Rwandan genocide

The Rwandan Genocide was the 1994 mass killing of hundreds of thousands of Rwanda's Tutsis and Hutu political moderates by Hutus under the Hutu Power ideology. Over the course of approximately 100 days, from the assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana on 6 April up until mid July, at least 500,000 people were killed. Most estimates indicate a death toll between 800,000 and 1,000,000.

The genocide had its roots in the Hutu-Tutsi ethnic divide and related sporadic violence, which had resulted in a large number of Tutsi refugees in the nations around Rwanda by 1990. In that year, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group composed mostly of Tutsi refugees, invaded. The Rwandan Civil War, fought between the Hutu regime, with support from Francophone nations of Africa and France itself, and the RPF, with support from Uganda, vastly increased the ethnic tensions in the country and led to the rise of Hutu Power, an ideology that stressed that the Tutsi intended to enslave Hutus and thus must be resisted at all costs. Despite ongoing ethnic tension, including the displacement of large numbers of Hutu in the north by the rebels and periodic localized ethnic cleansing of Tutsi to the south, pressure on the government of Juvénal Habyarimana led to a cease-fire in 1993 and the preliminary implementation of the Arusha Accords.

A genocidal plan had existed since 1957, when the Hutu Emancipation Movement called the Parmehutu published the "Bahutu" Manufesto, where it reported the monopoly of power held by the Tutsi minority. In the 1960, these denunciations led to the overthrowing of the monarchy and the establishment of the Republic headed by Gregoire Kayibanda. This was a regime which persecuted the Tutsi, who in many cases were forced to flee. The persecution also went on under the regime of Juvénal Habyarimana who had seized the power in 1973 and promised progress and reconciliation.

The assassination of Habyarimana in April 1994 was the proximate cause of mass killing of Tutsi and pro-peace Hutus carried out primarily by two Hutu militias associated with political parties: the Interahamwe and the Impuzamugambi. The genocide was directed by a Hutu Power group known as the Akazu. The killing also marked the end of the peace agreement meant to end the war and the Tutsi RPF restarted their offensive, eventually defeating the army and seizing control of the country.

Civil war

Main article: Rwandan Civil War

The Tutsi refugee diaspora was by the late 1980s a coherent political and military organization. Large numbers of Tutsi refugees in Uganda had joined the victorious rebel National Resistance Movement during the Ugandan Bush War and made themselves a separate movement. This was similar to the NRM, with two parts, the political RPF and the military RPA. On the international stage this movement is known as the RPF.

In October 1990 the RPF invaded Rwanda to restore themselves within the nation. The journal Kangura, a Hutu counteraction towards the Tutsi journal Kanguka, active from 1990 to 1993, was instrumental in incitement of Hutu disdain for Tutsis, on the basis of their ethnicity, rather than their previous economic advantages. Hassan Ngeze, founder and editor of Kangura, published the widely read Hutu Ten Commandments, which called for the formal installment of Hutu Power ideology in schools and the establishment of an exclusively Hutu army. Among the commandments was the dictum, "The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi."

In August 1993, the rebels and the Government of Rwanda signed the Arusha Accords, to end the civil war. The accords rolled back the authoritarian power of President Juvénal Habyarimana, vesting authority in the Transitional Broad Based Government (TBBG). The TBBG would include the RPF as well as the five political parties that had formed the coalition government, in place since April 1992, to govern until proper elections could be held. The Transitional National Assembly (TNA), the legislative branch of the transitional government, was open to all parties, including the RPF. The extremist Hutu Coalition for the Defence of the Republic (CDR), nominally controlled by President Habyarimana, was strongly opposed to sharing power with the RPF, however, and refused to sign the accords. When at last it decided to agree to the terms, the accords were opposed by the RPF. The situation remained unchanged until the genocide.

Preparations for the genocide

The killing was well organized and by the time it had started, the Rwandan militia numbered around 30,000 — one militia member for every ten families — and organized nationwide, with representatives in every neighborhood. Some militia members were able to acquire AK-47 assault rifles by completing requisition forms. Other weapons, such as grenades, required no paperwork and were widely distributed. Many members of the Interahamwe and Impuzamugambi were armed only with machetes, but these were some of the most effective killers.

Rwandan Prime Minister Jean Kambanda revealed, in his testimony before the International Criminal Tribunal, that the genocide was openly discussed in cabinet meetings and that "one cabinet minister said she was personally in favor of getting rid of all Tutsi; without the Tutsi, she told ministers, all of Rwanda's problems would be over." In addition to Kambanda, the genocide's organizers included Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, a retired army officer, and many top ranking government officials and members of the army, such as General Augustin Bizimungu. On the local level, the Genocide's planners included Burgomasters, or mayors, and members of the police.

