Phenomenology (philosophy)

For other uses, see Phenomenology (disambiguation).

Not to be confused with Phenomenalism.

Edmund Husserl

Martin Heidegger

Maurice Merleau-Ponty

Phenomenology (from Greek φαινόμενον, phainómenon "that which appears" and λόγος, lógos "study") is the philosophical study of the structures of experience and consciousness. As a philosophical movement it was founded in the early years of the 20th century by Edmund Husserl and was later expanded upon by a circle of his followers at the universities of Göttingen and Munich in Germany.

It then spread to France, the United States, and elsewhere, often in contexts far removed from Husserl's early work. Phenomenology is not a unified movement; rather, the works of different authors share a 'family resemblance' but with many significant differences.

In Husserl's original conception, it is primarily concerned with the systematic reflection on and study of the structures of consciousness and the phenomena that appear in acts of consciousness. Phenomenology can be clearly differentiated from the Cartesian method of analysis which sees the world as objects, sets of objects, and objects acting and reacting upon one another.

Overview

In its most basic form, phenomenology attempts to create conditions for the objective study of topics usually regarded as subjective: consciousness and the content of conscious experiences such as judgements, perceptions, and emotions. Although phenomenology seeks to be scientific, it does not attempt to study consciousness from the perspective of clinical psychology or neurology. Instead, it seeks through systematic reflection to determine the essential properties and structures of experience.

Though many of the phenomenological methods involve various reductions, phenomenology is, in essence, anti-reductionistic; the reductions are mere tools to better understand and describe the workings of consciousness, not to reduce any phenomenon to these descriptions. In other words, when a reference is made to a thing's essence or idea, or when the constitution of an identical coherent thing is specified by describing what one "really" sees as being only these sides and aspects, these surfaces, it does not mean that the thing is only and exclusively what is described here: the ultimate goal of these reductions is to understand how these different aspects are constituted into the actual thing as experienced by the person experiencing it. Phenomenology is a direct reaction to the psychologism and physicalism of Husserl's time.

According to Maurice Natanson (1973, p. 63), "The radicality of the phenomenological method is both continuous and discontinuous with philosophy's general effort to subject experience to fundamental, critical scrutiny: to take nothing for granted and to show the warranty for what we claim to know." In practice, it entails an unusual combination of discipline and detachment to bracket theoretical explanations and second-hand information while determining one's "naïve" experience of the matter. (To "bracket" in this sense means to provisionally suspend or set aside some idea as a way to facilitate the inquiry by focusing only on its most significant components.) The phenomenological method serves to momentarily erase the world of speculation by returning the subject to his or her primordial experience of the matter, whether the object of inquiry is a feeling, an idea, or a perception. According to Husserl the suspension of belief in what we ordinarily take for granted or infer by conjecture diminishes the power of what we customarily embrace as objective reality. According to Rüdiger Safranski (1998, 72), "[Husserl's and his followers'] great ambition was to disregard anything that had until then been thought or said about consciousness or the world [while] on the lookout for a new way of letting the things [they investigated] approach them, without covering them up with what they already knew."

Etymology

The following is a list of important thinkers, in rough chronological order, who used the term "phenomenology" in a variety of ways, with brief comments on their contributions:

• Friedrich Christoph Oetinger (1702–1782), German pietist, for the study of the "divine system of relations".
• Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728–1777), mathematician, physicist and philosopher, known for the theory of appearances underlying empirical knowledge.
• Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), in the Critique of Pure Reason, distinguished between objects as phenomena, which are objects as shaped and grasped by human sensibility and understanding, and objects as things-in-themselves or noumena, which do not appear to us in space and time and about which we can make no legitimate judgments.
• G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) challenged Kant's doctrine of the unknowable thing-in-itself. In his 1807 Phenomenology of Spirit he claims to show that by examination of phenomenal experience we can gradually arrive at a philosophical consciousness entirely self-conditioned and so "absolute".
• Carl Stumpf (1848–1936), student of Brentano and mentor to Husserl, used "phenomenology" to refer to an ontology of sensory contents.
• Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) established phenomenology at first as a kind of "descriptive psychology" and later as a transcendental and eidetic science of consciousness. He is considered to be the founder of contemporary phenomenology.
• Max Scheler (1874–1928) developed further the phenomenological method of Edmund Husserl and extended it to include also a reduction of the scientific method. He influenced the thinking of Pope John Paul II, Dietrich von Hildebrand, and Edith Stein.
• Martin Heidegger (1889–1976) criticized Husserl's theory of phenomenology to develop what he termed a fundamental ontology, which included his theorization of Dasein, the non-dualistic human being.
• Alfred Schütz (1899–1959) developed a phenomenology of the social world on the basis of everyday experience that has influenced major sociologists such as Harold Garfinkel, Peter Berger, and Thomas Luckmann.
• Francisco Varela (1946–2001), Chilean philosopher and biologist. Developed the basis for experimental phenomenology and neurophenomenology.

