Battle of Chosin Reservoir

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Jump to: navigation, search

Coordinates: 40°29′N 127°12′E / 40.483°N 127.2°E / 40.483; 127.2 (Chosin Reservoir)

Battle of Chosin Reservoir
Part of the Korean War

A column of the U.S. 1st Marine Division move through Chinese lines during their breakout from the Chosin reservoir
Date November 26 – December 13, 1950
Location Chosin reservoir, in modern-day Changjin County, South Hamgyong Province, North Korea
Result Strategic Chinese victory, tactical UN victory
successful UN withdrawal
Belligerents
 United Nations
 Flag of the People's Republic of China China
Commanders
Flag of the United States Oliver Smith Flag of the People's Republic of China Song Shi-Lun
Strength
30,000[citation needed] 150,000[citation needed]
Casualties and losses
2,500 killed,
192 missing,
5,000 wounded,
7,500 frostbite casualties[citation needed]		 19,202 by fighting, 28,954 by hunger and frostbite (Chinese sources)/35,000 (US estimation)

The Battle of Chosin Reservoir, also known as Battle of Changjin Lake (simplified Chinese: 长津湖之战; pinyin: Cháng Jīn Hū Zhī Zhàn), was a battle in the Korean War in which 30,000 United Nations (UN) troops (nicknamed "The Frozen Chosin" or "The Chosin Few") under the command of American General Ned Almond faced approximately 150,000 Chinese troops of the People's Volunteer Army 9th Army Group under the command of Song Shi-Lun. The name Chosin is the Japanese rendition of the Korean place name Changjin. The name stuck due to the Japanese names given to locations listed on maps used by UN forces.

Shortly after the People's Republic of China entered the conflict, large numbers of Chinese soldiers swept across the Yalu River, encircling the UN forces in the northeastern part of North Korea at the Chosin Reservoir. A brutal battle in freezing weather followed. Although they inflicted enormous casualties on the Chinese forces, the UN troops were forced to evacuate North Korea after they withdrew from the reservoir to the port of Hungnam.

The events of the Chosin Battle, which had a decisive impact on the future course of the war, were fought in the seventeen day period between November 27 and December 13, 1950:

  • the defense of Hagaru-ri,
  • the defense of Yudam-ni,
  • the effort of the 5th and 7th Marines to break through from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri,
  • the fight of RCT 31, east of Changjin
  • the 1st Marines / Task Force Dog seizure of hill 1081 in the vicinity of Chinhung-ni on 9 December and reconstruction of the MSR bridge and
  • the withdrawal to Hungnam through the protective lines of Task Force Dog, 3rd Infantry Division at Chinhung-ni.

Contents

[edit] Background

By mid-October 1950, the Korean War appeared to be nearly over to many UN leaders. Most of North Korea had been captured by UN forces. However, on October 25, 1950, the People's Republic of China entered the war and huge numbers of Chinese soldiers poured across the border into Korea. The UN command, under General Douglas MacArthur, was slow to appreciate the danger. MacArthur ordered his ground units, the Eighth United States Army in the west and the X Corps in the east, to continue their offensive to the Yalu River (the border with China) and to cut the Chinese supply route extending into the neighboring U.S. 8th Army sector.

[edit] Battle

The X Corps — commanded by controversial Major General Ned Almond, U.S. Army — was widely spread out over northeastern Korea, its units far apart and out of supporting distance from each other. The X Corps troops at Changjin, mainly the U.S. 1st Marine Division, a regimental combat team, RCT31 of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, and 41 Commando Royal Marines were, by late November, surrounded by units of the 9th Army Group of the People's Volunteer Army. The Chinese launched heavy assaults that halted the UN offensive. MacArthur and Almond ordered Major General O.P. Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division and associated forces in the Chosin area, to fight his way out of the trap. Starting on November 26, 1950, the UN troops began a fighting withdrawal to the south, towards Hungnam. While General Almond was in overall command, both General Almond and General MacArthur had given General Smith orders to strike quickly to the Yalu. General Smith paid most of those orders lip service only. Instead of over-extending his units as the Army high command ordered, Smith slowly built up supply points along the way, which ultimately saved not only his division but the 7th Infantry Division and other UN forces as well.

