First Balkan War
|First Balkan War|
|Part of the Balkan Wars|
Clockwise from top: Bulgarians attack the Ottoman positions in the Battle of Lule-Burgas; Bulgarian heavy artillery; Serbian forces entering the town of Mitrovica; The Greek king and the Bulgarian tsar in Thesaloniki; Ottoman troops at the Battle of Kumanovo; The Greek fleet at the Naval Battle of Elli
Balkan League: |
|Commanders and leaders|
Nazim Pasha, |
Ali Rizah Pasha,
Hasan Tahsin Pasha
Mihail Savov |
Crown Prince Constantine,
King Nicholas I,
Prince Danilo Petrović,
|336,742 men initially||
Serbia 230,000 men,
Greece 125,000 men,
Montenegro 44,500 men
|Casualties and losses|
The First Balkan War, which lasted from October 1912 to May 1913, pitted the Balkan League (Serbia, Greece, Montenegro and Bulgaria) against the Ottoman Empire. The combined armies of the Balkan states overcame the numerically inferior and strategically disadvantaged Ottoman armies, and achieved rapid success. As a result of the war, almost all remaining European territories of the Ottoman Empire were captured and partitioned among the allies. Ensuing events also led to the creation of an independent Albanian state. Despite its success, Bulgaria was dissatisfied over the division of the spoils in Macedonia, which provoked the start of the Second Balkan War.
- 1 Background
- 2 Order of battle and plans
- 3 Operations
- 3.1 Bulgarian theater of operations
- 3.2 Greek theater of operations
- 3.3 Serb-Montenegrin theater of operations
- 4 Conclusion of the war and aftermath
- 5 Reactions among the Great Powers
- 6 See also
- 7 References
- 8 Sources
Tensions among the Balkan states over their rival aspirations to the provinces of Ottoman-controlled Roumelia, namely Eastern Roumelia, Thrace and Macedonia, subsided somewhat following intervention by the Great Powers in the mid-19th century, aimed at securing both more complete protection for the provinces' Christian majority and protection of the status quo. By 1867, Serbia and Montenegro had all secured their independence, which was confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin a decade later. But the question of the viability of Ottoman rule was revived after the Young Turk Revolution of July 1908 compelled the Sultan to restore the suspended Ottoman constitution, and the significant developments in the years 1909-1911.
Serbia's aspirations towards Bosnia and Herzegovina were thwarted by the Austrian annexation of the province in October 1908. The Serbs then focused their attention to the south for expansion. After the annexation the Young Turks tried to induce the Muslim population of Bosnia to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire. These immigrants were settled by the Ottoman authorities in those districts of north Macedonia where the Muslim population was weak. The experiment proved disastrous. Those elements of the population which could be induced to emigrate were largely considered to be ignorant, unruly, fanatical, and economically worthless. Their presence in Kosovo and north Macedonia proved to be a catastrophe for the Empire since they readily united with the existing population of Albanian Muslims in the series of Albanian uprisings before and during the spring of 1912. These Muslim revolutionaries were joined by some of the Ottoman troops, who had been operating against them, mostly of Albanian origin. In May 1912 the Albanian revolutionaries after driving out the Ottomans from Skopje continued towards Bitola forcing the Ottomans to recognize extented regions in western Balkans as Albanian, in June 1912. For Serbia this was also considered problematic. After its hopes of northern expansion were closed due to Austria's annexation of Bosnia it now found the last direction of possible expansion also closing due to the creation of Albania as a state. For Serbia it meant a struggle against time to avoid the creation of the Albanian state.
The timetable of the creation of the Balkan League indicates that the increasing prewar understanding between Serbia and Bulgaria went on parallel to the success of the Albanian Uprising, making the uprising the triggering issue behind the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement and therefore the Balkan Wars. On the other hand, Bulgaria used the favorable timing in forcing Serbia to come to painful compromises regarding its aspirations toward Vardar Macedonia, since the party under time-pressure was Serbia. The agreement provided that in the event of a victorious war against the Ottomans, Bulgaria would receive all of Macedonia south of the Kriva Palanka-Ohrid line. Serbia's expansion was to be to the north of this line, including Kosovo, and out to the coast of the Adriatic sea to the west. This includes the northern half of modern Albania, giving Serbia access to the sea. If Serbia intended to honour the treaty, then it had sold Macedonia to buy Albania.
Bulgaria had held a long-term policy regarding the Ottomans since restoring its independence during the Russo-Turkish War. After the successful coup d'état for the unification with Eastern Rumelia, it had orchestrated a methodical scenario of indirect expansion through the creation, in the multi-ethnic Ottoman-held Macedonia, of a revolutionary organization, the IMRO, allegedly without national colour. IMRO's rhetoric claimed to be speaking generally for liberation on behalf of the “Macedonian People”, declaring its anti-chauvinism. In fact it was a Bulgarian backed organization created with a secret agenda to facilitate the incorporation of Thrace (Eastern and Western) and Macedonia (Aegean and Vardar) into a new autonomous state, as an intermediate step before the unification with Bulgaria could take place in the same way as with Eastern Rumelia. After an initial success Serbia and especially Greece realized the true purpose of IMRO and consequently a vicious guerilla war (see Macedonian Struggle) broke out between Bulgarian and Greek backed groups within Macedonia, ending when the Young Turks movement came into power in the Ottoman Empire with its initially democratic and modernization agenda. Bulgaria then turned to the more orthodox method of expansion through winning a war, building a large army for that purpose and started to see itself as the "Prussia of the Balkans". But even so, it was clear that Bulgaria could not win a war against the Ottomans alone.
In Greece, Army officers had revolted in August 1909 and secured the appointment of a progressive government under Eleftherios Venizelos, which they hoped would resolve the Cretan issue in Greece's favour and reverse their defeat of 1897 at the hands of the Ottomans. An emergency military reorganization had begun for that purpose led by a French military mission, but its work interrupted at the outbreak of war. In the discussions that led Greece to join the League Bulgaria refused to commit to any agreement on the distribution of territorial gains, unlike the deal with Serbia over Macedonia. Bulgaria's diplomatic policy was to push Serbia into an agreement limiting its access to Macedonia, while at the same time refusing any such agreement with Greece, believing that its army would be able to occupy the larger part of Aegean Macedonia and the important port city of Salonica (Thessaloniki) before the Greeks.
In 1911, Italy had launched an invasion of Tripolitania, which was quickly followed by the occupation of the Dodecanese Islands. The Italians' decisive military victories over the Ottoman Empire greatly influenced the Balkan states towards the possibility of winning a war against the Ottomans. Thus in the spring and summer of 1912 these consultations between the various Christian Balkan nations had resulted in a network of military alliances which became known as the Balkan League.
The Great Powers, most notably France and Austria-Hungary, reacted to this diplomatic grouping by trying to dissuade the League from going to war, but failed. In late September, both the League and the Ottoman Empire mobilized their armies. Montenegro was the first to declare war, on September 25 (O.S.)/October 8. The other three states, after issuing an impossible ultimatum to the Porte on October 13, declared war on the Empire on October 17.
