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1740 Batavia massacre

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Batavia massacre
Two black and white drawings of events during the massacre. At left, Dutch troops kill ethnic Chinese residents while the residents' homes burn in the background. At right, the Dutch execute Chinese prisoners in a courtyard.
The execution of Chinese prisoners during the massacre
Date9 – 24 October 1740
Location
MethodsPogroms
Resulted inSee Aftermath
Parties
Dutch East Indies troops, various native and slave groups
Casualties and losses
500 Dutch troops killed
> 10,000 killed, > 700 injured

The 1740 Batavia massacre (Dutch: Chinezenmoord, literally 'Murder of the Chinese'; Indonesian: Geger Pacinan, meaning 'Chinese Tumult') was a pogrom against ethnic Chinese in the port city of Batavia, the Dutch East Indies (present-day Jakarta), that occurred between 9 and 22 October 1740, with skirmishes outside the walls that continued until late the next month.

With unrest in the Chinese population caused by government repression and the falling price of sugar, Governor-General Adriaan Valckenier declared that any uprising was to be dealt with using deadly force. Valckenier's resolution was called into force on 7 October after hundreds of ethnic Chinese, many of them sugar millers, killed 50 Dutch soldiers; in response the Dutch sent over 1,800 troops and supporting units, leading to the Chinese populace being stripped of all weapons and put under curfew. After an assault by ethnic Chinese on the walls of Batavia the following day, Valckenier called another meeting of the Council on 9 October; the same day as the meeting, other Batavian ethnic groups began burning Chinese houses along Kali Besar after being frightened by rumours of Chinese atrocities. This encouraged the Dutch soldiers, who later that day launched an assault on ethnic Chinese homes using cannons. From there the violence spread throughout Batavia, and Chinese men, women and children were killed. Despite an amnesty declared by Valckenier on 11 October, fugitive Chinese were hunted and killed by gangs of "bandits" for almost two weeks, until Valckenier called more forcefully for a cease of hostilities on 22 October. Outside the walls of the city, Dutch troops fought to contain the rioting sugar millers. After several weeks of minor skirmishes, Dutch-led troops assaulted Chinese strongholds in sugar mills throughout the area, driving them east towards Bekasi.

The massacre is generally agreed to have killed 10,000 ethnic Chinese; only 600 to 3,000 survived. It was followed by a period of numerous attacks on ethnic Chinese throughout Java, which led to a two-year war between a joint army of ethnic Chinese and Javanese against Dutch troops. Valckenier was recalled to the Netherlands and charged with crimes related to the massacre; Gustaaf Willem van Imhoff replaced him as governor-general. The massacre has featured heavily in Dutch literature, and is credited for the etymology of several areas in Jakarta.

Background

Adrian Valckenier, Governor-General of the Dutch East Indies, in a large white wig and regal clothing, holding a pipe-shaped object
Governor-General Valckenier ordered the killings of ethnic Chinese.

During the early years of the Dutch colonization of Indonesia, many people of Chinese descent were contracted as skilled artisans in the construction of Batavia, on the northwestern coast of Java;[1] they also served as traders, sugar millers, and shopkeepers.[2] Along with the economic boom caused by trade between the East Indies via Batavia and China, the number of ethnic Chinese in Batavia grew rapidly, reaching a total of 10,000 by 1740. At least another 15,000 lived outside the city walls,[3] with numbers reportedly as high as 80,000.[4] The Dutch colonials required them to carry registration papers, and initially sent back to China those who did not carry such papers.[5]

The deportation policy changed during the 1730s, after an outbreak of malaria that killed thousands, including Governor of Batavia Dirck van Cloon.[5][6] With both natives and the Dutch increasingly suspicious and resentful of the growing number of ethnic Chinese and their economic prowess, Commissioner of Native Affairs Roy Ferdinand, under orders of Governor-General Adriaan Valckenier, decreed on 25 July 1740 that Chinese considered "suspicious" should be deported to Zeylan (modern day Sri Lanka), where they would provide manpower for cinnamon harvesting.[6][7][8] Wealthy Chinese were extorted by corrupt Dutch officials, who threatened them with deportation;[6][9][10] British explorer and historian of Java Stamford Raffles notes that, in some Javanese accounts, the Dutch were told by the local Chinese captain to deport all those wearing blue, as those would be the poor ones.[11] There were also rumours that deportees were not taken to their destinations at all but were instead thrown overboard once out of sight of Java,[4][9] or, among other circles, that they died when running amok on the ships.[11] These measures caused unrest among the ethnic Chinese, as a result, many Chinese workers fled from their jobs.[4][9]

