Battle of Chosin Reservoir

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Coordinates: 40°29′N 127°12′E / 40.483°N 127.2°E / 40.483; 127.2 (Chosin Reservoir)

Battle of Chosin Reservoir Part of the Korean War A column of the U.S. 1st Marine Division move through Chinese lines during their breakout from the Chosin Reservoir Date November 27 – December 13, 1950 Location Chosin Reservoir, in modern-day Changjin County, South Hamgyong Province, North Korea Result Strategic Chinese victory, tactical UN victory Successful UN withdrawal Belligerents  United Nations South Korea (KATUSA) United Kingdom United States China Commanders Douglas MacArthur Edward Almond Oliver P. Smith Mao Zedong Peng Dehuai Song Shi-Lun Strength X Corps 1st Marine Division 3rd Infantry Division 7th Infantry Division 41 Commando Royal Marine Nominal: 103.520[1] Committed: 30,000[2] 9th Army[nb 1] 20th Corps 26th Corps 27th Corps Nominal: 150,000[3] Committed: ~60,000[2] Casualties and losses US sources:[nb 2] 1,029 killed 4,582 wounded 4,894 missing 7,338 nonbattle casualties[4] 15 tank losses[5] Chinese estimation: 13,900[3] Official data: 19,202 battle casualties 28,954 nonbattle casualties[3] Unofficial estimations: 60,000+[6][nb 3] UN estimation: 29,800+[7]

v • d • e Korean War North Korea Offensive Ongjin · Kaesong · Munsan · Dongducheon · Chuncheon · Uijeongbu · 1st Seoul · Gangneung · Miari · Han River · Jumunjin UN Participation Chumonchin Chan · Osan · Donglakri · Danyang · Jincheon · Yihwaryeong · Taejon · Yeongdeok · Hwaryeongjang · Younggang · Andong · Pusan Perimeter · Haeju · Inchon · 2nd Seoul · Hill 282 · Wonsan · Yongju · Yeonghung · Kumchon · Pyongyang · Huichon · Chosan Chinese Intervention Onjong · Unsan · Pakchon · Ch'ongch'on River · Wawon · Chosin Reservoir · Task Force Faith · 3rd Seoul · Twin Tunnels · Chipyong-ni  · Roundup · Killer  · Ripper · 4th Seoul · Courageous  · Tomahawk · Yultong Bridge · Imjin River · Kapyong · Bloody Ridge  · Han River  · Heartbreak Ridge · Maryang San · Sunchon · Hill Eerie · Sui-ho Dam · Old Baldy · Hudson Harbor · White Horse · Triangle Hill · Jackson Heights · The Hook · Pork Chop Hill  · Outpost Harry  · Samichon River After Ceasefire Blue House Raid  · Pueblo Incident  · EC-121 Shootdown  · Axe Murder Incident  · Rangoon bombing  · KAL Flight 858  · Gangneung  · Yosu  · 1st Yeonpyeong  · Amami-Ōshima  · 2nd Yeonpyeong  · Daecheong

The Battle of Chosin Reservoir, also known as the Chosin Reservoir Campaign or the Changjin Lake Campaign (simplified Chinese: 长津湖战役; pinyin: Cháng Jīn Hū Zhàn Yì),^{[nb 4]} was a decisive battle in the Korean War. Shortly after the People's Republic of China entered the conflict, the People's Volunteer Army 9th Army^{[nb 1]} infiltrated the northeastern part of North Korea and surprised the US X Corps at the Chosin Reservoir area. A brutal seventeen day battle in freezing weather soon followed. In the period between November 27 and December 13, 1950, 30,000 United Nations troops (nicknamed "The Frozen Chosin" or "The Chosin Few") under the command of Major General Edward Almond were encircled by approximately 60,000 Chinese troops under the command of Song Shi-Lun. Although Chinese troops managed to surround and outnumber the UN forces, the UN forces successfully broke out of the encirclement while inflicted crippling losses to the Chinese. The evacuation of the X Corps from the port of Hungnam marked the complete withdraw of UN troops from North Korea.

