Battle of the Ebro
| Battle of the Ebro | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of the Spanish Civil War | |||||||
| |||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||
| Second Spanish Republic | Nationalist Spain | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
|
Juan Modesto Enrique Lister |
Queipo de Llano Francisco Franco | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 100,000 | 80,000 | ||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||
|
30,000 dead 20,000 wounded 19,563 captured 200 aircraft |
6,500 dead 30,000 wounded 5,000 captured | ||||||
The Battle of the Ebro (spanish: Batalla del Ebro, catalan: Batalla de l'Ebre) was the last great offensive of the Spanish Republicans in the Spanish civil war.
Purpose
By 1938, the Second Spanish Republic was in dire straits. The Basque regions had fallen, the POUM had been destroyed by intra-Republican fighting, and many foreign governments felt it was only a matter of time before the question of who would rule Spain would be settled in favour of the Nationalists.
In response to the situation, the Spanish premier Juan Negrín approved a plan by Vicente Rojo Lluch to launch attacks against the main Nationalist forces advancing through Valencia. The purpose of the attacks was to relieve the pressure on Valencia and Catalonia. Another purpose of these actions was to show European governments that the Republican government was still a viable alternative.
Critics (eg Anthony Beevor) have argued that Negrin "active war policy" - ie an attacking stance rather than adopting strong defences and hoping for a wider European conflict or harrying the nationalist forces - was primarily driven by the PCE's desire for propaganda victories, and, as at the Ebro, destroyed the republican army for no great purpose.
The battle
The Battle of the Ebro opened on July 25, 1938. Republican forces under Colonel Juan Modesto launched attacks across the Ebro river. The Republican forces were initially successful, but the Nationalist forces, who had superior air cover, eventually beat them back. The battle lasted until November 16, 1938.
The Nationalist army had, by this point, greater numbers and near total air superiority. As the republicans were attacking over open ground the role of air support as mobile artillery was decisive. In addition the republicans had no great strategic objective and, according to Beevor, were unwilling to apply the theory of the deep operation to their attacks - meaning their forces spent a long time clearing nationalist secondary defensive positions, allowing the highly mechanised nationalist forces to quickly deploy in strong defensive positions.
The battle was fought by both sides as a World War I Western Front battle, with each side launching bloody frontal assaults on enemy positions. The attacks by both sides tended to fail, but not without inflicting severe losses on each of them.
But nationalist superiority in numbers and armaments meant they were better able to withstand the losses. Essentially the Ebro saw the republican forces destroyed as a capable force as republican commanders were unable or unwilling to withdraw even after it was obvious that the battle was lost, so leading to massive losses.
The Battle was also the last action of the International Brigades, who were withdrawn midway through it.
Aftermath
This defeat destroyed the Republican Army as a fighting force. After this battle, the Republicans would continue to lose ground until April 1, 1939 when the war was declared over by Franco.
Sources
Spartacus Schoolnet- Battle of the Ebro -- http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPebro.htm The Spanish Civil War by Gabriele Ranzato