Talk:Operation Barbarossa

Three Soviet Directives from 22 June 1941:

I tried to put this into the article, however my edition was deleted:

Victory?

In the infobox it says the Germans won tactically, but the lede says it failed. Which one? Burklemore1 (talk) 09:06, 22 January 2016 (UTC)

Good call. This is one of the stuff that changed/vanished during a bout of vandalism that occurred last month. Fixed. EyeTruth (talk) 07:48, 23 January 2016 (UTC)

Ah so I see. Thanks for the fix, I knew something was up when there was a sudden change saying they won. Burklemore1 (talk) 08:27, 23 January 2016 (UTC)

I don't want to get into an edit/revert/edit cycle but this is the article about Operation barbarossa, which ended in 1941. It is not the WW2 article or the Eastern Front article. The result statement must be confined to what happened directly as a result of Barbarossa, not things that happened years later and were contingent on all sorts of factors. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:23, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

I just reverted again in the info box. I think the box needs to confine itself to things that happened directly as a result of Barbarossa, not events that happened years later that were not 100% determined by this operation. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 13:58, 22 February 2016 (UTC)

Why don't just Operation failure, seems more obvious. Eleutheure (talk) 14:51, 22 February 2016 (UTC)

Because it is far more complex than that. The Wehrmacht essentially defeated the pre-war Red Army and took incredible amounts of territory.....yet the USSR survived and stayed in the fight, which created a gigantic strategic problem for the Germans and frankly the best strategic opportunity the allies had. Still, it's a long way from Dec 1941 to May 1945. DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:56, 22 February 2016 (UTC)

It's pretty complex, and that complexity will never get into a one line citation. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Eleutheure (talk • contribs) 15:01, 22 February 2016 (UTC)

I think operation failure is appropriate. The goal of Barbarossa was to destroy the Red Army and the Soviet state, none of which occurred. K.e.coffman (talk) 17:29, 22 February 2016 (UTC)

This has come up again and again; see archived talk 2 and 3 from 2008, for example, when many of the same arguments were made. Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 20:26, 22 February 2016 (UTC)

German Intelligence of Soviet Forces

There doesn't seem to be any mention of the assessment by German high-command of the strength of the Russian forces as part of Operation Barbarossa and prior to the invasion, with the exception of the comment "If I had known about the Russian tank strength in 1941 I would not have attacked". I feel this is a gaping hole in the article. I don't really have any good sources handy, but my recollection from study of the Operation is this was significant shortfall in the development of the Operation Barbarossa plan. Any thoughts on this? Aeonx (talk) 12:10, 14 February 2016 (UTC)

Well, the fact is that Hitler set the date for Barbarossa, not the military, so it's not like they waited until their ducks were in a row and then launched the attack. They got whatever intelligence they could in the very short period of time between when Hitler told them the attack was going to happen, and the actual jumping off date.

That doesn't actually excuse the German Army, it was their job to be ready for any eventuality, but Hitler had early on assured them that there would be no two-front war, as in World War I, so when he suddenly reversed himself, they were caught with their pants down. BMK (talk) 16:44, 14 February 2016 (UTC)

Copy-paste from Erich Marcks:

In the summer of 1940, Franz Halder, chief of OKH General Staff, directed Marcks to draft an initial operational plan for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Marcks produced a report entitled "Operation Draft East". Citing the need to "protect Germany against enemy bombers (no other reason was given)", the report advocated the A-A line as the operational objective of the invasion of "Russia" (sic). This goal was a line from Arkhangelsk on the Arctic Sea through Gorky and Rostov to the port city of Astrakhan at the mouth of the Volga on the Caspian Sea. Marcks envisioned that the campaign, including the capture of Moscow and beyond, would require between nine to seventeen weeks to complete.

References

My reading of this is that the planning started at least a year in advance. Is this not sufficient time for the military intelligence to arrive at accurate estimate of enemy forces and capabilities? K.e.coffman (talk) 20:18, 14 February 2016 (UTC)e

It really depends on what kind of sources they had, what assets they had in place in rhe Soviet Union, and whether they penetrated past the caoital(s) region of Moscow/Petrograd back beyond the Urals, where Stalin's reinforcements were eventually to come from, once he got over the profound shock that Hitler has actually attacked, something that didn't come about for a significant time after the attack began. My impression is that German intelligence did a pretty good job at the tactical level, but never really had an adequate idea of what kind of resources and manpower the USSR had in its interior, nor were they aware that the Soviets were moving factories lock-stock-and-barrel out of harm's way past the Urals, where they churned out tanks and planes galore, all possible because other resources -such as trucks, uniforms, helmets, rations etc -- were being provided by the US on Lend-Lease, allowing the Russians to concentrate on the front-line material they needed. That's another factor Hitler and the Wehrmacht missed - I think they believed that the US would never supply the Soiviets to the degree thet did the British because of the fundamental clash between their political systems.

So, no, the German Army did not go an especially good job overall, but when they did they were rewarded by tactical victory after victory. Perhaps the one factor they most severly misspprciated was effect of the rains followed by the freeze, which bogged them down, and which they were toally unprepared for -- but at Hitler's specific order, since he was convinced that the battle would be over before there would be any need for winter clothing.