At the same time native occupants of Batavia became increasingly distrustful of the Chinese. Economic factors played a role. Most natives were poor, while the Chinese were seen as occupying some of the most prominent neighbourhoods in the city;[12][13] although Dutch historian A.N. Paasman notes that at the time the Chinese were the "Jews of Asia",[14] the actual situation was more complicated. Many poor Chinese living in the area around Batavia were sugar millers who felt exploited by the Dutch and Chinese elite alike.[15] Rich Chinese owned the mills and were involved in revenue farming and shipping; they drew income from milling and the distillation of arak, a molasses and rice-based alcoholic beverage.[15][16] On the other hand, the Dutch overlords set the price for sugar, causing unrest in its own right[17] because of declining prices: the sugar industry in the East Indies had suffered considerably from "changes in worldwide supplies to the European market" since the 1720s;[18] by 1740 worldwide sugar prices had dropped to half of the 1720 prices.[19]

Initially some councilors believed that the Chinese would never attack Batavia,[9] and stronger measures to control them were blocked by a faction led by Valckenier's distant cousin and political opponent, former governor of Zeylan Gustaaf Willem van Imhoff, who returned to Batavia in 1738.[20][21][22] After large numbers of Chinese began to arrive from nearby settlements, on 26 September Valckenier called an emergency meeting of the Council of the Indies, where he gave orders to respond to any ethnic Chinese uprisings with deadly force.[6] This continued to be contested by van Imhoff's faction; Dutch scholar J. Th. Vermeulen suggested in 1938 that the tension between the two factions played a role in the ensuing massacre.[7]

In the evening of 1 October Valckenier received reports that a crowd of a thousand Chinese had gathered outside the gate, angered by his statements at the meeting 5 days earlier. This report was accepted increduously by Valckenier and the council.[23] However, after the murder of a Balinese sergeant by Chinese outside the walls, the council decided to take "extraordinary measures" and reinforce the guard:[7][24] two groups of fifty Europeans and a number of native porters were sent to outposts on the south and east sides of the city,[25] and a plan of attack was formulated.[7][24]

Incident

Massacre

Bird's eye view of part of the city of Batavia where there is fighting while houses stand in flames in the foreground at the time of the massacre of the Chinese in 1740.
Chinese houses were burned during the massacre.

After groups of Chinese sugar millers revolted using custom-made weapons to loot and burn mills,[15] hundreds of ethnic Chinese[A] suspected to have been led by Captain Ni Hoe Kong[B] killed 50 Dutch soldiers in Meester Cornelis (now Jatinegara) and Tanah Abang on 7 October.[6][10] In response, the Dutch sent 1,800 regular troops, accompanied by schutterij (militia) and eleven battalions of conscripts to stop the revolt; they established a curfew and canceled plans for a Chinese festival.[6] For fear that the Chinese would conspire against the colonials by candlelight, those inside the city walls were not allowed to light candles; they were forced to surrender everything "down to the smallest kitchen knife".[26] The following day, the Dutch repelled an attack at the city's outer walls by up to 10,000 ethnic Chinese, led by groups from nearby Tangerang and Bekasi;[7][27] Raffles writes that 1,789 Chinese died in this attack.[28] In response, Valckenier called another meeting of the council on 9 October.[7][27]

Meanwhile, rumours spread among the other ethnic groups in Batavia, including Betawi servants, Indian soldiers, and slaves from Bali and Sulawesi, that the Chinese were plotting to kill, rape or enslave them.[5][29] These groups pre-emptively burned houses belonging to ethnic Chinese along Kali Besar. The Dutch followed this with an assault on Chinese settlements elsewhere in Jakarta in which houses were burned and people killed. Dutch politician and colonial system critic W.R. van Hoëvell wrote that "pregnant and nursing women, children, and trembling old men fell on the sword. Prisoners were slaughtered like sheep".[C][30]

