Alcibiades

Alcibiades
Alcibiades
Allegiance	Athens (temporarily Sparta)
Rank	general (strategos)
Battles / wars	Battle of Abydos (410 BC) Battle of Cyzicus (410 BC) Siege of Byzantium (408 BC)

Alcibiades Cleiniou Scambonides (also Alkibiades) (Greek: Ἀλκιβιάδης Κλεινίου Σκαμβωνίδης)(c. 450 BC–404 BC) was a prominent Athenian statesman, orator and general. The last known member of his family, which fell from prominence after the Peloponnesian War, he played a great role in the second half of the conflict by means of strategic advice, military tactics, and political influence. Likely owing to his youth, he failed to win the consistent support of Athenian voters that was essential to the conduct of a coherent strategy against Sparta.

At the beginning of the Sicilian Expedition, Alcibiades was accused of mutilating the city's hermai. The charges against him eventually caused him to defect to the Peloponnesian side. The activities of Agis II induced him however to abandon the Spartans and seek refuge with Tissaphernes, whose favour he soon gained. Through his influence, Tissaphernes deserted the Spartans and offered to assist the Athenians, who accordingly recalled Alcibiades from banishment and reinstated him as an Athenian strategos and commander-in-chief of all the land and sea forces. But the defeat at Notium, which happened in his absence, gave Alcibiades' enemies leverage to use against him, and he was relieved of his command. He exiled himself to his fortified domain in Thrace and, after the fall of Athens, took refuge with Pharnabazus. He was about to proceed to the court of Artaxerxes II of Persia, when one night his house was surrounded by a band of armed men and set on fire.

In combination with an outbreak of plague and interference from Persia, Alcibiades' advice to Sparta in connection with Syracuse and the fortification of Decelea contributed to the downfall of Athens, although it is argued that, had he been allowed to continue in command of the Sicilian Expedition, he would have overruled the policy of Nicias and prevented the catastrophe of 413 BC. Though he must have known that he had but little influence over the Persian satrap, Alcibiades used it as bait offered, first, to Sparta, then to the Athenian oligarchs, and finally to the democratic faction in Athens.

Early career

Jean-Léon Gérôme (1824-1904): Socrates seeking Alcibiades in the House of Aspasia, 1861

Alcibiades was born in Athens, the son of Cleinias and Deinomache, the latter of whom belonged to the family of the Alcmaeonidae. It is said that his family was traced back to Eurysaces. His grandfather, also named Alcibiades, was a friend of Cleisthenes, who had supported the democratic reforms. He was a close relative of Pericles, who, after the death of Cleinias at the Battle of Coronea (447 BC), became his guardian. Alcibiades had a number of famous teachers such as Socrates, and was well trained in the art of rhetoric. Alcibiades was noted for his unruly behavior, which is mentioned by the ancient Greek writers in various occasions.^[α] Plutarch is however criticized for using "implausible or unreliable stories" in order to construct Alcibiades' portrait.

He took part in the Battle of Potidaea in 432, where Socrates saved his life, a service which he repaid at the Battle of Delium in 424 BC. ^[β] Alcibiades had an intimate relation with Socrates and once expressed his great admiration for him, saying: "His nature is so beautiful, golden, divine, and wonderful within that everything he commands surely must be obeyed, even like the voice of a god." According to Plutarch, Demosthenes "feared and reverenced Socrates alone, and despised the rest of his lovers".

An example of his bold, flamboyant nature occurred during the Olympic games of 416 where "he entered seven teams in the chariot race, more than any private citizen had ever put forward, and three of them came in first, second, and fourth".

Jean-Baptiste Régnault (1754-1829): Socrates dragging Alcibiades from the Embrace of Sensual Pleasure, 1785

Alcibiades first rose to prominence when he began advocating aggressive Athenian action after the signing of the Peace of Nicias. A.W. Gomme believes that Alcibiades felt offended with the Lacedaimonians for having negotiated the treaty through Nicia and Laches, and having overlooked him on account of his youth. This uneasy truce between Sparta and Athens, signed midway through the Peloponnesian War, came at the end of seven years of fighting in which neither side had gained a decisive advantage. Disputes over the interpretation of the treaty led the Spartans to dispatch ambassadors with "full powers to arrange all matters in dispute [regarding the Peace of Nicias] upon fair and equal terms". The Athenian council initially received these ambassadors well, but Alcibiades met with them in secret before they were to speak to the larger assembly and informed them that the Athenian "people are full of ambition and great designs" and that a more prudent course of action would be to "quit…this indiscreet simplicity, if you expect to obtain equal terms from the Athenians". He urged them to renounce their diplomatic authority to represent Sparta, and instead allow him to assist them through his influence in Athenian politics. The representatives agreed and were all the more impressed with Alcibiades foresight, but unwittingly they had alienated themselves from Nicias, who was sympathetic to their wishes and sincerely wanted to reach an agreement with the Spartans. The next day during the assembly Alcibiades asked them what powers Sparta had granted them to negotiate and they replied, as agreed, that they did not come as plenipotentiaries. This was in direct contradiction to what they had said the day before and Alcibiades seized on this opportunity to denounce their character, cast suspicion on their aims, and to destroy their credibility. Having succeeded in this ploy, Alcibiades increased his standing at the expense of Nicias and he was subsequently appointed general. He took advantage of this leadership role to orchestrate the creation of an alliance between, Argos, Mantinea, Elis and other states in the Peloponnese, threatening Sparta's dominance in the region. According to A.W. Gomme, "it was a grandiose scheme for an Athenian general at the head of a mainly Peloponnesian army to march through the Peloponesse cocking a snook at Sparta when her reputation was at its lowest". This alliance, however, would ultimately be defeated at the Battle of Mantinea.

