Argument from religious experience

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The argument from religious experience is an argument for the existence of God. It holds that the best explanation for religious experiences is that they constitute genuine experience or perception of a divine reality. Various reasons have been offered for and against accepting this contention.

Contemporary defenders of the argument are Alister Hardy and Dinesh D'Souza.


In essence, the argument's structure is as follows:[citation needed]

  1. There are compelling reasons for believing that claims of religious experience point to and validate spiritual realities that exist in a way that transcends material manifestation;
  2. According to materialism, nothing exists in a way that transcends material manifestation;
  3. According to classical theism, God endows human beings with the ability to perceive – although imperfectly – religious, spiritual and/or transcendent realities through religious, spiritual and/or transcendent experience.
  4. To the extent that premise 1. is accepted, therefore, theism is more plausible than materialism.

As statements 2 to 4 are generally treated as uncontroversial,[citation needed] discussion has tended to focus on the status of the first.

Suggested reasons for accepting the premise[edit]

Some principal arguments that have been made in favor of the premise include:

  • Very substantial numbers of ordinary people report having had such experiences, though this isn't to say that religious believers aren't ordinary.[1] Such experiences are reported in almost all known cultures.
  • These experiences often have very significant effects on people's lives, frequently inducing in them acts of extreme self-sacrifice well beyond what could be expected from evolutionary arguments.
  • These experiences often seem very real to the people involved, and are quite often reported as being shared by a number of people.[2] Although mass delusions are not inconceivable, one needs compelling reasons for invoking this as an explanation.
  • Swinburne suggests that, as two basic principles of rationality, we ought to believe that things are as they seem unless and until we have evidence that they are mistaken (principle of credulity), and that those who do not have an experience of a certain type ought to believe others who say that they do in the absence of evidence of deceit or delusion (principle of testimony) and thus, although if you have a strong reason to disbelieve in the existence of God you will discount these experiences, in other cases such evidence should count towards the existence of God.[3]

Suggested reasons for disputing the premise[edit]

On the other hand, the following reasons have been offered for rejecting the premise:

  • These might be mis-firings of evolved mechanisms selected for very different reasons.[4]
  • Religious texts such as the Bible that speak of revelations are of disputable historical accuracy.[5]
  • It is conceivable that some claimed religious experiences are lies, possibly done for attention or acceptance.[5]
  • Argument from inconsistent revelations: Different people have had, or believed to have had, religious experiences pointing to the existence of different religions. Not all of these can be correct. Kraemer highlighted a link between arguments of religious experience and self-righteousness (perception of superiority over those who do not receive providence).[6]
  • It has been argued that religious experiences are little more than hallucinations aimed at fulfilling basic psychological desires of immortality, purpose, etc. Sigmund Freud, for example, considered God to be simply a psychological "illusion"[7] created by the mind, instead of an actual existing entity. This argument can be based upon the fact that since we know about some believers for whom this argument is correct (their reports for religious experiences are nothing more than illusions), we assume that perhaps all such reports may be illusions.

Alternate formulations[edit]

American analytic philosophers Alvin Plantinga and William Alston developed arguments for accepting knowledge gained from religious experience based on drawing analogies with knowledge gained from sense experience.[8] In both cases they apply their arguments to Christian religious experiences, but accept that they may equally apply to other religious experiences.[8]

Plantinga argues that just as the knowledge gained from sense experience is regarded as properly basic despite being unsupported based on foundationalism in the mould of Descartes, religious experiences should be accepted as providing properly basic knowledge of God.[8]

Alston argues that if sets of practices used to form beliefs produce conclusions that are coherent over time both internally and with other belief-forming practices, they should be accepted. He argues this is the only way our ordinary beliefs are justified, and that by the same criteria belief based on Christian religious experience is justified.[8]



  1. ^ Polkinghorne Belief in God in an Age of Science' "the surveys conducted by the distinguished biologist Alister Hardy"Swinburne references David Hay Religious Experience Today (1990) chapters 5, 6 and Appendix
  2. ^ For example the New Testament speaks of Jesus, after his resurrection, appearing to 10 or more people at once (see e.g. 1 Corinthians 15:6, Luke 24, Mt 28, Jn 16, Acts 1).
  3. ^ Swinburne, Is there a God? p 133–136
  4. ^ This is broadly Dawkins' line in The God Delusion
  5. ^ a b Walker, Cliff. "Is The Bible Historically Accurate?". Positive Atheism. Archived from the original on 13 June 2010. Retrieved 11 May 2010.
  6. ^ Kraemer, Hendrik (2009). The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World. Centre for Contemporary Christianity. p. 107. ISBN 8190869108.
  7. ^ Freud, Sigmund, The Future of an Illusion, W. W. Norton & Company, ISBN 0-393-00831-2
  8. ^ a b c d Webb, Mark (2017). "Religious experience". In Zalta, Edward N. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 13 January 2018.

Further reading[edit]