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==Proposals by User:عمرو بن كلثوم==
==Proposals by User:عمرو بن كلثوم==

Now that many ArbCom members have had a firsthand experience, here on this board, of the type of behavior we have been dealing with, I am certain they have identified for themselves the disruptive "users" in this case even before consulting the evidence provided. On top of this behavior issue, as Barkeep has correctly noticed above, we do have a content and source dispute. GPinkerton et al. have decided to adopt the wildest Kurdish nationalistic view, including the name "Syrian Kurdistan" for parts of northern Syria. They have decided to present that name as an undisputed name for areas that have always had very mixed populations, ethnically and culturally. I am certain most of you know that the name "Kurdistan" means (Land of the Kurds). While in some locations (parts of northwestern Iran, eastern Turkey and northeastern Iraq) the population is almost entirely Kurdish in large swaths of land, the situation is very different in northern Syria, and I will present evidence below. GPinkerton et al. removed content and maps related to the 20th century history of the area from the Syrian Kurdistan article, under different pretexts and arbitrary rules, in an effort to hide the fact that most of the Kurdish population in Syria have in fact immigrated from Turkey. We are not here in a position to discuss what's right and what's wrong, we are simply here to present facts and leave the judgement to the reader. As indicated in the sources listed below, the fact is that large numbers of immigrants from Turkey have arrived in many successive waves throughout the first half of the 20th century, and regardless whether some Kurds existed in this area before or not, these immigrants arriving in the tens of thousands (20,000 to 25,000 in the 1920's alone according to Sir John Hope Simpson and John McDowall, both detailed below) significantly inflated the number of Kurds compared to other constituents. We have British maps ([https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Maunsell%27s_map_Ras_el_Ain_marked.jpg 1], [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sykes_demographic_map_of_middle_section_of_Syria-Turkey_border._The_town_of_Ras_al-Ain_is_in_Syria.jpg 2]) from the early 20th century showing exactly the location of Arab and Kurdish tribes prior to the establishment of the border (the train track was used as the border line, the towns [[Kobani|Arab Punar]], [[Ras al-Ayn]] and [[Nusaybin]] are right on the Syria-Turkey border and could be used as reference points)). The French scholarship from the era (some mentioned below) gives VERY DETAILED accounts of this immigration, still GPinkerton wants to toss that out, because that does not agree with their POV and ideological convictions. Let's assume we throw that away, we still have newer scholarship, such as Strom (2005). Well, this time GPinkerton does not like it because it does not give too much details. Assuming we go with that, Jordi Tejel (2009) mentions the following<ref>{{cite book|last=Tejel|first=Jordi|title=Syria's Kurds: History, Politics and Society|year=2009 |publisher=Routledge|location=London|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5lh9AgAAQBAJ&pg=PT250|isbn=978-0-203-89211-4|page=144}}</ref>: {{tqq|The mandatory authority’s attitude toward Kurdish refugees evolved from one of rejection in 1925 to one of encouragement to settle in Jazira, and to a lesser extent in Kurd Dagh. '''If before 1927 there were at most 45 Kurdish villages in this region, by 1939, they numbered between 700 and 800 agglomerations of Kurdish majority.'''}} According to official French mandate of Syria census numbers presented in 1939 there were 54,769 Muslim Arabs (including 25,000 nomads), 53,315 Kurds (in addition to 2181 Kurdo-Christians and 1602 Yezidis), and the rest being Christian (40,283). As you can see, this is almost a perfect three way split, with no dominant group, and even after all the Kurdish (and Christian) immigration in the previous two decades, the number of Kurds is only half the population in 1939. How would that justify adopting the Kurdish nationalistic name for the area and imply the other "native" half of the population are now foreigners on their land? Despite all these pieces of evidence, GPinkerton still [[https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Syrian_Kurdistan&diff=prev&oldid=991136495 to accept this fact that most Kurds in Syria have immigrated from Turkey]. The table below from De Vaumas (1956) clearly shows the effect on the inflowing immigration on the population of Syrian Jazira province<ref>De Vaumas Étienne. [https://www.persee.fr/doc/geo_0003-4010_1956_num_65_347_14375 Population actuelle de la Djézireh]. In: Annales de Géographie, t. 65, n°347, 1956. pp. 72-74; doi : https://doi.org/10.3406/geo.1956.14375.</ref>.
{{Historical populations
|type =
|1929|40000|1931|44153 |1932|63000 |1933|64886 |1935|94596 |1937|98144 |1938|103514 |1939|106052 |1940|126508 |1941|129145|1942|136107 |1943|146001 |1946|151137 |1950|159300|1951|162145 |1952|177388 |1953|232104 |1954|233998
|
}}

The commonly used name for the area (still not very neutral, but definitely less exclusive than "Syrian Kurdistan") is demonstrated in [https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/16390538.pdf Kaya (2012)]: {{tqq|Although it is well established that these maps overlook the heterogeneous character of the population inhabiting the area as well as the political boundaries of the existing states, they appear in almost all types of sources, from Kurdish websites to non-Kurdish academic works, journals and newspapers. They typically refer to the region as '''‘Kurdish populated areas’ or the ‘Kurdish region’'''.}}

Even the Kurdish activist [[Ismet Cheriff Vanly]], writing in 1993, when describing Kurdistan referred to the Kurdish areas of in Syria as follows<ref>A People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, Zed Books. [https://www.google.com/books/edition/A_People_Without_a_Country/W78I4hK0JLQC?hl=en&gbpv=1&bsq=western%20Kurdistan pp. 139-140]</ref>: {{tqq|Kurdistan in Iraq is often referred to as Southern Kurdistan but in fact it occupies a more or less central position in the Kurdish territories. It is the link between what is variously known as Turkish, Northern or Western Kurdistan to the north and north-west, and so-called Eastern or Iranian Kurdistan to the east and south-east, and it also borders on the '''mainly Kurdish areas of the Syrian Jezireh'''.}}
Along the same lines, a declassified CIA report talks about "Turkish Kurdistan", "Kurdistan" in Iran", and "Kurdistan" in Iraq, but for Syria it uses the term "Kurds in Syria" (see quotes below).

Back to the Syrian Kurdistan page, [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Syrian_Kurdistan&oldid=988216156 this version] was a consensus/compromise version that was last edited by user Applodion, a moderate and decent user who usually edits in favor of Kurds and their autonomous administration, but is still and reasonable and not hostile (to put it nicely) towards the other ethnic constituents like some other users here. That version does show the Kurdish nationalistic name, but does point out that it is disputed. Then the edit-warring sock puppet [[u|Konli17]] shows up and starts a "Major clean-up, ..." [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Syrian_Kurdistan&type=revision&diff=988357903&oldid=988312080 here] that started this mess, then GPinkerton shows up and continues the edit-warring and takes over from the sock-puppet. Even admin [[u|Valereee]] accepted that the name is disputed [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk:Syrian_Kurdistan&diff=prev&oldid=991715918 here], then she [https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Talk%3ASyrian_Kurdistan&type=revision&diff=991145096&oldid=991136495 recused herself] but came back after and placed a source restriction (as indicated before by user Supreme Deliciousness in the evidence) and handed a few brief Talk page blocks to three users (Supreme Deliciouseness, [[u|Fiveby]] and myself) because we were not in agreement with the POV-pushing and presentation of the "Syrian Kurdistan" term is an undisputed fact.

===Non-exhaustive examples of scholarship on Kurdish immigration from Turkey into Syria===

{{collapse top|Rondot (1936)}}
*{{cite journal|author= Pierre Rondot|title=Les tribus montagnardes de l'asie antérieures. Quelques aspects sociaux des populations kurdes et assyriennes|journal=Bulletin d'Etudes Orientales|date= 1936|volume=6|pages=1–50|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/41585290|language=fr|quote=Le massif montagneux de l'Arménie et du Kurdistan tombe assez brusquement au sud, au delà de Mardine, Nissibin, et Djéziret ibn Omar, vers les steppes de la Djézireh , domaine du nomade arabe. C'est la frontière de deux mondes : tandis que les Arabes, grands nomades dont l'existence est liée à celle du chameau, ne sauraient pénétrer dans la montagne rocailleuse, les Kurdes considèrent avec envie la bordure du steppe, relativement bien arrosé et plus facile à cultiver que la montagne, où ils pourraient pousser leurs moutons et installer quelques cultures. Dès que la sécurité le permet, c'est- à-dire dès que le gouvernement - ou le sédentaire arme- est asses fort pour imposer au Bédouin le respect des cultures, le Kurde descend dans la plaine. Mais la sécurité ne règne pas longtemps, les récoltes ne sont pas toujours bonnes, le climat débilite le montagnard; la plaine "manges" les Kurdes, et il y a flux et reflux}}

