Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections

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Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 25–26, 1966
Decided March 24, 1966
Full case name Annie E. Harper, et al. v. Virginia Board of Elections, et al.
Citations 383 U.S. 663 (more)
86 S. Ct. 1079; 16 L. Ed. 2d 169; 1966 U.S. LEXIS 2905
Prior history Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
Holding
A State's conditioning of the right to vote on the payment of a fee or tax violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Court membership
Case opinions
Majority Douglas, joined by Warren, Clark, Brennan, White, Fortas
Dissent Black
Dissent Harlan and Stewart
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. XIV

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), was a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court found that Virginia's poll tax was unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. The Twenty-fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibited poll taxes in federal elections; the Supreme Court extended this prohibition to state elections.

Contents

Background[edit]

The case was filed by Virginia resident Annie E. Harper, who was unable to register without having to pay a poll tax. She brought the suit on behalf of other poor residents and herself. After being dismissed by a U.S. district court, the case went to the United States Supreme Court.

The Decision[edit]

In a 6 to 3 vote, the Court ruled in favor of Ms. Harper. The Court noted that “a state violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution whenever it makes the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard. Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth.”

This ruling reversed a prior decision by the Court, Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), which upheld the state's ability to impose poll taxes, and the Court did so despite the fact that there had been no relevant change in the text of the Constitution between 1937 and 1966. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment, adopted in 1964, outlawed the poll tax in federal elections, but did not speak to the question of state elections, which was the question involved in the Harper case.

Dissents[edit]

Joined by Justice Potter Stewart, Justice John Marshall Harlan II's dissented, arguing that the Court had allowed some forms of discriminatory voting qualifications without violating the equal protection clause, e.g., Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections (literacy test), Breedlove v. Suttles (poll tax on men), as long as it was rational. In this case, Virginia's poll tax could be deemed rational because of state’s desire to collect revenue and the belief that people who pay to vote might have more interest in the state’s policies.[1]

Justice Hugo Black filed a separate dissent. Black based his dissent mainly on stare decisis basis. As a textualist, he also criticized the majority for expanding the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment by using what he called the old "natural law due process formula." He emphasized that new meanings can be added to the Constitution only through amendments.

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Issacharoff, Karlan, Pildes, Samuel, Pamela, Richard (2007). The Law of Democracy. Foundation Press. p. 41. ISBN 978-1587784606. 

External links[edit]