Although the term "phenomenology" has been used occasionally in such was as the above, current philosophical usage most typically refers to the distinctive project initiated by Husserl.

History

Husserl's conceptions

Husserl derived many important concepts central to phenomenology from the works and lectures of his teachers, the philosophers and psychologists Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf. An important element of phenomenology that Husserl borrowed from Brentano is intentionality (often described as "aboutness"), the notion that consciousness is always consciousness of something. The object of consciousness is called the intentional object, and this object is constituted for consciousness in many different ways, through, for instance, perception, memory, retention and protention, signification, and so forth. Throughout these different intentionalities, though they have different structures and different ways of being "about" the object, an object is still constituted as the identical object; consciousness is directed at the same intentional object in direct perception as it is in the immediately-following retention of this object and the eventual remembering of it.

As envisioned by Husserl, phenomenology is a method of philosophical inquiry that rejects the rationalist bias that has dominated Western thought since Plato in favor of a method of reflective attentiveness that discloses the individual's "lived experience." Loosely rooted in an epistemological device called epoché, Husserl's method entails the suspension of judgment while relying on the intuitive grasp of knowledge, free of presuppositions and intellectualizing. Sometimes depicted as the "science of experience," the phenomenological method, rooted in intentionality, represents an alternative to the representational theory of consciousness. That theory holds that reality cannot be grasped directly because it is available only through perceptions of reality that are representations in the mind. Husserl countered that consciousness is not "in" the mind; rather, consciousness is conscious of something other than itself (the intentional object), whether the object is a substance or a figment of imagination. Hence the phenomenological method relies on the description of phenomena as they are given to consciousness, in their immediacy.

Logical Investigations (1900/1901)

In the first edition of the Logical Investigations, still under the influence of Brentano, Husserl describes his position as "descriptive psychology." Husserl analyzes the intentional structures of mental acts and how they are directed at both real and ideal objects. The first volume of the Logical Investigations, the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, begins with a devastating critique of psychologism, that is, the attempt to subsume the a priori validity of the laws of logic under psychology. Husserl establishes a separate field for research in logic, philosophy, and phenomenology, independently from the empirical sciences.

"Pre-reflective self-consciousness" is Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi's term for Husserl's (1900/1901) idea that self-consciousness always involves a self-appearance or self-manifestation (German: Für-sich-selbst-erscheinens) prior to self-reflection, and his idea that the fact that "an appropriate train of sensations or images is experienced, and is in this sense conscious, does not and cannot mean that this is the object of an act of consciousness, in the sense that a perception, a presentation or a judgment is directed upon it."

Ideas (1913)

In 1913, some years after the publication of the Logical Investigations, Husserl published Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, a work which introduced some key elaborations that led him to the distinction between the act of consciousness (noesis) and the phenomena at which it is directed (the noemata).

• "noetic" refers to the intentional act of consciousness (believing, willing, etc.)
• "noematic" refers to the object or content (noema), which appears in the noetic acts (the believed, wanted, hated, and loved, etc.)

What we observe is not the object as it is in itself, but how and inasmuch it is given in the intentional acts. Knowledge of essences would only be possible by "bracketing" all assumptions about the existence of an external world and the inessential (subjective) aspects of how the object is concretely given to us. This procedure Husserl called epoché.

Husserl concentrated more on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness. As he wanted to exclude any hypothesis on the existence of external objects, he introduced the method of phenomenological reduction to eliminate them. What was left over was the pure transcendental ego, as opposed to the concrete empirical ego.