Google translation: {{tq|The mountain range of Armenia and Kurdistan falls rather sharply to the south, beyond Mardin, Nissibin, and Djéziret ibn Omar, towards the steppes of Djézireh, domain of the Arab nomad. It is the border of two worlds: while the Arabs, great nomads whose existence is linked to that of the camel, could not enter the rocky mountain, the Kurds envy the edge of the steppe, relatively well watered and more easy to cultivate than the mountain, where they could push their sheep and install some crops. As soon as security permits, that is to say as soon as the government - or the sedentary armed - is strong enough to impose respect for cultures on the Bedouin, the Kurd descends into the plain. But security does not reign for long, the harvests are not always good, the climate debilitates the mountain dweller; the plain "eats" the Kurds, and there is ebb and flow.}}

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{{collapse top|Sir John Hope Simpson (1939)}}
*{{Cite book|last=Simpson|first=John Hope|title=The Refugee Problem: Report of a Survey|year=1939 |publisher=Oxford University Press|location=London|ASIN=B0006AOLOA|page=458|edition=First|url-access=registration|url=https://books.google.com/books/about/The_refugee_problem_report_of_a_survey.html?id=SxR8uwEACAAJ|language=en| quote=A few Moslem refugees of the older generation, Circassians and Cretans, are settled in various parts of the country, and, under the conditions of peace and security established under the Mandate authority, some 20,000 Kurds have settled in the Upper Jezira.}}
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{{collapse top|Declassified CIA report (1948)}}
*{{Cite book|last=Anonymous |first=|title=The Kurdish Minority Problem|year=1948 |publisher=CIA|location=London|ASIN=B0006AOLOA|page=458|edition=First|url-access=registration|url=https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000258376.pdf |language=en|quote=The Kurds constitute a relatively small minority in Syria and Lebanon. Kurdish communities of long standing are located in the Kurd Dagh area of northwestern Syria, but the largest concentration is in the Jazirah section of northeastern Syria, '''where a considerable number of Kurdish immigrants settled after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire'''. Small but politically active Kurdish communities exist in Damascus and Beirut.
The Kurds, along with other minorities, are accorded equal rights and privileges with the majority groups in Syria and Lebanon. They have parliamentary representation and generally concede that they have received fair treatment in such matters as road-building, construction of schools, and administration of justice. Nevertheless, many of them feel that their integrity as a group is in jeopardy. This feeling is most noticeable in Beirut and Damascus, which have become centers of Kurdish nationalist propaganda, and '''among the non-native immigrant Kurds''', who have retained their traditional hatred of alien domination. The immigrant group has provided most of the leaders of the Syrian and Lebanese Kurds, notably the Badr Khan family, Dr. Ahmad Nazif, and Hassan Hajo Agha.}}
Also in the same report (page 16):
{{2. Turkey: The Turkish policy of breaking up agglomerations of Kurds and settling them in groups of very small numbers in western Anatolia, despite recent reversals of that policy, has decreased the total number of Kurds in Turkish “Kurdistan”.}}
{{3. Iran: Territorial overlapping of Kurds with the largely Turki-speaking population of Iranian Azerbaijan and also Lur tribes makes definition of Iranian “Kurdistan” difficult. Generally speaking, however, the Kurdish area may be taken to include …}}
{{4. Iraq: “Kurdistan” in Iraq may be generally described as comprising the territory east of the Tigris River and north of a line …}}
{{5. Syria and Lebanon: The Kurds in Syria live chiefly along the northern border, and particularly in Jazira, a large province in the northeast bordering Turkey and Iraq. There are also Kurds in Damascus and Beirut. A fairly recent estimate gives the number of Kurds in the two countries as “perhaps” 200,000, out of ta total population of 2,860,411 (Syria) and 1,126,601 (Lebanon). All but a few thousand of these Kurds live in Syria.}}

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{{collapse top|David McDowall (2004)}}
*{{Cite book|last=McDowall |first=David |title=Modern History of the Kurds|year=2004 |publisher=Bloomsbury Academic, Limited|location=London|language=en|ISBN=9781850434160|page=469|edition=Third|url-access=registration| url=https://books.google.com/books/about/The_refugee_problem_report_of_a_survey.html?id=SxR8uwEACAAJ|quote=Before the First World War, Jazira was largely empty and life there insecure. There had been seasonal Kurdish pastoralist tribes for centuries, most notably the Milli and Miran confederations. These wintered on the Jazira plain before ascending into the foothills of Anatolia for summer grazing. These northern lands of the Jazira were occupied during the summer months by certain Bedouin tribes, notably the Shammar (to whom the Milli were tributaries), and also the Tayy, driven north by the intense heat of the desert. Thus the area was one shared by two essentially seasonal pastoralist systems, that happened to be either Kurd of Arab. This picture was already changing towards the end of the nineteenth century with the decline of lawlessness for which the region had been notorious. Some Kurdish tribes began moving southward off the Anatolian plateau, abandoning their pastoralism in favour of farming.
By 1918 Kurds probably slightly outnumbered Arabs in the Jazira. '''From 1920 onwards, however, many more Kurdish tribespeople arrived, feeling from the Turkish armed forces particularly during the pacification of the tribes, 1925-28. Although the precise number crossing the new international border is unknown, it was probably in the order of about 25,000.''' Christians also arrived in even larger numbers, …}}

Same book (page 473-474), more on post-WWII incoming Kurdish immigration:
{{tq|Arab nationalists had good reason to be paranoid about internal and external enemies. Nowhere was the Syrian Arab cause less assured than in the north where so many non-Arab communities lived, particularly in al-Hasaka governorate. The population had grown rapidly, and it was the growth since 1945 that gave cause for Arab concern. In its own words, the government believed that 'At the beginning of 1945, the '''Kurds began to infiltrate into al-Hasakeh governorate. They came singly and in groups from neighbouring countries, especially Turkey, crossing illegally along the border from Ras al'Ain to al-Malikiyya. Gradually and illegally, they settled down in the region along the border in major population centres such as Dirbasiyya, Amuda and Malikiyya. Many of these Kurds were able to register themselves illegally in the Syrian civil registers. They were also able to obtain Syrian identity cards through a variety of means, with the help of their relatives and members if their tribes. They did so with the intent of settling down and acquiring property, especially after the issue of the agricultural reform law, so as to benefit from land redistribution.' Official figures available in 1961 showed that in a mere seven year period, between 1954 and 1961, the population of al-Hasakah governorate had increased from 240,000 to 305,000, an increase of 27 per cent which could not possibly be explained merely by natural increase.''' The government was sufficiently worried by the apparent influx that it carried out a sample census in June 1962 which indicated the real population was probably closer to 340,000. Although these figures may have been exaggerated, they were credible given the actual circumstances. From being lawless and virtually empty prior to 1914, the Jazira had proved to be astonishingly fertile once order was imposed by the French mandate and farming undertaken by the largely Kurdish population.... A strong suspicion that many migrants were entering Syria was inevitable. In Turkey the rapid mechanisation of farming had created huge unemployment and massive labour migration from the 1950s onwards. The fertile but not yet cultivated lands of northern Jazira must have been a strong enticement and the affected frontier was too long feasibly to police it.}}

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{{collapse top|Lise Storm (2005)}}
*{{cite book|last1=Storm|first1=Lise|title=A Companion to the History of the Middle East|date=2005|publisher=Wiley-Blackwell|location=Utrecht|isbn=1-4051-0681-6 |page=475 |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=qgKE_-HtfoAC&q=kurds+in+Syria&pg=PA475 |chapter=Ethnonational Minorities in the Middle East Berbers, Kurds, and Palestinians|quote=Most Syrian Kurds are originally Turkish Kurds who have crossed the border during different events in the 20th century. …}}

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{{collapse top|Jordi Tejel (2009)}}
{{cite book|last=Tejel|first=Jordi|title=Syria's Kurds: History, Politics and Society|year=2009 |publisher=Routledge|location=London|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5lh9AgAAQBAJ&pg=PT250|isbn=978-0-203-89211-4|page=144|quote|The mandatory authority’s attitude toward Kurdish refugees evolved from one of rejection in 1925 to one of encouragement to settle in Jazira, and to a lesser extent in Kurd Dagh. '''If before 1927 there were at most 45 Kurdish villages in this region, by 1939, they numbered between 700 and 800 agglomerations of Kurdish majority.'''}}