Troops under Lieutenant Hermanus van Suchtelen and Tanah Abang survivor Captain Jan van Oosten took station in the Chinese district: Suchtelen and his men stationed themselves at the poultry market, while van Oosten's men held post at the nearby canal.[31] At around 5:00 p.m. local time (UTC+7) the Dutch opened fire on Chinese-occupied houses with cannons, causing the houses to catch fire.[32] Some Chinese died in the burning houses, while others were shot upon leaving their homes and still others committed suicide in desperation. Those who reached the canal located near the housing district were killed by Dutch troops waiting in small boats,[32] while other troops searched in between the rows of burning houses, killing any survivors they found.[30] The actions later spread throughout the city.[32] Vermeulen notes that many of the perpetrators were sailors and other "irregular and bad elements" of society.[D][33] During this period, there was heavy looting[33] and property seizures.[28]

A black and white drawing of the execution of Chinese prisoners during the Batavia massacre. Decapitated heads can be seen on the ground, with one Dutch soldier in the midst of decapitating another prisoner. Armed guards stand watch over the group, including the prisoners queued for execution.
Chinese prisoners were executed by the Dutch on 10 October 1740.

The following day the violence continued to spread, and Chinese patients in a hospital were taken outside and killed.[34] After a failed attempt to put out the fires in the areas devastated the preceding day, the flames burned with renewed vigor and spread, only dying on 12 October.[35] Meanwhile, a group of 800 Dutch soldiers and 2,000 natives assaulted Kampung Gading Melati, where a group of Chinese survivors were holding up under the leadership of Khe Pandjang.[E] Although the Chinese evacuated to Paninggaran, they were later driven out of the area by Dutch forces. There were approximately 450 Dutch and 800 Chinese casualties in the two attacks.[28]

Follow-up and further violence

On 11 October Valckenier requested officers to control their troops and stop the looting, but was unsuccessful.[36] Two days later the council established a reward of two ducat for every Chinese head surrendered to the soldiers as an incentive for the other ethnic groups to assist in the purge.[36] As a result, ethnic Chinese who had survived the initial assault were hunted by gangs of "bandits", who killed those they found for the reward.[34] The Dutch worked together with Native Indonesians in different parts of Batavia, with Bugis and Balinese grenadiers sent to reinforce the Dutch on 14 October.[36] On 22 October Valckenier called for all killings to cease.[34] In a lengthy letter which laid the blame for the unrest squarely at the feet of the Chinese rebels, Valckenier offered amnesty to all Chinese, except for the leaders of the unrest, on whose heads he placed a bounty of up to 500 rijksdaalders.[37]

Outside the walls skirmishes between the Dutch and Chinese rebels continued. On 25 October, after almost two weeks of minor skirmishes, 500 armed Chinese approached Cadouwang (now Angke), but were repelled by cavalry under the command of Ridmeester Christoffel Moll and Cornets Daniel Chits and Pieter Donker. The following day the cavalry, consisting of 1,594 Dutch and Indonesian forces, marched on the rebel stronghold at the Salapadjang sugar mill, first gathering in the nearby woods and then setting the mill on fire with the rebels still inside; another mill at Boedjong Renje was taken in the same manner by another group.[38] Fearful of the oncoming Dutch, the Chinese retreated to a sugar mill in Kampung Melayu, four hours from Salapadjang; this stronghold fell to troops under Captain Jan George Crummel. After defeating the Chinese and retaking Qual, the Dutch returned to Batavia.[39] Meanwhile, the fleeing Chinese, who were blocked to the west by 3,000 troops from the Sultanate of Banten, headed east along the north coast of Java;[40] by 30 October it was reported that the Chinese had reached Tangerang.[39]

A ceasefire order reached Crummel on 2 November, upon which he and his men returned to Batavia after stationing a contingent of 50 men at Cadouwang. When he arrived at noon there were no more Chinese stationed at the walls.[41] On 8 November, between 2,000 and 3,000 native troops were requested from the Sultanate of Cirebon. Looting continued until at least 28 November and the last native troops stood down at the end of that month.[36]

Aftermath

A portrait of Governor-General van Imhoff in a large white wig and black suitcoat over plate armour. He is carrying a cane in his left hand and has a sword sheathed on his right side.
Van Imhoff was recalled to the Netherlands, and later reassigned as governor-general of the Dutch East Indies.