Contents 1 Background 1.1 Location, terrain and weather 1.2 Forces and strategies 2 Battle 2.1 Actions at Yudam-ni 2.2 East of the reservoir 2.3 Actions at Hagaru-ri 2.4 Breakout 2.5 Evacuation at Hungnam 3 Aftermath 3.1 Operation Glory 4 See also 5 Notes 6 References 7 Further reading 8 External links

[edit] Background

“	That's impossible. There aren't two Chinese Communist divisions in the whole of North Korea.	”
—Maj. Gen. Edward M. Almond[8]

By mid-1950, after the successful landing at Inchon by the US X Corps and the subsequent destruction of the Korean People's Army, the Korean War appeared to be all but over.^[9] United Nations (UN) forces advanced rapidly into North Korea with the intention of reuniting Korea before the end of 1950.^[10] North Korea is cut in the middle by the impassable Taebaek Mountains, dividing the UN forces to into two groups.^[11] The US Eighth Army advanced north through the west side of the Korean Peninsula, while the Republic of Korea (ROK) I Corps and the US X Corps took over responsibilities on the east side.^[11]

At the same time, the People's Republic of China entered the conflict after issuing several warnings to the United Nations.^[9] On 14 October 1950, large formations of Chinese troops, dubbed the People's Volunteer Army (PVA), secretly crossed the border and into North Korea.^[12] One of the first Chinese units to reach the Chosin Reservoir area was the PVA 42nd Corps, and it was tasked with stopping the eastern UN advances.^[13] On 25 October, the advancing ROK I Corps made contact with the Chinese and halted at Funchilin Pass, south of the Chosin Reservoir.^[14] After the landing at Wonsan, the US 1st Marine Division of the X Corps engaged the defending 124th Division on 2 November, and the ensuing battle caused heavy causalties among the Chinese.^[15] On 6 November, the PVA 42nd Corps ordered a retreat to the north with the intention of luring the UN forces into the Chosin Reservoir.^[16] By 24 November, the 1st Marine Division occupied both Sinhung-ni^{[nb 5]} on the east side of the reservoir, and Yudami-ni on the west side of the reservoir.^[17]

Faced with the sudden attacks by Chinese forces in the Eighth Army sector, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the X Corps to attack west from the Chosin Reservoir in order to cut the vital Manpojin—Kanggye—Huichon supply line.^[18] As a response, Major General Edward M. Almond, commander of the US X Corps, formulated a plan on 21 November. It called for the US 1st Marine Division to advance west through Yudami-ni, while the US 7th Infantry Division would provide a regimental combat team to protect the right flank at Sinhung-ni. The US 3rd Infantry Division would also protect the left flank while providing security in the rear area.^[19] By then the X Corps was stretched thin along a 400 miles (640 km) front.^[17]

On 31 October, in a telegraph to Song Shi-Lun,^{[nb 6]} the commander of the PVA 9th Army, Mao Zedong called for the destruction of the ROK Capital Division, ROK 3rd Infantry Division, US 1st Marine Division and US 7th Infantry Division.^[20] Under Mao's urgent orders, the 9th Army was rushed into North Korea on 10 November.^[21] Undetected by UN intelligence,^[22] the 9th Army quietly entered the Chosin Reservoir area on 17 November, with the 20th Corps of the 9th Army relieving the 42nd Corps near Yudami-ni.^[23]

[edit] Location, terrain and weather

Chosin Reservoir is a man made lake located at the northeast of the Korean peninsula.^[24] The name Chosin is the Japanese rendition of the Korean place name Changjin, and the name stuck due to the outdated Japanese maps used by UN forces.^[25] The battle's main focus was around the 78 miles (126 km) long road that connects Hungnam and Chosin Reservoir,^[26] and it served as the only retreat route for the UN forces.^[27] Through this road, Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, located at the west and east side of the reservoir respectively, are connected at Hagaru-ri. From there, the road passes through Koto-ri and eventually leads to the port of Hungnam.^[28] The areas around the Chosin Reservoir were also sparsely populated.^[29]

The battle was fought over one of the roughest terrains during the harshest weather of the Korean War.^[2] The road was created by cutting through the hilly terrains of Korea, accompanied with steep climbs and drops. Dominant peaks, such as the Funchilin Pass and the Toktong Pass, overlook the entire length of the road. The road's quality was also poor, and in some places it was reduced to one lane gravel trails.^[28] On 14 November, a cold front from Siberia descended over the Chosin Reservoir, and the temperature plunged to as low as −35 °F (−37.2 °C).^[30] The cold weather was accompanied by frozen grounds, frostbite casualties, icy roads and weapon malfunctions.