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{{collapse top|Vahé Tachjian (2009)}}
*{{cite book|last1=Tachjian (2009)|first1=Vahé |title=The expulsion of non-Turkish ethnic and religious groups from Turkey to Syria during the 1920s and early 1930s|publisher=Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence|isbn=1961-9898|date= 2009|page=5-6|url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/en/document/expulsion-non-turkish-ethnic-and-religious-groups-turkey-syria-during-1920s-and-early-1930s |language=en|quote=This was also why, during their occupation of Syria, '''the French authorities were not opposed to the streams of refugees coming from neighboring Turkey or Iraq. These were Assyrians/Syriacs, Chaldeans, Armenians or Kurds''' who, for various reasons, had left their homes and had found refuge in Syria. The French authorities themselves generally organized the settlement of the refugees. One of the most important of these plans was carried out in Upper Jazira in northeastern Syria. There, thanks to French efforts, new towns and villages were built with the intention of housing the refugees considered to be “friendly”. This meant that the '''non-Turkish minorities that were under Turkish pressure knew that, no matter how painful and undesirable it was to leave their ancestral homes, shops, fields and property, they could find refuge and rebuild their lives in relative safety on the other side of the border, in Syria'''}}

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{{collapse top|Kheder Khaddour (2017)}}
*{{cite book|author= |last1=Khaddour |first1=Kheder |title=How Regional Security Concerns Uniquely Constrain Governance in Northeastern Syria|publisher=Carnegie Middle East Center|date= 2017|page=5-6|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep12990.pdf?acceptTC=true&coverpage=false&addFooter=false|language=en|quote=For much of the twentieth century, the Jazira was strategically important because the area found itself on the front lines of Syria’s rivalries with both Turkey and Iraq. That said, the heterogeneous composition of the Jazira, and the divides that came with it, meant that no one in practice really dominated the region. During the French Mandate over Syria (1923–1946), the Mandatory authorities sought to lay down the foundations of a modern state. Administratively, they transformed the Jazira into a governorate. To encourage the tribes to become sedentary, they introduced regulations on land ownership to persuade tribal leaders to settle in return for being granted property rights. Arab and Kurdish landowners and tribal leaders, as well as members of the Assyrian and Syriac communities, came to form a class of elites mostly concentrated in the city of al-Hasakeh, the governorate’s capital. A second city, al-Qamishli, located on the Syrian-Turkish border, became an important trading center when Kurds from southeastern Turkey resettled there to work as traders or be employed by the Jazira’s landowners.}}

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===Proposed remedies by AIK (عمرو بن كلثوم)===
===Proposed remedies by AIK (عمرو بن كلثوم)===

Revision as of 10:51, 11 February 2021

Main case page (Talk) — Evidence (Talk) — Workshop (Talk) — Proposed decision (Talk)

Case clerk: TBD Drafting arbitrator: TBD

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Purpose of the workshop

Arbitration case pages exist to assist the Arbitration Committee in arriving at fair, well-informed decisions. The case Workshop exists so that parties to the case, other interested members of the community, and members of the Arbitration Committee can post possible components of the final decision for review and comment by others. Components proposed here may be general principles of site policy and procedure, findings of fact about the dispute, remedies to resolve the dispute, and arrangements for remedy enforcement. These are the four types of proposals that can be included in committee final decisions. There are also sections for analysis of /Evidence, and for general discussion of the case. Any user may edit this workshop page; please sign all posts and proposals. Arbitrators will place components they wish to propose be adopted into the final decision on the /Proposed decision page. Only Arbitrators and clerks may edit that page, for voting, clarification as well as implementation purposes.

Expected standards of behavior

  • You are required to act with appropriate decorum during this case. While grievances must often be aired during a case, you are expected to air them without being incivil or engaging in personal attacks, and to respond calmly to allegations against you.
  • Accusations of misbehaviour posted in this case must be proven with clear evidence (and otherwise not made at all).

Consequences of inappropriate behavior

  • Editors who conduct themselves inappropriately during a case may be sanctioned by an arbitrator or clerk, without warning.
  • Sanctions issued by arbitrators or clerks may include being banned from particular case pages or from further participation in the case.
  • Editors who ignore sanctions issued by arbitrators or clerks may be blocked from editing.
  • Behavior during a case may also be considered by the committee in arriving at a final decision.

Motions and requests by the parties

Request for preliminary statements

1)I suggest a short statement on the evidence provided by the Arbitrators following the end of the evidence phase.— Preceding unsigned comment added by Paradise Chronicle (talk • contribs)

Comment by Arbitrators:
There are nine separate submissions, with somewhere in the vicinity of fifty subsections. Probably, as is usually the case, a lot of it will not be deemed relevant to the final decision, but that takes time to parse out. I'm just not sure what the point is here, and I don't recall this being a thing in previous cases. Beeblebrox (talk) 00:46, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
@Levivich:, I'm not a drafter on this case, but in my experience, real in-depth examination of the evidence tends to start once that phase is closed or close to being closed. You can't really make a statement until all the evidence is in and has has been examined. With the sheer volume here that is going to take some time, so by the time the drafters could reasonably post such a statement it could easily be a case of "closing the barn door after the horses have bolted." You may be aware that the committee is in the early stages of discussion to reform how workshops work to prevent the sort of issue you mention, but no changes were made as of the openong of this process so it will operate under the normal rules, which, as far as I can tell, do not actually exist. So there is a problem to be solved here, it just isn't limited to this one case. Beeblebrox (talk) 01:34, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I think this seems like a bad idea. But I'm curious what benefit Paradise Chronicle was hoping for. That could be worth considering in future cases (we're not going to change procedures in this case as previously mentioned). Best, Barkeep49 (talk) 01:55, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Comment by parties:
@Beeblebrox: you might get fifty more subsections of workshop. Some feedback from arbs could help focus everyone's efforts and ultimately reduce the amount of additional writing and reading by everyone. I'm not aware of it being done in previous cases either, but this just might be a good time to start. Levivich harass/hound 01:09, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I thought it might be good to identify the areas of the dispute which have caught the main interest of the ArbCom members before we incur into making rebuttals. I can make rebuttals or confirmations for every each argument presented against me.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 07:42, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I have made a first analysis of the evidence to show you what awaits us if you don't come up with a clarifying statement on the evidence. We must assume you include such evidence in your fact finding process if you don't exclude it, and therefore rebuttals will be made and in detail. This time I made the rebuttal per section, but we can get more into detail (like including every each diff showing there is no Kurd or Kurdistan included in the edit).Paradise Chronicle (talk) 12:17, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I am used to argue with Amr Ibn Kulthum like this since May 2020, but I guess and hope the ArbCom has better things to do than to double check a large number of diffs completely unrelated to Kurds and Kurdistan in an ArbCom case on Kurds and Kurdistan.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 12:42, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Comment by others:
The "preliminary statement(s) on evidence by the arbitrators" suggestion stikes me as an exceedingly bad idea. The main purpose of the Workshop is to analyze the evidence in detail. Ideally, the arbitrators should not have much of an opinion on the evidence yet. If there are 50 sections in the Workshop, so be it. Plus, procedurally, this suggestion is just a recipe for disaster. The process currently is complicated but at least it is well defined. If a new ad-hoc step such as the preliminary statement(s) on evidence by the arbitrators is suddenly introduced now, that'll just create endless opportunities for wikilawyering, cries of unfairness (e.g. "you've just prejudiced everyone against me proposing this and that for the final decision!"), requests to redo something, and various other attemps at gaming. Having 100 sections in the Workshop will seem like a minor headache by comparison. Nsk92 (talk) 01:35, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Template

2)

Comment by Arbitrators:
Comment by parties:
Comment by others:

Template

3)

Comment by Arbitrators:
Comment by parties:
Comment by others:

Proposed temporary injunctions

Not a productive use of the workshop; these proposals are not what temporary injunctions are for, which are usually issued at the beginning of a case as a stop-gap measure to address a pressing issue. Maxim(talk) 19:42, 8 February 2021 (UTC)

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Request to block Supreme Deliciousness

1) Supreme Deliciousness should be blocked indefinitely for incorrigible nationalistic edit warring on middle east topics (see latest example of many: [1], [2], [3], this time on Druze). Supreme Deliciousness is a single-purpose account with issues of long-term abuse. GPinkerton (talk) 17:53, 7 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Comment by Arbitrators:
I'm struggling to see how this fits inside the scope of this case, which is not "Middle East topics in general." Beeblebrox (talk) 23:25, 7 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I agree. Barkeep49 (talk) 23:50, 7 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Ditto. KevinL (aka L235 · t · c) 10:42, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Comment by parties:
Comment by others:
The edit summary says "must be signed into an account and have at least 500 edits and 30 days' tenure" and links to ARBPIA4, the validity of which was confirmed by an admin in Special:Diff/1005021174. ARBPIA4 enforcement tends to be legalistic; even good changes by non-ECP editors are still reverted, and sometimes the editors blocked, so this revert seems to be in line with that. No comment on the content itself, but the reverts don't seem to be problematic. ProcrastinatingReader (talk) 18:08, 7 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Proposal to remove edits by عمرو بن كلثوم and block the editor concerned