Transcendental phenomenology is the study of the essential structures that are left in pure consciousness: this amounts in practice to the study of the noemata and the relations among them.

Transcendental phenomenologists include Oskar Becker, Aron Gurwitsch, and Alfred Schütz.

Munich phenomenology

Main article: Munich phenomenology

After Husserl's publication of the Ideas in 1913, many phenomenologists took a critical stance towards his new theories. Especially the members of the Munich group distanced themselves from his new transcendental phenomenology and preferred the earlier realist phenomenology of the first edition of the Logical Investigations.

Such "realist phenomenologists" include Edith Stein, Adolf Reinach, Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Max Scheler, Roman Ingarden, Nicolai Hartmann, and Dietrich von Hildebrand.

Heidegger's conception

Martin Heidegger modified Husserl's conception of phenomenology because of what Heidegger perceived as Husserl's subjectivist tendencies. Whereas Husserl conceived humans as having been constituted by states of consciousness, Heidegger countered that consciousness is peripheral to the primacy of one's existence (i.e., the mode of being of Dasein), which cannot be reduced to one's consciousness of it. From this angle, one's state of mind is an "effect" rather than a determinant of existence, including those aspects of existence of which one is not conscious. By shifting the center of gravity from consciousness (psychology) to existence (ontology), Heidegger altered the subsequent direction of phenomenology.

As one consequence of Heidegger's modification of Husserl's conception, phenomenology became increasingly relevant to psychoanalysis. Whereas Husserl gave priority to a depiction of consciousness that was fundamentally alien to the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious, Heidegger offered a way to conceptualize experience that could accommodate those aspects of one's existence that lie on the periphery of sentient awareness.

According to Heidegger, philosophy was not a scientific discipline, but more fundamental than science itself. According to him science is only one way of knowing the world with no special access to truth. Furthermore, the scientific mindset itself is built on a much more "primordial" foundation of practical, everyday knowledge. Husserl was skeptical of this approach, which he regarded as quasi-mystical, and it contributed to the divergence in their thinking.

While for Husserl, in the epoché, being appeared only as a correlate of consciousness, for Heidegger our pre-conscious grasp of being is the starting point. While for Husserl we would have to abstract from all concrete determinations of our empirical ego to be able to turn to the field of pure consciousness, Heidegger claims that "the possibilities and destinies of philosophy are bound up with man's existence, and thus with temporality and with historicality."

Husserl charged Heidegger with raising the question of ontology but failing to answer it, instead switching the topic to the Dasein (loosely: human existence), the only being for whom being is an issue. That is neither ontology nor phenomenology, according to Husserl, but merely abstract anthropology.

Convergent phenomenology

The work of Jim Ruddy in the field of comparative philosophy, combined the concept of "transcendental ego" in Husserl's phenomenology with the concept of the primacy of self-consciousness in the work of Sankaracharya. In the course of this work, Ruddy uncovered a wholly new eidetic phenomenological science, which he called "convergent phenomenology." This new phenomenology takes over where Husserl left off, and deals with the constitution of relation-like, rather than merely thing-like, or "intentional" objectivity.

Varieties

The Encyclopedia of Phenomenology (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997) features separate articles on the following seven types of phenomenology:

1. Transcendental constitutive phenomenology studies how objects are constituted in transcendental consciousness, setting aside questions of any relation to the natural world.
2. Naturalistic constitutive phenomenology studies how consciousness constitutes things in the world of nature, assuming with the natural attitude that consciousness is part of nature.
3. Existential phenomenology studies concrete human existence, including our experience of free choice and/or action in concrete situations.
4. Generative historicist phenomenology studies how meaning—as found in our experience—is generated in historical processes of collective experience over time.
5. Genetic phenomenology studies the emergence/genesis of meanings of things within one's own stream of experience.
6. Hermeneutical phenomenology (also hermeneutic phenomenologyor post-phenomenology/postphenomenology elsewhere) studies interpretive structures of experience. This approach was introduced in Martin Heidegger's early work.
7. Realistic phenomenology (also realist phenomenology elsewhere) studies the structure of consciousness and intentionality as "it occurs in a real world that is largely external to consciousness and not somehow brought into being by consciousness."

The contrast between "constitutive phenomenology" (sometimes, static phenomenology or descriptive phenomenology) and "genetic phenomenology" (sometimes, phenomenology of genesis) is due to Husserl.