Government leaders communicated with figures among the population to form and arm militias called Interahamwe, "those who stand (fight, kill) together", and Impuzamugambi, "those who have the same (or a single) goal". These groups, especially the youth wings, were responsible for most of the violence.

Facts and figures

Out of a population of 7.3 million people - 84% of whom where Hutu, 15% Tutsi and 1% Twa - the official figures published by the Rwandan government estimated the number of victims of the genocide to 1,174,000 in 100 days (10,000 murdered every day, 400 every hour, 7 every minute). Other sources put the death toll to 800,000, including 20% Hutus. It is estimated that about 300,000 Tutsis survived the genocide. Thousands of widows, many of whom were submitted to rape, are now HIV positive. There are about 400,000 orphans and nearly 85,000 of them have become heads of family.

Media Propaganda

The cover of the December 1993 issue of Kangura. The title states, "Tutsi: Race of God", while the text to the right of the machete states, "Which weapons are we going to use to beat the cockroaches for good?". The man pictured is the second president of the First Republic, Grégoire Kayibanda, who made Hutu the governing ethnicity after the 1959 massacres.

According to recent commentators the news media played a crucial role in the genocide: local print and radio media fuelled the killings, while the international media either ignored or seriously misconstrued events on the ground. The print media in Rwanda is believed to have started hate speech against Tutsis which was later continued by radio stations. According to commentators anti-Tutsi hate speech “became so systemic as to seem the norm.” The state-owned newspaper Kangura had a central role, starting an anti-Tutsi and anti-RPF campaign in October 1990. In the ongoing International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the individuals behind Kangura have been accused of producing leaflets in 1992 picturing a machete and asking “What shall we do to complete the social revolution of 1959?” - a reference to the Hutu revolt that overthrew the Tutsi monarchy and the subsequent politically orchestrated communal violence that resulted in thousands of mostly Tutsi casualties and forced roughly 300,000 Tutsis to flee to neighboring Burundi and Uganda. Kangura also published the infamous “10 Hutu Commandments,” which called upon Hutus to massacre Tutsis, and more generally communicated the message that the RPF had a devious grand strategy (one feature article was titled “Tutsi colonization plan”).

Due to high rates of illiteracy at the time of the genocide, radio was an important way for the government to deliver messages to the public. Two radio stations key to inciting violence before and during the genocide were Radio Rwanda and Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines(RTLM). In March 1992, Radio Rwanda was first used in directly promoting the killing of Tutsi in Bugesera, south of the national capital Kigali. Radio Rwanda repeatedly broadcast a communiqué warning that Hutu in Bugesera would be attacked by Tutsi, a message used by local officials to convince Hutu that they needed to protect themselves by attacking first. Led by soldiers, Hutu civilians and members of the Interahamwe, subsequently attacked and killed hundreds of Tutsi. At the end of 1993, the RTLM's highly sensationalized reporting on the assassination of the Burundi president, a Hutu, was used to underline supposed Tutsi brutality. The RTLM falsely reported that the president had been tortured, including castration of the victim (in pre-colonial times, some Tutsi kings castrated defeated enemy rulers). From late October 1993, the RTLM repeatedly broadcast themes developed by the extremist written press, underlining the inherent differences between Hutu and Tutsi, the foreign origin of Tutsi, the disproportionate share of Tutsi wealth and power, and the horrors of past Tutsi rule. RTLM also repeatedly stressed the need to be alert to Tutsi plots and possible attacks and called upon Hutu to prepare to 'defend' themselves against the Tutsi. After 6 April 1994, authorities used RTLM and Radio Rwanda to spur and direct killings, specifically in areas where the killings initially were resisted. Both radio stations were used to incite and mobilize, then to give specific directions for carrying out the killings.

The RTLM had used terms such as inyenzi (cockroach in Kinyarwandan) and Tutsi interchangeably with others referring to RPF combatants and warned specifically that RPF combatants dressed in civilian clothes were mingling among displaced people fleeing combat zones. These broadcasts gave the impression that all Tutsi were necessarily supporters of the RPF force fighting against the government. Women were part of the anti-Tutsi propaganda prior the 1994 genocide, for example the "Ten Hutu Commandments" published in December 1990 by “Kangura” included four commandments which portrayed Tutsi women as tools of the Tutsi people, as sexual weapons that would be used by the Tutsi to weaken and ultimately destroy the Hutu men. Gender based propaganda also include cartoons printed in newspapers depicting Tutsi women as sex objects. Examples of gender-based hate propaganda used to incite war rape include statements by perpetrators such as “You Tutsi women think that you are too good for us” and “Let us see what a Tutsi woman tastes like “.