2) The following edit adds nothing new to the case, and is filled with irrelevant personal attacks and aspersions that have nothing to do with Kurds or Kurdistan and demonstrate nothing more than my efforts to uphold NPOV in the face of concerted nationalist/Islamist POV-pushing across various articles and عمرو بن كلثوم own attempts to discredit reliable sources by personal attacks and by casting aspersion on editors who supply neutral, reliable information with academic sources by resuscitating stale nationalistic debates in which I and my edits were vindicated by the community and through consensus opposed by my detractors (the story is the same on the Syrian Kurdistan page, an area in which عمرو بن كلثوم has long been pursuing his agenda): [4]

  • There is now plenty of evidence of عمرو بن كلثوم tendentious editing on the topic of the myths inculcated by the Syrian Arab Republic's Ba'ath Party and al-Assad dynasty in support of their ethnic cleansing programme in particular and on the Kurds, Kurdistan, and the middle east in general. GPinkerton (talk) 18:37, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Comment by Arbitrators:
Comment by parties:
Agree with the removal part, and about the blocking, well, they have refused multiple times to accept academic scholarship and in exchange supported unreliable sources either for the article and more over for the lead specially on the Kurds and Kurdistan related pages. But it seems there absolutely no guideline which admins comes to mind to forbid this so far. It would great this would stop and the ArbCom finds a solution to this.
Comment by others:

Proposal to overturn topic ban of GPinkerton

3) It is now clear to all that the topic ban (and the preceding blocks) are entirely unjustified, that no unreasonable "personal attacks" (rather than strident statements of fact) have been made on my part, and that allegations of tendentious editing on either the topic of the middle east or Islam are wholly and utterly spurious and made under the influence of editors like عمرو بن كلثوم and Supreme Deliciousness who have sought to poison the well when their long-term POV-pushing has been exposed. It would be absurd to allege that my having been blocked indefinitely for raising this issue at ANI and calling out administrators' inaction (a view shared by many administrators themselves) could have been justified. As a result, the blocks and topic ban should be overturned as spurious, It is clear that it has been used multiple times to make baseless argumentum ad hominem claims by abusive editors whose POV-pushing has been exposed. GPinkerton (talk) 18:46, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Comment by Arbitrators:
@GPinkerton: I think this is unlikely to happen as a mid-case action. It could be considered as part of a final decision and might belong in that area. Barkeep49 (talk) 19:26, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Comment by parties:
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4)

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The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Questions to the parties

Arbitrators may ask questions of the parties in this section.

Proposed final decision

Proposals by User:GPinkerton

Proposed principles

Reliability of sources

1) In general, reliable academic sources should be used, with more recent and more reliable sources to be preferred.

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2) {text of Proposed principle}

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Proposed findings of fact

Suitability of references

1) The following sources are suitable sources for the quoted material and the information represented there:

  • For background, a basic summary of the history of Syrian Kurdistan can be found, for example, in a review of the 2015 work The Kurds: A Modern History by Michael M. Gunter. The review summarizes Gunter's whole chapter on the Kurds of Syria as follows, including a mention of this very ideological talking point, namely, that Kurds do not belong in what is now Syria:

    Under the French mandate after World War I, Syria became an important center for Kurdish political and cultural activism until its independence in 1946. In addition to the Kurds in major urban centers and Kurdish enclaves in northern Syria, Kurdish refugees also arrived from Turkey. A Kurdish nationalist organization, Khoybun, operated in Syria and Lebanon and spearheaded the Ararat Re-bellion (1928-31) against Turkey. Exiled Kurdish nationalists from Turkey played a major role in Syria and Lebanon. The Jaladet, Sureya and Kamuran brothers from the princely Bedirkhan family, for example, led a Kurdish cultural movement. The end of the French mandate and the eventual rise of the Baath regime in Syria created a serious backlash for the Kurds. Gunter indicates that the Baath regime came to view Kurds as a foreign threat to the Arab nation, and it repressed them after the early 1960s. Kurds in Syria, as a result, came to be less known in the West, as compared to their compatriots in Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Some Kurds were stripped of their citizenship in 1962 on the grounds that they supposedly all came from Turkey. Moreover, the state tried to Arabize the Kurdish territories in northern Syria. Gunter adds that the fractured Kurdish political-party system is another reason for the invisibility of the Syrian Kurds until the early 2000s.
    — Akturk, Ahmet Serdar (assistant professor of history, Georgia Southern University) (2016). "Review: The Kurds: A Modern History, by Michael M. Gunter. Markus Wiener Publishers, 2015. 256 pages. $26.95, paperback". Middle East Policy. 23 (3): 152–156. doi:10.1111/mepo.12225. ISSN 1475-4967.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