Keeping his units concentrated and moving deliberately, Smith made an aggressive assault to break out of the reservoir. When asked if the Marines were retreating, Smith explained that their fighting withdrawal through Chinese lines did not constitute a retreat. As he explained: "Retreat, hell! We're not retreating, we're just advancing in a different direction." (recalling the famous quote from Captain Lloyd W. Williams in the Battle of Belleau Wood during World War I, "Retreat? Hell, we just got here!").[1]

Map of the Battle of the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.

[edit] East of the Changjin Reservoir

On the eastern side of the Changjin Reservoir, a U.S. Army Regimental Combat Team (minus one infantry battalion and a tank company) of less then 2500 men from the 7th Infantry Division, RCT 31, was isolated by a force of approximately 17,000 Chinese soldiers from the PVA 80th and 81st Divisions, plus a regiment from the PVA 94th Division[2]. On the second day, the Chinese commander committed the remainder of the 81st and held the 94th Division in reserve for his main effort down the east side of the reservoir (these units originally were en route to finish off the garrison at Hagaru-ri). Greatly outnumbered and worn down by incessant attacks, RCT 31 was virtually destroyed, in part due to mistaken air attacks on them by Marine Corsairs. Survivors from this unit reached Marine lines at Hagaru-ri on December 2, 1950. Some survivors of RCT 31 and other army units, including the Regimental Tank Company from the 31st Infantry and combat engineers, joined Smith's forces and participated in the breakout.

Nine members of RCT 31 were awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Army's second highest award for valor. Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith Jr. Commanding 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry assumed Task Force Command when Colonel Allan MacLean was killed. Lieutenant Colonel Faith died of wounds on December 1, 1950 and was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions and leadership of RCT 31. In addition, elements of Regimental Combat Team 31 received the Navy Presidential Unit Citation (individual award equivalent would be the Navy Cross) in 1999 (some 49 years after their participation in the Battle East of the Changjin Lake.)

[edit] Task Force Drysdale

In mid-November 1950, the roughly 300 men of 41 Independent Commando, Royal Marines, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, were attached to the U.S. 1st Marine Division. This marked the second time that U.S. Marines and Royal Marines had served together.[3] (The first time was during the Boxer Rebellion.)

41 Commando had been at Koto-ri with Colonel Chesty Puller’s 1st Marine Regiment when the Chinese attacked. On the morning of November 29, Major General O.P. Smith, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, ordered Puller to send a task force to open up the road between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri, where the majority of the division was. The breakthrough force was composed of Drysdale’s 41 Royal Commando, Captain Carl Sitter's G Company, 3rd Battalion 1st Marines (G/3/1), B Company, 31st Infantry Regiment, and various Headquarters and Services Marines. All totaled, the task force was around 900 men and 140 vehicles.[4]

The task force struck out of Koto-ri at 09:30 on November 29, and by 16:30, it had advanced only halfway to the objective, because of stiff enemy resistance. Halfway to Hagaru-ri, the Chinese ambushed the task force and cut it to pieces. The units of the Task Force had become bogged down, separated and were not in radio contact in an area later named "Hell Fire Valley" by Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale. After being reinforced by tanks from D Company, 1st Tank Battalion, Drysdale contacted Smith at Hagaru-ri and was told to “Press on at all costs.” Drysdale responded by stating, “Very well, then: we’ll give them a show.”[5] He passed word that they were going to run the gauntlet to Hagaru-ri.

Map of the Retreat from the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir.