Modern scholarship also recognizes the existence of the following varieties: late Heidegger's transcendental hermeneutic phenomenology, Maurice Merleau-Ponty's embodied phenomenology., Michel Henry's material phenomenology, Alva Noë's analytic phenomenology, and J. L. Austin's linguistic phenomenology.

Concepts

Intentionality

Main article: Intentionality

Intentionality refers to the notion that consciousness is always the consciousness of something. The word itself should not be confused with the "ordinary" use of the word intentional, but should rather be taken as playing on the etymological roots of the word. Originally, intention referred to a "stretching out" ("in tension," from Latin intendere), and in this context it refers to consciousness "stretching out" towards its object. However, one should be careful with this image: there is not some consciousness first that, subsequently, stretches out to its object; rather, consciousness occurs as the simultaneity of a conscious act and its object.

Intentionality is often summed up as "aboutness." Whether this something that consciousness is about is in direct perception or in fantasy is inconsequential to the concept of intentionality itself; whatever consciousness is directed at, that is what consciousness is conscious of. This means that the object of consciousness doesn't have to be a physical object apprehended in perception: it can just as well be a fantasy or a memory. Consequently, these "structures" of consciousness, i.e., perception, memory, fantasy, etc., are called intentionalities.

The term "intentionality" originated with the Scholastics in the medieval period and was resurrected by Brentano who in turn influenced Husserl's conception of phenomenology, who refined the term and made it the cornerstone of his theory of consciousness. The meaning of the term is complex and depends entirely on how it is conceived by a given philosopher. The term should not be confused with "intention" or the psychoanalytic conception of unconscious "motive" or "gain".

Intuition

Main article: Intuition

Intuition in phenomenology refers to cases where the intentional object is directly present to the intentionality at play; if the intention is "filled" by the direct apprehension of the object, you have an intuited object. Having a cup of coffee in front of you, for instance, seeing it, feeling it, or even imagining it – these are all filled intentions, and the object is then intuited. The same goes for the apprehension of mathematical formulae or a number. If you do not have the object as referred to directly, the object is not intuited, but still intended, but then emptily. Examples of empty intentions can be signitive intentions – intentions that only imply or refer to their objects.

Evidence

In everyday language, we use the word evidence to signify a special sort of relation between a state of affairs and a proposition: State A is evidence for the proposition "A is true." In phenomenology, however, the concept of evidence is meant to signify the "subjective achievement of truth." This is not an attempt to reduce the objective sort of evidence to subjective "opinion," but rather an attempt to describe the structure of having something present in intuition with the addition of having it present as intelligible: "Evidence is the successful presentation of an intelligible object, the successful presentation of something whose truth becomes manifest in the evidencing itself."

Noesis and noema

Main article: Noema

See also: Noetic consciousness

Noesis and noema started in ancient/Classical Greek philosophy such as Socratic-Platonic dialogues and continued in neoclassical focus such as in German Idealism. In Husserl's phenomenology, which is quite common, this pair of terms, derived from the Greek nous (mind) (all three transliterated) designate respectively the real content, noesis, and the ideal content, noema, of an intentional act (an act of consciousness). The noesis is the part of the act that gives it a particular sense or character (as in judging or perceiving something, loving or hating it, accepting or rejecting it, and so on). This is real in the sense that it is actually part of what takes place in the consciousness (or psyche) of the subject of the act. The noesis is always correlated with a noema; for Husserl, the full noema is a complex ideal structure comprising at least a noematic sense and a noematic core. The correct interpretation of what Husserl meant by the noema has long been controversial, but the noematic sense is generally understood as the ideal meaning of the act. For instance, if A loves B, loving is a real part of A's conscious activity – noesis – but gets its sense from the general concept of loving, which has an abstract or ideal meaning, as "loving" has a meaning in the English language independently of what an individual means by the word when they use it. The noematic core as the act's referent or object as it is meant in the act. One element of controversy is whether this noematic object is the same as the actual object of the act (assuming it exists) or is some kind of ideal object.

