Problem of evil
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In the philosophy of religion and theology, the problem of evil is the question of whether evil exists and, if so, why. The question particularly arises in religions that propose the existence of a deity who is omnibenevolent while simultaneously also being omnipotent, and omniscient[1][2]; attempts to resolve the question under these contexts has historically been one[citation needed] of the prime concerns of theodicy. The problem is also relevant to certain polytheistic traditions involving many gods.[3]
There are also many discussions of "evil" and associated problems in other philosophical fields, such as secular ethics[4][5][6], and scientific disciplines such as evolutionary ethics.[7][8] But as usually understood in the Anglo-American tradition, the problem of evil is posed in a religious context.[1][2]
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[edit] Detailed arguments
Numerous different versions of the problem of evil have been formulated.[1][2][9]
[edit] Logical problem of evil
One example among many of a formulation of the problem of evil is presented by Epicurus and may be schematized as follows:
- If a perfectly good god exists, then there is no evil in the world.
- There is evil in the world.
- Therefore, a perfectly good god does not exist.
This argument is of the logically valid form modus tollens (denying the consequent). In this case, P is "God exists" and Q is "there is no evil in the world".
Another version:
- God exists
- God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good
- A perfectly good being would want to prevent all evils.
- An omniscient being knows every way in which evils can come into existence.
- An omnipotent being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence has the power to prevent that evil from coming into existence.
- A being who knows every way in which an evil can come into existence, who is able to prevent that evil from coming into existence, and who wants to do so, would prevent the existence of that evil.
- If there exists an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly good being, then no evil exists.
- Evil exists (logical contradiction).[2]
Versions such as these are referred to as the logical problem of evil. They attempt to show that that the assumed propositions lead to a logical contradiction and cannot therefore all be correct. Most philosophical debate has focused on the propositions stating that God cannot exist with, or would want to prevent, all evils. A common response is that God can exist with and allow evil in order to achieve a greater good.
Many philosophers accept that arguments such as Plantinga's free will defense (in brief, that God allows evil in order to achieve the greater good of free will) are logically possible and thus successfully solve the logical problem of evil in terms of human action; the question of how free will and God's Omniscience are compatible remains however (see the Argument from free will). The free will defense also does not account for the problems, or sufferances, due to the natural world (e.g., diseases, pain, natural disasters). Plantinga's response is the supposedly logically possible notion that God allows natural evil to enter the world due to Original Sin. In such a case, however, it is difficult to see how this would be compatible with Omnibenevolence, though the possibility that it is in order to achieve a greater good perhaps remains open. How such an explanation logically explains the rampant suffering throughout the world is questionable however; as Thomas Hobbes famously said, life in the natural state of the world is "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". Additionally, it appears that Evil may only exist when intentional and so it might be argued that evil might only exist in a world with a God, as it is the willful source of the naturalistic suffering and allows it to continue despite supposedly having the power to stop it. [9]
[edit] Evidential problem of evil
The evidential version of the problem of evil (also referred to as the probabilistic or inductive version), seeks to show that the existence of evil, although logically consistent with the existence of God, counts against or lowers the probability of the truth of theism.
A version by William L. Rowe:
- There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
- An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
- (Therefore) There does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.[2]
Another by Paul Draper:
- Gratuitous evils exist.
- The hypothesis of indifference, i.e., that if there are supernatural beings they are indifferent to gratuitous evils, is a better explanation for (1) than theism.