Somewhere in the years 417-415 BC a complex struggle of Hyperbolos with Nicias and Alcibiades is said to have taken place, where Hyperbolos tried to bring about the ostracism of one of this pair but they combined their influence to induce the people to expel Hyperbolos instead".

Sicilian Expedition

Main article: Sicilian Expedition

File:Sicily map.gif

Map of Sicily designed by Marco Prins or Jona Lendering with all the Phoencian and Greek settlements.

In 415 BC, delegates from the Sicilian city of Segesta arrived at Athens to plead for the support of the Athenians in their war against Syracuse. During the debates on the undertaking, Nicias was vehemently opposed to Athenian intervention, explaining that the campaign would be very costly and attacking the character and motives of Alcibiades, who had emerged as the supporter of the expedition. On the other hand, Alcibiades argued that this new theatre would bring riches to the city and expand their empire just as had happened in the aftermath of the Persian wars. In his speech Alcibiades appears overconfident with regard to how easily they would be able to recruit allies in the region and how easily the people would adopt Athenian rule (Thucydides). Still it was Nicias who, through a "failed rhetorical trick", turned "a modest undertaking…into a massive campaign that made the conquest of Sicily seem possible and safe". It was at his suggestion that the size of the fleet was significantly increased from 60 ships to "140 galleys, 5,100 men at arms, and about 1300 archers, slingers, and light armed men". Leo Strauss underscores that the Sicilian expedition surpassed everything undertaken by Pericles. Almost certainly Nicias' intention was to hint at the scale of forces necessary to invade Sicily, but rather than dissuade his fellow citizens it made them all the more eager. Against his wishes Nicias was appointed general along with Alcibiades and Lamachus who were given full powers to do what was in the best interests of Athens while in Sicily.

One night during preparations for the expedition the hermai statues throughout Athens were destroyed. These were monuments to the god Hermes, who represented fertility, luck, roads, and borders. This was a serious crime in ancient Greece and was seen as a bad omen for the mission. Plutarch explains that "Androcles, the popular leader, produced sundry aliens and slaves who accused Alcibiades and his friends of mutilating other sacred images, and of making a parody of the Eleusinian Mysteries in a drunken revel". According to Thucydides, the Athenians "were always in fear and took everything suspiciously". Later his opponents, chief among them being Androcles and Thessalus, enlisted orators to argue that Alcibiades should set sail as planned and stand trial on his return from the campaign". Alcibiades was suspicious however of their intentions and asked to be allowed to stand trail immediately, under penalty of death, in order to clear his name. This was not allowed however and the fleet set sail soon after, with the charge still over him.

As he suspected, his absence only served to embolden his enemies. They began to accuse him of other sacrilegious actions and speech and even alleged that these actions were connected with a "plot against the democracy". When Alcibiades arrived in Catana they found the state trireme "Salaminia" waiting to bring Alcibiades and the others indicted for the mutilating the Hermae or profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries back to Athens to stand trial. In Thurii he escaped with his crew in his own ship and in Athens he was condemned to death in absentia. His property was confiscated and a reward of a talent was promised to whoever succeeded in killing any who had fled. Meanwhile the Athenian force in Sicily scored a few victories and then moved against Messina, where they expected their secret allies within the city to betray it to them. Thucydides explains the futility of this plan as "Alcibiades…foreseeing that he would be outlawed, gave information to the friends of the Syracusans in Messina, who had at once put to death its authors…and succeeded in preventing the admission of the Athenians". With his betrayal and the death of Lamachus in battle some time later, the Sicilian Expedition was in the hands of Nicias who didn't have the capacity to manage and lead such a force.

Modern scholars have forwarded speculations that the specific nature of the "profanation of the mysteries" may have been using entheogens considered sacred within the rites as a pure recreational drug.

Defection to Sparta

After his disappearance at Thurii he quickly contacted the Spartans "promising to render them aid and service greater than all the harm he had previously done them as an enemy". The Spartans granted this request and received him among them. When they were unable to secure a force to come to the relief of Syracuse, Alcibiades spoke and instilled fear of Athenian ambition into the Spartan ephors by informing them of their desire to conquer Sicily, Italy, and even Carthage. Although he said such things principally to motivate the Spartans, Kagan claims that much of this was a lie. In contrast to Thucydides who seems to assume what Alcibiades said was fact and that he himself believed it, D. Kagan says he knowingly exaggerated the plans of the Athenians to convince them "of the benefit they stood to gain from his advice and help". According to him, this was prior to Alcibiades' "legendary" reputation and the Spartans saw before them instead "a defeated and hunted man" whose policies "produced strategic failures" and brought "no decisive result". If true this assessment underscores one of Alcibiades greatest talents, his political prowess, a vital tool in navigating the turbulent and unforgiving political landscape of ancient Greece. According to Kagan, we cannot help but "marvel at his boldness and imagination and at the enormity of his bluff". After making the threat seem imminent, he advised them to send troops and most importantly, a Spartan commander to discipline and aid the Syracusians.

