Accession of Turkey to the European Union

Turkey formally applied to join the European Community—the organisation that has since developed into the European Union—on April 14, 1987. It was officially recognised as a candidate for membership on December 10, 1999 at the Helsinki summit of the European Council, having been an Associate Member since 1963. It has been invited to start negotiations from October 3, 2005, a process that is likely to take at least a decade to complete. Its possible future accession is now the central controversy of the ongoing enlargement of the European Union.

File:Crude-EU29.png

The EU, after the proposed admission of Turkey (as well as Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia)

History

Turkey first applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community in 1957, and finally signed an Association Agreement in 1963. This provided for the future possibility of full membership. Turkey made such an application on 14 April, 1987. Though this application was rejected by the Commission in 1989, on the basis of its poor economy and human rights record, Turkey's eligibility for membership was confirmed.

During the 1990s Turkey proceeded with a closer integration with the European Union by agreeing to a customs union in 1995 (in effect since 1996). Moreover the Helsinki European Council of 1999 again stated that Turkey was a candidate for full membership on the same basis as other candidates, namely the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria.

Another significant aspect of this summit was that Greece for the first time withdrew its longstanding objections over giving Turkey official candidate status. In return, Turkey agreed to cooperate for a solution on the problem of divided Cyprus, while the European Union pledged that such a solution would not however be a prerequisite on the future accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the Union. Around this time a strong and wide-reaching reform program was also initiated under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a popular pro-European party with Islamist roots.

The next significant step in Turkish-EU relationships came with the December 2002 Copenhagen European Council. According to it, "[t]he EU would open negotiations with Turkey 'without delay' if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria."

Turkey also backed the latest EU-supported UN plan to reunite Cyprus in 2004, even though it had consistently rejected all earlier efforts. At the same time, a three-decade long period of hyperinflation ended, with inflation being reduced to 6% in recent years from annual levels of 75% during the mid-90s.

Also the political reform program of the Erdoğan government continued. Some specific developments during this time included:

• Turkey ratified the Sixth Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights and signed the 13th Protocol, meaning it has abolished the death penalty for all crimes, peacetime and wartime.
• The AKP government has lifted a small part of the large-scale ban on the teaching of Kurdish; now there are two private schools teaching Kurdish—although it does not yet accept the use of Kurdish in regular education (as required by European conventions in those areas historically and currently inhabited by Kurds).

In response to these developments, the European Commission recommended that the negotiations should begin in 2005, but also added various precautionary measures. The EU's leaders agreed on 16 December, 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey from 3 October, 2005. The country's eventual accession now faces democratic approval processes in European and member states legislative procedures.

One of the recommendations of the Commission's report was that the EU will need to define its financial perspective for the period from 2014 before negotiations can be concluded. Though it is as yet unknown if and when Turkey will actually join, this clarified somewhat the timeframe: it may be unlikely to happen before 2015—while some EU officials have discussed 2019 as a potential end-date.

Concerns and opposition to Turkey's entry

The main EU concerns about Turkey have traditionally been the Turkish human rights record, Turkey's non-recognition of the Armenian Genocide, the state of its economy, and the influence of the military in Turkish politics.

Opposition to Turkey's entry into the EU varies among the public of the current EU member states, as does political support or opposition to the entry bid. The issues mentioned by some of those objecting to Turkey's EU candidacy can be divided among those inherent to Turkey's situation, those that involve internal issues about human rights, democracy, and related matters, and those concerning Turkey's open external disputes with its neighbours.

Inherent issues

• Only 3% of Turkey's territory lies in geographical Europe. Furthermore, the Turkish capital is not in Europe, but, like Cyprus, in Asia. Turkey's membership would mean that the European Union's external borders would now reach Middle Eastern nations such as Syria, Iraq and Iran.

• Turkey's large size and relative poverty. Turkey would upon accession represent an expansion almost equal in population to that of the 2004 Enlargement while the Turkish economy has been known for very unstable growth and sharp recessions despite some recent improvement. Many question whether the EU can support and "absorb" such a large and poor state, and many member states are wary of a potentially huge wave of poor Turkish immigration.

• Turkey's large political power once in the Union. Its almost 70 million inhabitants will bestow it the second largest number of representatives in the European Parliament, after Germany. With the current rate of population increase some fear it might even surpass Germany by the time of accession.

• Possible differences in fundamental ethical values and culture between a predominantly Muslim country with current EU members, all of which are historically Christian (though increasingly secular). This remains an issue even though both Turkey and current EU members claim to be secular, and thereby would in principle not discriminate on the basis of religion. Beginning in 2005, fierce internal intellectual opposition arose in Turkey against the state's encouragement of nationalism. Leading intellectuals heavily criticised the Erdoğan government's aggressive stance on Armenia and other issues.

Human rights, democracy, and other internal issues

• Turkey so far refuses to recognize its responsibility for the Armenian Genocide, something which France has recently demanded Turkey do. Instead Turkey notes that the events were part of a civil war during final years of the Ottoman Empire. Important groups within the European Parliament have urged Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide in the past. Additionally, Turkey currently enforces a total trade embargo against Armenia, and the Turkish-Armenian border is closed.