Most accounts of the massacre estimate that 10,000 people were killed within Batavia's city walls, while another 500 were seriously wounded. Between six and seven hundred houses were raided and burned.[42][43] Vermeulen gives a figure of 600 survivors,[36] while Indonesian scholar A.R.T. Kemasang estimates that 3,000 Chinese survived.[44] Indonesian historian Benny G. Setiono notes that 500 prisoners and hospital patients were killed,[42] and a total of 3,431 people survived.[45] The massacre was followed by an "open season"[46] against the ethnic Chinese throughout Java, causing another massacre in 1741 in Semarang, and more later in Surabaya and Gresik.[46]

As part of conditions for the cessation of violence, all of Batavia's ethnic Chinese were moved to a pecinan, or Chinatown, outside of the city walls, now known as Glodok. This allowed the Dutch to more easily monitor the Chinese.[47] To leave the pecinan, ethnic Chinese required special passes.[48] By 1743, however, ethnic Chinese had already returned to inner Batavia; several hundred merchants operated there.[4] Other ethnic Chinese led by Khe Pandjang[49] fled to Central Java; they attacked Dutch trading posts, and were later joined by troops under the command of Pakubuwono II. Though this further uprising was quashed in 1743,[50] conflicts in Java continued to last "almost without interruption" for 17 years.[2]

After a vote of no confidence by the Council of the East Indies on 16 December 1740, Valckenier resigned and left the East Indies in 1744. Valckenier was later investigated for his involvement in the massacre, but died before the investigation was completed.[51] Vermeulen characterizes the investigation as unfair, suggesting that popular outrage back home contributed to Valckenier's investigation.[52] Van Imhoff was called back to the Netherlands to face charges of insubordination. After these charges were dismissed, van Imhoff was sent to Batavia to be the new governor-general of the East Indies, beginning his service in 1743.[51]

Sugar production in the area suffered greatly after the massacre, as many of the Chinese who had run the industry were dead or missing, but began recovering after new governor-general Van Imhoff "colonized" Tangerang. He initially intended to have men come from the Netherlands to work the land as he considered those already settled in the Indies lazy. He was unable to attract new settlers because of high taxes and thus sold the land to those already in Batavia. As he had expected, the new land-owners were unwilling to "soil their hands", and quickly rented out the land to ethnic Chinese.[53] Production rose, but took until the 1760s to reach pre-1740 levels; it soon diminished again.[53][54] The number of mills also diminished from 131 in 1710 to 66 in 1750.[16]

Effects

Vermeulen described the massacre as "one of the most striking events in 18th century [Dutch] colonialism".[F][55] In his doctoral dissertation, W.W. Dharmowijono notes that the pogrom has figured heavily in Dutch literature, with early examples including a poem by Willem van Haren condemning the massacre (dating from 1742) and an anonymous poem, from the same period, critical of the Chinese.[56] Still, British explorer and historian of Java Stamford Raffles writes that Dutch historical records are "far from complete or satisfactory".[57]

Dutch historian Leonard Blussé writes that the massacre indirectly led to the rapid expansion of Batavia, and institutionalized a modus vivendi that led to dichotomy between the ethnic Chinese and other groups which could still be felt in the late 20th-century.[58] The massacre also led to the names of numerous areas in Jakarta. One possible etymology for Tanah Abang, meaning "red earth", is that it was named for the Chinese blood which was spilled there; Van Hoëvell suggests that it was a compromise to make the Chinese survivors accept amnesty more quickly.[59][60] The name Rawa Bangke, for a subdistrict of East Jakarta, may be derived from the vulgar Indonesian word for corpse, bangkai, due to the great number of ethnic Chinese killed there; a similar etymology has been suggested for Angke in Tambora.[59]

See also

Notes

  1. ^
    For example, the minor post of Qual, located near the Tangerang River and staffed by 15 soldiers, was surrounded by at least five hundred Chinese.[61]
  2. ^
    Kong is noted as surviving both the assault and the massacre. How he did so is not known; there is speculation that he had a secret cellar under his house or that he dressed in women's clothing and hid inside the governor's castle.[62] Van Hoëvell suggests that he gathered several hundred people after escaping the castle and hid in a Portuguese church near the Chinese quarters.[63] He was later captured and accused of leading the uprising by the Dutch but, despite being tortured, he did not confess.[62]
  3. ^
    Original: "... Zwangere vrouwen, zoogende moeders , argelooze kinderen, bevende grijsaards worden door het zwaard geveld. Den weerloozen gevangenen wordt als schapen de keel afgesneden."
  4. ^
    Original: "... vele ongeregelde en slechte elementen ..."
  5. ^
    Sources spell his name alternatively as Khe Pandjang, Que Pandjang, Si Pandjang, or Sie Pan Djiang.[28][49][64] Setiono suggests that his actual name may have been Oie Panko.[64]
  6. ^
    Original: "... markante feiten uit onze 18e-eeuwse koloniale geschiedenis tot onderwerp genomen."