Next Alcibiades advised them to build a permanent fort in Decelea, an area just over 10 miles from Athens and within sight of the city. The purpose was to "cut them off entirely from their homes and crops and the silver mines of Sunium". This was part of his plan to renew the war with Athens in Attica. This move was devastating to Athens and forced the citizens into the long walls of the city year round, fostering the plague and making them entirely dependent on their naval supremacy. A consequence of this would be the revolt of Delian League members as they saw that the war was going badly for Athens and that they were occupied on two fronts. To disrupt the Athenian's source of income Alcibiades brought almost all Ionia to revolt. Despite his help to the Spartan cause it was around this time it was discovered Alcibiades was having an affair with the wife of the Spartan king, Agis II. It is said that Timaia, Agis' wife, ultimately bore him a son, Leotychides. With his treachery discovered and the retirement of the ephor most friendly to him, Alcibiades knew his time in Sparta was limited. The King sentenced him to death when he learned of his wife's infidelity but Alcibiades received warning of this order and escaped over to the Persian satrap Tissaphernes who had been supporting the Peloponnesian forces financially in 412 BC.

In Asia Minor

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Bust of Alcibiades, Musei Capitolini, Roma

On his arrival in the Persian court he won the trust of the powerful satrap and made several policy suggestions which were well received. According to Thucydides, Alcibiades immediately began to do all he could with Tissaphernes to injure the Peloponnesian cause. Firstly the satrap had the payments to the Peloponnesian fleet reduced and made irregularly. Next he told him to bribe the generals of the cities to gain valuable intelligence on their activities. Lastly, and most importantly, he told Tissaphernes to be in no hurry to bring the Persian fleet into the conflict, as the longer the war dragged out the more exhausted the combatants would become. This would allow the Persians to more easily conquer the region in the aftermath of the fighting. Alcibiades therefore tried to convince the satrap that it was Persia's interest to wear both Athens and Sparta out at first, "and after docking the Athenian power as much as he could, forthwith to rid the country of the Peloponnesians". Although Alcibiades' advice helped the Persians, it was merely a means to an end. Thucydides tells us that his real motives were, true to his character, to use his influence or at least what looked like his influence with the Persians to "effect his restoration to his country".

Planning his recall to Athens

During all this Alcibiades, who seemed to presume that "radical democracy" would never agree to his recall to Athens, sent to the Athenian leaders at Samos and suggested that if they could install an oligarchy friendly to him he would return to Athens and bring with him Persian money and possibly the Persian fleet of 147 triremes.According to T. Buckley, Alcibiades set about winning over the most influential Athenians of the fleet at Samos and acieved his goal by convincing them that there is every chance of winning over Tissaphernes and the King to the Athenian side. According to Buckley, these influential Athenians formed a club of conspirators, triggering the anger of the majority of the armed forces, which calmed down "by the advantageous prospect of the pay from the king". The conspirators consisted of two groups: the "extreme" oligarchs and the "moderates". According to Thucydides, the members of the club assembled and prepared to send Peisander on an embassy to Athens to treat for the restoration of Alcibiades and the abolition of the democracy in the city, and thus to make Tissaphernes the friend of the Athenians, Peisander won the argument, putting Alcibiades and his promises at the center.

Whether Thucydides was right or wrong about the sentiment towards the democracy at Samos, he seems to be right about the intentions of Alcibiades and Tissaphernes during the ensuing meeting. He asserts that Tissaphernes would not make an agreement with the Athenians on any terms, wanting to follow his policy of neutrality. Alcibiades realized this and attempted with success to make the Athenians "think not that he was unable to persuade Tissaphernes, but that after he had been persuaded and was willing to join them, they had not conceded enough to him". Although they were angered at the audacity of the Persian demands, they nevertheless departed with the impression that Alcibiades could have brought about an agreement among the powers if he had chosen to do so. The fiasco at the court of Tissaphernes put however an end to the negotiations of the conspirators with Alcibiades. The group was however convinced that Alcibiades could not deliver his side of the bargain, as Tissaphernes preferred the policy of wearing down both sides of the Greeks. Thereby, the conspirators decided to break with Alcibiades.

As Kagan points out, Tissaphernes was a prudent leader and had recognized the advantages of wearing each side out without direct Persian involvement. In truth there was no such fleet in the region and probably no likelihood one would ever arrive. Moreover Kagan criticizes Thucydides sweeping generalization that all the trierarchs and generals at Samos were receptive to Alcibiades proposal to change the government, citing Thrasybulus as a leader who remained loyal to the democracy and would later become a hero for overthrowing the thirty tyrants who ruled Athens briefly after their loss. Still the prospect of breaking the Persian alliance with Sparta and bringing them to their cause proved irresistible and they soon sent a delegation to Tissaphernes to negotiate with him through Alcibiades.

Reinstatement as an Athenian General

Meanwhile news that the democracy had been overthrown in favor of the government of the four hundred reached the democratic fleet at Samos. Here Plutarch claims that they sent for Alcibiades so as to use his help in putting down the tyrants in Athens. During his speech upon his arrival he does have harsh words for the oligarchy in Athens, but the primary motives of his speech were to "increase his credit with the army at Samos and to prejudice the enemy (Sparta) as strongly as possible against Tissaphernes" and to reach this goal he "extravagantly magnified his own influence" with the Persians. Kagan offers a more immediate reason for his restoration, that being "revolts and a Spartan fleet in the Straits threatened the Athenian grain supply and consequently its ability to stay in the war". Whatever the reason the fleet recalled him, upon hearing his speech they immediately elected him general based on the hopes he instilled in them. In fact, he roused them so much that they "proposed to attack at once the Piraeus and the oligarchs in Athens". It was primarily Alcibiades, along with Thrasybulus, who calmed the people and showed them the folly of this proposal, as it would have sparked civil war and led to the immediate defeat of Athens.