United Nations

On January 11, 1994 Lieutenant General Roméo Dallaire (UN Force Commander in Rwanda) notified Military Advisor to the Secretary-General, Major-General Maurice Baril of four major weapons caches and plans by the Hutus for extermination of Tutsis. The telegram from Dallaire stated that an informant who was a top level Interahamwe militia trainer was in charge of demonstrations carried out a few days before. The goal of the demonstrations was to provoke an RPF battalion in Kigali into firing upon demonstrators and Belgian United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops into using force. Under such a scenario the Interhamwe would have an excuse to engage the Belgian troops and the RPF battalion. Several Belgians were to be killed, which would guarantee a withdrawal of the Belgian contingent. According to the informant, 1,700 Interhamwe militiamen were trained in Governmental Forces camps and he was ordered to register all the Kigali Tutsis. Dallaire made immediate plans for UNAMIR troops to seize the arms caches and advised UN Headquarters of his intentions, believing these actions lay within his mission's mandate. The following day headquarters stated in another cable that the outlined actions went beyond the mandate granted to UNAMIR under Security Council Resolution 872. Instead, President Habyarimana was to be informed of possible Arusha Accords violations and the discovered concerns and report back on measures taken. The January 11 telegram later played an important role in discussion about what information was available to the United Nations prior to the genocide.

On the 6 April 1994 the RTLM accused the Belgian peacekeepers of having shot down – or helping to shoot down – the president's plane. This broadcast has been linked to the killing of ten Belgian UN troops by soldiers of the Rwandan army.

The situation proved too "risky" for the United Nations to attempt to help. The RPF successfully brought the country under their sway, although their efforts towards a conclusion to the conflict were delayed after the UN-mandated French-led force, under Operation Turquoise, established and maintained a "safe zone" for Hutu refugees to flee to in the southwest. Eventually, after the UN Mandate of the French mission was at an end, millions of refugees left Rwanda, mainly headed to Zaire. The presence of Hutu refugees (see Great Lakes refugee crisis) on the border with Rwanda was the cause for the First and Second Congo Wars with clashes between these groups and the Rwandan government continuing.

The UN's mandate forbids intervening in the internal politics of any country unless the crime of genocide is being committed. France has been accused of aiding the Hutu regime to flee by creating what is known as Operation Turquoise. Canada, Ghana, and the Netherlands provided consistent support for the UN mission under the command of Roméo Dallaire although it was left without an appropriate mandate for the capacity to intervene from the U.N. Security Council. Despite emphatic demands from UNAMIR's commanders in Rwanda, before and throughout the genocide, its requests for authorization to end it were refused and its intervention-capacity was even reduced.

Religion

Main article: Religion in Rwanda

Religious factors were not prominent; the event was ethnically motivated. However the Human Rights Watch reported that a number of religious authorities, particularly Roman Catholic, in Rwanda failed to condemn the genocide. On the other hand the acquittal of Bishop Misago, accused of corruption and complicity in the genocide, in 2000 raised questions about this. The majority of Rwandans and of Tutsis in particular are Catholic.

Catalyst and initial events

Main articles: Assassination of Habyarimana and Ntaryamira and Initial events of the Rwandan Genocide

Memorial for the dead Belgian UNAMIR personnel in Kigali.

On April 6, 1994, the airplane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, and Cyprien Ntaryamira, the Hutu president of Burundi, was shot down as it prepared to land in Kigali. Both presidents died when the plane crashed. Responsibility for the attack is disputed, with both the RPF and Hutu extremists being blamed. But in spite of disagreements about the identities of its perpetrators, the attack on the plane is to many observers the catalyst for the genocide.