So, I guess what I'm saying here is that it was a system, and most parts of the system malperformed, but primarily the Fuehrer himself, so it seems a bit unfair to blame the army per se for what was not entirely their fault. BMK (talk) 21:29, 14 February 2016 (UTC)

I think this is pretty accurate, although I associate the failure to consider the Russian winter a consequence of the bigger problem being they underestimated the size, equipment, rate of reinforcement and dispositions of the Russian forces as a failure of intelligence preparation which of consequence meant a significant delay and ultimate halt to the advance. Where they were then trapped in the winter without adequate clothing and supply lines. I'm sure this historical pov is cited in one my books...somewhere. Aeonx (talk) 04:30, 16 February 2016 (UTC)

Result, again

Result was reverted to 2015 version on May 5th? Why USSR victory? There was a German failure to complete their objectives. But USSR failed to achive it's devensive objectives as well. There was loss at battle of Moscow, but overall it was a loss for USSR and failure of Germans. Can't this article follow the footsteps of First_Battle_of_El_Alamein#Aftermath? Very similar situation where neither side reached it's objectives? To say that it was USSR victory, or German, is very weak. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 139.88.52.143 (talk) 21:04, 2 May 2016 (UTC)

This article has gone through numerous changes to the "Result" section of the info box over the years.

May I suggest we discuss? The major outcomes of Operation Barbarossa are: axis failure to defeat the USSR in a single campaign, and, because the USSR continued fighting, the creation of the eastern front. I personally think that is enough for the info box. Everything else is details that can be described in the article. In particular, 'failure to reach the A-A line' is (I mean no disrespect here but) merely a terrain metric for staff officers. The real goal was to crush the USSR militarily; reaching the A-A line was one terminal terrain objective that is a part of that goal. Likewise, results such as "eventual defeat of the Axis' are results, not of barbarossa, but of WW2.

Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 17:25, 6 April 2016 (UTC)

I hear what you are saying DMorpheus, but equally the a-a line was no mere staff metric. It was the specific end goal of the operation as written by Hitler himself Full text

I would like to see "axis failure to achieve operation objectives" with Directive 21 linked, and "creation of eastern front". It gives readers the opportunity to examine it. Irondome (talk) 17:47, 6 April 2016 (UTC)

I agree with DMorpheus2 about A-A line, this was just one of the many sub-failures under main failure to defeat USSR. On other hand, I personally don't see much point in listing "creation of the eastern front" as result. Not to mention that if feels a bit awkward as "result", considering that Eastern Front started on 22.06.2016 and Barbarossa with formed a very substantial part of it.--Staberinde (talk) 17:48, 6 April 2016 (UTC)

I understand your points too Staberinde, just it's that I feel a bit more detail, ideally a link to Dir. 21 may be instructive to our readers. It really sums it up. Creation of eastern front is perhaps too obvious to state. Irondome (talk) 17:52, 6 April 2016 (UTC)

Not too obvious, IMO. After all, the failure to knock the USSR out in a single campaign is arguably the biggest strategic consequence of the operation.

Regarding the A-A line, again, I think we're mistaking the means with the ends. The goal was to eliminate the USSR's warmaking ability. The objective was the Red Army itself, not any terrain objective.

Again we're talking about the info box here, not the full article, which of course should deal with this in much greater detail.

Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 19:03, 6 April 2016 (UTC)

Then I would suggest keeping the points we have, and removing the a-a line mention, as it has its own link in mainspace, but re-positioning it. I think the a-a line concept is important in terms of understanding the full implications of Barbarossa, just as is Generalplan Ost and the Hunger Plan. This was not just a conventional military campaign but the prelude to an unprecedented -and still arguably poorly understood racial/colonial onslaught on the world. Irondome (talk) 19:41, 6 April 2016 (UTC)

Failure to knock out USSR is already covered by other points, I don't really see what "Opening of the Eastern Front" adds to it.--Staberinde (talk) 14:49, 7 April 2016 (UTC)

Pre-emptive strike

Closing discussion resulting from edit warring by a HarveyCarter sockpuppet

The article should mention the fact that Hitler publicly claimed the operation was a pre-emptive strike, before Stalin was ready for war against the European Axis Powers. (81.159.6.5 (talk) 22:25, 25 March 2016 (UTC)) Agreed. It's not as if we are saying this claim was true. Martijn Meijering (talk) 22:31, 25 March 2016 (UTC) It's already in the article: see the first para of Operation Barbarossa#German invasion plans and a discussion of the relevant historiography in the last para of Operation Barbarossa#Soviet preparations. Nick-D (talk) 22:40, 25 March 2016 (UTC) Exactly. This is not the place to expand on the Icebreaker crap. It has it's own article. What is said as Nick indicates, is enough. Irondome (talk) 22:42, 25 March 2016 (UTC) It should be mentioned in the previous section because it is relevant there. We know Stalin was preparing for war with the European Axis, and Hitler could not allow this to continue otherwise the Soviets would have been too powerful. (81.159.6.5 (talk) 22:44, 25 March 2016 (UTC)) We "know" no such thing, and such a view is long-discredited. Please see the final para of Operation Barbarossa#Soviet preparations. Please stop edit warring as well - you (rightly) started this discussion after your changes were reverted, and need to now see if a consensus supporting your position develops. Nick-D (talk) 22:51, 25 March 2016 (UTC) It was confirmed when the Cold War ended that Stalin was preparing for war against Germany and Italy in 1941. (81.159.6.5 (talk) 23:00, 25 March 2016 (UTC)) By whom? Nick, my socks are itching.Irondome (talk) 23:07, 25 March 2016 (UTC) By the documents that were released by the Kremlin. Historians have dismissed the theory that Stalin was about to attack German forces in the summer of 1941, but all historians agree he was preparing for war. (81.159.6.5 (talk) 23:09, 25 March 2016 (UTC))

Axis invasion, not German

It was an Axis invasion, involving troops from many different countries. To call it a German invasion is just Nazi propaganda. (86.133.255.131 (talk) 17:28, 10 May 2016 (UTC))