Presently he sailed to Tissaphernes with a detachment of ships. According to Plutarch the supposed purpose was to stop the Persian fleet from coming to the aid of the Peloponnesians, but as we have seen it is doubtful that a fleet was ever coming anyway. Thucydides is in agreement with Plutarch that the Persian fleet was at Aspendus and that he told them he would bring the fleet to their side or prevent it from coming at all, but Thucydides further speculates that the real reason was to flaunt his new position to Tissaphernes and try to gain some real influence over him. If true, we see Alcibiades as a master of trickery once more, using supposed influence with one party to increase his own standing and power with the other. The stakes were very high because although he had just been elected general, his position with the Athenians was precarious at best. Kagan reveals that this was not the glorious return to Athens which he had hoped for but rather he owed his reinstatement to Thrasybulus a close friend and leader of “only one faction of democrats”. Moreover he was being recalled to Samos, not to Athens and his immunity there "protected him for the time being but not from a reckoning in the future".

411 to 407 BC

It is most likely that Alcibiades after he was recalled by the five thousand, the government which succeeded the four hundred, in 411 that he waited until 407 to actually return to the city. Plutarch tells us that he was resolved to come back with glory. While this was certainly his goal, it was again means to an end, that end being avoiding prosecution upon his return to Athens. The next significant part he would play in the war would occur at the battle of Abydos. While Alcibiades was away he managed to collect money with which he was able to pay the rowers and gain their favor. From here the bulk of the Athenian force sailed northward and Alcibiades stayed behind to guard the southern entrance to the Hellespont. The engagement took place off the coast of Abydos, where the Peloponnesians had set up their main naval base. The battle was evenly matched and raged for a long time, when Alcibiades sailed into the Hellespont to their support, with eighteen ships. The Persian satrap Pharnabazus, who was now working with the Peloponnesian fleet instead of Tissaphernes, moved his land army to the shore to defend the ships and sailors who had beached their ships and moved to land. Only the supporting Persian land army and the coming of night saved their fleet from complete destruction.

Shortly after the battle Tissaphernes had arrived in the Hellespont and Alcibiades left the fleet at Sestos to meet him, bringing gifts and hoping to once again try to win over the Persian governor. Evidently Alcibiades made a grave misjudgment he was arrested on arrival. Within a month he would escape and resume command, but this event marked the end of his deception. It was obvious he had no influence with the Persians and from now on “his authority would depend on what he actually accomplished rather than on what he promised to do”.

The next major sea battle took place at Cyzicus, where the Athenians had intelligence indicating that Pharnabazus and Mindarus (The Peloponnesian fleet commander) were together plotting their next move. Concealed by storm and darkness the combined Athenian force reached the vicinity in the spring of 410 completely to the surprise of the Peloponnesians. Here the Athenians devised an ingenious plot to draw the enemy into battle. According to Diodorus Siculus,^[γ] Alcibiades advanced with a small squadron in order to draw the Spartans out to battle, and, after he successfully deceived Mindarus with this ploy, the squadrons of Thrasybulus and Theramenes came to join him, cutting off the Spartan's retreat.

The Spartan fleet suffered losses in the flight, and reached the shore with the Athenians hot on their heels. Alcibiades's troops, leading the Athenian pursuit, landed and attempted to pull the Spartan ships back out to sea. The Peloponnesians mooring their ships together, they fought with their adversaries as they sailed down upon them. Alcibiades, however, sailed round the fleets and landed on the shore. When Mindarus saw this, he also landed, and fell fighting on the shore. Meanwhile, a letter intercepted from the Spartan troops which read: "The ships are lost. Mindarus is dead. The men are starving. We know not what to do. A short time later Sparta petitioned for peace but their appeals were ultimately rejected by the Athenians.

After this Alcibiades and Thrasyllus began the siege of Chalcedon in 409 with about 190 ships. Although unable to attain a decisive victory or induce the city to surrender, Alcibiades was able to win a small tactical land battle outside of the city gates and Theramenes concluded an agreement with the Chalcedonians. Afterwards they concluded a temporary alliance with Pharnabazus which secured some much needed immediate cash for the army, but despite this Alcibiades was still forced to depart in search for more booty to pay the soldiers and oarsmen of the fleet.

In pursuit of these funds he traveled to the Gallipoli Peninsula and attacked the city of Selymbria on the north shore of the Propontis. According to Plutarch, he plotted with a pro-Athenian party within the city and offered the Selymbrians reasonable terms and imposed strict discipline to see that they were observed. He did their city no injury whatever, but merely took a sum of money from it, set a garrison in it and left. His performance is judged as skillful, since it saved time, resources, and lives and still fully achieved its goal.