[edit] Forces and strategies

The Chinese formulated their strategy based on their experiences from the Chinese Civil War.^[31] Working with the assumption that only light UN presence would be at the reservoir, the 9th Army was at first to destroy the UN garrisons at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, then push towards Hagaru-ri.^[31] Believing that the bulk of the US X Corps would scramble to rescue the destroyed units, the 9th Army would then block and trap the main UN forces on the road between Hagaru-ri and Hungnam.^[31] The 9th Army initially committed six divisions for the battle,^[32] with most of the forces concentrated at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni.^[31]

But the flaw of the Chinese plan was the lack of accurate intelligence on the UN forces.^[33] Although the US X Corps was stretched thin over northeast Korea, the bulk of the US 1st Marine Division, including the 5th, 7th and 11th Marine Regiment, was concentrated at Yudami-ni.^[34] Similarly, the strategically important Hagaru-ri, which contained an airfield and a supply dump,^[35] was not a priority for the Chinese despite being lightly defended by the 1st and the 7th Marine Regiment.^[36] Only the RCT-31, a hastily formed regimental combat team of the US 7th Infantry Division, was understrength and spread thin along the eastern bank of the reservoir.^[37] All those units would later take the brunt of the Chinese assaults.

Although the 9th Army was one of China's elite formations composed of veterans and former POWs from the Huaihai Campaign,^[38] several deficiencies hampered its ability during the battle. Initially the 9th Army was intended to be outfitted at Manchuria during November, but Mao suddenly ordered the 9th Army into Korea before that could happen.^[23] As the result, the 9th Army received almost no winter gear for the harsh Korean winter.^[39] Similarly, poor logistics forced the 9th Army to abandon heavy artillery^[3][40] while working with little food and ammunition supply.^[39] Unable to forage at the sparsely populated reservoir, mass starvations and exposure soon broke out among the Chinese units.^[39] By the end of the battle, more Chinese troops died from the cold than from combat and air raids.^[41]

[edit] Battle

“	You can't retreat or withdraw when you are surrounded. The only thing you can do is break out, and when you break out, that's an attack.	”
—General Oliver P. Smith[42]

On the night of 27 November, the PVA 20th and 27th Corps of the 9th Army launched multiple attacks and ambushes along the road between the Chosin Reservoir and Koto-ri. At Yudam-ni, the US 5th, 7th and 11th Marine Regiments were surrounded and attacked by the PVA 59th, 79th and 89th Division. Similarly, RCT-31 was isolated and ambushed at Sinhung-ni by the PVA 80th and the 81st Division. Finally, the PVA 60th Division surrounded elements of the US 1st Marine Regiment at Kotor-ri from the north.^[31] Caught by complete surprise, the UN forces were cut-off at Yudam-ni, Sinhung-ni, Hagaru-ri and Kotor-ri by 28 November.^[43]

[edit] Actions at Yudam-ni

Acting on General Almond's instruction, the 1st Marine Division ordered the 5th Marine Regiment to attack west toward Mupyong-ni on the day of 27 November.^[44] The attack was soon stalled by the PVA 89th Division and forced the Marines to dig in on the ridges surrounding Yudam-ni.^[45][46] As night came, five Chinese battalions of the 79th Division attacked the ridges on the north and northwest of Yudam-ni, hoping to annihilate the garrison in one stroke.^[47] Close range fighting soon developed as the attackers infiltrated into Marine positions,^[48] but the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments managed to hold the line despite suffering heavy casualties.^[49] As day broke on 28 November, all five Chinese battalions were rendered combat ineffective.^[47]

While the battle was underway at Yudam-ni, the PVA 59th Division blocked the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri by attacking the defending C and F Company of the 7th Marine Regiment.^[50] The successful assault forced C Company to retreat into Yudam-ni which left F Company trapped on Toktong Pass, a vital pass that controlled the road.^[51] On 29 November, several efforts by the 7th Marine Regiment had failed to rescue F Company despite inflicting heavy casualties on the Chinese.^[52] Aided by artillery from Hagaru-ri and air support, F Company managed to hold out for five days while enduring constant attacks by the PVA 59th Division.^[53]