Order of battle and plans
The Ottoman order of battle when the war broke out constituted from a total of 12,024 officers 324,718 men, 47,960 animals, 2,318 artillery pieces and 388 machine guns. From these a total 920 officers and 42,607 men had been assigned in non-divisional units and services, the remained 293,206 officers and men being assigned into four Armies. Opposing them and in continuation of their secret prewar settlements of expansion between them, the three Slavic allies (Bulgarian, Serbs and Montenegrins) had led out extensive plans to coordinate their war efforts: the Serbs and Montenegrins in the theater of Sandžak, the Bulgarians and Serbs in the Macedonian and Thracian theaters. The bulk of the Bulgarian forces (346,182 men) was targeting Thrace, pitted against the Thracian Ottoman Army of 96,273 men and about 26,000 garrison troops or about 115,000 in total, according to both Hall's, Erickson's and the Turkish Gen. Staff's study of 1993, books. The remaining Ottoman army of about 200,000 was located in Macedonia, pitted against the Serbian (234,000 Serbs and 48,000 Bulgarians under the Serbians orders) and Greek (115,000 men) armies, and divided into the Vardar and Macedonian Ottoman armies with independent static guards around the fortress cities of Ioannina (against the Greeks in Epirus) and Shkodër (against the Montenegrins in north Albania).
Bulgaria was militarily the most powerful of the four states, with a large, well-trained and well-equipped army. Bulgaria mobilized a total of 599,878 men out of a population of 4,300,000. The Bulgarian field army counted for 9 infantry divisions, 1 cavalry division and 1116 artillery units. Commander-in-Chief was Tsar Ferdinand, while the actual command was in the hands of his deputy, General Michail Savov. The Bulgarians also possessed a small navy of six torpedo boats, which were restricted to operations along the country's Black Sea coast.
Bulgaria's war aims were focused on Thrace and Macedonia. It deployed its main force in Thrace, forming three armies. The First Army (79,370 men), under general Vasil Kutinchev with 3 infantry divisions, was deployed to the south of Yambol, with direction of operations along the Tundzha river. The Second Army (122,748 men), under general Nikola Ivanov, with 2 infantry divisions and 1 infantry brigade, was deployed west of the First and was assigned to capture the strong fortress of Adrianople (Edirne). According to the plans, the Third Army (94,884 men), under general Radko Dimitriev, was deployed east of and behind the First, and was covered by the cavalry division hiding it from the Turkish view. The Third Army had 3 infantry divisions and was assigned to cross the Stranja mountain and to take the fortress of Kirk Kilisse. The 2nd (49,180) and 7th (48,523 men) divisions were assigned independent roles, operating in Western Thrace and eastern Macedonia respectively.
Serbia called upon about 255,000 men (out of a population of 2,912,000 people) with about 228 guns, grouped in 10 infantry divisions, two independent brigades and a cavalry division, under the effective command of former War Minister Radomir Putnik. The Serbian High Command, in its pre-war wargames, had concluded that the likeliest site of the decisive battle against the Turkish Vardar Army would be on the Ovče Pole plateau, before Skopje. Hence, the main forces were formed in three armies for the advance towards Skopje, while a division and an independent brigade were to cooperate with the Montenegrins in the Sanjak of Novi Pazar.
The First Army (132,000 men) was commanded by General Petar Bojović, and was the strongest in number and force, forming the center of the drive towards Skopje. The Second Army (74,000 men) was commanded by General Stepa Stepanović, and consisted of one Serbian and one Bulgarian (7th Rila) division. It formed the left wing of the Army and advanced towards Stracin. The inclusion of a Bulgarian division was according to a pre-war arrangement between Serbian and Bulgarian armies, but that division ceased to obey orders of Gen. Stepanović as soon as the war began, followed only the orders of the Bulgarian High Command. The Third Army (76,000 men) was commanded by General Božidar Janković and, being the right-wing army, had the task to liberate Kosovo and then join the other armies in the expected battle at the Ovče Polje. There were also two other concentrations in northwestern Serbia across the Serbo-Austrohungarian borders, the Ibar Army (25,000 men) under General Mihail Zhivkovich and the Javor brigade (12,000 men) under Lt Colonel Milovoje Anđelković.
Greece, a state of 2,666,000 people, was considered the weakest of the three main allies, since it fielded the smallest army and had suffered an easy defeat against the Ottomans 16 years before in the Greco-Turkish War. In the words of a British consular dispatch from 1910, "if there is war we shall probably see that the only thing Greek officers can do besides talking is to run away". However Greece had a strong navy, which was vital to the League, as it could prevent Turkish reinforcements from being rapidly transferred by ship from Asia to Europe. This fact was readily appreciated by the Serbs and Bulgarians, and was the chief factor in initiating the process of Greece's inclusion in their alliance. As the Greek ambassador to Sofia put it during the subsequent negotiations that led to Greece's entry in the League: "Greece can provide 600,000 men for the war effort. 200,000 men in the field, and the fleet will be able to stop 400,000 men being landed by Turkey between Salonica and Gallipoli."
The army was still undergoing reorganization by a French military mission when the war began. Under its supervision, the Greeks had adopted the triangular infantry division as their main formation, but more importantly, the reorganization allowed the country to field and equip a far greater number of troops than it had in 1897: while foreign observers estimated a mobilized force of ca. 50,000 men, the Greek Army fielded 125,000 with another 140,000 in the National Guard and reserves. Upon mobilization, it was grouped in two Armies. The Army of Thessaly, under Crown Prince Constantine, with Lt Gen Panagiotis Danglis as his chief of staff, but the real organizational and strategic mind behind the scene was major (later General) Ioannis Metaxas. It fielded 7 infantry divisions, a cavalry regiment and 4 independent Evzones battalions, equaling roughly 100,000 men. It was expected to overcome the fortified Turkish border positions and advance towards south and central Macedonia, aiming to take Thessaloniki and Bitola.
Further 10,000 to 13,000 men in eight battalions were assigned to the Army of Epirus under Lt Gen Konstantinos Sapountzakis, which was intended to advance into Epirus. As it had no hope of capturing its heavily fortified capital, Ioannina, its initial mission was simply to pin down the Turkish forces there until sufficient reinforcements could be sent from the Army of Thessaly after its successful conclusion of operations.
The Greeks had a relatively modern navy, strengthened by the purchase of numerous new units and undergoing reforms under the supervision of a British mission. The mission, invited by Venizelos in 1910, began its work upon its arrival in May 1911. Granted extraordinary powers and under the energetic leadership of Vice Admiral Lionel Grand Tufnell, it thoroughly reorganized the Navy Ministry, and dramatically improved the number and quality of exercises in gunnery and fleet maneuvres. In 1912, the core unit of the fleet was the fast armoured cruiser Averof, completed in 1910 and a that time the most modern and fast of any other battleship in the combatant navies. It served along with the rather antiquated battleships of the Hydra class. There were also eight destroyers built in 1906–1907, and six new destroyers that were hastily bought in summer 1912 as the imminence of war became apparent.