From here Alcibiades joined in the siege of Byzantium along with Theramenes and Thrasyllus. A portion of the citizens of the city, demoralized and hungry, decided to surrender the city to Alcibiades for similar terms as the Selymbrians had received. On the agreed upon night the defenders left their posts and the Athenians attacked the Peloponnesian garrison in the city and their boats in the harbor. The portion of the citizenry that remained loyal to Peloponnesians fought so savagly that Alcibiades issued a statement in the midst of the fighting which guaranteed their safety and this persuaded the remaining citizens to turn against the Peloponnesian garrison which was nearly totally destroyed.

Return to Athens, Defeat at Notium and Dismissal

It was in the aftermath of these successes that Alcibiades resolved to finally return to Athens "in the spring of 407…having every appearance of being not only a great general who had revived Athenian fortunes, but also once again the only man who had the power to deprive the Spartans of Persian help and win the war". Still Alcibiades was exceedingly careful in his return, mindful of the changes in government, the charges still technically over him, and the great injury he had done to Athens. Thus "he entered the harbor full of fear […] till standing on the deck he saw Euryptolemus, his cousin, and others of his friends and acquaintance, who were ready to receive him and invited him to land". Upon arriving on shore he was greeted with a hero's welcome, the people blaming their failures on their own rash judgment and faulting him for nothing.

He left Athens the supreme commander of the navy and with hand picked subordinates. In the meanwhile Tissaphernes had been replaced by Cyrus (a relative of Darius) who decided to financially support the Peloponnesian forces. This new revenue started to attract deserters to the Spartan navy from the Athenians. Additionally the Spartans had replaced Mindarus with Lysander, a very capable admiral. These factors caused the rapid growth of the Peloponnesian fleet at the expense of the Athenian fleet. It was the search for funds and the need to force another decisive battle that caused Alcibiades to leave Notium and sail to help Thrasybulus in the siege of Phocaea. He was aware the Spartan fleet was nearby, so he left nearly 80 ships to guard against attack by them. In charge was Alcibiades personal helmsman, Antiochus under orders not to attack. Although he was certainly trusted by him, he proved to be a little too independent minded as he disobeyed the one order he was given and endeavored to draw Lysander into a fight by similar methods as had been employed at Cyzicus with great success. The conditions here were utterly different than they had been however and the strategam (Greek battleplan) was poorly conceived and executed. In practice Antiochus was killed by Lysander in the opening phase of the battle and his small squadron retreated in disorganized panic back to Notium, chased by the whole of Lysander's forces. There the remainder of the fleet was taken off guard, lacking central leadership and not being prepared for such a rapid sequence of events. In the end the Athenians lost 22 ships to none on the Peloponnesian side. Alcibiades soon returned and desperately tried to undo the defeat at Notium by scoring another victory, but Lysander could not be compelled to attack the fleet again.

Ultimately responsibility for the defeat fell on Alcibiades and his enemies used the opportunity to attack him and have him removed from command, although G. Cawkell believes that Alcibiades quite unfairly got the blame for Antiochus' mistake. Diodorus adds that, in addition to his mistake at Notium, Alcibiades was discharged on account of false accusations brought against him by his enemies. Consequently he himself condemned himself to exile. Alcibiades had prepared a safe harbor for himself in a fortified castle he had built on the Gallipoli Peninsula during his years in service in the Hellespont, and it was to here that he escaped. The implications of the defeat were severe for Athens. Although the defeat had been minor it occasioned the removal of not only Alcibiades but also his allies like Thrasybulus and Theramenes. These were likely the most capable commanders Athens had at the time and their removal would help lead to the Athenian surrender only two years later after their complete defeat at Aegospotami.

Death

Michele de Napoli (1808-1892): Morte di Alcibiade (1839 circa). Naples National Archaeological Museum.

With one exception, Alcibiades' role in the war ended with his command. Prior to the Battle of Aegospotami, in the last attested fact of his career, Alcibiades recognized that the Athenians were anchored in a strategically disadvantageous spot and advised them to move to Sestus where they could benefit from a harbor and a city. Diodorus, however, does not mention this advice, ^[δ] arguing instead that Alcibiades offered the generals Thracian aid in exchange for a share in the command. The generals of the Athenians, however, "considering that in case of defeat the blame would attach to them and that in case of success all men would attribute it to Alcibiades", asked him to leave and not come near the camp ever again. Days later the fleet would be annihilated by Lysander.

After the Battle of Aegospotami, Alcibiades crossed the Hellespont and took refuge in Phrygia, with the object of securing the aid of Artaxerxes against Sparta. But the Spartans induced Pharnabazus to put him out of the way. According to Plutarch Lysander sent an envoy to Pharnabazus who then dispatched his brother to Phrygia where Alcibiades was living with his mistress Timandra. ^[ε] In 404 BC, as he was about to set out for the Persian court, his residence was surrounded and set on fire. Seeing no chance of escape he rushed out on his assassins, dagger in hand, and was killed by a shower of arrows.