Gunter 2014
  • Gunter, Michael (2014). Out of Nowhere: The Kurds of Syria in Peace and War. London: C. Hurst and Co. pp. 9, 19. ISBN 978-1-84904-531-5. this situation regarding the Turkish origin of some Syrian Kurds provided the Syrian rationale for the disenfranchisement of many of these Kurds in modern Syria, which began with the French mandate under the League of Nations following the First World War and the removal of the short-lived rule of Faisal as king. After much acrimony, a French-Turkish agreement arbitrarily made the Baghdad railway line that ran between Mosul in Iraq and Aleppo in Syria the present border between most of Turkey and Syria after it crossed the Iraqi-Syrian boundary. Indeed even today many Kurds in Turkey and Syria who live on either side of the border do not refer to themselves as coming from those states. Rather, for the Kurds of Turkey, Syria is Bin Xhet (below the line), and for the Kurds of Syria, Turkey is Ser Xhet (above the line)." and "The situation regarding the Turkish origin of some of the Syrian Kurds described in Chapter 1 provided the Syrian government's rationale for the disenfranchisement of many of these Kurds in modern Syria. Never mind the fact that before the Sykes-Picot Agreement artificially separated the Kurds of the Ottoman Empire into three separate states after the First World War (Turkey, Iraq and Syria) all of these Kurds had lived within a single border.
Nazdar 1978
  • Nazdar, Mustafa (1993) [1978]. "The Kurds in Syria". In Chaliand, Gérard (ed.). Les Kurdes et le Kurdistan [A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan]. Translated by Pallis, Michael. London: Zed Books. p. 199. ISBN 978-1-85649-194-5. The Kurds were suspected of being "in league" with the Kurds of Iraq, who had just launched the September 1961 insurrection aimed at securing autonomous status within an Iraqi framework. On August 23, 1961, the government promulgated a decree (no. 93) authorizing a special population census in Jezireh Province. It claimed that Kurds from Turkish Kurdistan were "illegally infiltrating" the Jezireh in order to "destroy its Arab character". The census was carried out in November of that year; when its results were released, some 120,000 Jezireh Kurds were discounted as foreigners and unjustly stripped of their rights as Syrian nationals. In 1962, to combat the "Kurdish threat" and "save Arabism" in the region, the government inaugurated the so-called "Arab Cordon plan" (Al Hizam al-arabi), which envisaged the entire Kurdish population living along the border with Turkey. They were to be gradually replaced by Arabs and would be resettled, and preferably dispersed, in the south. The discovery of oil at Qaratchok, right in the middle of Kurdish Jezireh, no doubt had something to do with the government's policy.
  • Nazdar, Mustafa (1993) [1978]. "The Kurds in Syria". In Chaliand, Gérard (ed.). Les Kurdes et le Kurdistan [A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan]. Translated by Pallis, Michael. London: Zed Books. p. 199. ISBN 978-1-85649-194-5. In March 1963, Michel Aflaq's Baath Party came to power. Its socialism was soon shown to be mainly of the national variety. The Kurds' position worsened. In November 1963, in Damascus, the Baath published a Study of the Jezireh Provnce in its National, Social, and Political Aspects, written by the region's chief of police, Mohamed Talab Hilal. ... Hilal had set out to "prove scientifically", on the basis of various "anthropological" considerations, that the Kurds, "do not constitute a nation". His conclusion was that "the Kurdish people are a people without history or civilization or language or even definite ethnic origin of their own. Their only characteristics are those shaped by force, destructive power and violence, characteristics which are, by the way, inherent in all mountain populations." Furthermore: "The Kurds live from civilization and history of other nations. They have taken no part in these civilizations or in the history of these nations."
  • Nazdar, Mustafa (1993) [1978]. "The Kurds in Syria". In Chaliand, Gérard (ed.). Les Kurdes et le Kurdistan [A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan]. Translated by Pallis, Michael. London: Zed Books. pp. 199–200. ISBN 978-1-85649-194-5. A zealous nationalist, Hilal proposed a twelve-point plan, which would first be put into operation against the Jezireh Kurds: (1) a batr or "dispossession" policy, involving the transfer and dispersion of the Kurdish people; (2) a tajhil or "obscurantist" policy of depriving Kurds of any education whatsoever, even in Arabic; (3) a tajwii or "famine" policy, depriving those affected of any employment possibilities; (4) an "extradition" policy, which meant turning the survivors of the uprisings in northern Kurdistan over to the Turkish government; (5) a "divide and rule" policy, setting Kurd against Kurd; (6) a hizam or cordon policy similar to the one proposed in 1962; (7) an iskan or "colonization" policy, involving the implementation of "pure and nationalist Arabs" in the Kurdish regions so that the Kurds could be "watched until their dispersion"; (8) a military policy, based on "divisions stationed in the zone of the cordon" who would be charged with "ensuring that the dispersion of the Kurds and the settlement of Arabs would take place according to plans drawn up by the government"; (9) a "socialization" policy, under which "collective forms", mazarii jama'iyya, would be set up for the Arabs implanted in the regions. These new settlers would also be provided with "armament and training"; (10) a ban of "anybody ignorant of the Arabic language exercising the right to vote or stand for office"; (11) sending the Kurdish ulemas to the south and "bringing in Arab ulemas to replace them"; (12) finally, "launching a vast anti-Kurdish campaign amongst the Arabs".
  • Nazdar, Mustafa (1993) [1978]. "The Kurds in Syria". In Chaliand, Gérard (ed.). Les Kurdes et le Kurdistan [A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan]. Translated by Pallis, Michael. London: Zed Books. pp. 200–201. ISBN 978-1-85649-194-5. Many of the measures listed above were put into practice. The 120,000 Kurds classified as non-Syrian by the "census" suffered particularly heavily. Although they were treated as foreigners and suspects in their own country, they were nonetheless liable for military service and were called up to fight on in the Golan Heights. However, they were deprived of any other form of legitimate status. They could not legally marry, enter a hospital or register their children for schooling.
  • Nazdar, Mustafa (1993) [1978]. "The Kurds in Syria". In Chaliand, Gérard (ed.). Les Kurdes et le Kurdistan [A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan]. Translated by Pallis, Michael. London: Zed Books. pp. 200–201. ISBN 978-1-85649-194-5. The euphemistically renamed "Plan to establish model state farms in the Jezireh Province", the so-called "Arab Cordon" plan, was not dropped in the years that followed. Under the cover of "socialism" and agrarian reform, it envisaged the expulsion of the 140,000 strong peasantry, who would be replaced with Arabs. In 1966, there were even thoughts of applying it seriously, and perhaps extending it to the Kurd-Dagh. But those Kurdish peasants who had been ordered to leave refused to go. In 1967 the peasants in the Cordon zone were informed that their lands had been nationalized. The government even sent in a few teams to build "model farms" until the war against Israel forced it momentarily to drop its plans.
  • Nazdar, Mustafa (1993) [1978]. "The Kurds in Syria". In Chaliand, Gérard (ed.). Les Kurdes et le Kurdistan [A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan]. Translated by Pallis, Michael. London: Zed Books. pp. 200–201. ISBN 978-1-85649-194-5. The little town of Derik lost its Kurdish name and was officially restyled Al-Malikiyyeh.
  • Nazdar, Mustafa (1993) [1978]. "The Kurds in Syria". In Chaliand, Gérard (ed.). Les Kurdes et le Kurdistan [A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan]. Translated by Pallis, Michael. London: Zed Books. pp. 200–201. ISBN 978-1-85649-194-5. The plan was carried out gradually, so as not to attract too much attention from the outside world. The Kurds were subjected to regular administrative harassment, police raids, firings and confiscation orders. Kurdish literary works were seized, as were records of Kurdish folk music played in public places.
  • Nazdar, Mustafa (1993) [1978]. "The Kurds in Syria". In Chaliand, Gérard (ed.). Les Kurdes et le Kurdistan [A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan]. Translated by Pallis, Michael. London: Zed Books. pp. 200–201. ISBN 978-1-85649-194-5. True the Assembly retained a certain number of Kurdish deputies, but they could not stand as such since the official fiction decreed that all Syrian citizens are Arabs. In all the official publications of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Kurds - and every other non-Arab group - are never mentioned. Since the Republic is Arab, the Kurds must be as well.
  • Nazdar, Mustafa (1993) [1978]. "The Kurds in Syria". In Chaliand, Gérard (ed.). Les Kurdes et le Kurdistan [A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan]. Translated by Pallis, Michael. London: Zed Books. pp. 200–201. ISBN 978-1-85649-194-5. However in 1976, President Assad officially renounced any further implementation of the plan to transfer the population, and decided "to leave things as they are". The Kurdish peasants would not be harassed any more, and no further Arab villages would be built on their lands. But the villages which had already been built would stay, as would the newcomers transplanted from the Euphrates Valley. The radio began to broadcast Kurdish music and the Kurds in the country felt much safer. They wondered, however, if this was the beginning of a new policy vis-a-vis the Kurds of Syria or if it was just as government maneuver predicated on the rivalry between Damascus and the Iraqi Government.
Allsopp 2019
  • Allsopp, Harriet (2019). The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflicts. London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. p. 33. doi:10.5040/9781788315944.0010. ISBN 978-1-78831-483-1. … punitive exclusion of groups and individuals from benefits accruing from state employment, health care and even citizenship, created underclasses not linked to either social or labour relations. Within Kurdish society, an estimated 120,000 Kurds were denaturalized by the Syrian government as a result of the 1962 Hasakah census. These Kurds were registered individually as 'ajnabi al-Hasakah or "a foreigner of Hasakah province", while those who were left unregistered were known collectively as the maktumiin. By 2011 their combined number was estimated by some to be more than 300,000. A unique underclass of Kurds was formed that crossed formal class and tribal structures. Until the beginning of the civil protests in Syria in 2011, these Kurds were denied even the conditional rights to representation, services and property that other Kurds in Syria could claim as Syrian Arab citizens.
O'Shea 2004
Hassanpour
  • Hassanpour, Amir (2005). Shelton, Dinah L. (ed.). Kurds. Macmillan Reference USA. pp. 632–637. Retrieved 2020-11-30. The majority live in Kurdistan, a borderless homeland whose territory is divided among the neighboring countries of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. … The dismantling of the Ottoman empire in World War I led to the division of its Kurdish region and the incorporation of that territory into the newly created states of Iraq (under British occupation and mandate, 1918–1932), Syria (under French occupation and mandate, 1918–1946), and Turkey (Republic of Turkey since 1923). The formation of these modern nation-states entailed the forced assimilation of the Kurds into the official or dominant national languages and cultures: Turkish (Turkey), Persian (Iran), and Arabic (Syria, and, in a more limited scope, Iraq). {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
Dahlman 2002

Dahlman, Carl (2002-06-01). "The Political Geography of Kurdistan". Eurasian Geography and Economics. 43 (4): 271–299. doi:10.2747/1538-7216.43.4.271. ISSN 1538-7216. The Kurds of Syria are predominant along the border with Turkey (Fig. 1), especially in the regions of Kurd-Dagh and Jazira, as well as pockets in major cities, especially Aleppo and Damascus. Most estimates number the Syrian Kurdish population at well over one million, while Kurdish parties cite estimates as high as three million. Because of the government's anti-Kurdish policies and intentional census manipulation, the true figure is distorted by a number of factors discussed below. Official repression of linguistic and civil rights for the Kurds in Syria began under the French mandate (1920–1946). Wary of unbalancing either the mandate system or Turkey's young government in light of the 1920s uprisings, the French officially banned Kurdish language and education. Kurdish demands for greater selfrule and cultural rights emerged as early as 1928, although it was not until World War II, when Syria came under British control, that Kurdish cultural expression was officially tolerated.: 292 

Dahlman, Carl (2002-06-01). "The Political Geography of Kurdistan". Eurasian Geography and Economics. 43 (4): 271–299. doi:10.2747/1538-7216.43.4.271. ISSN 1538-7216. The 1961 Kurdish uprising in Iraq had implications for the Kurds living in Syria, whom the government suspected of harboring similar independent orientations. In 1962, the Syrian government conducted an extraordinary census in the Kurdish areas of the northeast, by which an estimated 120,000 Kurds were classified as ajanib, or foreigners. Putatively targeted at "alien infiltrators" from Turkey, the policy of identifying "foreigners" clearly was intended to Arabize northeastern Syria. Although officially the classification was to target those whose residence in Syria began after 1945, the policy of exclusion attending that classification was often applied to Kurds regardless of the tenure of their residency. Through the use of identity cards, the newly "foreign" Kurds are unable to vote, own property or businesses, hold licensed professional employment, or marry Syrian citizens. These stateless Kurds remain today without rights and, owing to their lack of documentation, cannot safely leave Syria, much less return. Furthermore, the 75,000 or more children of stateless Kurds are simply maktoumeen, or unregistered, having neither identity cards nor documented nationality, further denying them access to education and other child services.24 Syrian Government sources estimate the total number of stateless persons at around 150,000, although others claim 200,000 (Hasanpour, 1991). There is no estimate of how many Kurds, recognizing the intention of the policy, have registered themselves as Arabs.: 292 