However, at the outbreak of the war, the Greek fleet was still not ready. In terms of number of ships, speed of the main surface units and, more importantly, in the number and caliber of the ship's guns, the Turks had a clear advantage. In addition, the war caught the fleet in the middle of its expansion and reorganization. As a result, a third of the fleet (the six new destroyers and the submarine Delfin) only reached Greece after hostilities had started, coal and other war stores were in short supply, and the Averof itself had arrived with barely any ammunition.
In 1912, the Ottomans found themselves in a difficult position. They had a large population of 26,000,000, but only 6,130,000 of them lived in the European part of the Empire, and of these only 2,300,000 were Muslims, the rest being Christians, considered unfit for conscription. The very poor transport network, especially in the Asian part, dictated that the only reliable way for a mass transfer of troops to the European theater was by sea, but that was under question due to the presence of the Greek fleet in the Aegean Sea. They were also still engaging in a protracted war with the Italians in Libya (and by now in the Dodecanese islands of the Aegean), which had dominated the Ottoman military effort for over a year and would last until 15 October, a few days after the outbreak of hostilities in the Balkans. They were therefore unable to significantly reinforce their positions in the Balkans as the relations with the Balkan states deteriorated over the course of the year.
Ottoman forces in the Balkans
The Ottomans' military capabilities were hampered by domestic strife caused by the Young Turk Revolution and the counter-revolutionary coup several months later (see Countercoup (1909) and 31 March Incident). An effort had been made to reorganize the army by a German mission, but its effects had not taken hold. The regular army (Nizam) was composed of well-equipped and trained active divisions, but the reserve units (Redif) that reinforced it were ill-equipped, especially in artillery, and badly trained.
The Ottomans had three armies in Europe (the Macedonian, Vardar and Thracian Armies) with 1,203 pieces of mobile and 1,115 fixed artillery on fortified areas. Western Group of Armies in Macedonia fielded at least 200,000 men detailed against the Greek and the Serbian-Montenegro Armies and the First Army in Thrace had at least 115,000 men detailed against the Bulgarian Army.
The Thracian Army was deployed against the Bulgarians. It was commanded by Nazim Pasa and numbered seven corps of 11 Regular Infantry, 13 Redif and 1+ Cavalry divisions:
- I Corps with 3 divisions (2nd Infantry (minus regiment), 3rd Infantry and 1st Provisional divisions).
- II Corps with 3 divisions (4th (minus regiment) and 5th Infantry and Usak Redif divisions).
- III Corps with 4 divisions (7th, 8th and 9th Infantry Divisions, all minus a regiment, and the Afyonkarahisar Redif Division).
- IV Corps with 3 divisions (12th Infantry Division (minus regiment), Izmit and Bursa Redif divisions).
- XVII Corps with 3 divisions (Samsun, Ergli and Izmir Redif divisions).
- Edirne Fortified Area with 6+ divisions (10th and 11th Infantry, Edirne, Babaeski and Gumulcine Redif and the Fortress division, 4th Rifle and 12th Cavalry regiments).
- Kircaali Detachment with 2+ divisions (Kircaali Redif, Kircaali Mustahfiz division and 36th Infantry Regiment).
- An independent cavalry division and the 5th Light Cavalry Brigade
The Western Group of Armies (Macedonian and Vardar) was composed of ten corps with 32 infantry and two cavalry divisions.
Against the Serbs the Ottomans deployed the Vardar Army (HQ in Skopje under Halepli Zeki Pasa) with five Corps of 18 Infantry divisions, one cavalry division and two independent cavalry brigades under the:
- V Corps with 4 divisions (13th, 15th, 16th Infantry and the Istip Redif divisions)
- VI Corps with 4 divisions (17th, 18th Infantry and the Monastir and Drama Redif divisions)
- VII Corps with 3 division (19th Infantry and Skopje and Pristina Redif divisions)
- II Corps with 3 divisions (Usak, Denicli and Izmir Redif divisions)
- Sandžak Corps with 4 divisions (20th Infantry (minus regiment), 60th Infantry, Mitrovice Redif Division, Taslica Redif Regiment, Firzovik and Taslica Detachment)
- An independent Cavalry Division and the 7th and 8th Cavalry Brigades.
The Macedonian Army (HQ in Thessaloniki under Ali Riza Pasa) was composed of 14 divisions in five corps detailed against Greece, Bulgaria and Montenegro.
Against Greece, 7+ divisions were deployed:
- VIII Corps with 3 divisions (22nd Infantry and Naslic and Aydin Redif divisions).
- Ioannina Corps with 3 divisions (23rd Infantry, Ioannina Redif and Bizani Fortress divisions).
- Thessaloniki Redif division and Karaburun Detachment as independent units.
Against Bulgaria in the South-Eastern Macedonia, 2 divisions forming the Ustruma Corps (14th Infantry and Serez Redif divisions, plus the Nevrekop Detachment) were deployed.
Against Montenegro, 4+ divisions were deployed:
- Shkodër Corps with 2+ divisions (24th Infantry, Elbasan Redif, Shkodër Fortified Area and Ipec Detachment)
- Independent Corps with 2 divisions (21st Infantry and Prizren Redif divisions)
According to the organizational plan the men of the Western Group had to number 598,000. But slow mobilization procedures and the poor railroad efficiency reduced drastically the available men, so that when war began, according to the Western Army Staff there were only 200,000 men available. Although during the next period more men reached the units, due to the war casualties, the Western Group never came near its nominal strength. In time of war the Ottomans planned to bring more troops in from Syria, both Nizamiye and Redif. Greek naval supremacy however prevented those reinforcements from arriving. Instead those soldiers had to deploy via the land route, and most never made it to the Balkans.
The Ottoman General Staff, assisted by the German Military Mission, developed 12 war plans, designed to counter various combinations of opponents. Work on plan #5, which was against a combination of Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, was very advanced, and had been sent to the Army staffs for them to develop local plans.
The Ottoman fleet had performed abysmally in the Greco-Turkish War of 1897, forcing the Ottoman government to begin a drastic overhaul. Older ships were retired and newer ones acquired, chiefly from France and Germany. In addition, in 1907 the Ottomans called in a British naval mission to update their training and doctrine. The mission, headed by Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, would find its task almost impossible however.To a large extent this was due to the political upheaval in the aftermath of the Young Turk Revolution; it is indicative that between 1908 and 1911, the office of Navy Minister changed hands nine times. Inter-departmental infighting and the entrenched interests of the bloated and over-aged officer corps, many of whom occupied their positions as a quasi-sinecure, further obstructed drastic reform. In addition, British attempts to control the Navy's construction programme were met with suspicion by the Ottoman ministers, and funds for Gamble's ambitious plans for new ships were not available.