Assessments

Political career

In ancient Greece Alcibiades was a polarizing figure. Thucydides reprehends the Athenian statesman for his political conduct and motives. According to the historian, Alcibiades, being "exceedingly ambitious", proposed the expedition in Sicily, in order "to gain in wealth and reputation by means of his successes". Alcibiades is held responsible by Thucydides for the destruction of Athens, since "his habits gave offence to every one, and caused them to commit affairs to other hands, and thus before long to ruin the city". In addition, he indulged "his tastes beyond what his real means would bear". Plutarch regards him as "the least scrupulous and most entirely careless of human beings". Alcibiades excited in his contemporaries a fear for the safety of the political order. Thereby, he has not been spared by ancient comedy and stories attest to an epic confrontation between Alcibiades and Eupolis resembling that between Aristophanes and Cleon. On the other hand, Diodorus argues that "for in boldness he far excelled all other men, ... in appearance he was exceedingly handsome and in spirit brilliant and intent upon great enterprises". S. Press points out that even Xenophon emphasizes Alcibiades' service to the state, rather than the harm he was charged with causing it. Demosthenes defends Alciviades' achievements, saying that "he had ... taken arms in the cause of democracy, twice in Samos and a third time in Athens itself, displaying his patriotism, not by gifts of money or by speeches, but by personal service." For Demosthenes and other orators Alcibiades constitutes the figure of the great man during the glorious days of Athens and becomes a rhetorical symbol. In an Isocrates' speech, delivered by the son of Alcibiades, it is argued that for his services the Athenian statesman deserves Athenians' gratitude. On the other hand, in a Lysias' oration it is argued that Athenians should "regard him none the less as an enemy because of the general tenor of his life", as "he repays with injury the open assistance of any of his friends". According to Aristotle, traits of a proud man like Alcibiades are "equanimity amid the vicissitudes of life and impatience of dishonour". Central to the depiction of the Athenian statesman is Cornelius Nepos' famous phrase that Alcibiades "surpassed all the Athenians in grandeur and magnificence of living."

Even nowadays Alcibiades remains an ambiguous personality. For M.F. McGregor Alcibiades was rather a shrewd gambler than a mere opportunist, while E.P. Fotiades predicates that he was "a first class diplomat" and had "huge skills". Nevertheless his spiritual powers were not counter-balanced with his magnificent mind and he had the hard luck to lead a people susceptible to demagoguery. K. Paparrigopoulos underlines his "spiritual virtues" and compares him with Themistocles, but he then asserts that all these gifts created a "traior, an audacious and impious man". For his part, D. Gribble argues that Alcibiades' actions against his city were misunderstood and predicates that "the tension which led to Alcibiades' split with the city was between purely personal and civic values". Russell Meiggs asserts that the Athenian statesman was absolutely unscrupulous despite his great charm and brilliant abilities. According to Meiggs his actions were dictated by shelfish motives and his feud with Cleon and his successors undermined Athens. The same scholar underscores that "his example of restless and undisciplined ambition strengthened the charge brought against Socrates". Being even more critical, A.G. Platias and C. Koliopoulos state that Alcibiades' own arguments "should be sufficient to do away with the notion that Alcibiades was a great statesman, as some people still believe".

Aeschylus in Aristophanes' Frogs sees Alcibiades as a powerful creation arousing admiration, but also as a "savage figure" unacceptable and dangerous when released in the city, saying:

You should not rear a lion cub in the city,

[best not to rear a lion in the city,]

but if one is brought up, accommodate its ways.

According to Andocides, Alcibiades "instead of holding that he ought himself to conform with the laws of the state, he expects you to conform with his own way of life".

Military achievements

Despite his critical comments, Thucydides admits in a short digression that "publicly his conduct of the war was as good as could be desired". Diodorus and Demosthenes regard him as a great general. According to E.P. Fotiades, "Alcibiades was an invincible general and, wherever he went, victory followed him". The Greek scholar believes that if he had led the army in Sicily, the Athenians would have avoided disaster and, if his countrymen had followed his advice at Aegospotami, Lysander would have lost and Athens would have ruled Greece. K. Paparrigopoulos believes however that the Sicilian Expedition, prompted by Alcibiades, was a strategical mistake. In agreement with Paparrigopoulos, A.G. Platias and C. Koliopoulos underscore that "the Sicilian expedition was a strategic blunder of the first magnitude, ... resulting from frivolous attitude and an unbelievable underestimation of the enemy". On the other hand, A. Vlachos underlines the constant interest of Athens for Sicily from the beginning of the war.^[στ] According to A. Vlachos the expedition had nothing the extravagant or adventurous and constituted a rational strategic decision based on traditional Athenian aspirations. A. Vlachos asserts that Alcibiades had already conceived a broader plan: the conquest of the whole West. He intended to conquer Carthage and Libya, then to attack Italy and, after winning these, to encompass at once Italy and Peloponnesus. The initial decision of ecclesia provided however for a reasonable military force, which later became unreasonably large and costly because of Nicias' demands. D. Kagan criticizes Alcibiades for failing to recognize that the large size of the Athenian expedition undermined the diplomatic scheme on which his strategy rested.

D. Kagan believes that Alcibiades was a commander of considerable ability, but he constituted no military genious and his confidence and ambitions went far beyond his skills. He thus was capable of important errors and serious miscalculations. D. Kagan predicates that at Notium he committed a serious error in leaving the fleet in the hands of an inexperienced officer and that in Cyzicus the key figure was Thrasybulus and not Alcibiades. Kagan's remarks remind us of Cornelius Nepos, who said that Athenians' extravagant opinion of Alcibiades' abilities and valour was his chief misfortune.

S. Press argues that "though Alcibiades can be considered a good general on the basis of his performance in the Hellepont, he would not be considered so on the basis of his performance in Sicily", but he adds that "the strengths of Alcibiades' performance as a general outweigh his faults". D.R. McCann and B. Strauss attempt a comparaison between Alcibiades and Douglas MacArthur, pointing out that "both men stood out as military leaders to whom a mystique attached itself".