Dahlman, Carl (2002-06-01). "The Political Geography of Kurdistan". Eurasian Geography and Economics. 43 (4): 271–299. doi:10.2747/1538-7216.43.4.271. ISSN 1538-7216. The loss of citizenship for many of Syria's Kurds and the government's increased persecution of Kurdish cultural and political activities was the first step in a larger program to Arabize the well-resourced northeast (Vanly, 1992). Beginning in 1962, the government began removing Kurds from the Hizam 'arabi, or Arab belt, a 10–15 km wide zone running: 292  300 kilometers along the borders with Iraq and Turkey, as far west as Ra's al-'Ayn. Although the region has long been settled by Kurds, the government misrepresented the region as an Arab land under threat by the Kurds. The removal of an estimated 60,000-120,000 Kurds, some already dispossessed of their land under the 1961 census, was part of a larger campaign to remove the Kurdish presence entirely, including Kurdish toponymy (Hasanpour, 1991). In their place, the government began resettling Arabs in model villages and farms throughout the Arab belt, significantly altering the ethnic composition of the borderlands (Nazdar, 1993). The nationalization of property and its conversion to Arab control was planned to continue along the Kurdish borderlands in the Jazira region, but the war with Israel in 1967 refocused Damascus's attention (Hassanpour, 1991; Nazdar, 1993). It was not until 1976 that Hafiz al-Asad formally ended the program, although no Ba'thist land redistribution was implemented that would benefit the Kurds (Hassanpour, 1991; Cleveland, 1994, pp. 357- 359).: 293 

Dahlman, Carl (2002-06-01). "The Political Geography of Kurdistan". Eurasian Geography and Economics. 43 (4): 271–299. doi:10.2747/1538-7216.43.4.271. ISSN 1538-7216. The unique historical and geopolitical events of the separate states that comprise the "rule of four" over the Kurds nevertheless demonstrate recurrent and parallel themes. Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria have each tried to depopulate Kurdistan, whether to disrupt the feudal and tribal structures that sustain traditional Kurdish society or to commit genocide against a population for whom the ruling authority wishes to make no provision. Kurdistan's demographic structure has been repeatedly altered by both regional and internecine conflict, forced migration, and oppressive economic and social underdevelopment. Some regimes have sought to break up Kurdistan by forcibly removing villagers to towns outside Kurdistan, whereas some Kurds have willingly sought improved opportunities outside Kurdistan and, indeed, outside the region. The decision by the Allies after World War I to draw the boundaries through Kurdistan rather than to create a separate buffer state has meant that what was recognized as a population worthy of a separate territory was damned to become a minority in four countries.).: 293 

2. The following sources are weak, insufficiently in-depth, or otherwise unusable sources for the quoted material and the information represented there:

  • Storm, Lise (2005). "Ethnonational Minorities in the Middle East Berbers, Kurds, and Palestinians". A Companion to the History of the Middle East. Utrecht: Wiley-Blackwell. p. 475. ISBN 1-4051-0681-6. The majority of the Kurds in Syria are originally Turkish Kurds, who left Turkey in the 1920s in order to escape the harsh repression of the Kurds in that country. These Kurds were later joined in Syria by a new large group that drifted out of Turkey throughout the interwar period during which the Turkish campaign to assimilate its Kurdish population was at it highest.
    • (a three paragraph, half-page treatment in a non-specialist book with vast scope no particular relevance to Syrian Kurdistan)
  • Mustapha, Hamza (2018). "The Issue of the Kurds in Syria: Facts, History and Myth". AlMuntaqa. 1 (3): 111–113. doi:10.31430/almuntaqa.1.3.0111. ISSN 2616-8073.
    • (a two-page book review by an "Assistant researcher at the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies and PhD candidate at the University of Exeter." The Beirut-published book's editor is Hezbollah-linked Azmi Bishara, who founded the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. The book review is published in AlMuntaqa itself published by ... the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies. Cosy.)

3. The following sources are irrelevant, outdated, or otherwise unusable sources for the quoted material and the information misrepresented from there:

  • De Vaumas, Étienne (1956). "Le peuplement de la Djézireh". Annales de Géographie. 65 (347): 70–72. Le peuplement de la Djézireh. — Une reconnaissance aérienne et au sol, menée en mai 1925 par A. Poidebard qui a bénéficié en outre de la documentation rassemblée par le Service de Renseignement de Hassetché, permet de se faire une idée précise de l'occupation humaine en Djézireh à la veille de la pacification. Au Nord, à part des Circassiens musulmans (tribu des Tchatchans) établis en 1876 près de Ras el Aïn (villages de Saf eh et de Tell Rouman) , la zone des villages ou des campements fixes formant villages s'étendait d'Arreda (à l'Est de Ras el Aïn) jusqu'aux environs du Tigre sur 130 km de longueur et 15 à 20 km de largeur. Elle était plaquée le long du chemin de fer, c'est-à-dire de la frontière, et habitée par des Kurdes dont les tribus occupaient des territoires perpendiculaires sur cette frontière et à cheval sur elles. Ils cultivaient la partie septentrionale de la Djézireh et poussaient leurs troupeaux en hiver jusqu'au Djebel Sindjar et au Djebel Abd el Aziz. Le Djebel Sindjar était tenu par les Yézidis, population de dialecte kurde et à l'étrange religion. Leurs villages étaient dans la montagne au Sud de laquelle ils nomadisaient l'hiver, payant le Khaoua (impôt de fraternité) aux Chammar. Les vallées du Khabour et du Jagh Jagh, de même que les environs du lac de Khatouniyé et de la source ďel Hol, étaient aux mains des Arabes semi-sédentaires qui utilisaient pour leurs troupeaux les grands espaces nus qui séparaient les vallées. Les grands nomades enfin (les Chammar des Zors) avaient pour terrain de parcours toute la zone située entre Tigre et Sindjar à l'Est, Euphrate et Khabour à l'Ouest, se déplaçant d'une ligne Anah-Bagdad au Sud jusqu'aux approches de la voie ferrée au Nord. Le schéma de l'occupation était donc relativement simple : Kurdes le long de la frontière, Arabes sur le bord des rivières, semi-nomades et nomades partout.
  • Rondot, Pierre (1936). "Les tribus montagnardes de l'Asie antérieur. Quelques Aspects Sociaux des Populations Kurdes et Assyriennes". Bulletin d'études orientales. 6: 1–50. ISSN 0253-1623. Le massif montagneux de l'Arménie et du Kurdistan tombe assez brusquement au sud, au delà de Mardine, Nissibin, et Djéziret ibn Omar, vers les steppes de la Djézireh , domaine du nomade arabe. C'est la frontière de deux mondes : tandis que les Arabes, grands nomades dont l'existence est liée à celle du chameau, ne sauraient pénétrer dans la montagne rocailleuse, les Kurdes considèrent avec envie la bordure du steppe, relativement bien arrosé et plus facile à cultiver que la montagne, où ils pourraient pousser leurs moutons et installer quelques cultures. Dès que la sécurité le permet, c'est- à-dire dès que le gouvernement - ou le sédentaire arme- est asses fort pour imposer au Bédouin le respect des cultures, le Kurde descend dans la plaine. Mais la sécurité ne règne pas longtemps, les récoltes ne sont pas toujours bonnes, le climat débilite le montagnard; la plaine "manges" les Kurdes, et il y a flux et reflux.
Comment by Arbitrators:
I'm going to advise you to just stop right here and not pursue this line of argument. ArbCom is not going to decide which sources are permissible in an article. We resolve behavioral issues only, not content issues. Our task is not to wade into the minutia of sourcing and so on but rather to "break the back" of the behavioral problems thorough appropriate remedies. Beeblebrox (talk) 21:20, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
I very much agree with Beeblebrox. Valereee's source restriction has been included in the evidence, and we may comment on that, but otherwise will not be assessing sources ourselves. --BDD (talk) 15:49, 10 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Comment by parties:
@Beeblebrox: ArbCom is surely going to have to make a determination as to whether or not these sources are being used tendentiously by the editors accused of doing so in order to push their POV on the Syrian Kurdistan issue. In order to do so, the relevant extracts must be read and arbiters should arbitrate on a.) whether these behavioural issues exist, as I and others allege, and b.) whether the behaviour should be allowed to continue and if not, how. The issue is of two parts; the exemplary tendentiousness at Syrian Kurdistan, and the wider systematic issues with Kurd-related issues throughout Wikipedia. I hope I have demonstrated and others that the cause of both is in large part due to the same handful of editors identified as parties to the case, but beyond them it is generated in no small part by the contentiousness of the issue itself, (subsumed as it is in the larger contentiousness of middle east geopolitics, the Syrian Civil War, etc.), just as Palestine, and the Balkans, and the Caucasus, and the historiography of the Second World War are perennially fertile ground for disruptive editing. GPinkerton (talk) 21:52, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Comment by others:
It would be odd for ArbCom to make statements about specific sources in such detail - that sounds absolutely like a content issue. Can you explain why ArbCom should make statements like this instead of leaving it to the community? Is there a long history of failure to agree consensus on sources? If that is because of bad faith on one side then sanctions to address the bad faith editing would seem more appropriate. Also, not at all clear to an outside observer what is wrong with the sources in point 3. (disclaimer: not involved; have not commented previously on Wikipedia; not familiar with the topic area but read ArbCom & ANI for fun) 2A02:C7F:820C:EC00:49A2:C6CD:2E63:71AA (talk) 13:57, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
Trying not to get sidetracked by reading ArbCom for fun: the problem with the three sources in point 3 is that they're 65-85 years old, and this subject has abundant recent scholarship. Wikipedia prefers to use the best sources available, and the gold standard is recent scholarship. That's not to say older sources couldn't in theory be used to explain what was being said 85 years ago, but if recent scholars are commenting on what was being said 85 years ago, that would be a better source for that information. And if recent scholars aren't even commenting on what was being said 85 years ago, is there an argument as to whether that information is still even relevant to this encyclopedia article? Not everything anyone ever said about a subject needs to be included in the article about that subject. —valereee (talk) 16:24, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