To counter the Greek acquisition of the Averof, the Ottomans tried to buy the new German armoured cruiser SMS Blücher or even the battlecruiser SMS Moltke. When these moves failed due to the ships' exorbitant costs, the Ottomans acquired two old Brandenburg-class pre-dreadnought battleships, which became Barbaros Hayreddin and Turgut Reis. Along with the cruisers Hamidiye and Mecidye, these two ships formed the core of the Ottoman fleet. By the summer of 1912 however, they were already in a poor state due to chronic neglect: the rangefinders and ammunition hoists had been removed, the telephones were not working, the pumps were corroded, and most of the watertight doors could no longer be closed.
Montenegro started the First Balkan War by declaring war against the Ottomans on 8 October [O.S. 25 September] 1912.
Bulgarian theater of operations
The western region of the Balkans, including Albania, Kosovo, and Macedonia was less important to the resolution of the war and the survival of the Ottoman Empire than the Thracian theater, where the Bulgarians fought major battles against the Turks. But although the geography dictated that Thrace would be the major battlefield in a war with the Ottoman Empire, the position of the Ottoman Army there was jeopardized by erroneous intelligence estimates of their opponents' order of battle. Unaware of the secret prewar political and military settlement over Macedonia between Bulgaria and Serbia, the Ottoman leadership assigned the bulk of their forces there. The German ambassador Hans Baron von Wangenheim, one of the most influential people in the Ottoman capital, had reported to Berlin on October 21 that the Turks believed that the bulk of the Bulgarian army would be deployed in Macedonia with the Serbs. Subsequently the Ottoman HQ under Abdullah Pasha expected to meet only three Bulgarian infantry divisions, accompanied by cavalry, east of Adrianople. According to E. J. Erickson this assumption possibly resulted from their analysis of the objectives of the Balkan Pact - but it had deadly consequences for the Ottoman Army in Thrace, which would have to defend the area against the bulk of the Bulgarian army against impossible odds. This misappraisal was also the reason of the catastrophic aggressive Ottoman strategy at the start of the campaign in Thrace.
Bulgarian offensive and advance to Çatalca
In the Thracian front the Bulgarian army had placed 346,182 men against the Ottoman 1st Army with 105,000 men in eastern Thrace and the Kircaali detachment of 24,000 men in western Thrace. The Bulgarian forces were divided into the 1st (Lt. Gen. Vasil Kutinchev), 2nd (Lt. Gen. Nikola Ivanov) and 3rd (Lt. Gen. Radko Dimitriev) Bulgarian Armies of 297,002 men in the eastern part and 49,180 (33,180 regulars and 16,000 irregulars) under the 2nd Bulgarian Division (Gen. Stilian Kovachev) in the western part. The first large-scale battle occurred against the Adrianople-Kirk Kilisse defensive line, where the Bulgarian 1st and 3rd Armies (together 174,254 men) defeated the Ottoman East Army (of 96,273 combatants), near Gechkenli, Seliolu and Petra. The Ottoman XV Corps urgently left the area to defend the Gallipoli peninsula against an expected Greek amphibious assault, which in the event never materialized. The absence of this Corps created an immediate vacuum between Adrianople and Demotika, and the 11th Infantry Division from the Eastern Army's IV Corps was moved there to replace it. Thus one complete army corps was removed from the Eastern Army's order of battle.. As a consequence of the insufficient intelligence on the invading forces, the Ottoman offensive plan failed completely in the face of Bulgarian superiority forcing Abdullah Pasha to abandon Kirk Kilisse, which was taken without resistance by the Bulgarian Third Army,. The fortress of Adrianople, with some 61,250 men, was isolated and besieged by the Bulgarian Second Army, although for the time being no assault was possible due to the lack of siege equipment in the Bulgarian inventory. Another consequence of the Greek naval supremacy in Aegean was that the Ottoman forces did not receive the reinforcements projected in the war plans, consisting of a further corps to be transferred by sea from Syria and Palestine. Thus the Greek Navy played a crucial albeit indirect role in the Thracian campaign, by neutralizing three corps, a significant portion of the Ottoman Army, in the all-important opening round of the war. Another, more direct role, was the emergency transportation of the Bulgarian 7th Rila Division from the Macedonian to the Thracian front after the termination of the operations there.
After the battle of Kirk Kilisse the Bulgarian high command decided to wait a few days, a decision which allowed the Turks to occupy a new defensive position on the Luleburgaz-Karaagach-Bunarhisar line. Despite this, the Bulgarian attack by First and Third Army which together accounted for 107,386 rifleman,3115 cavalry,116 machine guns and 360 artillery pieces defeated the reinforced Turkish Army consisting of 126,000 riflemen,3500 cavalry,96 machine guns and 342 artillery pieces and reached the Sea of Marmara. In terms of forces engaged it was the largest battle fought in Europe between the end of the Franco-Prussian War and the beginning of the First World War.As a result of it the Turks were pushed to their final defensive position across the Çatalca Line protecting the peninsula on which Constantinople is located. There they succeeded in stabilizing the front with the help of fresh reinforcements from the Asian provinces. The line had been constructed during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8 under the directions of a German engineer in Ottoman service, von Bluhm Pasha, but was considered obsolete by 1912..
Meanwhile the forces of the Bulgarian 2nd Thracian division, 49,180 men divided into the Haskovo and Rhodope detachments, advanced toward the Aegean Sea. The Ottoman Kircaali detachment (Kircaali Redif and Kircaali Mustahfiz Divisions and 36th Regiment with 24,000 men), tasked with defending a 400 km front across the Thessaloniki-Dedeagach railroad, failed to offer serious resistance and on 26 November their commander Yaver Pasha was captured together with 10,131 officers and men by Macedonian-Adrianopolitan Volunteer Corps. After the occupation of Thessaloniki by the Greek army, his surrender completed the isolation of the Ottoman forces in Macedonia from those in Thrace.
On 17 November [O.S. 4 November] 1912, the offensive against the Çatalca Line began, despite clear warnings from Russia that if the Bulgarians occupied Constantinople it would attack them. This was an early evidence of the lack of realistic thinking of the Bulgarian leadership. The Bulgarians launched their attack along the defensive line with 176,351 men and 462 artillery pieces against the Ottomans' 140,571 men and 316 artillery pieces, but despite Bulgarian superiority, the Ottomans succeeded to repulse them. An armistice was consequently agreed on 3 December [O.S. 20 November] 1912 between the Ottomans and Bulgaria, the latter also representing Serbia and Montenegro, and peace negotiations began in London. Greece also participated in the conference, but refused to agree to a truce, continuing its operations in the Epirus sector. The negotiations were interrupted on 5 February [O.S. 23 January] 1913, when a Young Turk coup d'état in Constantinople under Enver Pasha overthrew the government of Kiamil Pasha. Upon expiration of the armistice, on February 16, hostilities recommenced.