• Many have continuing doubts on the commitment of the Turkish state to democracy and human rights, and its ability to reach European standards in these and other issues such as gender equality and minority rights (especially as regards the Kurdish population and non-Muslims). Freedom of political speech is another area in which some concerns have arisen (e.g. "Regular Report on Turkey's progress towards accession", p. 36 and others). Some decry the recent recognition of the Kurdish language by Turkish authorities as a cosmetic operation. Kurdish education is provided through only a few private local courses, while television in Kurdish is only for half an hour a week and under the monopoly of the state broadcasting corporation TRT. Turkey's persecution of the Kurdish people and other indigenous populations is also of concern.

• The issue of church and state separation is another concern. Islam continues to enjoy large-scale privileges in Turkey, with thousands of imams in state employment, while Turkish clerics from other religions are not paid at all. The Greek Orthodox Church has not yet been able to re-open the Theological School of Halki as has been its request. Turkey also continues to post state-financed imams to regions of EU member states (both to those where the local minority of Turkish origin requests one and those that prefer locally trained imams). Some EU citizens resent this as interference in the domestic affairs of their states. Moreover, some religious traditions are a concern, as they may be at odds with official equality policy—for example the continued consecration of polygamous marriages by state-paid imams, incompatible with the EU's very fundamental insistence on equal rights for women. Although the claims of the Alevi minority have become more vocal in recent years, the Turkish state continues its policy of building mosques and sending imams to Alevi villages. Some current members however are also open to criticism on these grounds. In the United Kingdom the law forbids the head of state from being a Catholic and there are number of state-financed faith schools.

• A largely unnoticed issue is the fact that Turkey signed both the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (CDRHI). That declaration has contradictory statements on the equality of and the non-discrimination between sexes as claiming in principle that legal systems should be defined in accordance with Shariah. However the European Court of Human Rights on 13 February, 2003 declared Shariah to be mutually incompatible with democracy: "The Court concurs in the Chamber’s view that sharia is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy" Case of Refah Partısı (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey. In that ruling the European Court upheld the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court to remove the mandates of three MPs for, among other things, advocating Shariah for Turkey which suggests that the chances of Turkey adopting Shariah are slim.

Relations with neighbours

• The Cyprus dispute—the island is still divided after Turkey's 1974 invasion of the island following a Greek coup d'etat against the Cypriot government, with Turkey occupying and supporting the internationally unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Turkey continues to occupy northern Cyprus and to officially recognise only the TRNC and not the Republic of Cyprus, which is an EU member (currently exerting sovereignty only over the southern part of the island).

• The Aegean crisis, a series of unresolved geostrategic issues in the Aegean Sea between Greece (a present EU member) and Turkey, which are sources of a great number of military provocations between those two countries.

• The economic embargo and closure of land border crossings currently maintained against Armenia (because of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh). In this conflict Turkey has sided with the ethnically and religiously closer Azerbaijan over Armenia, with which Turkey has many other disputes stemming from the Armenian Genocide. EU reports 3, p.8 state that Turkey should take active measures to resolve this situation before eventual accession, while then-President of the Commission, Romano Prodi said: "Personally, I do not like that the Armenian-Turkish border gate is closed. I do not exclude that the issue of closed borders could be one of the preconditions for Turkey's membership." [1]

• For the above reasons, Turkey has insisted that the route of the lucrative Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline bypass Armenian territory. Critics point out that this policy of embargo and isolation of a smaller neighbor is inconsistent with Turkey's desire to join the open European Community.

Effect on the future direction of the EU

There are two possible effects of Turkey's membership on the EU's future direction that are perceived differently depending on a person's own beliefs about what that direction should be.

• Many believe that the inclusion of such a large country with a different culture and poor economy might make it extremely difficult for the EU to deepen its integration, and might force it to be reduced to a simple zone of economic cooperation. This is something that is considered a benefit by many eurosceptics who want the EU to structurally remain as is or even revert to an earlier state, being mainly an economic free market project and not a wider political and cultural project, but the opposite view is espoused by the European federalists.

• Turkey is a traditionally Atlanticist and NATO country, with very close ties to the United States. The USA has also been one of the strongest backers of Turkey's membership. Some member states, like France, wish the EU to increase its political independence from the United States and therefore believe Turkish membership is undesirable. Atlanticist countries, however, like the United Kingdom, would see their positions strengthened.

• Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has opposed Turkey's admission on the grounds that it would lead to demands for accession by Morocco.

Turkey and others' arguments for entry

Turkey stresses its involvement in European history for about 500 years, mostly through the Ottoman Empire. It considers itself a European state. A prevalent point of view in Turkey, echoed by its prime minister Erdoğan, is that the EU seems to be a "Christian club", that the EU has no right to consider itself that way, and that this causes reluctance to accept a Muslim state into the Union.