Later that evening, most of the men from 41 Commando, Sitter's Marines, and the tanks from D Company arrived at Hagaru-ri, with a wounded Drysdale entering the division command post to announce “41 Commando present for duty.” In the confusion along the road, roughly 400 members of Task Force Drysdale were still left stranded and out of radio contact in Hell Fire Valley and completely surrounded by Chinese forces. For his leadership and valor, Captain Sitter was awarded the Medal of Honor, one of eleven Chosin Marines so honored.[6]

The stranded forces were composed of about 60 Royal Marines, most of B Company 31st Infantry Regiment, and the assorted Headquarters and Services Marines, strung out in four pockets along roughly two-thirds of a mile. Most of these men were killed, wounded or taken prisoner. A few were able to pass through Chinese lines and make it back to Koto-ri. During the night, army Lieutenant Alfred J. Anderson of B Company, 1/31 Infantry, regrouped those of his company that he could find into a defensive perimeter. Twice, he closed with enemy soldiers and killed them at arm's length, deflecting their weapons with one arm as he used his pistol. Early on the morning of November 30, Anderson received orders to withdraw those troops under his control. He led them back safely to Koto-ri.[6]

Of the 900 men of Task Force Drysdale, approximately 300 arrived at Hagaru-ri, 300 were killed or wounded and about 135 were taken prisoner, with the rest making it back to Koto-ri. Seventy-five of the 141 vehicles were also destroyed. Some considered the mission poorly conceived and doomed from the start. Major General Smith was not so quick to write it off however, saying that it was at least a partial success because it delivered over 300 seasoned infantrymen and a tank company to the beleaguered defenses at Hagaru-ri.[7]

[edit] Task Force Dog

In mid-November 1950 the 3rd Infantry Division sailed from Japan and landed at Wonson, Korea above the 38th Parallel and was assigned as the X Corps reserve. Many soldiers were South Korean draftees who had been trained for about six weeks in Japan. They were spread across the entire Division and very few of them spoke English. On December 1, the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment moved in trucks from Hamhung to Majon-dong where they took up defensive positions some 30 miles south of Hagaru-ri, the south end of the Chosin Reservoir.

Task Force Dog was formed at Majon-dong to assist in extricating the 1st Marine Division and RCT 31 from the Chinese trap at the Chosin Reservoir. It was commanded by Brigadier General Armistead D. Mead, assistant 3rd Division Commander. Task Force Dog consisted of Detachment Headquarters, 3d Infantry Division (and a detachment from the tactical command post); the 3d Battalion, 7th Infantry; the 92d Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Self-propelled [SP] 155mm howitzers); the 3d Platoon, 3d Reconnaissance Company; HQ Detachment, 3d Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA), Automatic Weapons (AW) Battalion (SP); Company A, 73d Engineers (Combat); a detachment of the 3rd Division Ordnance Bomb Disposal Unit; a detachment of the 3d Signal Company; the 52d Truck Transportation Battalion and a Tactical Air Control Party. TF Dog was further assisted by the 65th RCT and the 999th Field Artillery Battalion, the latter of which was given the mission of general support reinforcing (GSR) of the artillery units assigned to TF Dog[8]. The mission was to move about nine miles north on December 7 to Chinhung-ni, conduct a relief in place with 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) who were the southernmost combat unit of the 1st Marine Division and assist the X Corps forward elements withdrawal. The execution of the move north had the 65th Infantry Regiment assisting Task Force DOG by acting as its flank guard for the first two miles north of Majon-dong. The 65th Infantry would return to defensive positions at Majon-dong, leaving Company G to further assist Task Force DOG by occupying commanding terrain in the vicinity of Sudong, about four miles to the south of Chinhung-ni.

The 1st Battalion, 1st Marines were positioned on critical ground at Chinhung-ni. On December 6, the Chinese had cut the Main Supply Route (MSR) above and below Chinhung-ni. The entire MSR was constantly under fire as the Chinese attempted to disrupt north bound resupply and south bound medical evacuation. On December 7 Task Force Dog fought its way north from Sudong to Chinhung-ni, marrying up with its advanced party who had fought their way north the day before to coordinate the relief in place. 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, occupied 1st Marines defensive positions, freeing them to execute their planned attack to the northeast to seize key terrain on Hill 1081 overwatching the bridge area. The Chinese had blown up the MSR bridge three miles to the north of Chinhung-ni. On December 7, several sections of bridging were dropped by parachute to the Marines. Task Force Dog supported the Marines attack to seize Hill 1081 on December 8.