On 20 February Ottoman forces began their attack, both in Çatalca and south, at Gallipoli. There the Ottoman X Corps, with 19,858 men and 48 guns, landed at Şarköy, at the same time as an attack of around 15,000 men supported by 36 guns (part of the 30,000-strong Ottoman army isolated in the Gallipoli peninsula) at Bulair further south. Both attacks were supported by fire from Ottoman warships, and were intended in the long term to relieve pressure on Adrianople. Confronting them were about 10,000 men with 78 guns. The Ottomans were probably unaware of the presence in the area of the newly-formed 4th Bulgarian Army of 92,289 men under General Stiliyan Kovachev. The Ottoman attack in the thin isthmus, with a front of just 1,800m, was hampered by thick fog and strong Bulgarian artillery and machine gun fire. As a result the attack stalled, and was repulsed by a Bulgarian counterattack. By the end of the day both armies had returned to their original positions. Meanwhile the Ottoman X Corps, which had landed at Şarköy, advanced until by 23 February [O.S. 10 February] 1913 the reinforcements sent by General Kovachev succeeded in halting them. Casualties on both sides were light. After the failure of the frontal attack in Bulair, the Ottoman forces at Şarköy re-embarked into their ships on 11 February and were transported to Gallipoli.
The Ottoman attack at Çatalca, directed against the powerful Bulgarian First and Third Armies, was initially launched only as a diversion from the Gallipoli-Şarköy operation, pinning down the Bulgarian forces in situ. Nevertheless, it resulted in unexpected success. In the north the Bulgarians were forced to withdraw about 15 km and to the south over 20 km to their secondary defensive positions. With the end of the attack in Gallipoli the Ottomans cancelled the operation, reluctant to leave the Çatalca Line, but several days passed before the Bulgarians realized that the offensive was over. By February 15 the front had again stabilized but the fighting along the static lines continued until the armistice. The battle, which resulted in heavy Bulgarian casualties, could be characterized as an Ottoman victory at the tactical level, but strategically it was a failure, since it did nothing to prevent the failure of the Gallipoli-Şarköy operation or relieve the pressure on Adrianople.
Fall of Adrianople and Serbo-Bulgarian friction
The failure of the Şarköy-Bulair operation and the deployment of the 2nd Serbian Army together with its much needed heavy siege artillery sealed Adrianople's fate. On 11 March after a two weeks bombardment that destroyed much of the fortified structures around the city, the final assault started with Allied forces enjoying a crushing superiority over the Ottoman garrison. Under the command of General Nikola Ivanov, the Bulgarian 2nd Army with 106,425 men and two Serb divisions with 47,275 men eventually conquered the city, but at a high price: the Bulgarians suffering 8,093 and the Serbs 1,462 casualties. The Ottoman casualties for the entire Adrianople campaign reached 13,000 killed. The number of prisoners is less clear. The Turks began the war with 61,250 men in the Adrianople fortress. Richard Hall notes that 60,000 men were captured. Adding to the 13,000 killed, the modern Turkish General Staff History notes that 28,500 man survived captivity leaving only 20,000 men unaccounted as possibly captured (including the unspecified number of wounded). Bulgarian losses for the entire Adrianople campaign amounted to 18,282. According to both R.C. Hall and E.J. Erickson, the assault was an unnecessary bloodshed, it was more of a political decision and took place only to inflate the national pride of Tsar Ferdinand and some Bulgarian politicians, since the fortress would have to surrender anyhow by the end of the month due to starvation. The most important result however was that now the Ottoman command lost all hopes of regaining the initiative, which made any further fighting pointless.
The battle had major and key results in the Serbo-Bulgarian relations putting the seeds of the countries' confrontation some months later. The Bulgarian censor rigorously cut any references about the Serbian participation in the operation in the telegrams of the foreign correspondents. The public opinion in Sofia thus failed to realise the crucial services Serbia rendered in the battle. Accordingly the Serbs claimed that their troops of the 20th Regiment were those who captured the Turk commander of the city, and that Colonel Gavrilović was the allied officer who accepted Shukri's official surrender of the garrison, a statement that Bulgarians disputed. Subsequently the Serbs officially protested, pointing out that although they had sent their troops to Adrianople to win for Bulgaria territory the acquisition of which had never been foreseen by their mutual treaty, the Bulgarians had never fulfilled the clause of the treaty requiring Bulgaria to send 100,000 men to help the Serbians in their Vardar front. The Bulgarians answered that their Staff had informed the Serbs about that on 23 August.[clarification needed] The friction escalated some weeks later when the Bulgarian delegates in London bluntly warned the Serbs that they must not expect Bulgarian support on their Adriatic claims. The Serbs angrily replied that that was a clear withdrawal from the prewar agreement of mutual understanding according to the Kriva Palanka-Adriatic line of expansion, but the Bulgarians insisted that in their view, the Vardar Macedonian part of the agreement remained active and that the Serbs were still obliged to surrender the area as agreed. The Serbs answered by accusing the Bulgarians of maximalism, pointing out that if they lost both northern Albania and Vardar Macedonia, their participation in the common war would had been virtually for nothing. The tension soon was expressed in a series of hostile incidents between the two armies along their common line of occupation across the Vardar valley. The developments essentially ended the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance and made a future war between the two countries inevitable.
Greek theater of operations
Ottoman intelligence had also disastrously misread Greek military intentions. In retrospect, it would appear that the Ottoman staffs believed that the Greek attack would be shared equally between the two major avenues of approach, Macedonia and Epirus. The 2nd Army staff had therefore evenly balanced the combat strength of the seven Ottoman divisions between the Yanya Corps and VIII Corps, in Epirus and southern Macedonia respectively. This was a fatal decision for the Western Group of Armies, since it led to the early loss of the strategic center of all three Macedonian fronts, the city of Thessaloniki, a fact that sealed their fate. The Greek Army also fielded seven divisions, but, having the initiative, concentrated all seven against VIII Corps, leaving only a number of independent battalions of scarcely divisional strength in the Epirus front.. In an unexpectedly brilliant and rapid campaign, the Army of Thessaly seized the city. The loss of this city was a strategic disaster for the Turks. In the absence of secure sea lines of communications, the retention of the Thessaloniki-Constantinople corridor was essential to the overall strategic posture of the Ottoman Empire. Once this was gone, the defeat of the Ottoman Army became inevitable. To be sure, the Bulgarians and the Serbs played an important role in the defeat of the main Ottoman armies. Their great victories at Kirkkilise, Luleburgaz, Kumanovo, and Monastir shattered the Eastern and Vardar Armies. However, these victories were not decisive in the sense that they ended the war. The Ottoman field armies survived, and in Thrace, they actually grew stronger day by day. In the strategic point of view these victories were enabled partially by the weakened condition of the Ottoman armies brought about by the active presence of the Greek army and fleet.
With the declaration of war, the Greek Army of Thessaly under Crown Prince Constantine advanced to the north, successfully overcoming Ottoman opposition in the fortified Straits of Sarantaporo. After another victory at Giannitsa on 2 November [O.S. 20 October] 1912, Thessaloniki and its garrison of 26,000 men surrendered to the Greeks on 9 November [O.S. 27 October] 1912. Two Corps HQs (Ustruma and VIII), two Nizamiye divisions (14th and 22nd) and four Redif divisions (Salonika, Drama, Naslic and Serez) were thus lost to the Ottoman order of battle. Additionally, the Turks lost 70 artillery pieces, 30 machine guns and 70,000 rifles (Thessaloniki was the central arms depot for the Western Armies). The Turks estimated that 15,000 officers and men had been killed during the campaign in south Macedonia, bringing total losses up to 41,000 soldiers. Another direct consequence was that the destruction of the Macedonian Army sealed the fate of the Ottoman Vardar Army, which was fighting the Serbs to the north. The fall of Thessaloniki left it strategically isolated, without logistical supply and depth to maneuver, ensuring its destruction.
