Talk:Battle of Midway

*Was* it 2LT Muri who attempted to crash-dive Akagi in the Battle of Midway??

Didn't that B-26 crash into the sea?

FOX NEWS was the source given.  :-)

Let's not give Muri credit for an anonymous someone else's bravery.

Here is Muri's account from another source which clearly indicates that plane wasn't his:

"As he pulled out of his attack on Akagi, Jim Muri caught a fleeting glimpse of a B-26 that narrowly missed colliding with the island structure of Akagi before plunging into the sea. No one saw what happened to the fourth B-26. There was no time to look. As soon as they had cleared the flight deck of Akagi, the Zeros swooped again, riddling the B-26 with bullets in each firing pass. Once clear of the Japanese fleet, the Zeros disappeared, and Jim Muri now had time to assess the damage. His radio and hydraulic system had been knocked out. The leakproof fuel tanks of the B-26 had been repeatedly pierced by Zero bullets. Although wounded and bloodied himself, Corporal Frank L. Mello, Jr. crawled up to the cockpit from the waist gun turret to report that the plane was on fire and that all three gunners had been wounded. Lieutenant Moore left his co-pilot's seat and made his way quickly to the site of the fire. After putting it out, he treated the worst wounds, and then manned a gun."

http://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/USArmy_at_Midway.html

 — Preceding unsigned comment added by Lou Coatney (talk • contribs) 10:08, 1 May 2016 (UTC) 

Hardly "anonymous". The B-26 (40-1424) was flown by 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mayes, identified in the very source you linked. Whether he was attempting to "crash-dive" the Akagi is purely your conjecture; far more likely is that he like Muri and Collins was attempting to pull up, after launching his torpedo at wave-top level, in order to avoid a crash and save himself, his crew, and his airplane. As depicted in Roy Grinnell's painting, on the same link, Muri overflew the deck in evasive action but did not crash into the sea. Jack Fellows also painted the incident. The crews of all four B-26s, two from the 22nd BG's 18th Recon Squadron and two from the 38th BG's 69th Bomb Squadron, attacked in formation at low altitude and credit is due to all as equally brave, and as valorous as their more renowned Navy counterparts.Reedmalloy (talk) 21:47, 15 September 2016 (UTC)

Whats about the Tech issues?

The battle of Midway is one of the popular IIWW topics of Tv-films shown the last years, and some of them are quite interesting in its details. But such are not included here. However I have no references not remembering what TV-film I saw, I might remember some details wrong.

The main issue I learned from it was that the tech issues had a huge importance for the battle.

• The intelligence issue, code breaking (could be cover spying to protect sources though), made the US forces know what was going on in general
• The flight radar system on the US carriers (that the Japanese did not have) made that the US forces knew when the Japanese attacks were on its way, the Japanese obviously did not know when the US planes were approaching. This allowing the UIS defensive protection actions and the Japanese did not, very obviously
• The US carriers had fire extinguish control systems including protecting carrier fuel pipes by filling them with fire protecting gas (at least Yorktown did have it) and that's why the Japanese believed they attacked different carriers when the actually attacked the same over and over again. Leaving the other US carriers in peace to attack the Japanese.
• The Japanese carriers had wooden decks and the US of steel making Japanese carriers much more vulnerable of being hit

Not limiting the efforts of the troops and officers the tech issues are told to be of significant importance to the outcome of the battle.

Or is that just TV-tales?Zzalpha (talk) 12:35, 5 June 2016 (UTC)

Your third bullet wasn't a system, but rather a procedure, to empty the avgas lines and fill them with CO2. But you're correct, it was developed aboard the Yorktown. I don't recall if it was first considered during the raids in March and April, but the Lexington's loss at Coral Sea, after gasoline vapor exploded and started fires that blazed out of control, underscored the need for such a preventive measure. What made the Japanese think that they attacked a different carrier in the second strike against the Yorktown was the success of her damage control teams in repairing the damage from the dive-bombing attack. The most serious hit ruptured the exhaust venting and intakes for her boilers, which resulted in a lot of smoke, but the fires caused by the bomb hits were controlled very quickly. Damage control teams repaired the holes in the flight deck in short order, and the boiler gang was also able to repair the damage to the stack and several of the boilers relatively quickly. By the time the torpedo attack arrived, Yorktown was back up to around 25 knots, and from the air, she looked like an undamaged warship. Admiral Yamaguchi and his staff couldn't believe that any carrier damaged as badly as their fliers reported the first one to be, could be repaired that quickly.