- Therefore, evidence prefers that no god, as commonly understood by theists, exists.[10]
These arguments are probability judgments since they rest on the claim that, even after careful reflection, we can see no good reason for God’s permission of evil. The inference from this claim to the judgment that there exists gratuitous evil is inductive in nature, and it is this inductive step that sets the evidential argument apart from the logical argument.[2]
The logical possibility of hidden or unknown reasons for the existence of evil still exist. However, the existence of God is viewed as any large-scale hypothesis or explanatory theory that aims to make sense of some pertinent facts. To the extent that it fails to do so it is disconfirmed.[2] According to Occam's razor, one should make as few assumptions as possible. Hidden reasons are assumptions. Thus, as per Draper's argument above, the theory that there is an omniscient and omnipotent being who is indifferent requires no hidden reasons in order to explain evil. It is thus a simpler theory than one that also requires hidden reasons regarding evil in order to include omnibenevolence. Similarly, for every hidden argument that completely or partially justifies observed evils it is equally likely that there is an hidden argument that actually makes the observed evils worse than they appear without hidden arguments. As such, from a probabilistic viewpoint hidden arguments will neutralize one another.[1]
A common response to the evidential argument is by claiming that we do can see plausible and not hidden reasons for God’s permission of evil. This is discussed in a later section.
[edit] Related arguments
If there is a belief in hell, possibly including eternal suffering, then the problem of hell is a particularly strong form of the problem of evil. If unbelief or incorrect beliefs or poor design are considered evils, then the argument from nonbelief, the argument from inconsistent revelations, and the argument from poor design are similar to the problem of evil. There are also various omnipotency paradoxes.
[edit] Attempted answers
Responses to the problem of evil have sometimes been classified as defenses or theodicies. However, authors disagree on the exact definitions.[1][2][11] Generally, a defense attempts to show that there is no logical incompatibility between the existence of evil and the existence of God. A defense need not argue that this is a probable or plausible explanation. Only that the defense is logically possible. A defense attempts to answer the logical problem of evil.
A theodicy, from Greek θεός (theós, "god") and δίκη (díkē, "justice")), on the other hand, is a more ambitious attempt to provide a plausible justification for the existence of evil. A theodicy attempts to answer the evidential problem of evil.[2] Richard Swinburne maintains that it does not make sense to assume there are greater goods, unless we know what they are, i.e., we have a successful theodicy.[12]
As an example, some authors see arguments including demons or the fall of man as not logically impossible but not very plausible considering our knowledge about the world. Thus they are seen as defenses but not good theodicies.[2]
[edit] Free will
The free will argument is as follows. God's creation of persons with morally significant free will is something of tremendous value. God could not eliminate evil and suffering without thereby eliminating the greater good of having created persons with free will and who can make moral choices.[9][2] Christian apologist Greg Boyd claims that God's all-powerful nature does not mean that God exercises all power, and instead allows free agents to act against his own wishes.[13] He also argues that the need for a stable and predictable world, in which free agents can interact and build relationships, means that the laws of nature cannot be altered every time someone is going to be harmed. [14]
C. S. Lewis writes in his book The Problem of Pain:
| “ | We can, perhaps, conceive of a world in which God corrected the results of this abuse of free will by His creatures at every moment: so that a wooden beam became soft as grass when it was used as a weapon, and the air refused to obey me if I attempted to set up in it the sound waves that carry lies or insults. But such a world would be one in which wrong actions were impossible, and in which, therefore, freedom of the will would be void; nay, if the principle were carried out to its logical conclusion, evil thoughts would be impossible, for the cerebral matter which we use in thinking would refuse its task when we attempted to frame them.[15] | ” |
[edit] Definition of evil as absence of good
The fifth century theologian Augustine of Hippo maintained that evil was only privatio boni, or an absence of good, much like darkness is an absence of light. An evil thing can only be referred to as a negative form of a good thing, such as discord, injustice, and loss of life or of liberty. It is argued that evil is not created by God, but that God created mankind who has the choice to commit evil acts. [16]
[edit] Irenaean and Augustinian Theodicy
There have been two main responses to the problem of evil and suffering that the church has adopted. The Augustinian theodicy posited by St Augustine of Hippo, and Irenaean theodicy.