Upon learning of the outcome of the battle of Gianitsa, the Bulgarian high command urgently dispatched their 7th Rila Division from the north in the direction of the city. The division arrived there a week later, the day after its surrender to the Greeks. Until November 10, the Greek-occupied zone had been expanded to the line from Lake Dojran to the Pangaion hills west to Kavalla. In western Macedonia however, the lack of coordination between the Greek and Serbian HQs cost the Greeks a setback in the Battle of Vevi on 15 November [O.S. 2 November] 1912, when the Greek 5th Division crossed its way with the VI Ottoman Corps (a part of the Vardar Army consisting of the 16th, 17th and 18th Nizamiye divisions), retreating to Albania following the battle of Prilep against the Serbs. The Greek division, surprised by the presence of the Ottoman Corps, isolated from the rest of Greek army and outnumbered by the now counterattacking Ottomans centered on Bitola, was forced to retreat. As a result, the Serbs beat the Greeks to Bitola.
In the Epirus front the Greek army was initially heavily outnumbered, but due to the passive attitude of the Ottomans succeeded in conquering Preveza (21 October 1912) and pushing north to the direction of Ioannina. On November 5, a small force from Corfu made a landing and captured the coastal area of Himarë without facing significant resistance, and on November 20 Greek troops from western Macedonia entered Korce. However, Greek forces in the Epirote front had not the numbers to initiate an offensive against the German-designed defensive positions of Bizani that protected the city of Ioannina, and therefore had to wait for reinforcements from the Macedonian front.
After the campaign in Macedonia was over, a large part of the Army was redeployed to Epirus, where Crown Prince Constantine himself assumed command. In the Battle of Bizani the Ottoman positions were breached and Ioannina taken on 6 March [O.S. 22 February] 1913. During the siege, on 8 February 1913, the Russian pilot N. de Sackoff, flying for the Greeks, became the first pilot ever shot down in combat, when his biplane was hit by ground fire following a bomb run on the walls of Fort Bizani. He came down near small town of Preveza, on the coast north of the Aegean island of Lefkas, secured local Greek assistance, repaired his plane and resumed flight back to base. The fall of Ioannina allowed the Greek army to continue its advance into northern Epirus, the southern part of modern Albania, which it occupied. There its advance stopped, although the Serbian line of control was very close to the north.
On the outbreak of hostilities on 18 October, the Greek fleet, placed under the newly-promoted Rear Admiral Pavlos Kountouriotis, sailed for the island of Lemnos, occupying it three days later (although fighting continued on the island until 27 October) and establishing an anchorage at Moudros Bay. This move was of major strategic importance, as it provided the Greeks with a forward base in close distance to the Dardanelles, the Ottoman fleet's main anchorage and refuge. In view of the Ottoman fleet's superiority in speed and broadside weight, the Greek planners expected them to sortie from the straits early in the war. Given the Greek fleet's unpreparedness resulting from the premature outbreak of the war, such an early Ottoman attack might have been able to achieve a crucial victory. Instead, the Ottoman Navy spent the first two months of the war in operations against the Bulgarians in the Black Sea, allowing the Greeks to consolidate their control of the Aegean.
By mid-November Greek naval detachments had seized the islands of Imbros, Thasos, Agios Efstratios, Samothrace, Psara and Ikaria, while landings were undertaken on the larger islands of Lesbos and Chios only on 21 and 27 November respectively. Substantial Ottoman garrisons were present on the latter, and their resistance was fierce. They withdrew into the mountainous interior and were not subdued until 22 December and 3 January respectively. Samos, officially an autonomous principality, was not attacked until 13 March 1913, out of a desire not to upset the Italians in the nearby Dodecanese. The clashes there were short-lived as the Turks withdrew to the Anatolian mainland, so that the island was securely in Greek hands by March 16.
At the same time, with the aid of numerous merchant ships converted to auxiliary cruisers, a loose naval blockade on the Turkish coasts from the Dardanelles to Suez was instituted, which disrupted the Ottomans' flow of supplies (only the Black Sea routes to Romania remained open) and left some 250,000 Ottoman troops immobilized in Asia. In the Ionian Sea, the Greek fleet operated without opposition, ferrying supplies for the army units in the Epirus front. Furthermore, the Greeks bombarded and then blockaded the port of Vlorë in Albania on 3 December, and Durrës on 27 February. A naval blockade extending from the pre-war Greek border to Vlorë was also instituted on 3 December, isolating the newly-established Provisional Government of Albania there from any outside support.
Lieutenant Nikolaos Votsis scored a major success for Greek morale on 31 October, when he sailed his torpedo boat No. 11, under the cover of night, into the harbor of Thessaloniki and sank the old Ottoman ironclad battleship Feth-i Bülend. On the same day, Greek troops seized the Ottoman naval base of Preveza. The Ottomans scuttled the four ships present there, but the Greeks were able to salvage the Italian-built torpedo-boats Antalya and Tokat, which were commissioned into the Greek Navy as Nikopolis and Tatoi respectively. On 9 November, the wooden Ottoman armed steamer Trabzon was intercepted and sunk by the Greek torpedo boat No. 14 under Lt. Periklis Argyropoulos off Ayvalık.
Confrontations off the Dardanelles
The main Ottoman fleet remained inside the Dardanelles for the early part of the war; the Greek destroyers continuously patrolled the straits' exit to report on a possible sortie. Kountouriotis suggested mining the straits, but was not taken up for fear of international reactions. On 7 December, Tahir Bey was replaced by Ramiz Naman Bey, the leader of the hawkish faction among the officer corps, at the head of the Ottoman fleet. A new strategy was formulated, whereby the Ottomans had to take advantage of any absence of Averof to attack the other Greek ships. The Ottoman staff formulated a plan to lure a number of the Greek destroyers on patrol into a trap. A first such effort on 12 December failed due to boiler trouble, but the second try two days later resulted in an indecisive engagement between the Greek destroyers and the cruiser Mecidiye.
The war's first major fleet action, the Naval Battle of Elli, was fought two days later, on 16 December [O.S. 3 December] 1912. The Ottoman fleet, with 4 battleships, 9 destroyers and 6 torpedo boats sailed to the entrance of the straits. The lighter Ottoman vessels remained behind, but the battleship squadron moved on north under cover of the forts at Kumkale, and engaged the Greek fleet, coming from Imbros, at 9:40. Kountouriotis led the Averof into independent action: utilizing its superior speed, it cut across the Ottoman fleet's bow. Under fire from two sides, the Ottomans were quickly forced to withdraw to the Dardanelles. The whole engagement lasted less than an hour, in which the Ottoman suffered heavy damage to the Barbaros Hayreddin and 18 dead and 41 wounded (most during their disorderly retreat) and the Greeks one dead and seven wounded.
