447	Mach number will be 82 and selcal Charlie Papa Hotel Quebec.
00:00:35	ACC-RE	Air France 447, Air France 447 cal now frequency 125.45.
00:00:41	AFR 447	One two five four five, bye bye Air France 447.
00:00:57	AFR 447	Good evening Air France 447 level 350.
00:01:04	ACC-RE	447 350 squawk ident under radar control.
00:01:09	AFR 447	Roger Air France 447.
00:32:31	AFR 447	Recife Air France 447.
00:32:36	ACC-RE	Air France 447 go ahead.
00:32:43	AFR 447	Air France 447 squawk ident.
00:32:47	ACC-RE	Ok Air France 447 but squawk ident for Air France FOUR FIVE NINE, maintain 350 radar control.
00:35:15	ACC-RE	447 Recife Center.
00:35:56	ACC-RE	447, call me frequency one two eight decimal seven and secundary, correction, secundary one three four decimal eight.
00:36:12	AFR 447	Two eight seven, one three four eight.
00:36:15	AFR 447	Recife, Air France 447 level 350.
00:36:40	ACC-RE	Air France 447 good evening radar control, maintain flight level 350, over INTOL intersection contact Atlantico eitchef (HF) six five three five or five five six five, until there maintain this frequency.
00:36:55	AFR 447	Six five three five and five five six five for eitchef (HF) frequency, Air France 447.
01:14:23	AFR 447	...(Unintelligible)...447.
01:14:31	AFR 447	Air France 447, we cheking FEMUR at zero one one three, level 350, we contact Atlantico eitchef....
01:14:44	ACC-RE	Negative, after...over INTOL...(Ininteligível)...
01:14:54	AFR 447	After INTOL, Air France 447.
01:31:36	ACC-RE	Air France 447 Recife Center.
01:31:42	AFR 447	Air France 447.
01:31:44	ACC-RE	Air France 447 Atlantico six six four nine back up five five six five, after TASIL six five three five.
01:32:01	AFR 447	I undestood six six four nine and five five six five, six five three five.
01:32:10	ACC-RE	Six five three five only after TASIL with FIR DAKAR.
01:33:25	AFR 447	Atlântico, Atlântico, Air France 447 calling Atlântico on six six.
01:35:06	AFR 447	Atlântico, Atlântico, Air France 447 calling Atlântico on six six.
01:35:12	ACC-AO	Air France 447, Atlântico go ahead.
01:35:15	AFR 447	Air France 447, by checking INTOL zero one three three, level 350, SALPU zero one four eight, next ORARO zero two zero zero, selcall check Charlie Papa Hotel Quebec.
01:35:38	ACC-AO	Acionamento do código SELCALL
01:35:43	AFR 447	Air France 447, thank you.
01:35:46	ACC-AO	Welcome, maintaing flight level 350, say your estimate TASIL?
01:35:53	ACC-AO	Say your estimate TASIL?
01:35:59	ACC-AO	Air France 447 estimate TASIL?
01:36:14	ACC-AO	Air France 447 say your estimate TASIL?
23:07:15	ACC-BS	... Air France 447 por FLIRT. (Air France 447 at FLIRT)
23:07:17	ACC-RE	447 nível três cinco zero, deixa eu ver o limite aqui...INTOL. (447 level 350, let me see the limit here ... INTOL)
23:07:22	ACC-BS	INTOL.
01:04:37	ACC-RE	...já tem o Air France 447 em INTOL? (... I have Air France 447 in INTOL?)
01:04:42	ACC-AO	Não, ainda não. (No, not yet.)
01:04:44	ACC-RE	Ah, tá ok.
01:12:53	ACC-RE	...você tem o Air France 447? (...you have Air France 447?)
01:12:56	ACC-AO	Não, 447 ainda não. (No, not yet 447)
01:12:58	ACC-RE	INTOL. Não NÉ?
01:13:00	ACC-AO	Tá bom.
01:14:58	ACC-RE	Região de INTOL.
01:15:00	ACC-AO	Air France 447 já chegou. (Air France 447 has arrived.)
01:15:02	ACC-RE	Aos trinta e dois mantendo três cinco zero. (At thirty-two while 350.)
01:15:05	ACC-AO	Obrigado. (Thank you)
01:15:07	ACC-RE	Falou.
01:35:26	ACC-AO	Copy Air France 447.
01:35:29	ACC-DAKAR	447.
01:35:32	ACC-AO	Air France 447, TASIL zero two two zero
01:35:36	ACC DAKAR	Zero two two zero.
01:35:37	ACC-AO	Flight level 350 mach point eight two, and the...
01:35:45	ACC DAKAR	Ok, call you back, please.
01:35:46	ACC-AO	Ok, ok, no problem.

