Background and causes of the Syrian revolution: Difference between revisions
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== Drought == |
== Drought == |
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{{See also|Climate change in the Middle East and North Africa|Water conflict in the Middle East and North Africa}} |
{{See also|Climate change in the Middle East and North Africa|Water conflict in the Middle East and North Africa}} |
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Between 2007 and 2010, Syria experienced its worst [[drought]] in instrumental record, made more likely by [[Climate change in the Middle East and North Africa|climate change]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Kelley |first=Colin P. |last2=Mohtadi |first2=Shahrzad |last3=Cane |first3=Mark A. |last4=Seager |first4=Richard |last5=Kushnir |first5=Yochanan |date=2015-03-17 |title=Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought |url=https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4371967/ |journal=Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America |volume=112 |issue=11 |pages=3241–3246 |doi=10.1073/pnas.1421533112 |issn=0027-8424 |pmc=4371967 |pmid=25733898}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Gleick |first=Peter H. |date=2014-07-01 |title=Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria |url=https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/wcas/6/3/wcas-d-13-00059_1.xml |journal=Weather, Climate, and Society |language=EN |volume=6 |issue=3 |pages=331–340 |doi=10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1 |issn=1948-8327}}</ref> It has been proposed that the drought caused the collapse of [[agriculture in Syria]] and contributed to increased migration and the escalation of violence in 2011, although more recent analyses in [[Political Geography (journal)|''Political Geography'']] and [[Nature (journal)|''Nature'']] have challenged this narrative.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Eklund |first=Lina |last2=Theisen |first2=Ole Magnus |last3=Baumann |first3=Matthias |last4=Forø Tollefsen |first4=Andreas |last5=Kuemmerle |first5=Tobias |last6=Østergaard Nielsen |first6=Jonas |date=2022-04-06 |title=Societal drought vulnerability and the Syrian climate-conflict nexus are better explained by agriculture than meteorology |url=https://www.nature.com/articles/s43247-022-00405-w |journal=Communications Earth & Environment |language=en |volume=3 |issue=1 |pages=1–9 |doi=10.1038/s43247-022-00405-w |issn=2662-4435}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Selby |first=Jan |last2=Dahi |first2=Omar S. |last3=Fröhlich |first3=Christiane |last4=Hulme |first4=Mike |date=2017-09-01 |title=Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited |url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629816301822 |journal=Political Geography |language=en |volume=60 |pages=232–244 |doi=10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.05.007 |issn=0962-6298}}</ref> |
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In the five years before the uprising broke out, the country suffered [[Environmental_issues_in_Syria#Five_years_of_drought_(2006-2011)|a severe drought]], which caused great damage to farmers and reduced oil revenues by 39%.{{Citation needed|date=July 2022}} |
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== Corruption == |
== Corruption == |
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Revision as of 21:06, 5 October 2022
This article discusses the background and reasons that contributed to the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Protests in Syria began in March 2011 during the 2010–11 Middle East and North Africa protests (later referred to as the Arab Spring) but have been characterized by a multi-sided civil war. Another unique aspect of the Syrian war is that many countries have intervened and invested heavily in the warring parties within the country, and these countries have even intervened directly to help them.
Unemployment
Although official figures put the unemployment rate at 8.1 percent in 2009, Syrian economists estimate it at 24.4 percent. In 2010, the overall poverty rate was 34.3%, while the poverty rate in rural areas was about 62%. Poverty declined between 1997 and 2004 but began to rise in the second half of the 2000s.[1]
Drought
Between 2007 and 2010, Syria experienced its worst drought in instrumental record, made more likely by climate change.[2][3] It has been proposed that the drought caused the collapse of agriculture in Syria and contributed to increased migration and the escalation of violence in 2011, although more recent analyses in Political Geography and Nature have challenged this narrative.[4][5]
Corruption
The country ranked 129th out of 183 countries as per the 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index.[6]
Repression
Before the unrest, the Ba'ath Party had been the only ruling party since 1963, and there was no real opposition in the country. The country was known for its scarcity of protests compared to neighbouring countries, and the strength of security forces to deal with similar protests. The most recent challenge to Baathist rule dates back to 1982, when the Muslim Brotherhood uprising in northern Syria was quelled.
U.S. Sanctions
Before 2011, Syria was already under US sanctions with some dating back to the 1970s.[7][8]
Controversies
Some government supporters claim that one of the causes for the early protests is the government's refusal to the construction of a gas pipeline proposed by Qatar.[9][10] President Assad even mentioned it in a 2016 interview.[11] According to this theory, Qatar wanted to export its large natural gas stocks to Europe through Syria.[12] The United States supported this project to deter Iran, which in turn encouraged Assad to reject the pipeline and support its plan to send natural gas to the Mediterranean; Russia also wanted to drive Qatari gas away from the lucrative European market. Therefore, Qatar supported the Syrian uprising to overthrow Assad and remove obstacles to its projects.
See also
References
- ^ Jeanne Gobat and Kristina Kostial (18 July 2016). "Syria's Conflict Economy; IMF Working Paper WP/16/213" (PDF). International Monetary Fund. Retrieved 17 January 2022.
- ^ Kelley, Colin P.; Mohtadi, Shahrzad; Cane, Mark A.; Seager, Richard; Kushnir, Yochanan (17 March 2015). "Climate change in the Fertile Crescent and implications of the recent Syrian drought". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 112 (11): 3241–3246. doi:10.1073/pnas.1421533112. ISSN 0027-8424. PMC 4371967. PMID 25733898.
- ^ Gleick, Peter H. (1 July 2014). "Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria". Weather, Climate, and Society. 6 (3): 331–340. doi:10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1. ISSN 1948-8327.
- ^ Eklund, Lina; Theisen, Ole Magnus; Baumann, Matthias; Forø Tollefsen, Andreas; Kuemmerle, Tobias; Østergaard Nielsen, Jonas (6 April 2022). "Societal drought vulnerability and the Syrian climate-conflict nexus are better explained by agriculture than meteorology". Communications Earth & Environment. 3 (1): 1–9. doi:10.1038/s43247-022-00405-w. ISSN 2662-4435.
- ^ Selby, Jan; Dahi, Omar S.; Fröhlich, Christiane; Hulme, Mike (1 September 2017). "Climate change and the Syrian civil war revisited". Political Geography. 60: 232–244. doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.05.007. ISSN 0962-6298.
- ^ "2011 - CPI". Transparency.org.
- ^ "Newly Issued United States Economic Sanctions Against Syria Significantly Expand Restrictions on U.S. Firms and Impact Syrian Energy Sector". omm.com. Retrieved 17 January 2022.
- ^ Samir Aita (15 January 2021). "The Unintended Consequences of U.S. and European Unilateral Measures on Syria's Economy and Its Small and Medium Enterprises" (PDF). The Carter Center. Retrieved 17 January 2022.
- ^ "Syria intervention plans fuelled by oil interests, not chemical weapon concerns | Nafeez Ahmed". the Guardian. 30 August 2013.
- ^ Porter, Gareth. "The War Against the Assad Regime Is Not a "Pipeline War"". Truthout.
- ^ "بشار الأسد: رفضنا لمد خط أنابيب اقترحته قطر يعد أحد أسباب الحرب التي نعيشها". www.nessma.tv. 3 January 2017.
- ^ Mills, Robin (27 September 2016). "نظرية خط أنابيب الغاز في سوريا هي دراما ذات ميزانية منخفضة".