Hill 1081, described as the "most dominating and critical enemy position on the way down," was taken by the Marines with the support[9] of Task Force Dog’s 92nd Armored Field Artillery Battalion at mid-day on December 9.[10] A few hours later, construction of the bridge, shown on the map above as Treadway bridge, was complete and the first of the Marine vehicles began to cross south. The Chinese stubborn defense on Hill 1081 illustrated the importance of retaining that position. The Chinese left 530 dead on Hill 1081. Alpha Company, 1/1 lost 111 men, about half its strength. Replacement of the blown bridge was essential for a successful Marine withdrawal enabling them to escape with their vehicles.

The Chinese concentrated their efforts in the area of Sudong, south of the Task Force Dog's primary position. The task force's reconnaissance platoon and artillery battalion and also Company G of the 65th Infantry were involved in several actions against the Chinese in that area. Temperatures were below zero, sometimes as low as 35 degrees below zero. The first elements of the 1st Marine Division main body reached Chinhung-ni very early on the morning of December 10. It was evident that the men in the Marine column had experienced heavy fighting. The column was described by one soldier of Task Force Dog when he said, “It has been said that each vehicle had as many Marines as it could carry; if it had a bumper, ... a fender, ... or a gun barrel, dead Marines were tied to them."[11]

At Chinhung-ni, many Marines boarded trucks of Task Force Dog's 52nd Truck Transportation Battalion for the trip south. The fighting was not over for those in the column. The Chinese still tried to block their way between Chinhung-ni and Majon-dong in the south as well as closing in from the north. Early on the afternoon of December 11 the last of the Marine column cleared Chinhung-ni executing a battle hand-off to Task Force Dog. Several hours later Task Force Dog started to withdraw under fire. During the withdrawal, the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry was cut off during several occasions from the main body of the withdrawing convoy. The Battalion had to fight successive, isolated actions against probing Chinese units and incurred heavy casualties. Final elements of Task Force Dog closed into Majon-dong at 8:00 p.m. on December 11 when it passed through the defensive positions of the 65th Infantry Regiment with continuing heavy Chinese activity as far as Hamhung. Task Force Dog ceased to exist at Majon-dong and preparation for a defensive perimeter around Hŭngnam began.[12]

[edit] Final phases of the battle

USS Begor observes the destruction of Hŭngnam's port facilities.

In their withdrawal, U.S. troops were either attacking—conducting numerous assaults to clear Chinese roadblocks and overlooking hill positions—or under furious Chinese attack. The sub-zero temperatures inflicted even more casualties than the Chinese. U.S. forces enjoyed total air superiority, with Navy, Marine, and Air Force fighter-bombers flying hundreds of sorties a day against the encircling Chinese. Over 4,000 wounded were flown out and 500 replacements flown in during the operation, contributing considerably to its success. The Marines and Soldiers were able to destroy or effectively disable all seven Chinese divisions that tried to block their escape from the reservoir. Despite the effort of many Marines, whose plight attracted worldwide attention and was seized on by the western media as a "moral victory" in the midst of defeat, the strategic situation was highly unfavorable for UN forces, and it was decided to withdraw the entire X Corps from North Korea. The Marines, the rest of X Corps, and thousands of civilian refugees were evacuated by ship from the port of Hŭngnam, which was then destroyed to deny its use to the communists.

The estimates of troops involved at the Chosin: Army 7th Infantry: RCT 31 est. 3,000 men; the three Marine regiments, est. 18,000 men; Army casualties about 2,000 KIA, 1,000 WIA and frostbite. The Marines lost 836 KIA and 12,000 frost bite and WIA. Chinese losses are estimated at 35,000 KIA. The battle officially ended December 11, 14 days after it began. The Chinese had used ten divisions, six against the Marines and four versus the Eighth Army that was some distance away west of the Taebuk Mountains. The Marines are credited with destroying three Chinese divisions and crippling several others to the extent that they were no longer a threat.