After the devastating losses suffered by the PVA 79th Division at Yudam-ni, 9th Army headquarters realized that the bulk of the 1st Marine Division was stationed at Yudam-ni, with a garrison strength that was double the initial estimate.^[54] Believing that any further assaults would be futile, Song Shi-Lun ordered the 9th Army to switch their main attacks toward Sinhung-ni and Hagaru-ri,^[54] leaving Yudam-ni alone from 28 November to 30 November.^[55] At the same time, General Almond realized the grave situation of the X Corps, and ordered Major General Oliver P. Smith, the commander of the 1st Marine Division, to withdraw from Yudam-ni.^[56] On 30 November, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond L. Murray and Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, commander of the 5th and 7th Marine Regiments, respectively, issued a joint order to breakout from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri.^[57] Faced with tough fighting between the blocking Chinese divisions and the retreating Marines, Smith remarked: "Retreat, hell! We're not retreating, we're just advancing in a different direction."^[58]

For the breakout, the Marines formed into a convoy with a single M4A3 Sherman tank as the lead. The plan was to have the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Marine Regiment as the vanguard of the convoy, with three battalions covering the rear. At the same time, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment would attack towards F Company in order to open the road at Toktong Pass.^[59] To start the breakout, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment had to first attack south and capture Hill 1542 and Hill 1419 in order to cover the road from Chinese attacks.^[60]

On the morning of 1 December, the 3rd Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment engaged the PVA 175th Regiment of the 59th Division at Hill 1542 and Hill 1419. The tenacious Chinese defenders soon forced the Marines to dig in on the slopes between the road and the peaks^[61] when the convoy passed 3rd Battalion's position by the afternoon.^[60] With Hagaru-ri still not captured, the PVA High Command scrambled the 79th Division to resume attacks on Yudam-ni while the 89th Division rushed south towards Koto-ri.^[62] The Chinese struck at night, and the ferocious fighting forced the rear covering forces to call in night fighters to suppress the attacks.^[63] The fighting lasted well into the morning of 2 December until all Marines managed to withdraw from Yudam-ni.^[63]

At the same time, the 1st Battalion of the 7th Marine Regiment also tried to break the Chinese blockade at Hill 1419 on 1 December. Despite being badly reduced by combat, hunger and frostbite, the PVA 59th Division sent in its last five platoons and refused to yield.^[64] As night approched, the 1st Battalion finally captured the peak and started to march through the hills on the east side of the road.^[65] Relying on the element of surprise, the 1st Battalion managed to destroy several Chinese positions along the road.^[66] On the morning of 2 December, a joint attacks by F Company and the 1st Battalion secured the Toktong Pass, thus opening the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri.^[67]

Although the road had been opened between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the convoy still had to fight through the numerous Chinese positions on the hills overlooking the road. On the first night of the retreat, the Chinese struck the convoy in force and inflicted heavy casualties upon the 3rd Battlion of the 5th Marine Regiment.^[68] Although strong air cover suppressed most of the Chinese forces for the rest of the march, the cold weather, harassing fire, raiding parties, and road blocks slowed the retreat to a crawl while causing numerous casualties.^[69] Despite those difficulties, the convoy reached Hagaru-ri in an orderly fashion on the afternoon of 3 December, with the withdrawal completed on 4 December.^[70]

[edit] East of the reservoir

RCT-31, later known as "Task Force Faith", was a hastily formed regimental combat team from the 7th Infantry Division that guarded the right flank of the Marine advance towards Mupyong-ni. Before the battle, RCT-31 was spread thin with main elements separated at the hills north of Sinhung-ni, the inlet west of Sinhung-ni, and the town of Hudong-ni south of Sinhung-ni.^[71] Although the Chinese believed RCT-31 to be a reinforced regiment,^[54] the task force was actually understrength with one one battalion missing, due to the 7th Infantry Division being scattered over northeast Korea.^[72]