Also, your fourth bullet is not valid, I'm afraid. Our carriers absolutely had wooden decks. They were made of Douglas fir timbers, plated over with steel. The bombs that did the most damage to the Yorktown actually penetrated the flight deck (which was not considered an armored deck) and penetrated several decks down to the boilers and the base of the stack, where it exploded. What made the Japanese carriers so vulnerable to destruction was their design--enclosed hangars contained within the ship, similar to the British designs, with flammables like fuel and ammunition within reach. If an explosion occurred, the enclosed space was likely to magnify the effect, rather than to allow it to dissipate, as could happen with explosions or fires in the hangars of American carriers. Our carrier design treated the hangar deck as the strength deck, the armored deck, and the flight deck was superstructure erected over this. Our hangars had numerous large openings, which were usually left open for ventilation, but could be closed with rolling shutters. This open deck had a damage control advantage, too, in that ships assisting in fighting a fire aboard a carrier could direct water from hoses in through those openings.

Also, Japanese fire-fighting capabilities were relatively rudimentary, and vulnerable to damage. The single bomb that hit the Akagi, for example, damaged the fire curtains and water mains in the center of the ship, preventing their use. In 1942, the Japanese had a different doctrine regarding damage control, compared to the US Navy. The Japanese trained a small number of officers and petty officers as damage control specialists, but didn't extend this to the rest of the crew, who were simply recruited as manpower in an emergency. We trained nearly every member of a ship's crew, assigning roles in case of emergency. The amount of damage that the four Japanese carriers received overwhelmed the Japanese damage control system, and within a few hours of the hits, the Kaga and the Soryu were beyond saving, with fires burning out of control. The crew of the Akagi were able to stave off the disaster a little longer, but they, too, were fighting a losing battle. And the same fate befell the Hiryu around 5PM. She took enough severe hits that damage control procedures were just overwhelmed. Later in the war, after disasters such as Midway, the Japanese began to rethink their damage-control doctrine, but it was too late to have any helpful effect.

I recommend Parshall & Tully's "Shattered Sword" for an excellent recounting of the battle on the Japanese side. And I also recommend John Lundstrom's "First Team" series of books on the US Navy during the first year of the war in the Pacific.

Best regards, theBaron0530

TheBaron0530 (talk) 20:17, 10 June 2016 (UTC)theBaron0530

The first steel deck carrier in the US Navy, curiously enough, was the USS Midway, commissioned just after WWII.Reedmalloy (talk) 23:28, 15 September 2016 (UTC)

Four B-26s, not eight

I think we have an error regarding the number of B-26s sent to Midway. Every source I have ever read, from Lord, to Prange, to Lindstrom, Parshall and Tully, Caidin, give the number as four, not eight. All four were sent against Nagumo's force, and one, Lt. Muri's, survived. The paragraph has a footnote to Parshall & Tully, but I think that's incorrect. Do we have a specific reference for that number?