[edit] Aftermath

The UN forces in northeast Korea quickly withdrew to form a defensive perimeter around the port city of Hŭngnam, where a major evacuation was carried out in late December 1950. All together, 193 shiploads of men and material were evacuated from Hŭngnam Harbor, and about 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped to Pusan in orderly fashion.[13][14]

While the Chinese were able to expel the UN forces from the reservoir, U.S. forces inflicted heavy casualties on the Chinese. After their evacuation from North Korea, the Marines were redeployed to the south, where they continued to fight as part of UN forces until the armistice in July 1953.

The U.S. Marines consider the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir to be one of the proudest parts of their own history. The Marines marched out in an orderly fashion and intact, with remnants of RCT 31. Likewise, the Chinese People's Volunteer Army considered the battle an honor, although they were not prepared for the amount of casualties they incurred. This campaign, with the simultaneous victory against U.S. forces to the west, was the first time in a century that a Chinese army was able to defeat a Western army in a major battle.

[edit] Operation Glory

Following the conflict, the United Nations troop casualties were buried at a temporary gravesite near Hŭngnam. Operation Glory occurred from July to November 1954, during which the dead of each side were exchanged; remains of 4,167 U.S. Soldiers and Marines were exchanged for 13,528 North Korean and Chinese dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in United Nations prisoner of war camps were turned over to the South Korean government.[15]. After "Operation Glory" 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the Punchbowl Cemetery. According to a DPMO white paper [16] 1,394 names were also transmitted during "Operation Glory" from the Chinese and North Koreans {of whom 858 names proved to be correct}; of the 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans of whom all but 416 were identified by name. Of 239 Korean War unaccounted for: 186 not associated with Punchbowl unknowns {176 were identified and of the remaining 10 cases 4 were non-Americans of Asiatic descent; one was British; 3 were identified and 2 cases unconfirmed}. In 1990-1994 North Korea excavated and returned more than 208 sets of remains-possibly containing 200-400 remains of US servicemen-but very few have been identified-due to co-mingling of remains.[17] From 1996 to 2006, 220 remains were recovered from near the Chinese border. [18]

[edit] Notable U.S. participants and battle honors awarded

[edit] U.S. Marine Corps

[edit] U.S. Army

  • Col. Allan D. MacLean, US Army, Commanded all US Army troops East of the Reservoir, posthumously awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for actions as Commander of RCT 31 east of the Reservoir (Task Force Maclean).
  • Lt Col. Don Faith, US Army, posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for actions as a commander of RCT 31 (Task Force Faith).
  • Lt Col. John Page, US Army, X Corps Artillery, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for actions at Koto-ri and during the breakout.
  • Robert E. Jones (US Army) Maj., US Army, S-3 of 1/32 Inf., awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions east of Reservoir (RCT 31).
  • Earle Jordan Capt., US Army, M/31, awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions east of Reservoir (RCT 31).
  • George R. Cody Captain, US Army, HMC 31 Inf., posthumously awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions east of the Reservoir (RCT 31).
  • J.C. Barnes 2nd Lt., US Army, 48 FAB and FO to 1/32 Inf., awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions during breakout.
  • Alfred J. Anderson Lt., US Army, B/31, awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions at Hell's Fire Valley.
  • John E. Gray Lt., US Army, M/31, awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions east of Reservoir (RCT 31).
  • Robert G. Schmitt Lt., US Army M/31, posthumously awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions east of Reservoir (RCT 31).
  • Cecil G. Smith Lt., US Army, A/32, awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions during breakout.
  • Harold B. Haugland Sgt., US Army, D/15 AAA Bn., awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions east of Reservoir (RCT 31).
  • Charles Garrigus Sgt., US Army, 1/32 Inf., posthumously awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions east of Reservoir (RCT 31).
  • Stanford O. Corners Sgt., US Army Med/A/57 FAB, awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions east of Reservoir (RCT 31).
  • George H. Paine Sgt., US Army, H/31, awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions at Koto-ri.
  • James H. Godfrey Cpl., US Army, D/32 Inf., awarded Distinguished Service Cross for actions east of Reservoir (RCT 31).