Empathy and intersubjectivity

See also: Empathy and Intersubjectivity

In phenomenology, empathy refers to the experience of one's own body as another. While we often identify others with their physical bodies, this type of phenomenology requires that we focus on the subjectivity of the other, as well as our intersubjective engagement with them. In Husserl's original account, this was done by a sort of apperception built on the experiences of your own lived-body. The lived body is your own body as experienced by yourself, as yourself. Your own body manifests itself to you mainly as your possibilities of acting in the world. It is what lets you reach out and grab something, for instance, but it also, and more importantly, allows for the possibility of changing your point of view. This helps you differentiate one thing from another by the experience of moving around it, seeing new aspects of it (often referred to as making the absent present and the present absent), and still retaining the notion that this is the same thing that you saw other aspects of just a moment ago (it is identical). Your body is also experienced as a duality, both as object (you can touch your own hand) and as your own subjectivity (you experience being touched).

The experience of your own body as your own subjectivity is then applied to the experience of another's body, which, through apperception, is constituted as another subjectivity. You can thus recognise the Other's intentions, emotions, etc. This experience of empathy is important in the phenomenological account of intersubjectivity. In phenomenology, intersubjectivity constitutes objectivity (i.e., what you experience as objective is experienced as being intersubjectively available – available to all other subjects. This does not imply that objectivity is reduced to subjectivity nor does it imply a relativist position, cf. for instance intersubjective verifiability).

In the experience of intersubjectivity, one also experiences oneself as being a subject among other subjects, and one experiences oneself as existing objectively for these Others; one experiences oneself as the noema of Others' noeses, or as a subject in another's empathic experience. As such, one experiences oneself as objectively existing subjectivity. Intersubjectivity is also a part in the constitution of one's lifeworld, especially as "homeworld."

Lifeworld

Main article: Lifeworld

The lifeworld (German: Lebenswelt) is the "world" each one of us lives in. One could call it the "background" or "horizon" of all experience, and it is that on which each object stands out as itself (as different) and with the meaning it can only hold for us. The lifeworld is both personal and intersubjective (it is then called a "homeworld"), and, as such, it does not enclose each one of us in a solus ipse.

Phenomenology as empirical science

The phenomenological analysis of objects is notably different from traditional science. However, several frameworks do phenomenology with an empirical orientation or aim to unite it with the natural sciences or with cognitive science.

For a classical critical point of view, Daniel Dennett argues for the wholesale uselessness of phenomenology considering phenomena as qualia, which cannot be the object of scientific research or do not exist in the first place. Liliana Albertazzi counters such arguments by pointing out that empirical research on phenomena has been successfully carried out employing modern methodology. Human experience can be investigated by surveying, and with brain scanning techniques. For example, ample research on color perception suggests that people with normal color vision see colors similarly and not each in their own way. Thus, it is possible to universalize phenomena of subjective experience on an empirical scientific basis.

Notwithstanding, the scope of phenomenology is gravely restricted by bracketing. Phenomenology's aim is to study experience itself avoiding evolutionary or causal explanations. Husserl himself spoke strongly against the naturalization of phenomenology to fight the reduction of consciousness to psychology.

In the early twenty-first century, phenomenology has increasingly engaged with cognitive science and philosophy of mind. Some approaches to the naturalization of phenomenology reduce consciousness to the physical-neuronal level and are therefore not widely acknowledged as representing phenomenology. These include the frameworks of neuro-phenomenology, embodied constructivism, and the cognitive neuroscience of phenomenology. Other likewise controversial approaches aim to explain life-world experience on a sociological or anthropological basis despite phenomenology being mostly considered descriptive rather than explanatory.

Approaches to technology

See also: Hubert Dreyfus's views on artificial intelligence

For some phenomenologists the 'impact view' of technology as well as the constructivist view of the technology/society relationships is valid but not adequate (Heidegger 1977, Borgmann 1985, Winograd and Flores 1987, Ihde 1990, Dreyfus 1992, 2001). They argue that these accounts of technology, and the technology/society relationship, posit technology and society as if speaking about the one does not immediately and already draw upon the other for its ongoing sense or meaning. For the phenomenologist, society and technology co-constitute each other; they are each other's ongoing condition, or possibility for being what they are. For them technology is not just the artifact. Rather, the artifact already emerges from a prior 'technological' attitude towards the world (Heidegger 1977).