On the night of 27 November, three regiments from the 80th Division attacked the northern hills and the inlets,^[73] completely surprising the defenders.^[74] The ensuing battle caused heavy casualties on the 1st Infantry Battalion of the US 32nd Regiment to the north of Sinhung-ni,^[75] while the 57th Field Artillery Battalion and the 3rd Battalion from the US 31st Regiment were almost overrun at the inlet.^[76] The Chinese also sent the 242nd Regiment of the 81st Division towards Hill 1221,^[77] an undefended hill that controlled the road between Sinhung-ni and Hudong-ni.^[78] As the night fighting ended, RCT-31 was cut into three pieces.^[79]

Believing that the US defenders were completely destroyed at the inlet, the Chinese stopped their attacks and proceed to loot the US positions for food and clothing.^[80] As the morning came on 28 November, the US 3rd Battalion counterattacked the PVA 239th Regiment at the inlet, sending the surprised Chinese back in a complete rout.^[81] In the afternoon, General Almond flew into the perimeter of RCT-31, convinced that RCT-31 was strong enough to begin its attack north and deal with whatever "remnants" of Chinese forces that were in their way. Almond ordered Colonel Allan D. Maclean, the commander of RCT-31, to resume the offensive north while presenting Silver Stars to three of Maclean's officers. In disgust, Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr., the commander of the 1st Battalion of the US 32nd Regiment, threw his medal into the snow.^[82]

On the night of 28 December, the PVA 80th Division attacked again with three regiments.^[83] At the inlet, the Chinese assault became a disaster as the communications broke down while the devastating fire from the anti-aircraft (AA) guns of 57th Battalion swept the Chinese ranks.^[84] In the aftermath of the fightings, the PVA 238th and the 239th Regiment together had less than 600 soldiers.^[85] The attacks by PVA 240th Regiment, on the other hand, forced Maclean to order a retreat from the northern hills towards the inlet.^[86] On 29 November, the 1st Battalion managed to break through the Chinese blockade and reached the inlet, but Maclean disappeared as he mistook some Chinese soldiers as friendlies.^{[87][nb 7]} The Chinese finally stopped their attacks on the night of 29 November while waiting for fresh reinforcements.^[88]

While RCT-31 was under siege, General Almond finally instructed the 1st Marine Division to rescue RCT-31 by breaking out of Yudam-ni — an impossible order for General Smith to implement.^[89] Only the 31st Tank Company tried to rescue RCT-31 by attacking Hill 1221,^[90] but without infantry support, the two armor attacks on 28 and 29 November were stalled by slippery roads, rough terrain, and close infantry assaults.^[91] The US forces evacuated Hudong-ni on 30 November in order to defend Hagaru-ri, leaving the rest of RCT-31 completely stranded.^[92]

On 30 November, Major General David G. Barr, the commander of the 7th Infantry Division, flew into the Sinhung-ni inlet and met with Faith, who by now assumed command of RCT-31. Faith expressed the difficulties for a breakout, particularly the 500 wounded that RCT-31 has to carry.^[93] On the same day, the PVA 94th Division^{[nb 8]} arrived as reinforcements for the 80th Division.^[94] By midnight, four Chinese regiments renewed their attacks and Zhan Danan, the commander of the 80th Division, ordered the complete destruction of RCT-31 before dawn.^[95] Again, the 57th Battalion's AA guns held the Chinese at bay,^[96] but the shell supplies were running desperately low.^[97] On the day of 1 December, Faith finally ordered RCT-31 to breakout from Sinhung-ni and withdraw to Hagaru-ri.^[97]

The breakout began as soon as the weather allowed air cover on 1 December.^[98] As the soldiers formed a convoy and tried to leave the perimeter, the PVA 241st Regiment immediately swarmed over the convoy^[99] with three other regiments closing in.^[95] Left with no choice, the covering aircraft dropped napalm right in front of RCT-31, causing casualties among both Chinese and US troops.^[100] The resulting firestorm wiped out the blocking Chinese company,^[95] allowing the convoy to advance forward.^[101] As the front of RCT-31 made their way forward, heavy small arms fire caused many members of the rear guard to seek shelter below the road, instead of protecting the trucks.^[101] Chinese fire also killed or wounded those already in the trucks as well as the drivers who viewed the job as a form of suicide.^[102] Slowly, the convoy approached a roadblock under Hill 1221 in the late afternoon.^[103] Several parties tried to clear Hill 1221, but after taking part of the hill, the leaderless soldiers continued out onto the frozen reservoir instead of returning to the column.^[104] As Faith led an assault on the roadblock, he was killed by a Chinese grenade.^[105] The convoy managed to fight pass the first road block, but as it reached the second roadblock at Hudong-ni, RCT-31 disintegrated under Chinese attacks.^[106] About 319 survivors managed to reach Hagaru-ri from 1 to 3 December,^[107] and the remnants of RCT-31 were formed into a provisional army battalion for the rest of the battle.^[108]

[edit] Actions at Hagaru-ri

To support the Marine attack towards Mupyong-ni, Hagaru-ri had became an important supply dump with an airfield under construction. General Smith and the 1st Marine Division headquarters were also located at Hagaru-ri.^[43] With the bulk of the 1st Marine Division gathered at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri was lightly defended by two battalions from the 1st and 7th Marine Regiments, and the rest of the garrison was composed of engineers and rear support units from both the army and the Marines.^[109]

The original Chinese plan called for the 58th Division to attack Hagaru-ri on the night of 27 November, but the division was lost in the countryside due to the outdated Japanese maps.^[110] It wasn't until the dawn of 28 November that the 58th Division arrived at Hagaru-ri.^[110] Meanwhile, with the fighting and ambushes that had occurred the previous night, the garrison at Hagaru-ri noticed the Chinese forces around them. Lieutenant Colonel Thomas L. Ridge, the commander of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Marines Regiment, predicted the Chinese attack would come on the night of 28 November.^[111] Almost everyone, including rear support units that had little combat training, were pressed into the frontline due to the manpower shortage,^[112] and the entire perimeter was on full alert by 9:30 p.m.^[113]

It wasn't long before the PVA 173rd Regiment attacked the western and the southern perimeter while the 172nd Regiment struck the hills on the northern perimeter.^[114] Despite the preparations, the understrength garrison was soon overwhelmed, with the Chinese opening several gaps in the defence and reaching the rear areas.^[115] The resulting chaos, however, made the Chinese forces lose discipline, and the attackers started to loot for food and clothing instead of exploiting the situation.^[116] The defenders destroyed the intruders in counterattacks, while the breakdown of communications between the two Chinese regiments allowed the gaps to close.^[112] As the fighting stopped, the Chinese only gained the East Hill on the northern perimeter.^[112] Another attack was planned for the night of 29 November, but air raids broke the Chinese formations before it could be carried out.^[117]

Given the critical manpower shortage at Hagaru-ri, Smith ordered a task force to be send north from Koto-ri and to open the road south of Hagaru-ri.^[118] In response, a task force was formed with 41 Royal Marine Commando, the G Company from the 1st Marines Regiment and the B Company from the 31st Infantry Regiment.^[119] The task force was dubbed "Task Force Drysdale" after its commander Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, who also commanded 41 Commando.^[119] On the afternoon of 29 November, Task Force Drysdale pushed north from Koto-ri while under constant attack from the PVA 60th Division.^[120][121] The harrowing experience later earned the road the nickname "Hell Fire Valley".^[122] As the Chinese attacks dragged on, the task force became disorganized,^[123] and a blown truck in the convoy later split the task force into two section.^[124] Although the lead segment of the task force fought its way into Hagaru-ri on the night of 29 November, the rear force was destroyed.^[125] Despite the heavy losses, the task force managed to bring in 300 badly needed infantrymen for the defence at Hagaru-ri.^[126]

More reinforcements arrived at Hagaru-ri on 30 November,^[127] and it allowed the garrisons to attempt the recapture of East Hill. All efforts failed despite the destruction of a Chinese company.^[128][129] When darkness settled, the PVA 58th Division gathered its remaining 1,500 soldiers in a last ditch attempt to capture Hagaru-ri.^[128] The reinforced defenders annihilated most of the attacking forces, with only the defences around the East Hill giving way.^[130] As the Chinese tried to advance from the East Hill, they were cut down by the 31st Tank Company.^[131]

By 1 December, the PVA 58th Division was virtually destroyed,^[132] with the remainder waiting for reinforcements from the 26th Corps of the 9th Army.^[133][134] But much to the frustration of Song Shi-Lun, the 26th Corps did not arrive before the Marines broke out of Yudam-ni.^[3] The airfield was opened to traffic on 1 December, allowing UN forces to bring in reinforcements and to evacuate the dead and the wounded.^[135] With the Marines at Yudam-ni completing their withdrawal on 4 December, the trapped UN forces could finally start their breakout towards the port of Hungnam.