Oratorical skill

In terms of oratorical skills Plutarch asserted that "Alcibiades was a most able speaker in addition to his other gifts" and Theophrastus predicated that Alcibiades was the most capable of discovering and understanding what was required in a given case. Nevertheless, he would often stumble in the midst of his speech, but then he would resume and proceed with all the caution in the world. Even his lisp he had was noticed by Aristophanes, made his talk persuasive and full of charm. Eupolis underlines that he " prince of talkers, but in speaking most incapable"; namely he was more eloquent in his private discourses than when orating in front of ecclesia. For his part, Demosthenes underscored that Alcibiades was regarded as "the ablest speaker of the day". Nevertheless, K. Paparrigopoulos does not accept Demosthenes' opinion, but acknowledges that the Athenian statesman could sufficiently support his case. For his part, D Kagan acknowledges his rhetorical power, whilst T. Habinek asserts that the orator Alcibiades seemed to be whatever his audience needed on any given occasion. According to Habinek, his appearance in Plato's Symposium conforms to the pattern of Alcibiades literature: Alcibiades is always just what is wanted. In the field of oratory, the demos respond to Alcibiades' affection with affection of their own. Thereby, the orator "is the institiation of the city talking to - and loving - itself". According to Aristophanes the Athenian people "yearns for him, and hates him too, but wants him back".

References in popular culture

Main article: Alcibiades (fictional character)

Aristophanes mentions Alcibiades several times in his satirical plays and figures in several Socratic dialogues (Symposium and Alcibiades 1 and 2).

Alcibiades constituted also a source of inspiration for modern historical novelists, such as Steven Pressfield.

See also

• Ancient Greece
• Athenian democracy
• History of Athens
• Kings of Sparta
• Socrate of Erik Satie
• Timeline of Ancient Greece
• Trial of Socrates

Notes

α. ^{^} Alcibiades once wished to see Pericles, but, when he was told that Pericles could not see him; he was studying how to render his accounts to the Athenians. "Were it not better for him," said Alcibiades, as he went away, "to study how not to render his accounts to the Athenians?". Plutarch describes how Alcibiades "gave a box on the ear to Hipponicus, whose birth and wealth made him a person of great influence." This action received much disapproval, since it was "unprovoked by any passion of quarrel between them, but only because, in frolic, he had agreed with his companions to do it." To smooth the incident over, Alcibiades went to Hipponicus' house and, after stripping naked, "desired him to scourge and chastise him as he pleased". The wealthy Hipponicus forgot all about his resentment and eventually not only pardoned him but also bestowed upon him the hand of his daughter. According to Andocides, once Alcibiades competed against a man named Taureas as choregos of a chorus of boys and " Alcibiades drove off Taureas with his fists. The spectators showed their sympathy with Taureas and their hatred of Alcibiades by applauding the one chorus and refusing to listen to the other at all."

β. ^{^} According to Plutarch, Alcibiades "served as a soldier in the campaign of Potidaea and had Socrates for his tentmate and comrade in action" and "when Alcibiades fell wounded, it was Socrates who stood over him and defended him". Nonetheless, Antisthenes insists that Socrates saved Alcibiades at the Battle of Delium.

γ. ^{^} In the case of the battle of Cyzicus, R.J. Littman points out the different accounts given by Xenophon and Diodorus. According to Xenophon, Alcibiades' victory was due to the luck of a rainstorm, while, according to Diodorus, it was due to a carefully conceived plan.. Although most historians prefer the accounts of Xenophon, J. Hatzfeld remarks that Diodorus' accounts contain many interesting and unique details..

δ. ^{^} Plutarch mentions Alcibiades' advice, writing that "he rode up on horseback and read the generals a lesson. He said their anchorage was a bad one; the place had no harbor and no city, but they had to get their supplies from Sestos". B. Perrin regards Xenophon's testimony as impeachable. According to A. Wolpert, "it would not have required a cynical reader to infer even from Xenophon's account that he (Alcibiades) was seeking to promote his own interests when he came forward to warn the generals about their tactical mistakes"..

ε. ^{^} According to H.T. Peck and W. Smith. the assassins were probably either employed by the Spartans or by the brothers of a lady whom Alcibiades had seduced. According to Isocrates, when the Thirty Tyrants established their rule, all Greece became unsafe for Alcibiades.

στ. ^{^} Since the beginning of the war, the Athenians had already initiated two expeditions and sent a delegetion to Sicily. Plutarch underscores that "on Sicily the Athenians had cast longing eyes even while Pericles was living".