[edit] See also

United States Marine Corps portal

[edit] Notes

  1. ^ "Retreat of the 20,000". Time Magazine. 1950-12-18. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,858986,00.html. 
  2. ^ Updated history has now arrived at a general consensus of eight PVA division's at Changjin lake with 7,500 men per division, now reducing 120,000 men by 50% to equal a total of 60,000 men. http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/topics/chosin/index.htm#ArmyViewpoint
  3. ^ Russ Breakout, p.231.
  4. ^ Russ Breakout, p.231-232.
  5. ^ Russ Breakout, p.234.
  6. ^ a b Russ Breakout, p.233-245.
  7. ^ Russ Breakout, p.247.
  8. ^ Stewart, Richard W. Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, December 1950, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, April 1991
  9. ^ Cowart, Glenn C. (1992). Miracle In Korea: The Evacuation of X Corps from the Hungnam Beachhead. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. ISBN 0-87249-829-8.
  10. ^ Roy E. Appleman Escaping the Trap: The US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea
  11. ^ Colonel George O. Taylor Jr., The Forgotten War's Forgotten Task Force
  12. ^ Taylor, George O. JR. "The Forgotten War's Forgotten Task Force". Army Magazine, Association of the United States Army (July 2002)
  13. ^ Schnabel p. 304
  14. ^ Doyle James H., and Arthur J. Mayer. "December 1950 at Hungnam." Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute 105 (April 1979): 44-65.
  15. ^ "Operation Glory". Fort Lee, Virginia: Army Quartermaster Museum, U.S. Army. http://www.qmmuseum.lee.army.mil/korea/op_glory.htm. Retrieved on 2007-12-16. 
  16. ^ [1]
  17. ^ JPAC - Wars And Conflicts
  18. ^ Remains from Korea identified as Ind. soldier - Army News, opinions, editorials, news from Iraq, photos, reports - Army Times

[edit] References

  • Appleman, Roy (1990). Escaping the Trap: The US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950. Texas A and M University Military History Series, 14. ISBN 0-89096-395-9. 
  • Cowart, Glenn C. (1992). Miracle In Korea: The Evacuation of X Corps from the Hungnam Beachhead. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. ISBN 0-87249-829-8. 
  • Crocker, H.W. (2006). Don't Tread on me: A 400-year history of America at War, from Indian Fighting to Terrorist Hunting. Crown Forum. ISBN 1-40005-363-3. 
  • Drury, Bob; Clavin, Tom (2009). The Last Stand of Fox Company. New York City: Atlantic Monthly Press. ISBN 0-87113-993-6. 
  • Fehrenbach, T.R. (1963). This Kind of War. Dulles, Virginia: Brassey's. ISBN 1-57488-259-7. 
  • Halberstam, David (2007). The Coldest WInter - America and the Korean War. New York: Hyperion. ISBN 978-140130-052-4. 
  • Russ, Martin (1999). Breakout - The Chosin Reservoir Campaign, Korea 1950. Penguin Books. ISBN 0-14029-259-4. 
  • Schnabel, James F. (1988). Policy and Direction: The First Year.. U.S. Army in the Korean War. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U. S. Army. 
  • Sheehan, Neil (1988). A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York: Random House. ISBN 0-67972-414-1. 
  • Swatosh, Robert Beryl (2007). Wings, Wars and Life: An Autobiography. Merriam Press. ISBN 1576381358. 
  • Wayne E. Webb(1998). Cannon and Rifle: The Story of King Battery in Korea...1950

[edit] Further reading

[edit] External links

Search Wikimedia Commons Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Battle of Chosin Reservoir
Retrieved from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Chosin_Reservoir"
Personal tools