On the Ottoman side, in the aftermath of Elli, the energetic Lt. Commander Rauf Bey was placed in effective command of the fleet on 20 December. Two days later he led his forces out, hoping again to trap the patrolling Greek destroyers between two divisions of the Ottoman fleet, one heading for Imbros and the other waiting at the entrance of the straits. The plan failed as the Greek ships quickly broke contact, while at the same time the Mecidiye came under attack by the Greek submarine Delfin, which launched an torpedo against it but missed; the first such attack in history. During this time, the Ottoman Army continued to press upon a reluctant Navy a plan for the re-occupation of Tenedos, used as a base by the Greek destroyers, by an amphibious operation. The operation was scheduled for 4 January. On that day, weather conditions were ideal and the fleet was ready, but the Yenihan regiment earmarked for the operation failed to arrive on time. The naval staff nevertheless ordered the fleet to sortie, and an engagement developed with the Greek fleet, without any significant results on either side. Similar sorties followed on 10 and 11 January, but the results of these "cat and mouse" operations were always the same: "the Greek destroyers always managed to remain outside the Ottoman warships' range, and each time the cruisers fired a few rounds before breaking off the chase."
In preparation for the next attempt to break the Greek blockade, the Ottoman Admiralty decided to create a diversion by sending the light cruiser Hamidiye, captained by Rauf Bey, to raid Greek merchant shipping in the Aegean. It was hoped that the Averof, the only major Greek unit fast enough to catch Hamidiye, would be drawn in pursuit and leave the remainder of the Greek fleet weakened. In the event, Hamidiye slipped through the Greek patrols on the night of 14/15 January and bombarded the harbor of the Greek island of Syros, sinking the Greek auxiliary cruiser Makedonia which lay in anchor there (it was later raised and repaired). The Hamidiye then left the Aegean for the Eastern Mediterranean, making stops at Beirut and Port Said before entering the Red Sea. Although a major morale booster for the Ottomans, the operation failed to achieve its primary objective, as Kountouriotis refused to leave his post and pursue the Hamidiye.
Four days later, on 18 January [O.S. 5 January] 1913, when the Ottoman fleet again sallied from the straits towards Lemnos, it was defeated for a second time in the Naval Battle of Lemnos. This time, the Ottoman warships concentrated their fire on the Averof, which again made use of its superior speed and tried to "cross the T" of the Ottoman fleet. Barbaros Hayreddin was again heavily damaged, and the Ottoman fleet was forced to return to the shelter of the Dardanelles and their forts. The Ottomans suffered 41 killed and 101 wounded. It was the last attempt of the Ottoman Navy to leave the Dardanelles, thereby leaving the Greeks dominant in the Aegean. On 5 February [O.S. 24 January] 1913, a Greek Farman MF.7, piloted by Lt. Moutousis and with Ensign Moraitinis as an observer, carried out an aerial reconnaissance of the Ottoman fleet in its anchorage at Nagara, and launched four bombs on the anchored ships. Although it scored no hits, this operation is regarded as the first naval-air operation in military history.
General Ivanov, commander of the 2nd Bulgarian Army, acknowledged the role of the Greek fleet in the overall Balkan League victory by stating that "the activity of the entire Greek fleet and above all the Averof was the chief factor in the general success of the allies".
Serb-Montenegrin theater of operations
The Serbian forces operated against major part of Ottoman Western army which were located in the areas of Novi Pazar, Kosovo and northern and eastern Macedonia. Strategically the Serbian forces were divided into four independent armies and groups: Javor brigade and Ibar Army against Ottoman forces in the area of Novi Pazar, Third Army against Ottoman forces in the areas of Kosovo and Metohija, First Army against Ottoman forces in the area of northern Macedonia and Second Army (operating from the Bulgarian territory) against Ottoman forces in the area of eastern Macedonia. The decisive battle was expected to be fought in the area of northern Macedonia, more specifically in the plains of Ovče Pole, where the main forces of Ottoman Vardar Army were expected to concentrate. According to the plan of the Serbian Supreme Command, three Serbian armies (First, Second and Third) were supposed to encircle and destroy the Vardar Army in that area, with First Army advancing from the north (direction Vranje-Kumanovo-Ovče Pole ), Second Army advancing from the east (direction Kriva Palanka-Kratovo-Ovče Pole) and Third Army advancing from the north-west (direction Priština-Skopje-Ovče Pole). In the execution of this plan the main role was given to the First Army while Second Army was expected to cut of the Vardar Army's retreat route, and if necessary attack its rear and right flank. The main goal of Third Army was to conquer Kosovo and Metohija and if necessary give assistance to the First Army by attacking the Vardar Army's left flank and rear. Ibar Army and the Javor brigade had a minor role in the Serbian plan, they were expected to conquer and secure areas of the Sandjak of Novi Pazar and replace Third Army in Kosovo after it advanced further south.
The Serbian Army under General (later Marshal) Putnik dealt three decisive victories in Vardar Macedonia, its primary objective in the war, effectively destroying the Ottoman forces in the region and conquering north Macedonia. They also helped the Montenegrins to take the Sandžak and sent two divisions to help the Bulgarians at the siege of Adrianople.
The last battle for Macedonia was the battle of Monastir, in which the remains of the Ottoman Vardar Army were forced to retreat to central Albania. After the battle, Prime Minister Pasic asked Gen. Putnik to take part in the race for Thessaloniki. Putnik declined and instead turned his army to the west, towards Albania, foreseeing that a future confrontation between the Greeks and Bulgarians over Thessaloniki could greatly help Serbia's own plans over Vardar Macedonia.
After the Great Powers applied pressure on them, the Serbs started to withdraw from northern Albania and the Sandžak, although they left behind their heavy artillery park to help the Montenegrins in the continuing siege of Shkodër. On 23 April 1913 the fortress' garrison was forced to surrender due to starvation.
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Conclusion of the war and aftermath
The Treaty of London ended the First Balkan War on 30 May 1913. All Ottoman territory west of the Enez-Kıyıköy line was ceded to the Balkan League, according to the status quo at the time of the armistice. The treaty also declared Albania to be an independent state. Almost all of the territory that was designated to form the new Albanian state was currently occupied by either Greece or Serbia, which only reluctantly withdrew their troops. Having unresolved disputes with Serbia over the division of northern Macedonia and with Greece over southern Macedonia, Bulgaria was prepared, if the need arose to solve the problems by force, and began transferring its forces from Eastern Thrace to the disputed regions. Unwilling to yield to any pressure Greece and Serbia settled their mutual differences and signed a military alliance directed against Bulgaria on May 1, 1913, even before the Treaty of London had been concluded. This was soon followed by a treaty of "mutual friendship and protection" on May 19/June 1, 1913. Thus the scene for the Second Balkan War was set.