References

Footnotes
  1. ^ Tan 2005, p. 796.
  2. ^ a b Ricklefs 2001, p. 121.
  3. ^ Setiono 2008, pp. 109–110.
  4. ^ a b c d Armstrong, Armstrong & Mulliner 2001, p. 32.
  5. ^ a b c Dharmowijono 2009, p. 297.
  6. ^ a b c d e f Setiono 2008, pp. 111–113.
  7. ^ a b c d e f Dharmowijono 2009, p. 298.
  8. ^ Paasman 1999, pp. 325–326.
  9. ^ a b c d Pan 1994, pp. 35–36.
  10. ^ a b Dharmowijono 2009, p. 302.
  11. ^ a b Raffles 1830, p. 234.
  12. ^ Raffles 1830, pp. 233–235.
  13. ^ van Hoëvell 1840, pp. 461–462.
  14. ^ Paasman, p. 1999.
  15. ^ a b c Kumar 1997, p. 32.
  16. ^ a b Dobbin 1996, pp. 53–55.
  17. ^ Mazumdar 1998, p. 89.
  18. ^ Ward 2009, p. 98.
  19. ^ von Wachtel 1911, p. 200.
  20. ^ Dharmowijono 2009, pp. 297–298.
  21. ^ van Hoëvell 1840, p. 460.
  22. ^ Encyclopædia Britannica 2011, Gustaaf Willem.
  23. ^ van Hoëvell 1840, pp. 465–466.
  24. ^ a b van Hoëvell 1840, pp. 466–467.
  25. ^ van Hoëvell 1840, p. 468.
  26. ^ Pan 1994, p. 36.
  27. ^ a b Setiono 2008, p. 114.
  28. ^ a b c d Raffles 1830, p. 235.
  29. ^ Setiono 2008, pp. 114–116.
  30. ^ a b van Hoëvell 1840, p. 485.
  31. ^ van Hoëvell 1840, p. 486.
  32. ^ a b c Setiono 2008, p. 117.
  33. ^ a b Dharmowijono 2009, p. 299.
  34. ^ a b c Setiono 2008, pp. 118–119.
  35. ^ van Hoëvell 1840, pp. 489–491.
  36. ^ a b c d e Dharmowijono 2009, p. 300.
  37. ^ van Hoëvell 1840, pp. 493–496.
  38. ^ van Hoëvell 1840, pp. 503–506.
  39. ^ a b van Hoëvell 1840, pp. 506–507.
  40. ^ Ricklefs 1983, p. 270.
  41. ^ van Hoëvell 1840, p. 506-5088.
  42. ^ a b Setiono 2008, p. 119.
  43. ^ Van Hoëvell 1840, pp. 491–492.
  44. ^ Kemasang 1982, p. 68.
  45. ^ Setiono 2008, p. 121.
  46. ^ a b Kemasang 1981, p. 137.
  47. ^ Setiono 2008, pp. 120–121.
  48. ^ Setiono 2008, p. 130.
  49. ^ a b Dharmowijono 2009, p. 301.
  50. ^ Setiono 2008, pp. 135–137.
  51. ^ a b Setiono 2008, pp. 125–126.
  52. ^ Terpstra 1939, p. 246.
  53. ^ a b Ota 2006, p. 133.
  54. ^ Bulbeck et al. 1998, p. 113.
  55. ^ Terpstra 1939, p. 245.
  56. ^ Dharmowijono 2009, p. 304.
  57. ^ Raffles 1830, p. 231.
  58. ^ Blussé 1981, p. 96.
  59. ^ a b Setiono 2008, p. 115.
  60. ^ Van Hoëvell 1840, p. 510.
  61. ^ van Hoëvell 1840, p. 473.
  62. ^ a b Dharmowijono 2009, pp. 302–303.
  63. ^ Van Hoëvell 1840, p. 585.
  64. ^ a b Setiono 2008, p. 135.
Bibliography
Online references