Socrates2008 (Talk) 10:40, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

The only problem I have with the table is that two classes of communications are out of time synch. The AF447 ACC-RE sequences end there should be a separator and something that identifies the exchanged between ACC-RE, -BS and DAKAR.PB666 ^yap 18:14, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

May 31 23:07:15 to 23:07:22 Brasilia control <-> To Recife control - Status of AF447

May 31 23:19:27 to 23:19:43 *AF447 <-> Recife Control a -Acknowledge radar contact and transponder code

May 31 23:28:41 to 23:28:52 *AF447 <-> Recife Control a -Mach and SelCode

June 01 00:00:35 to 00:00:41 *AF447 <-> Recife Control a -handoff to Recife b

June 01 00:36:12 to 00:36:55 *AF447 <-> Recife Control b - Acknowledge contact and give eitchef freqs.

June 01 01:04:37 to 01:04:42 Recife Control <-> Brasilia Control - Is AF447 past INTOL? No.

June 01 01:12:53 to 01:13:00 Recife Contol <-> Atlantico Control - Is AF447 past INTOL? No.

June 01 01:14:31 to 01:14:54 *AF447 <-> Recife Control b - AF447 past FEMUR, eitchef clarification.

June 01 01:14:58 to 01:15:07 Recife Control <-> Atlantic Control - AF447 is 32

June 01 01:31:36 to 01:32:10 *AF447 <-> Recife Control b - Change in eitchef freqs. Assign HF for DAKAR

June 01 01:33:25 to 01:35:12 *AF447 <-> Atlantico - [2 min lag] Past Intol, SALPU in 15 min, ORARO by 2:00 UTC.

June 01 01:35:28 to 01:35:43 *AF447 <-> Atlantico - Activate the ? code [Last contact]

June 01 01:35:26 to 01:35:46 Atlantico <-> Dakar control - AF447 at TASIL 02:20 UTC, at Mach 0.82, FL350, ...

June 01 01:35:46 to 01:36:14 Atlantico <-> -AF 447 what is ETA to TASIL (no response)

Not sure why this needs to be in the article it is in the BEA report so all that is needed is a link. MilborneOne (talk) 20:01, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

Recognising contributions by all above, it seems that the ATC synchronization needs further study and whatever will help, such as open file above or any link so labeled so that broad exposure may result in more understanding of the problem as noted in BEA report in block quote below:

Under section( of BEA report July 2. 2009) 1.15 Survival Aspects .. the following appears

Given the current lack of information regarding the end of the flight, this chapter only deals with the launching and organization of the search and rescue operations. The chronology of events is based on the recordings from the ATC centres at Dakar and Brest and the Air France OCC. At this stage of the investigation, the BEA has not yet had access to the data from the Recife (ATLANTICO) and Sal (SAL OCEANIC) centres. Synchronization of the exchanges between the ATC centres is difficult and remains uncertain. In this chapter, the times have been rounded to the nearest minute, which is the scale of uncertainty.

Patelurology2 (talk) 23:32, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

Right and if you look above one message ends at 1:14:54 to AF447 and the next message between Recife and Atlantico begins. Another message begins at 1:35:46 Atlantico to Dakar and another begins at 1:35:46 Atlantico to AF447.PB666 ^yap

I think it would be much more important to have a similar table with the codes and a basic interpretation.PB666 ^yap 23:52, 4 July 2009 (UTC)

Still not sure why this is needed, we are not carrying out the investigation on wikipedia that is BEAs job, we are not in a hurry this is only an encyclopedia that can wait for official results. So what would adding the transcript and also re-jigging the order gain over a link to the the BEA report. MilborneOne (talk) 09:43, 5 July 2009 (UTC)

The damage assessment has basically concluded the AC disintegrated on water impact, which means these codes are, in their essence, the investigation. It is in the BEA report and the BEA does discuss some of the meanings of the code, so I think it can be added without interpretation. Given that there is a high probability it will be part of the final investigation. BEA has already moved 4 maintenance status issues from this list which means they assert some significance to the 22 messages that remain. The issue is not whether it deserves to be in the investigation section clearly it does by official sources, the issues is whether it is encyclopedia to give the raw messages and how fairly should it be pruned down.PB666 ^yap 13:30, 5 July 2009 (UTC)