Augustinian Theodicy Augustinian theodicy focuses on the genesis story that essentially dictates that God created the world and that it was good; evil is merely a consequence of the fall of man (The story of the garden of eden where Adam disobeyed God and caused inherent sin for man). Augustine stated that natural evil (evil present in the natural world such as natural disasters etc) was a direct result of the fall of man, whereas moral evil (evil caused by the will of human beings) is as a result of man having become estranged from God and choosing to deviate from his chosen path. Augustine argued that God could not have created evil in the world, as it was created good, and that all notions of evil are simply a deviation or privation of goodness. Evil cannot be separate and unique substance. For example, Blindness is not a separate entity, but is merely a lack or privation of sight. Thus they would argue that the problem of evil and suffering is void as God did not create evil; it was man who chose to deviate from the path of perfect goodness.
However this poses a number of questions such as DNA or Genetics; as if evil is merely a consequence of our choosing to deviate from God's desired goodness; then genetic disposition of 'evil' must surely be in God's plan and desire and cannot be blamed on Man. Similarly the idea of inherent sin because of our forebears seems incompatible with the teachings in the bible. The Old Testament states "should the children's teeth be set on edge because their fathers ate sour grapes?"[17]
Irenaean theodicy Irenaean Theodicy was first created by Irenaeus, however has been reformulated into its current state by John Hick. This is the belief and idea that one cannot achieve moral goodness or love for God if there is no evil and suffering in the world. Evil is soul making and leads one to be truly moral and close to God. God created an Epistemic distance (Where God is not immediately knowable) so that we may strive to know him and by doing so become truly good. Evil is good for 3 main reasons:
1. Useful as a means of knowledge Hunger leads to pain, and causes a desire to feed. Knowledge of pain prompts humans to seek to help others in pain
2. Character Building Evil offers the opportunity to grow morally. “We would never learn the art of goodness in a world designed as a hedonistic paradise” Swinburne
3. A predictable Environment The world runs to a series of natural laws. These are independent of any inhabitants of the universe. Natural Evil only occurs when these natural laws conflict with our own perceived needs. This is not immoral in any way.
[edit] See also
- Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov's chapters Rebellion and The Grand Inquisitor
- Irenaean theodicy
- Inconsistent triad
- Is-ought problem
- Qliphoth and Sephirah in Kabbalah
- Post-monotheism
- The Problem of Pain
- Trilemma
[edit] Notes
- ^ a b c d e The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "The Problem of Evil", Michael Tooley
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "| The Evidential Problem of Evil", Nick Trakakis
- ^ "Ancient Babylonia—Wisdom Literature". Bible History Online. http://www.bible-history.com/babylonia/BabyloniaWisdom_Literature.htm. Retrieved on 2007-04-19.
- ^ Nicholas J. Rengger, Moral Evil and International Relations, in SAIS Review 25:1, Winter/Spring 2005, pages 3-16
- ^ Peter Kivy, Melville's Billy and the Secular Problem of Evil: the Worm in the Bud, in The Monist (1980), 63
- ^ Kekes, John (1990). Facing Evil. Princeton: Princeton UP. ISBN 0691073708.
- ^ Timothy Anders, The Evolution of Evil (2000)
- ^ J.D. Duntley and David Buss, "The Evolution of Evil," in Miller, Arthur (2004). The Social Psychology of Good and Evil. New York: Guilford. pp. 102-133. ISBN 157230989X. http://homepage.psy.utexas.edu/homepage/Group/BussLAB/pdffiles/The%20evolution%20of%20evil.pdf.
- ^ a b c The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "| The Logical Problem of Evil", James R. Beebe
- ^ Draper, Paul (1989). "Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists". Noûs 23 (3): 331–350. doi:. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624%28198906%2923%3A3%3C331%3APAPAEP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0.
- ^ Honderich, Ted (2005). "theodicy". The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. ISBN 0199264791. "John Hick, for example, proposes a theodicy, while Alvin Plantinga formulates a defense. The idea of human free will often appears in a both of these strategies, but in different ways.".
- ^ Swinburne, Richard (2005). "evil, the problem of". in Ted Honderich. The Oxford Companion to Philosophy. ISBN 0199264791.