On April 6 and April 7 the staff of the Rwandan Armed Forces (RAF) and Colonel Theoneste Bagosora clashed verbally with the UNAMIR Force Commander Lieutenant General Dallaire, who stressed the legal authority of the Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, to take control of the situation as outlined in the Arusha Accords. Bagosora disputed the authority, and Dallaire gave an escort of UNAMIR personnel to Mrs. Uwilingiyimana to protect her and to allow her to send a calming message on the radio the next morning. But by then, the presidential guard had occupied the radio station and Mrs. Uwilingiyimana had to cancel her speech. In the middle of the day, she was assassinated by the presidential guard. The ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers sent to protect her were later found killed; Major Bernard Ntuyahaga was convicted of the murders in 2007. Other moderate officials who favored the Arusha Accords were quickly assassinated. Protected by UNAMIR, Faustin Twagiramungu escaped execution. In his book Shake Hands with the Devil, Dallaire recalled the events from April 7, the first day of the genocide:

I called the Force HQ and got through to [Ghanaian Brigadier General] Henry Anyidoho. He had horrifying news. The UNAMIR-protected VIPs - Lando Ndasingwa [the head of the Parti libéral], Joseph Kavaruganda [president of the constitutional court], and many other moderates had been abducted by the Presidential Guard and had been killed, along with their families [...] UNAMIR had been able to rescue Prime Minister Faustin, who was now at the Force HQ.

Genocide

Skulls in Murambi Technical School

Numerous elite Hutu politicians have been found guilty for the organization of the genocide. Military and Hutu militia groups systematically set out to murder all the Tutsis they could capture, irrespective of their age or sex, as well as the political moderates. The western nations evacuated their nationals from Kigali and abandoned their embassies in the initial stages of the violence. National radio, with the exacerbation of the situation, advised people to stay in their homes, and the Hutu power station RTLM broadcast vitriolic propaganda against Tutsis and Hutu moderates. Hundreds of roadblocks were put up by the militia around the country. Lieutenant-General Dallaire and UNAMIR were in Kigali, escorting Tutsis, and were unable to stop the Hutus from escalating their attacks. During this time, the Hutus also targeted Lieutenant-General Dallaire, and UNAMIR personnel through the RTLM.

Skulls of genocide victims in museum

The killing was quickly implemented throughout most of the country. The first to organize killings on the scale characterizing a genocide was the mayor of the northwestern town of Gisenyi, who on the evening of April 6 called a meeting to distribute arms and send out militias to kill Tutsis. Gisenyi was a center of anti-Tutsi sentiment, both as the homeland of the akazu and as the refuge for thousands of people displaced by the rebel occupation of large areas in the south. While killing occurred in other towns immediately after Habyarimana's assassination, it took several days for them to become organized on the scale of Gisenyi. The major exception to this pattern was in Butare Province. In Butare, Jean-Baptiste Habyarimana was the only Tutsi prefect and the province was the only one dominated by an opposition party. Prefect Habyarimana opposed the genocide, resulting in the province becoming a haven of relative calm, until he was arrested and killed on April 19. Finding the population of Butare lacking in enthusiasm for the killing, the government sent in militia members from Kigali and armed and mobilized the large population of Burundian refugees in the province, who had fled the Tutsi-dominated army fighting in the Burundian Civil War.

Murambi Technical School, where many victims were killed, is now a genocide museum.

Most of the victims were killed in their villages or in towns, often by their neighbors and fellow villagers. The militia members typically murdered their victims by hacking them with machetes, although some army units used rifles. The victims were often found hiding in churches and school buildings, where Hutu gangs massacred them. Ordinary citizens were called on by local officials and government-sponsored radio to kill their neighbors, and those who refused to kill were often killed themselves. "Either you took part in the massacres or you were massacred yourself." One such massacre occurred at Nyarubuye. On April 12, 1994, more than 1,500 Tutsis sought refuge in a Catholic church in Nyange, in then Kivumu commune. Local Interahamwe acting in concert with the priest and other local authorities then used bulldozers to knock down the church building.[3] People who tried to escape were hacked down with machetes or shot. Local priest Athanase Seromba was later found guilty and sentenced to life in prison by the ICTR for his role in the demolition of his church and convicted of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity.[4] In another case, thousands sought refuge in Ecole Technique Officielle school in Kigali where Belgian UNAMIR soldiers were stationed. However, on April 11, 1994, Belgian soldiers withdrew from the school and members of the Rwandan armed forces and militia killed all the Tutsis who were hiding there.

There is no consensus on the number of dead between April 6 and mid-July. Unlike the genocides carried out by the Nazis or by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, authorities made no attempts to record deaths. The RPF government has stated that 1,071,000 were killed, 10% of whom were Hutu. Philip Gourevitch agrees with an estimate of one million, while the United Nations lists the toll as 800,000. Alex de Waal and Rakiya Omar of African Rights estimates the number as "around 750,000," while Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch states that it was "at least 500,000." James Smith of Aegis Trust notes, "What's important to remember is that there was a genocide. There was an attempt to eliminate Tutsis — men, women, and children — and to erase any memory of their existence."