See also

• Existentialism
• Geneva School
• Heterophenomenology
• List of phenomenologists
• Neurophenomenology
• Phenomenography
• Phenomenological sociology
• Phenomenology (architecture)
• Phenomenology of religion
• Phenomenology (psychology)
• Qualia

References

Works Cited

• Adams, Suzi (2008). "Towards a Post-Phenomenology of Life: Castoriadis' Naturphilosophie". Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy. 4 (1–2).
• Albertazzi, Liliana (2018). "Naturalizing Phenomenology: A Must Have?". Frontiers in Psychology. 9 (1993) (1993).
• Benz, Ernst (2015). Christian Kabbalah: Neglected Child of Theology. Grailstone.
• Berdini, Federica (2019). John Langshaw Austin (1911—1960). Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Crowther, Paul (2013). Phenomenologies of Art and Vision: A Post-Analytic Turn. Bloomsbury.
• Farina, Gabriella (2014). "Some reflections on the phenomenological method". Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences. 7 (2): 50–62.
• Feenberg, A. (1999). "Technology and Meaning". Questioning Technology. Routledge.
• Gallagher, Shaun (2016). Phenomenology. Springer.
• Gallagher, Shaun; Zahavi, Dan (2023). Phenomenological Approaches to Self-Consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Heidegger, Martin (1975). The Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Indian University Press.
• Henry, Michel (2008). Material Phenomenology. Fordham University Press.
• Huemer, Wolfgang. The Constitution of Consciousness: A Study in Analytic Phenomenology. Routledge.
• Husserl, Edmund (1970). The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Northwestern University Press.
• Husserl, Edmund (1965). "Philosophy as a rigorous science". Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy. Harper. pp. 69–147.
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• Martinelli, Riccardo (30 October 2015). "A Philosopher in the Lab. Carl Stumpf on Philosophy and Experimental Sciences". Philosophia Scientiæ. Travaux d'histoire et de philosophie des sciences. 19 (3): 23–43.
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• Natanson, M. (1973). Edmund Husserl: Philosopher of Infinite Tasks. Northwestern University Press.
• O'Regan, J. Kevin; Myin, Erik; Noë, Alva (2004). "Towards an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of 'Bodiliness' and 'Grabbiness'". Seeing, Thinking and Knowing. Theory and Decision Library A. 38: 103–14. doi:10.1007/1-4020-2081-3_5. ISBN 1-4020-2080-5.
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• Smith, David Woodruff (2007). Husserl. Routledge.
• Smith, David Woodruff (2022). Phenomenology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Sokolowski, Robert (2000). Introduction to Phenomenology. Cambridge University Press.
• Spear, Andrew D. (2021). Husserl, Edmund: Intentionality and Intentional Content. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Tymieniecka, Anna-Teresa (2014). Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations — Expanding Dynamics — Life-Engagements A Guide for Research and Study. Springer.
• Waelbers, Katinka (2011). Doing Good with Technologies: Taking Responsibility for the Social Role of Emerging Technologies. Springer.
• Welton, Don (2003). The New Husserl. Indian University Press.
• Wheeler, Michael (2013). Martin Heidegger. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• Zahavi, Dan (2003). Husserl's Phenomenology. Stanford University Press.

External links

• At the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
  • • Cognitive Phenomenology
    • Edmund Husserl (1859—1938)
    • Edmund Husserl: Intentionality and Intentional Content
    • Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology of Embodiment
    • Ethics and Phenomenology
    • Frantz Fanon (1925—1961)
    • Jean Paul Sartre: Existentialism
    • Martin Heidegger (1889—1976)
    • Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908—1961)
    • Metaphor and Phenomenology
    • Phenomenological Psychology
    • Phenomenology and Natural Science
    • Phenomenology and Time-Consciousness
    • Phenomenology
    • Simone de Beauvoir (1908—1986)
    • The Phenomenological Reduction

• At the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:
  • • Alfred Schutz
    • Edmund Husserl
    • Jean-Paul Sartre
    • Martin Heidegger
    • Maurice Merleau-Ponty
    • Michel Henry
    • Moral Phenomenology
    • Phenomenal Intentionality
    • Phenomenologies of Race and Racism
    • Phenomenology
    • Phenomenology of Religion
    • Simone de Beauvoir
    • The Phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles