Talk:1972 Nixon visit to China
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|WikiProject United States / Government / Presidents|
|A fact from this article was featured on Wikipedia's Main Page in the On this day... section on February 28, 2007, February 28, 2008, February 28, 2009, February 28, 2012, and February 28, 2014.|
- Nixon and the U.S. government agreed to recognize China over Taiwan mainly to settle the dispute and peacefully agree with China themselves to open trade and commerce with mainland China. —№tǒŖïøŭş4lĭfė ♫♪
Add an effects section?
Nixon and Trudeau?
Perhaps a mention about Trudeau's visit to China should be added, as it's closely related to Nixon's. - 18.104.22.168 21:00, 8 October 2006 (UTC)
nixon liked pie!
Hong Kong and Macau
- Why not just make a post-meeting section? Where else would info like this belong? Benjwong (talk) 19:09, 2 September 2008 (UTC)
- Because this had nothing to do with the Nixon visit. It belongs in the history of Hong Kong. Cripipper (talk) 10:24, 3 September 2008 (UTC)
UN Recognition of PRC
Why is this not mentioned ? The changeover occurred 25th October 1971. Wasn't Nixon responding to force majeure from the UN ? ie he had no choice but to go to China.
"On 15 July 1971, 17 UN members requested that a question of the "Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations" be placed on the provisional agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the UN General Assembly, claiming that the PRC, a "founding member of the United Nations and a permanent member of the Security Council, had since 1949 been refused by systematic maneuvers the right to occupy the seat to which it is entitled ipso jure"."
This is from UN_General_Assembly_Resolution_2758
- Yup. This page must mention that and address the extent to which Nixon negotiated for China's recognition or was forced to accept the changes presented to him. — LlywelynII 15:08, 29 July 2016 (UTC)
Whitlam in China
Perhaps Whitlam's visit to China should also be mentioned. In Australia this was at first seen as a Labor Prime Minister being soft on Communism (a common accusation from their political opponents in the 70's). But after Nixon went it was seen as ok. It has been suggested by a few historians and academics that Whitlam went to test the waters for Nixon. Also, the lead of this article doesn't really summarise the significance of this event very well. For many it is considered the point at which the Sino-Soviet split allowed the USA to use China to contain the USSR. Basically this was the turning point geopolitically that ended the Cold War if this theory is to be believed. Not the meeting precisely, but the resumption of friendly diplomacy, trade etc. certainly helped strengthen the USA and China and weakened the USSR considerably.--Senor Freebie (talk) 05:56, 11 December 2010 (UTC)
What is the significance?
Can somebody explain the significance of the sentence 'Upon their meeting, Mao's first words to Nixon were: "Yesterday in the airplane you put forth a very difficult problem for us." '
- It should read, "Our common old friend, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, doesn't approve of this." That's a famous quotation. An anonymous account changed it without comment. Thanks for catching it. I've fixed it now. Will Beback talk 19:38, 19 May 2011 (UTC)
Why does this article mention Max Frankel's Pulitzer? The mention can be in Max Frankel's page, but doesn't belong here. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Konetidy (talk • contribs) 14:28, 8 December 2013 (UTC)
Problems with post-hoc analysis of Nixon's reason to open to China
The historical background section includes a quote from Winston Lord in which the explanation of reasoning for rapprochement was the common belief that it was counter-balance to the Soviet Union, in a method of "divide and conquer," trilateral diplomacy, exploiting the Sino-Soviet split. However, in the book A Cold War Turning Point by Chris Tudda, a historical revisiting of the decision using actual Nixon recordings (gotta love the irony that we gain the greatest transparency into presidential decision making from the most paranoid president's decision to record his conversations), it turns out that Nixon's original decision to pursue rapprochement was not due to trilateral gaming.
In fact, the idea didn't enter the administration's mind at the beginning of the process, and Nixon actively dissuaded such a strategy for a while. It was only much later in the process, around 1971, where gaining concessions from both entered the strategic thinking. Previous to that, it was born out of Nixon's concern of America's decline and the threats of two nuclear-armed rivals. He saw both powers as established and saw no choice but to have better relations with them, and be able to carve out spheres of influence. Consider that there were no guarantees of Soviet acceptance of Sino-US relations at the time would be peaceful.
So, while the post-hoc analysis leads us to believe that it was a stroke of genius as the China visit got concessions out of BOTH the Soviets and the Chinese, it began as an admission of the limited nature of America's power post-WWII, as was Vietnamization, and deference to both powers.