Sorry I thought we were discussing the ATC transcripts! MilborneOne (talk) 14:15, 5 July 2009 (UTC)

Recognising the above contributions and the need for some brevity as suggested above, first and foremost is the stress the importance of all the ATC records and it's discordance if any- as this is being studied above; same applies to ACARS code and similar facts as they come needing scrutiny and understanding of meaning with ultimate goal is to write better main page article. This is for anywhere in Wikipedia; one's interpretation or what to look for will differ from the other who is exposed to the same fact if is outlined somewhere. If the problem or information that one stubles upon can be shared with others on discussion page to make a meaning of, it should be detailed for broad exposure to make advance in our mission for better encyclopedia. Patelurology2 (talk) 17:02, 5 July 2009 (UTC)

To answer the comments above, the information in the table is presented "raw" from the BEA report without synthesis, hence the non-chronological order. I'm happy to bury this, as there's no apparent consensus to include it. Thanks for your time. Socrates2008 (Talk) 23:16, 5 July 2009 (UTC)

I don't think putting a blank line between the two would be a synthesis.PB666 ^yap 01:22, 6 July 2009 (UTC)

Mine is not much of a synthesis, either, since the primary document states the following synopsis of communications.

on the BRASILIA frequency (126.55 MHz, then 125.45 MHz and 128.7 MHz).

At 23 h 18 min 37 s, it was transferred to the RECIFE frequency (126.5 MHz).

At 0 h 36 min 40 s, the RECIFE controller asked it to maintain the altitude of FL350 and to contact ATLANTICO on HF (6535 or 5565 kHz) when passing the INTOL point.

At 1 h 31 min 44 s, the RECIFE controller gave it the ATLANTICO HF frequencies: 6649 or 5565 kHz, then 6535 kHz after the TASIL point. The crew read back the three frequencies. Note: TASIL is on the boundary between the ATLANTICO and DAKAR Oceanic FIRs.

At 1 h 33 min 25 s, the crew contacted the ATLANTICO controller on the 6649 kHz frequency.

At 1 35 min 15 s, they informed the controller that they had passed the INTOL point at 1 h 33, at FL350. They announced the following estimates: SALPU at 1 h 48 then ORARO at 2. They also transmitted their SELCAL code: CPHQ.

At 1 h 35 min 26 s, the ATLANTICO controller coordinated flight AF447 with the DAKAR controller.

At 1 35 min 32 s, the ATLANTICO controller transmitted the following items to the DAKAR controller: TASIL estimated at 2 h 20, FL350, Mach 0.82.

At 1 h 35 min 38 s, the ATLANTICO controller sent a SELCAL call.

At 1 h 35 min 43 s, the crew thanked the controller.

At 1 h 35 min 46 s, the controller asked them to maintain an altitude of FL350 and to give a TASIL estimate.

Between 1 h 35 min 53 s and 1 h 36 min 14 s, the ATLANTICO controller asked the crew three times for their estimated time passing the TASIL point. The crew did not answer.

[Note: In the same document at 2 h 01, the crew tried, without success for the third time, to connect to the Dakar ATC ADS-C system,] AF447 may have desired to change course at that time, all other flights diverted around the ORARU - TASIL flight path.

• Flight LH507 (AF447 -24min) The crew reported that it flew at the upper limit of the cloud layer and then in the clouds in the region of ORARO. In this zone they saw green echoes on the radar on their path, which they avoided by changing their route by about ten nautical miles to the west. While flying through this zone, which took about fifteen minutes, they felt moderate turbulence and did not observe any lightning. They lowered their speed to the speed recommended in turbulent zones." The atmosphere surrounding LH507 was extremely electrically charged.
• Flight (IB6024 + 12 min) The crew saw AF447 take off while taxiing at Rio de Janeiro. When passing the INTOL waypoint, they encountered conditions typical of the inter-tropical convergence zone. These conditions were particularly severe 70 NM to 30 NM before the TASIL waypoint. They moved away from the route by about 30 NM to the east to avoid cumulonimbus formations with a significant vertical development, and then returned to the airway in clear skies close to the TASIL waypoint. The crew reported they had difficulties communicating with Dakar ATC.
• AF459 (AF447 +37 min) On leaving the ATLANTICO FIR, through the TASIL waypoint, the crew attempted in vain to contact Dakar control in HF on the 5565 KHz and 6535 KHz frequencies, and on the other HF frequencies given in the on-board documentation. Likewise, the attempted ADS-C connection was unfruitful.