Reactions among the Great Powers
The developments that led to the war did not go unnoticed by the Great Powers, but although there was an official consensus between the European Powers over the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, which led to a stern warning to the Balkan states, unofficially each of them took a different diplomatic approach due to their conflicting interests in the area. As a result, any possible preventative effect of the common official warning was cancelled by the mixed unofficial signals, and failed to prevent or to stop the war:
- Russia was a prime mover in the establishment of the Balkan League and saw it as an essential tool in case of a future war against her rival, the Austro-Hungarian Empire. But she was unaware of the Bulgarian plans over Thrace and Constantinople, territories on which she had long-held ambitions, and on which she had just secured a secret agreement of expansion from her allies France and Britain, as a reward in participating in the upcoming Great War against the Central Powers(for more, see Constantinople Agreement).
- France, not feeling ready for a war against Germany in 1912, took a totally negative position against the war, firmly informing her ally Russia that she would not take part in a potential conflict between Russia and Austro-Hungary if it resulted from the actions of the Balkan League. The French however failed to achieve British participation in a common intervention to stop the Balkan conflict.
- The British Empire, although officially a staunch supporter of the Ottoman Empire's integrity, took secret diplomatic steps encouraging the Greek entry into the League in order to counteract Russian influence. At the same time she encouraged the Bulgarian aspirations over Thrace, preferring a Bulgarian Thrace to a Russian one, despite the assurances she had given to the Russians in regard of their expansion there.
- Austria-Hungary, struggling for an exit from the Adriatic and seeking ways for expansion in the south at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, was totally opposed to any other nation's expansion in the area. At the same time, the Habsburg empire had its own internal problems with the significant Slav populations that campaigned against the German-Hungarian control of the multinational state. Serbia, whose aspirations in the direction of the Austrian-held Bosnia were no secret, was considered an enemy and the main tool of Russian machinations that were behind the agitation of Austria's Slav subjects. But failed to achieve German backup for firm reaction. Initially, Emperor Wilhelm II told the Archduke Franz Ferdinand that Germany was ready to support Austria in all circumstances - even at the risk of a world war, but Austro-Hungarians hesitated. Finally, in the German Imperial War Council of 8 December 1912 the consensus was that Germany would not be ready for war until at least mid-1914 and notes about that passed to the Habsburgs. Consequently no actions could be taken when the Serbs acceded to the Austria ultimatum of October 18 and withdrew from Albania.
- Germany, already heavily involved in the internal Ottoman politics, officially opposed a war against the Empire. But in her effort to win Bulgaria for the Central Powers, and seeing the inevitability of Ottoman disintegration, was playing with the idea to replace the Balkan positions of the Ottomans with a friendly Greater Bulgaria in her San Stefano borders. An idea that was based on the German origin of the Bulgarian King and his anti-Russian sentiments.
Finally, when Serb-Austrian tensions again grew hot in July 1914 when a Serbian backed organization assassinated the heir of the Austro-Hungarian throne, no one had strong reservations about the possible conflict and the First World War broke out.
|Battles of the First Balkan War|
|Battle of Kardzhali||Bulgarians||Col. Vasil Delov||Ottomans||Mehmed Yaver Pasha||Oct 21 1912||Bulgarians|
|Battle of Sarantaporo||Greeks||Crown Prince Constantine||Ottomans||Oct 22 1912||Greeks|
|Battle of Giannitsa||Greeks||Crown Prince Constantine||Ottomans||Hasan Tahsin Pasha||Nov 1 1912||Greeks|
|Battle of Kumanovo||Serbs||Gen. Radomir Putnik (promoted to Vojvoda after the battle)||Ottomans||Gen. Zeki Pasha||Oct 23 1912||Serbs|
|Battle of Kirk Kilisse||Bulgarians||Gen. Radko Dimitriev, Gen. Ivan Fichev||Ottomans||Mahmut Muhtar Pasha||Oct 24 1912||Bulgarians|
|Battle of Pente Pigadia||Ottomans||Esat Pasha||Greeks||Lt. Gen. Konstantinos Sapountzakis||Nov 6-12 1912||Greeks|
|Battle of Prilep||Serbs||Ottomans||Nov 3 1912||Serbs|
|Battle of Lule-Burgas||Bulgarians||Gen. Radko Dimitriev, Gen. Ivan Fichev||Ottomans||Abdullah Pasha||Oct 28-31 1912||Bulgarians|
|Battle of Merhamli||Bulgarians||Gen. Nikola Genev, Col. Aleksandar Tanev||Ottomans||Mehmed Yaver Pasha (POW)||Nov 26 1912||Bulgarians|
|Battle of Vevi||Greeks||Ottomans||Nov 15 1912||Ottomans|
|Battle of Bitola||Serbs||Gen. Petar Bojović||Ottomans||Zeki Pasha (Gen.)||Nov 16-19 1912||Serbs|
|Naval Battle of Kaliakra||Bulgarians||Cap. Dimitar Dobrev||Ottomans||Hűseyin Rauf Bey (Rauf Orbay)||21 Nov 1912||Bulgarians|
|Naval Battle of Elli||Greeks||Rear Adm. Pavlos Kountouriotis||Ottomans||Adm Remzi Bey||Dec 16 1912||Greeks|
|Battle of Bulair||Ottomans||Fethi Bey||Bulgarians||Gen. Georgi Todorov||Jan 26 1913||Bulgarians|
|Battle of Şarköy||Ottomans||Enver Bey||Bulgarians||Gen. Stiliyan Kovachev||26-28 Jan 1913||Bulgarians|
|Naval Battle of Lemnos||Greeks||Rear Adm. Pavlos Kountouriotis||Ottomans||Jan 18 1913||Greeks|
|Battle of Bizani||Greeks||Crown Prince Constantine||Ottomans||Esat Pasha||Mar 5-6 1913||Greeks|
|Siege of Adrianople||Bulgarians & Serbs||Gen. Georgi Vazov, Gen. Stepa Stepanovic||Ottomans||Gen. Gazi Ṣűkrű Pasha||Mar 11-13 1913||Bulgarians & Serbs|
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- Hall (2000), p. 17
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- Hall (2000), p. 19 Cite error: Invalid
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- Erickson (2003), p. 62
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- Hall (2000), pp. 22-24 Cite error: Invalid
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- The war between Bulgaria and Turkey 1912-1913, Volume II Ministry of War 1928, p.660
- Erickson (2003), p. 82
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- The war between Bulgaria and Turkey 1912-1913, Volume V, Ministry of War 1930, p. 1053
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- Baker, David, "Flight and Flying: A Chronology", Facts On File, Inc., New York, New York, 1994, Library of Congress card number 92-31491, ISBN 0-8160-1854-5, page 61.
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|Wikimedia Commons has media related to First Balkan War.|
- Erickson, Edward J. (2003). Defeat in Detail: The Ottoman Army in the Balkans, 1912–1913. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0-275-97888-5.
- Fotakis, Zisis (2005). Greek naval strategy and policy, 1910–1919. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-35014-3.
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