Crude personal attacks by عمرو بن كلثوم and Shadow4Dark

2) The baseless and crude personal attacks and casting of aspersions repeatedly engaged in at Wikipedia:Arbitration/Requests/Case/Kurds_and_Kurdistan/Evidence#GPinkerton_declares_anti-Arab,_anti-Muslim,_anti-Turkish_POV_agenda_and_conspiracy_theories and Wikipedia:Arbitration/Requests/Case/Kurds_and_Kurdistan/Evidence#GPinkerton_anti-Turkish,_anti-Muslim_rhetoric are beyond the pale and devoid of merit, motivated only by desperation and bad faith. The editors that have made them do not belong on any Wikimedia project.

Comment by Arbitrators:
"The editors that have made them do not belong on any Wikimedia project." That's probably a bit harsh, and certainly not language you are going to see in the final decision, if for no other reason than it is out of our jurisdiction to say what other projects should and should not allow. Beeblebrox (talk) 21:30, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]


Comment by parties:
Comment by others:

Proposed remedies

Note: All remedies that refer to a period of time, for example to a ban of X months or a revert parole of Y months, are to run concurrently unless otherwise stated.

No more removal of Kurdish place names

1) {No more removal of Kurdish place names} Experienced editors who oppose the mentioning of Kurdish names, remove them all the time for unsourced or even if sourced. Experienced pro-Kurdish editors don't remove names in Turkish, Farsi or Arabic language for unsourced or even at all. I can't remember any edit of diff for such an aim from an experienced pro-Kurdish editor. If a significant Kurdish population is mentioned in the article, (like if they have had a historical presence or are the current majority, plurality or the second most mentioned population in a location) the name should be encouraged to be sourced but not removed. Repeated removal of the Kurdish name for not mentioning the amount of the population if a Kurdish population is mentioned should lead to a block for racist behavior, removal of only the Kurdish names and leave other languages unsourced as well. This might be something to be drafted in better words by the ArbCom and might be adapted to other ethnic/nationalist conflicts. Maybe a similar remedy already exists for other ethnic conflicts, I don't know.

Comment by Arbitrators:
It's more likely that we would make a more general sanction, such as applying 1RR to articles under the scope of the final decision, rather than targeting this one specific thing. Experience has shown that overly-tailored sanctions can be gamed. This is not to say this is entirely without merit, or that everyone sees it exactly the way I do. Beeblebrox (talk) 21:24, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
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Proposals by User:Supreme Deliciousness

Proposed principles

Baseless accusations

1) Claiming other editors of showing tolerance towards ISIS without evidence is disruptive

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Proposed findings of fact

Unacceptable language

1) GPinkerton has used unacceptable language at Syrian Kurdistan

Evidence: [5]

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Unacceptable behaviour

1) GPinkerton has behaved in an uncooperative and unacceptable way at Syrian Kurdistan

Evidence: [6]

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Toxic environment

1) GPinkertons behavior at Syrian Kurdistan has created a toxic environment

Evidence: [7]

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Could you elaborate on toxic environment? Can't find any WP guideline on this.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 19:30, 10 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
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Baseless accusations

2) Paradise Chronicle has repeatedly and without evidence claimed other editors of showing tolerance towards ISIS

Evidence:[8]

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Comment by parties:The second diff within the evidence refers to an edit in which I explain for why I was accused of having called someone a terrorist sympathizer. I apologize for having caused discomfort with the expression "tolerance towards ISIL". More to read on this at Analysis of the Evidence.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 00:02, 11 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
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Detrimental source restriction

2) The source restriction Valereee introduced at Syrian Kurdistan is detrimental

Evidence:[9][10]

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Unfair behavior

2) Valereee has been unfair towards Supreme Deliciousness

Evidence:[11]

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Proposed remedies

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Topic ban

1) GPinkerton is banned indefinitely from all articles, discussions, and other content related to Kurds and Kurdistan, broadly construed across all namespaces

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Comment by parties:Oppose and suggest a lifting of the topic ban. His additions to articles I was involved in are quiet impressive.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 00:15, 11 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
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Lifting of source restriction

2) The detrimental source restriction Valereee introduced at Syrian Kurdistan is lifted

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Warned

2) Paradise Chronicle is warned not to continue making baseless accusations towards other editors

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Proposals by User:Paradise Chronicle

Proposed principles

One must give an explanation on topic (before reverting, or for the inclusion of poorly sourced content)

1) {One must give an explanation on topic (before reverting, or for the inclusion of poorly sourced content)} Some lesser editors (I call them allies) who mostly don't take part in lengthy discussions just revert. Others, also experienced editors, also use to ignore questions and arguments at the talk page. With poorly sourced I mean no academic scholarship. What can be refuted with scholarship should above some obscure sources like sources which don't mention the topic or sources which are unreliable like conspiracy theorists disguised as a journalist of the Hill or disputed or of Think tanks which are deemed as unreliable. This is actually basic Wikipedia but concerning Kurds and Kurdistan this was often not enforced. I discussed for months.

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Analysis of evidence

Place here items of evidence (with diffs) and detailed analysis

These "evidences" presented under GPinkerton edit-wars often across a wide range of articles are every each unrelated to Kurds and Kurdistan

Bulgaria during World War II is not relating to Kurds but to an event of World War II

Basilica also not

Catholicity as well christian released,

Vashti is biblical

Hagia Sophia is a religious building,

Mehmed the Conqueror is an Ottoman Sultan and the word Kurd is not included in the article

Constantine the Great and Christianity is about a Roman emperors relation to Christianity also doesn't include Kurd or Kurdistan

Murder of Samuel Paty Is about a Murder in France.

Then Kurds are not even the reason for the dispute at these articles, but edit warring.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 12:20, 8 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

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Analysis by Valereee

I think this diff in SD's rebuttal to GP here is kind of this whole issue in a nutshell: GP has called SD's edits "misrepresenting sources." SD truly believes their POV is correct and their interpretation of sources is correct: that because they can show scholars have referred to Syrian Kurdistan as "a concept" or "an imagined community" -- and SD is quite correct that those types of terms are used often in recent scholarship -- that it provides absolutely compelling evidence, even the necessity, to call Syrian Kurdistan imaginary -- that is: not real. They and others have made this argument many many times at the talk.

This is not bad-faith editing on SD's or the other editors' parts. The issue here to me seems to be that they are so absolutely sure their POV is the literal truth that they are only able to interpret sources in ways that support that POV. It's not bad faith. It's simply absolute knowledge that Syrian Kurdistan doesn't exist except in some people's imaginations and that therefore the sources must support that simple truth. Obviously they wouldn't be offering this diff (and others in the same rebuttal, all backed up by quotes from multiple scholarly sources that they believe prove scholars are calling SK imaginary) as evidence if they didn't think the arbitration committee would see the obvious truth of the matter and vindicate their interpretation. This is the kind of thing that is likely happening with other bits of content at various articles surrounding Kurds and Kurdistan. —valereee (talk) 14:04, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

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On the removal of sourced material for which PC was blocked before

Yes I was blocked for ca 1.30 hours for not reverting to this version The version I reverted to include the same lines, but they are from a self revert not from a restoration of the previous version. That I self reverted was also the reason for why the 3RR report was closed as a self revert.