There are alleged double standards in the requisites for Turkish membership. While some refuse Turkey's admission on the grounds of its territory being mostly Asian, Cyprus is also considered to be geographically Asian. Turkey is poor but not significantly more so than Bulgaria and Romania which will in all likelihood be joining in 2007. While critics claim that Turkey is not secular and point to the proposal of an anti-adultery bill, in the Republic of Ireland divorce was illegal upon its accession. (It should be noted, however, that Ireland's accession occurred in 1973 when the European Community was a much more purely economically-oriented union.)

The Turks clearly consider their state a strongly secular one, just as the EU defines itself (for example with the abandonment of the proposals to make reference to Europe's Christian heritage in the draft European Constitution).

Turkey's overwhelmingly Muslim population would lend considerable weight to EU multi-culturalism efforts and might help to prevent potential scenarios involving a clash of civilizations. At the same time, Turkey's young (23% of population is under 15) and relatively well-educated population might act as a balance for the increasingly aging populations of the current EU.

Outside Turkey, Atlanticist countries such as the United Kingdom believe that Turkey, having been a staunch NATO ally, would help counteract France's usually independent stance towards the United States. Germany has long-lasting historical ties to Turkey and a considerable Turkish minority that is supportive of Turkish membership.

Many in the West believe that Turkish membership would cement its alignment with the West. Turkey is a strong regional military power that would give the EU more weight in hotspots like Syria, Iraq or Iran. Alternatively some believe that conditional Turkish membership would encourage moves towards more stable economic growth, democratic government and a less interfering military. This could potentially provide a model of democracy for the rest of the Middle East, comparable to the role played by Western Europe in the Cold War.

Likelihood of accession

EU member states must unanimously agree to Turkish membership for Turkish accession to be successful. A number of nations could oppose it, notably Austria, which historically served as a bulwark for Christian Europe against the Ottoman Empire, and France, which is fearful of the prospect of another wave of Muslim immigrants (especially given the poor integration of its existing, mainly Arab, Muslim minority).

• French President Jacques Chirac, a supporter of the accession of Turkey into the EU, had to agree that the amendment to the French constitution authorizing the ratification of the proposed European Constitution [2] contains a clause saying that a referendum is required before France can give its approval to Turkey or other future candidates to the European Union (the amendment excludes states that have already signed agreements). [3] Some politicians opposed to the constitutional treaty, such as Philippe de Villiers, pretended that the treaty paved the way to Turkish membership, which they deem highly undesirable.
• Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schüssel has said that he may hold a referendum on the issue. Recently, Austrian President Heinz Fischer has strongly suggested a pan-European referendum on the issue, given its great importance for the future of the EU. Recent Greek governments supported Turkish membership hoping that Turkey would soften up its stance in a number of issues of conflict between Turkey and Greece during the process of and after joining EU. However, opinion polls from the end of December 2004 show that opposition is twice as strong among ordinary Greeks as support.
• Notable individuals in many other countries also oppose Turkish membership. In Belgium, Willy Claes and Karel van Miert, both socialist ex-prime ministers, one a former NATO-secretary and the other a former European Commissioner, are strongly opposed to any Turkish adhesion. Similar opposition is known from Jacques Delors, a French socialist and former president of the European Commission.

Developments within Turkey could also freeze accession talks—such as interference of the skeptical military in civilian rule, the rise to power of a hard-line Islamic or nationalist government, or the current government failing to prove its willingness to respect the acquis communautaire.

The European Parliament has voted overwhelmingly in favor of Turkish membership talks.[4]

Reactions (quotes)

"In my opinion, it would be the end of Europe."—Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (former President of France, drafter of the European Constitution), 8 November, 2002.

"Turkey has always been associated with European civilisation, and it is an important and loyal member of the Atlantic alliance. It is in our political interest to have a modern, stable, democratic Turkey which has made the choice of secularism since 1924, a Turkey agreeing to share our aims and values."—French President Jacques Chirac, April 29, 2004

References

• The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam

See Also

• Foreign relations of Turkey
• Armenian Genocide
• Greco-Turkish relations
• Cyprus dispute
• Kurdish people
• Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
• Nagorno-Karabakh
• Istanbul Pogrom

External links

• The COE's Framework Convention for the Protection of national Minorities
• EU report on Issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective
• Human Rights Watch on Turkey
• Foreign Affairs - Turkey's Dreams of Accession
• Foreign Affairs - Talking Turkey (Discussion about Turkish Accession)
• BBC Have Your Say - Should Turkey Join the EU? (Moderated public discussion concerning primarily English-speaking opinion concerning Turkish Accession)
• Freedom of Expression in Turkey - IFEX
• EUROPE’S REASONS AND TURKEY’S ACCESSION (ARI)
• Good Reasons to Say NO to Turkey
• European Press Review: E.U. Snubs Turkey (Views about Turkish EU membership from London, Paris, Frankfurt, Athens, Berlin, Munich, Vienna, Hamburg, Turin, and Zurich)
• Turn the Page, but Read It First: Why Europe and Turkey Must Now Address the Armenian Genocide