[edit] Breakout

After a short period of rest, the breakout began on 6 December with the 7th Marine Regiment as the vanguard of the retreating column while the 5th Marine Regiment covered the rear.^[136] At the same time, the belated PVA 26th Corps arrived at Hagaru-ri with its 76th and 77th Division relieving the 58th and 60th Division.^[137] As the 7th Marine Regiment pushed aside the PVA 76th Division at the south of Hagaru-ri, the 5th Marine Regiment took over the Hagaru-ri perimeter and recaptured the East Hill from the 76th Division.^[138][139] In a last effort to stop the breakout,^[138] the customary Chinese night attack returned with the 76th and 77th Division striking the Hagaru-ri perimeter in all directions.^[133] The Marines repulsed the Chinese attacks, inflicting heavy casualties.^[140]

Meanwhile, the 7th Marine Regiment opened the road between Hagaru-ri and Koto-ri by capturing the high ground surrounding the road. But as soon as the Marines pulled out, the 77th Division returned to the peaks and attacked the column.^[141][142] Chaotic fighting broke out within the column and the retreat was slowed to a crawl.^[143] The air cover, however, returned to subdue the Chinese forces,^[142] and the fighting destroyed most of the blocking troops.^[144] On 7 December, the rest of the column managed to reach Koto-ri with little difficulty with the last elements arrived at Koto-ri on the night of 7 December.^[145]

After the failure of the 26th Corps at Hagaru-ri, the PVA High Command ordered the 26th and the 27th Corps to chase after the escaping UN force with the 20th Corps blocking the escape route.^[146][144] But with most of the 20th Corps destroyed at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the only forces between Koto-ri and Hungnam were the few remnants of the 58th and the 60th Division.^[147] In desperation, Song Shi-Lun ordered these troops to dig in at Funchilin Pass while blowing up the vital Threadway Bridge, hoping the terrain and obstacles would allow the 26th and the 27th Corps to catch up with the retreating UN forces.^[3][147] The PVA 180th Regiment that occupied Hill 1081 blew up the bridge three times, believing the bridge was rendered irreparable.^[148] In response, the 1st Battalion of the 1st Marine Regiment attacked Hill 1081 from the south, and the hill was captured on 9 December after the defenders fought to the last man.^[149] At the same time, the 7th Marine Regiment and RCT-31 attacked the Threadway Bridge from the north, only to encounter defenders that were already frozen in their foxholes.^[150] The 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company rebuilt the bridge by 9 December.^[151] Outmaneuvered, the 58th and the 60th Division still tried to slow the UN advance with ambushes and raids, but after weeks of non-stop fighting, the two divisions, together, had only 200 soldiers left.^[152] The last UN forces left Fuchilin Pass by 11 December.^[153]

One of the last engagements during the retreat was an ambush at Sudong by the chasing PVA 89th Division,^[152] which the Task Force Dog of the 3rd Infantry Division repulsed with little difficulty.^[154] The trapped UN forces finally reached the Hungnam perimeter by 9 p.m. on 11 December.^[155]

[edit] Evacuation at Hungnam

By the time the trapped UN forces arrived at Hungnam, the ROK I Corps, US 3rd Infantry Division, and elements from the US 7th Infantry Division had already set up defensive positions around the port.^[156] Some skirmishes broke out between the defending 3rd Infantry Division and the chasing 27th Corps, but against the strong naval fire support, the badly-mauled 9th Army was in no shape to approach the Hungnam perimeter.^[157][158] In the greatest evacuation movement by sea in US military history,^[159] a massive 193 ship armada assembled at the port and evacuated not only the UN troops, but also their heavy equipment and the Korean refugees.^[160] The last UN unit left at 2:36 p.m. on 24 December, and the port was destroyed to deny its use to the Communists.^[159] The PVA 27th Corps entered Hungnam on the morning of 25 December.^[161]

[edit] Aftermath

“	...Casualties had reached a 40,000 high. The Central [Government] expresses its deepest sorrow...	”
—Mao Zedong[161][162]