Amr Ibn following insisted that I revert (others would use the term canvass) further which I did on the encouragement of El C. I was deblocked following the confusion was resolved. Both versions don't include the two quotes I removed this time.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 17:46, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

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Amr Ibn has reverted by far the most at the Tel Abyad page, has achieved two blocks while never having been blocked. I also included a Wikilink for Kurdification, which was reverted, tooParadise Chronicle (talk) 17:46, 9 February 2021 (UTC).[reply]
The root of the cause for Amr Ibns reverts was the disruptive sockpuppet Konli17 that was edit warring:[12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20]. This sockpuppet casued great damage to a a lot of editors across several Kurd related articles. The sock started the entire disruption at Syrian Kurdistan, Arbitrators do not let this sock win. Also, PC, I did not revert your wikilink to kurdification, its still there. --Supreme Deliciousness (talk) 19:57, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]
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Analysis on the lack of civility through the Tell Abyad evidence

Presented by Paradise Chronicle (further on PC) as well as Amr Ibn Kulthum (further Amr Ibn).

PC wanted to show Tell Abyad as an example of the Civility in Kurdish related articles, Amr Ibn for the removal of sourced info and the removal of content I was blocked for

Tell Abyad is a good example to show the long lasting dispute on the presentation of the Kurds as well as the behavior of the participants in Kurdish articles. Amr Ibns main argument for the inclusion of the quotes was sourced. This was in May 2020 the case and also in the recent ArbCom case

diffMay 2020

diffMay 2020

diffMay 2020

diff revert from an edit by Applodion in June

Sourced at talk page in October 2020

diff

and at the current ArbCom Case

diff


Amr Ibn hasn't answered on questions to terms like unilaterally and formally since June 2020 when I brought this up. I don't what you think is another expression of his in the Tell Abyad discussion as explained in the evidence section.

difffor unilaterally

diff for formally

You can use the search function by pressing control/command + f and dial Unilaterally and Formally, all are from me when addressing the issue of the renaming of the city and unilaterally detaching it from the Raqqa Governorate.

To suggest that "the Kurds" have formally renamed the city into a Kurdish name (Kurdish was forbidden before, the Kurds around the YPG and the PYD just allowed it to be spoken and written) used Latin script understandable to Turkish Kurds instead of Arabic script (Latin and Arabic script are present in traffic signs all over Syria images from Wikicommons) and unilaterally detached it from an "existing" Syrian Raqqa Governorate (which before and after was called Raqqa Wilaya by ISIL and large parts of it were controlled by ISIL until the end of 2016,Raqqa fell in October 2017) in a dominant fashion of a quote is not NPOV. I agree to text in our own Wikipedia language which includes accused by (in 2015) or according to and include a Kurdifying wikilink, but not to prominent long quotes with several inaccuracies.

The Washington Institute quote by Fabrice Balanche is anyway WP:UNDUE as it is not a reliable source per se according to WP:RS Archive 48 nor is Fabrice Balanche a notable figure or citizen of Tell Abyad.

Reasons I brought forward for the removal of the quotes, besides several reports at the noticeboards:

diff Removal of Kurdwatch in July 2020 quote per WP:cite and WP:Quotations No author can be mentioned. The Kurdwatch quote is presently removed.

diff removed quotes per WP:ONUS September 2020

diff WP:UNDUE and MOS:QUOTEPOV in September 2020

diff Removal of WINEP and WaPo quotes in October 2020 for not addressing the points I made at the talk page

diff October 2020 Remove quotes as no response at talk page

diff January 2021 to see what happens if the eyes of the ArbCom are present, (not in the edit summary)

All except for the WINEP, WP:RSN argument I have brought in discussions before as well. Konli17 has argued similarly but Amr Ibn and others have ignored questions several times. Amr Ibn also ignored questions specifically directed at him. Just check with command + f and dial Amr?.


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Analysis of Violations of BLP by PC

BLP as to my understanding refers to biographies of living people and Harun Yahya is really described as someone who refutes Darwinism and being accused of anti-semitism on wikipedia. A version of the 26th of January is this one. Eva Savelsberg has no article yet and really attends SETA (Turkish Government Think Tank of which Erdogan spox Ibrahim Kalin was the founding director) forums. This is my defense and it is yours to judge.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 23:20, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

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Rebuttal of the Evidence provided by Amr Ibn at Whitewashing and self-declared POV

Amr Ibn Kulthum and ThePharoah17 tried to include several sources not mentioning the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) for a phrase including the KCK. Then they also wanted to include Harun Yahya, a well known Turkish conspiracy theorist and an advocate of Islamic creationism disguised as Bill Rehkop of The Hill (newspaper). This all in the lead of the pro-Kurdish PYD

diff sources used there (beside Harun Yahya) were for example

diff Council of Foreign Relations (think tank) not mentioning the KCK

diff Reuters not mentioning the KCK

diff Hoover (think tank) article by Fabrice Balanche not mentioning the KCK

After serious attempts to include those sources for the KCK, I clarified them, revealing authors like Harun Yahya and Fabrice Balanche. They

reverted again. There was a

discussion at the WP:RS

(without Admins involved) after which I was finally able to remove Harun Yahya and the sources not mentioning the KCK.

The POV accusation refers to a question on women's rights in relation to ISIL which I asked on the 25 November 2020, the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women and I fully stand behind this question. Also behind my statement on the Gender-egalitarian and women empowering etc. Government in the AANES and the SDF who fought against ISIL.Paradise Chronicle (talk) 23:59, 9 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

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Analysis of evidence provided by Paradise Chronicle (PC) and Supreme Deliciousness (SD) on the approach on ISIL and Kurds

When Amr Ibn Kulthum (Amr Ibn) refers to ISIL they use the control, and not occupied. From Supreme Deliciousness (SD) I haven't found any edit about ISIL territory, neither under control or occupied. But both Amr Ibn and SD refer to the areas of Syrian Kurdistan which are Governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) of which most areas are captured/liberated from ISIL as Kurdish occupied, occupied by Kurds or occupied by a (pro-)Kurdish organization.

diff from evidence Being occupied by MILITARY FORCE...

difffrom evidence The areas in your maps are occupied by military force

diff The YPG-linked PKK and ISIS are both classified as terrorist organizations by the United States and the European Union. Is one really different from the other? by ThePharoah in the discussion about the move attempt from Syrian Kurdistan to Kurdish occupied regions in Syria in November 2020

diff "Western Kurdistan (Rojava)" on the area occupied by kurds by SD

diff There are no "kurdish areas" in Syria, they are Kurdish-occupied by SD in October 2019

diff So if YPG occupied Raqqa by Attar Aram syria

diff military occupation by YPG militias at Hasakah by Amr Ibn January 2017

[diff] I guess this should be renamed to "The Kurdish occupation of northeastern Syria" by Amr Ibn at Rojava conflict in August 2020

Together with the Move attempt of Syrian Kurdistan to Kurdish occupied Region of Syria during the ISIL led Siege of Kobane and that I haven't found any ISIL territory deemed as occupied (by military force) by the editors in question I translated this into a surprising tolerance towards ISIS for which I after was accused

of having called someone a terrorist sympathizer by Swarm and

also Thepharoah17 for which an apology would nice, too.

I apologize for having caused discomfort with the expression "tolerance towards ISIL". But I let the ArbCom judge over the yearlong and repeated classifying of ISIL liberated areas as Kurdish occupied and their move attempts from articles related to Kurds and Kurdistan to Kurdish occupied...Paradise Chronicle (talk) 23:45, 10 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

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Proposals by User:عمرو بن كلثوم

Proposed remedies by AIK (عمرو بن كلثوم)

  1. Given the previous edit-warring, combative behavior of GPinkerton during this case, personal attacks, canvassing, gaming the system, party intimidation and evidence of disruptive evidence and non-collaborative mentality, it is time to reinforce the indefinitely block this user who has created so many battle grounds across a wide range of article.
  2. User Paradise Chronicle should be topic banned for one year, until they prove that they can stop their edit-warring behavior. I am optimistic that they will learn their lesson from this case and come back to positively contribute to this area.
  3. Restore the Syrian Kurdistan page to the version of 11 November 2020 (meaningful date).
  4. Drop the innovated rules about old scholarship that were meant to prevent the presentation of a balanced article.
  5. Close this case as soon as practical and stop wasting everyone's time.
  6. As a few admins requested, create a 1RR for Kurdish-related topics, and impose discretionary sanctions.

Thank you to the ArbCom members and the Admins who participated here for your time, and sorry for the lengthy submission. Amr ibn Kulthoumعمرو بن كلثوم (talk) 09:39, 11 February 2021 (UTC)[reply]

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