PB666 ^yap 01:58, 6 July 2009 (UTC)

Request for input from other Wikipedias

User:Patelurology2 has left me a note on my talkpage requesting input from other language Wikipedias, given that my mother tongues are English and French and I speak German and Russian to a near native level. The most logical choice to me is the French Wikipedia. Before I undertake the comparison of versions (9 pages on the FR Wikipedia) and given that I don't have much time at the moment (I have three hours of Arabic lessons per day and a final exam on Friday), does anyone have any comments on the pertinence me undertaking this? AlexandrDmitri (talk) 13:03, 7 July 2009 (UTC)

Off topic discussion collpased - this is not the place for general discussion of the merits of auto-translation MickMacNee (talk) 11:51, 9 July 2009 (UTC)

With respect to above the following may help understand the extent of problems and opportunities to learn from Wikipedias in other languages; Language barrier can be overcome.Topic title listed in Language barrier : Same Topic in Different Language Wikipedia- Divergence & Similarities in Study of any Subject ..include also opportunities to learn and cross feed. Different language Wikipedia pages for the same topic for e.g. the English page AF447 and the French page [1] and respective talk pages are likely to have divergence and similarities in evolution of study of any subject at hand; ability to cross contribute the content save Language barrier needs further study by active contributors of their respective language pages. ...Language is no barrier. Auto-translation programs can be used e.g. Bing Translator as possibly preferred for a such study for Side by Side feature of ability to view two languages, the original and machine translation to understand the gist; auto-translation is no substitute for a professional human translator.Patelurology2 (talk) 15:10, 7 July 2009 (UTC) Any page in any Wikipedia should have a machine auto-translation feature to help understand atleast the gist of the article; existing links on all pages in languages are for the the original pages in those respective languages. Importance of translation of all the articles that Wikipedia has in different languages is emphasised; machine auto-translation feature on any page and talk pages in any langnguage Wikipedia would suffice and for intensive study human translators available in Wikipedias would help. Meta.Wikipedia Translation Requests Patelurology2 (talk) 18:31, 7 July 2009 (UTC)

External Cameras - Studying Environment & Effects on Aircraft and Flight

• A340 has external camera for taxi aid and other purposes; youtube has a video mounted on tail [2]. Looking for information on all external cameras available on A330 and whether the images are recorded within black boxes or transmitted somewhwere besides being viewed in cockpit. For completeness of subject at issue what are the external images available to pilots which may possibly aid in study of the external environment and its effect on airframe and flight.Patelurology2 (talk) 17:02, 8 July 2009 (UTC)

I wroting new article ...

Alternate law which linking to this article, which I knew is poor grammer. But other editor is delete it! Can you help me improvied it? Alternate law —Preceding unsigned comment added by B767-500 (talk • contribs) 05:44, 9 July 2009 (UTC)

It was prodded as 'incoherent'. While I wouldn't have put it that insensitively, it wasn't really up to stub standard, so I've redirected it to Aircraft flight control systems for now. Hopefully someone will develop it, but a start would probably be to add material to Aircraft flight control systems. MickMacNee (talk) 11:37, 9 July 2009 (UTC)

Thats a really bad redirect, IMHO. I would rather see a page with poor grammar decent links that a redirect as this. Alternate Law is an Airbus solution to an obligate fly by wire system, it is not a general aircraft control system. I someone wants to create a page that discusses the Normal, Alternate, Direct, and Mechanic Law that would be a preferable situation. There is nothing wrong with having a stub.PB666 ^yap 13:49, 9 July 2009 (UTC)

Grammar was the least of its problems. MickMacNee (talk) 13:58, 9 July 2009 (UTC)

I neither prodded nor deleted the article, but was in the midst of making some suggestions on the talk page, when the article was deleted. I also offered to help with the copywriting. As the article no longer exists, I left a few comments on B767-500's talk page. AlexandrDmitri (talk) 19:57, 9 July 2009 (UTC)

I propose the page Flight control laws (Airbus) as an alternative to the page on Alternative Law. Here are the reasons:

1. Alternate Law makes no sense unless normal Law is roughly outlined
2. Direct Law makes no sense unless Normal law and Alternate Law are outline
3. Mechanical Law makes no sense unless all the above 3 are outlined.
4. Each (Normal, Alternate, Direct, and Mechanical can be directly linked to using the #section wikilink)
5. all make no sense in a general context (such as general aviation article), they might make more sense in a fly-by-wire context, but that would require a separate section on Airbus, and still subsections for each Law.

128.249.96.252 (talk) 22:47, 9 July 2009 (UTC)