Time line

Timeline of Alcibiades' life (c.450 BC-404 BC)

References

Primary sources

• Andocides, Against Alcibiades. See original text in Perseus program
• Aristophanes, Frogs. See original text in Perseus program
• Aristophanes, Wasps. See original text in Perseus program
• Aristotle, Posterior Analytics. Translated by R.G. Mure
• Cornelius Nepos, Alcibiades. See original text in the Latin Library. Translated in English by Rev. John Selby Watson
• Demosthenes, Against Meidias. See original text in Perseus program
• Diodorus Siculus, Library, 13th Book. See original text in Perseus program.
• Herodotus; Thyucidides. The history of Herodotus; The history of the Peloponnesian War [by] Thucydides. Translated by Richard Crawley, Revision by R. Feetham. Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1955/c1952. 616 p.
• Isocrates, Concerning the Team of Horses. See original text in Perseus program
• Lysias, Against Alcibiades 1. See original text in Perseus program
• Lysias, Against Alcibiades 2. See original text in Perseus program
• Xenophon, Hellenica. See original text in Perseus program
• Plato, Alcibiades 1. See original text in Perseus program
• Plato, Symposium. See original text in Perseus program
• Plutarch, Agesilaus. Translated by John Dryden
• Plutarch, Alcibiades. See original text in Perseus program. Translated in English by:
  • Arthur H. Clough. New York: Collier Press, 1909.
  • Aubrey Stewart-George Long and
  • John Dryden
• Plutarch, Lysander. See original text in Perseus program
• Plutarch, The Comparison of Alcibiades with Coriolanus. Translated in English by:
  • Aubrey Stewart-George Long and
  • John Dryden

Secondary sources

• Buckley, Terry (1996). Aspects of Greek History 750-323 BC. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-09957-9.
• Cartwright David, Warner Rex (1997). A Historical Commentary on Thucydides: A Companion to Rex Warner's Penguin Translation. University of Michigan Press. ISBN 0-472-08419-4.
• Cawkwell, George (1997). Thucydides and the Peloponnesian War. Routledge (UK). ISBN 0-415-16552-0.
• "Alcibiades". Encyclopaedia Britannica. 2002.
• "Alcibiades". Encyclopaedic Dictionary The Helios (in Greek). 1952.
• Gomme, A. W. (A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover). An Historical Commentary on Thucydides (I-V). Oxford University Press (1945-1981). ISBN 0-19-814198-X. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
• Gribble, David (1999). Alcibiades and Athens: A Study in Literary Presentation. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-815267-1.
• Habinek, Thomas N. (2004). Ancient Rhetoric and Oratory. Blackwell Publishing. ISBN 0-631-23515-9.
• Hatzfeld, Jean (1951). Alcibiade (in French). Presses Universitaires de France.
• Kagan, Donald (1991). The Fall of the Athenian Empire. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-9984-4.
• Kagan, Donald (2003). The Peloponnesian War. Viking Penguin (Penguin Group). ISBN 0-670-03211-5.
• Littman, Robert J. (1968). "The Strategy of the Battle of Cyzicus". Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association. 99: pp265-272. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
• McCann David, Strauss David (2001). War and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean War and the Peloponnesian War. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-0695-X.
• McGregor, Malcolom F. (1965). "The Genius of Alkibiades ". Phoenix. 19: pp27-50. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
• Paparrigopoulos, Konstantinos (-Pavlos Karolidis) (1925), History of the Hellenic Nation (Volume Ab). Eleftheroudakis (in Greek).
• Peck, Harry Thurston (1898). Harper's Dictionary Of Classical Literature And Antiquities.
• Perrin, Bernadotte (1906). "The Death of Alcibiades". Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association. 37: pp25-37. {{cite journal}}: |pages= has extra text (help)
• Platias Athanasios G., Koliopoulos Constantinos (2006). Thucydides on Strategy. Eurasia Publications. ISBN 960-8187-16-8.
• Press, Sharon (1991). "Was Alcibiades a Good General?". Brown Classical Journal. 7.
• Smith, Willian (1851). A New Classical Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography, Mythology and Geography. Harper & brothers.
• Strauss, Leo (1978). The City and Man. University of Chicago Press. ISBN 0-226-77701-4.
• Sykoutris, Ioannis (1934). Symposium (Introduction and Comments) -in Greek. Estia.
• Vlachos, Angelos (1974). Thucydides' bias. Estia (in Greek).
• Wolpert, Andrew (2002). Remembering Defeat: Civil War and Civic Memory in Ancient Athens. Johns Hopkins University Press. ISBN 0-8018-6790-8.

Further reading

• Hughes-Hallett, Lucy. Heroes: A History of Hero Worship. Alfred A. Knopf, New York, New York, 2004. ISBN 1-4000-4399-9.
• Pressfield, Steven. Tides of War: A Novel of Alcibiades and the Peloponnesian War. Doubleday, New York, New York, 2000. ISBN 0-385-49252-9.
• Romilly de, Jacqueline (1997). Alcibiade, ou, Les dangers de l'ambition (in French). LGF. ISBN 2-253-14196-8.

External links

Biographical

• "Alcibiades was an Athenian general in the Peloponnesian War". Bingley. Retrieved August 5. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Alcibiades: Aristocratic ideal or Antisocial Personality Disorder". Evans, Kathleen. Retrieved August 5. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Alcibiades". Meiggs, Russell. Retrieved August 5. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Alcibiades". Prins, Marco-Lendering, Jona. Retrieved August 5. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Alcibiades". The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth Edition. 2001-05. Retrieved August 5. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)

Texts and analyses

• "Good Man, Bad Man, Traitor: Aspects of Alcibiades". Arcan, Gabriela. Retrieved August 5. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Thucydides and Civil War: the Case of Alcibiades". Faulkner, Robert. Retrieved August 5. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Alcibiades and the Sicilian Expedition". Rubio, Alexander G. Retrieved August 5. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Plato, Thucydides, and Alcibiades". Syse, Henrik. Retrieved August 5. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Alcibiades, Athens, and the Human Condition in Thucydides' History". Warren, Brian. Retrieved August 5. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)