- ^ Gregory A. Boyd Is God to blame? (InterVarsity Press: Downers Grove, 2003) p.57-58
- ^ Gregory A. Boyd Is God to blame? (InterVarsity Press: Downers Grove, 2003) p.114
- ^ C. S. Lewis The Problem of Pain HarperCollins:New York, 1996 p.24-25
- ^ http://www.str.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=5093
- ^ Jeremiah 31:29-30 and Ezekiel 18:2-4
[edit] References
- Beebe, James R. (2006), "The Logical Problem of Evil", in Fieser, James; Bradley, Dowden, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Carver Thomas N. 1908. "The Economic Basis of the Problem of Evil," Harvard Theological Review, 1(1), pp. 97-111.
- Farrer, Austin (1961), Love Almighty and Ills Unlimited, Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
- Wilson, William McF.; Hartt, Julian N. (2004), "Farrer's Theodicy", in Hein, David; Henderson, Edward, Captured by the Crucified: The Practical Theology of Austin Farrer, New York: T & T Clark International, pp. 100–118, ISBN 0567025101.
- Haught, James A. (1996), 2,000 Years of Disbelief: Famous People with the Courage to Doubt, Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, ISBN 1-57392-067-3.
- Hick, John (1966), Evil and the God of Love, London: Macmillan, ISBN 978-0060639020.
- Mackie, J. L. (1982), The Miracle of Theism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, ISBN 978-0060639020.
- Murray, Michael (1998), "Leibniz on the Problem of Evil", in Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Palmquist, Stephen (2000), "Faith in the Face of Evil (Appendix VI)", Kant's Critical Religion, Aldershot, England: Ashgate, ISBN 0-7546-1333-X.
- Plantinga, Alvin (1977), God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, ISBN 978-0802817310.
- Plantinga, Alvin (1974), The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon Press, ISBN 978-0198244141.
- Swinburne, Richard (1997), The Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, ISBN 978-0198240709.
- Tooley, Michael (2002), "The Problem of Evil", in Zalta, Edward N., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Trakakis, Nick (2006), "Evidential Problem of Evil", in Fieser, James; Bradley, Dowden, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[edit] External links
- A Rational and Biblical Approach to the Problem of Hell (A Calvinist Theodicy)
- Why Does God Permit Suffering? (A Jehovah's Witness Perspective)
- Problem of Evil Blog
- Gregory S. Neal: "The Nature of Evil and the Irenaean Theodicy" Grace Incarnate (1988)
- Putting God on Trial — The Biblical Book of Job A Hegelian theodicy.
- A Collection and Critique of Responses
- A debate between theist William Lane Craig and atheist Kai Neilsen regarding the problem of evil.
- A selection of articles on good and evil in Judaism from Chabad.org
- Apocatastasis article at Orthodoxwiki
- The Problem of Evils & Predestination, (Islam), Frithjof Schuon, retrieved 11 June 2007
- Bediuzzaman Said Nursî's Scriptural Approach to the Problem of Evil, (Islam), Yamine Mermer, retrieved 11 June 2007
- Beyond the Problem of Evil, A Graduate Level Research Paper
- Tattersall, Nicholas (1998). "The Evidential Argument from Evil". Secular Web Library. Internet Infidels. http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/nicholas_tattersall/evil.html. Retrieved on 2007-04-12.
- Evidential Arguments from Evil
- Project Gutenburg: Leibniz, Theodicy (English translation)
- Theodicy: the problem of Evil
- Dr. Barry L. Whitney, preeminent figure on theodicies
- Faith in the Face of Evil, Appendix VI of Kant's Critical Religion, by Stephen Palmquist.
[edit] Encyclopedias
- The Logical Problem of Evil entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- The Evidential Problem of Evil entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- The Problem of Evil entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Leibniz on the Problem of Evil entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
- Evil - The Catholic Encyclopedia
- Theodicy - The Catholic Encyclopedia
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