Best regards, theBaron0530

TheBaron0530 (talk) 20:22, 10 June 2016 (UTC)theBaron0530

Four attacked but more than that were deployed. The 69th Bomb Squadron, at Hickam Field en route to New Caledonia, sent a flight of three to Midway on June 2 (Capt. James F Collins, 1st Lt. Lewis C. Long, and 2nd Lt. William Stapleton Watson). They had been the first of the 69th to arrive in Hawaii and had trained for ten days practicing torpedo runs. Long did not fly the torpedo mission, his aircraft held in reserve. The Navy's account of the battle mentions that the air complement on Midway changed from day to day, so the figure of 8 may reflect the total number deployed, not the number used in the attack on the carriers, two of which (1st Lt. James P. Muri and Collins) made it back to Midway, two of which (Watson and 1st Lt. Herbert C. Mayes) were shot down.Reedmalloy (talk) 21:54, 15 September 2016 (UTC)

It was not a turning point

Japan did not have the industrial capacity to wage war against the United States, China and the British Empire. (86.142.36.102 (talk) 11:40, 30 June 2016 (UTC))

True. But they waged war anyway, picking up much territory in the first six months. Binksternet (talk) 14:40, 30 June 2016 (UTC)

Japan lost the war when it attacked Pearl Harbor. It's misleading to say Midway was a turning-point because there was only ever going to be one outcome. (109.159.10.246 (talk) 11:54, 1 July 2016 (UTC))

If there are reliable sources stating it was not a turning point, we're interested. Even if Japan losing was actually a forgone conclusion, few people thought so until after this battle. --A D Monroe III (talk) 20:59, 1 July 2016 (UTC)

All modern historians state the battle was not a turning point. It was only heralded as a great victory for propaganda purposes. The Roosevelt administration made clear at the time that Japan was always destined to lose the war due to the US economic and industrial advantage. (165.120.184.14 (talk) 10:24, 2 July 2016 (UTC))

That's utter rubbish, IP 165. You are not being constructive. 50.111.25.178 (talk) 04:53, 15 September 2016 (UTC)

Stating "All modern historians" is not an RS. --A D Monroe III (talk) 14:21, 2 July 2016 (UTC)

This article argues Guadalcanal was the real turning-point: http://www.combinedfleet.com/turningp.htm (15:58, 2 July 2016 (UTC)) — Preceding unsigned comment added by 86.133.85.205 (talk)

Thanks for providing a source; that's how things work here. However, in that source, the last paragraph in the "Conclusion" states "The arguments presented ... are not final or definitive." It doesn't claim Midway wasn't the turning point, only that it's hard to choose one over the other. The current article doesn't claim it was "the" turning point, but only "a" turning point. I think this is in line with the sources and statements in the Battle of Midway#Impact section. I think we'd need more conclusive RSs to begin to counter the sources there. --A D Monroe III (talk) 21:06, 2 July 2016 (UTC)

Many, many sources say that the Battle of Midway was the turning point. The sources that say otherwise are fewer. That's why we are sticking with the mainstream assessment of the battle being the turning point. That balance is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, so it's useless to argue here against it. Should we mention the various other conclusions which contradict the mainstream view? Certainly, yes. But we don't change the overall assessment. Binksternet (talk) 06:39, 15 September 2016 (UTC)

Japan's intent and war strategy in the beginning was to acquire as much territory as quickly as possible before then negotiating a ceasefire and an end to (what they hoped would be) a short war. They famously didn't count on the outrage of the overall American population. Thus, the idea that this battle was a turning point has validity; it clearly ended Japanese hopes of a quick victory, although that may also have been true of the Battle of Coral Sea. Frunobulax (talk) 13:33, 5 June 2017 (UTC)

Counterfactual: we know this how?

"It was fortunate Spruance did not pursue, for had he come in contact with Yamamoto's heavy ships, including Yamato, in the dark and considering the Japanese Navy's superiority in night-attack tactics at the time, his cruisers would have been overwhelmed and his carriers sunk.[122]"

This sentence jarred me when I read it, and I see it was edited and then reverted back to the original. As a counterfactual, it is speculation; granted it is well-founded and sourced. It is nevertheless a probabilistic statement. Shouldn't we consider tweaking the language to reflect that? Regards, DMorpheus2 (talk) 14:14, 13 December 2016 (UTC)

I agree; the remark in question assumes a greater likelihood of an end result than the available evidence warrants. Its certainty should be toned down since it's bombastic as it stands. 70.210.141.43 (talk) 12:20, 18 February 2017 (UTC) (by EPischedda)