While the X Corps was being evacuated from the eastern front, the Eighth Army had already retreated to the 38th parallel on the western front in the aftermath of the Battle of Ch'ongch'on River. With the entire UN front collapsing, the race to Yalu was ended with the Communist recapturing much of North Korea.^[9] The Korean War would drag on for another two and half years before the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953.^[9]

Despite the loss of North Korea, the X Corps preserved much of its strength.^[163] About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to Pusan,^[160] and they would later rejoin the war effort in Korea. General Smith was credited by both the Chinese and the UN for saving the X Corps from destruction,^[164][3] and the 1st Marine Division also gained fame for its tenacity during the battle.^[165]

China was also catapulted into the status of a major military power following the victory at Chosin,^[166] but the victory came with a staggering cost. With the escape of the US X Corps and the ROK I Corps, Mao's vision for Chosin was not realized, and the failure caused Song Shi-Lun to offer his resignation.^[167] At the same time, heavy casualties caused by both combat and poor logistical support destroyed much of the eight elite divisions under the 20th and the 27th Corps. Of those eight divisions, two divisions were forced to disband, and only by March 1951 did the 9th Army returned to its normal strength.^[6][168]

[edit] Operation Glory

During the battle, the UN casualties were buried at temporary gravesites along the road. Operation Glory occurred from July to November 1954, during which the dead of each side were exchanged. The remains of 4,167 US Soldiers and Marines were exchanged for 13,528 North Korean and Chinese dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in UN prisoner of war camps were turned over to the South Korean government.^[169]. After "Operation Glory" 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the Punchbowl Cemetery. According to a DPMO white paper, 1,394 names were also transmitted during "Operation Glory" from the Chinese and North Koreans, of whom 858 names proved to be correct.^[170] The 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals, of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans, with all but 416 identified by name. Of the 239 Korean War unaccounted for, 186 are not associated with Punchbowl unknowns.^{[nb 9]} From 1990 to 1994 North Korea excavated and returned more than 208 sets of remains that possibly containing 200 to 400 remains of US servicemen, but very few have been identified due to the co-mingling of remains.^[171] From 1996 to 2006, 220 remains were recovered near the Chinese border.^[172]

[edit] See also

• History of the People's Liberation Army
• History of the United States Army
• History of the United States Marine Corps

[edit] Notes

Footnotes

Citations

[edit] References

[edit] Further reading

• Frank, Benis M. (2003-02-24). "The Epic of Chosin". Colloquium on Contemporary History Project. U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center. http://www.history.navy.mil/colloquia/cch3e.htm. Retrieved 2006-11-05. 
• Simmons, BGen Edwin H. (2002) Frozen Chosin pt1 pt2 pt3, United States Marine Corps Historical Division. PCN 19000410000.
• Crocker, H.W. (2006). Don't Tread on me: A 400-year history of America at War, from Indian Fighting to Terrorist Hunting. Crown Forum. ISBN 1-40005-363-3. 
• Drury, Bob; Clavin, Tom (2009). The Last Stand of Fox Company. New York City: Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 0-87113-993-6. 
• Fehrenbach, T.R. (1963). This Kind of War. Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's. ISBN 1-57488-259-7. 
• Russ, Martin (1999). Breakout - The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14029-259-4. 
• Schnabel, James F. (1988). Policy and Direction: The First Year.. U.S. Army in the Korean War. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U. S. Army. 
• Swatosh, Robert Beryl (2007). Wings, Wars and Life: An Autobiography. Merriam Press. ISBN 1576381358. 
• Webb, Wayne E. (1998). Cannon and Rifle: The Story of King Battery in Korea...1950. 

[edit] External links

Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Battle of Chosin Reservoir

• "Chosin Reservoir: Epic of Endurance". Korean War Educator. 2007-01-23. http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/chosin/index.htm. Retrieved 2007-12-16. 

• "The Chosin Few". http://home.hawaii.rr.com/chosin/. Retrieved 2006-08-21. 

• "The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention". Center for Military History, U.S. Army. http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm. Retrieved 2007-01-10. 

• Wilder, Wild Bill. "Chosin Reservoir ‘50". Armchair General Magazine. http://www.armchairgeneral.com/articles.php?p=2352&page=1. Retrieved 2006-10-01.