War rape

In 1998, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda made the landmark decisions that the war rape during the Rwanda genocide was an element of the crime of genocide. The Trial Chamber held that "sexual assault formed an integral part of the process of destroying the Tutsi ethnic group and that the rape was systematic and had been perpetrated against Tutsi women only, manifesting the specific intent required for those acts to constitute genocide." Although no explicit written orders to rape and sexual violence have been found, evidence suggests that military leaders encouraged or ordered their men to rape Tutsi as well as condoned the acts taking place, without making efforts to stop them. Compared to other conflicts the sexual violence in Rwanda stands out in terms of the organized nature of the propaganda that contributed significantly to fueling sexual violence against Tutsi women, the very public nature of the rapes and the level of brutality towards the women.

In his 1996 report the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Rwanda, Rene Degni-Segui stated that “rape was the rule and its absence the exception.” The report also stated that “rape was systematic and was used as a “weapon” by the perpetrators of the massacres. This can be estimated from the number and nature of the victims as well as from the forms of rape.” The Special Rapporteur estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandese women and girls had been raped. A 2000 report prepared by the Organization of African Unity’s International Panel of Eminent Personalities concluded that “we can be certain that almost all females who survived the genocide were direct victims of rape or other sexual violence, or were profoundly affected by it”. Within the context of the Rwanda genocide victims of sexual violence were predominantly attacked on the basis of their gender and ethnicity. The victims were mostly Tutsi women and girls, of all ages, while men were only seldom the victims of war rape. War rape during the genocide was also directed against Hutu women considered moderates, but also occurred regardless of ethnicity or political affiliation, with young or beautiful women being targeted based only on their gender. Sexual violence against men was much less common, but frequently included mutilation of the genitals, which were often displayed in public. The perpetrators of war rape during the Rwanda genocide were mainly members of the Hutu militia, the “Interahamwe”. Rapes were also committed by military soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forced (RAF), including the Presidential Guard, and civilians.

Sexual violence against women and girls during the Rwanda genocide included: rape, gang rape, sexual slavery (either collectively or individually through “forced marriages”), rape with objects such as sticks and weapons often leading to the victim’s death, sexual mutilation of, in particular, breasts, vaginas or buttocks, often during or following rape. Pregnant women were not spared from sexual violence and on many occasion victims were killed following rape. Many women were raped by men who knew they were HIV positive and it has been suggested that there were deliberate attempts to transmit the virus to Tutsi women and their families. War rape occurred across the country and was frequently perpetrated in plain view of others, at sites such as schools, churches, roadblocks, government buildings or in the bush. Some women were kept as personal slaves for years after the genocide, forced to move to neighbouring countries after the genocide along with their captors.

UNAMIR and the international community

Main articles: UNAMIR and Role of the international community in the Rwandan Genocide

A school chalk board in Kigali. Note the names "Dallaire", UNAMIR Force Commander, and "Marchal", UNAMIR Kigali sector commander.

UNAMIR was hampered from the outset by resistance from numerous members of the United Nations Security Council from becoming deeply involved first in the Arusha process and then the genocide. Only Belgium had asked for a strong UNAMIR mandate, but after the murder of the ten Belgian peacekeepers protecting the Prime Minister in early April, Belgium pulled out of the peacekeeping mission. Belgian equipment was sent directly from Somalia without any maintenance or cleaning in between missions, however the Belgian troops proved to be a necessary asset to the mission.

The UN and its member states appeared largely detached from the realities on the ground. In the midst of the crisis, Dallaire was instructed to focus UNAMIR on only evacuating foreign nationals from Rwanda. The change in orders led Belgian peacekeepers to abandon a technical school filled with 2,000 refugees, while Hutu militants waited outside, drinking beer and chanting "Hutu Power." After the Belgians left, the militants entered the school and massacred those inside, including hundreds of children. Four days later the Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR to 260 men.

Following the withdrawal of the Belgian forces, Lt. General Roméo Dallaire consolidated his contingent of Canadian, Ghanaian, and Dutch soldiers in urban areas and focused on providing areas of "safe control". His actions directly saved the lives of 20,000 Tutsis. The administrative head of UNAMIR, former Cameroonian foreign minister Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh, has been criticized for downplaying the significance of Dallaire's reports and for holding close ties to the Hutu militant elite.

The US government was reluctant to involve itself in the "local conflict" in Rwanda and refused to label the killings as "genocide", a decision which then-President Bill Clinton later came to regret in a Frontline television interview. In the interview Clinton stated that he believes if he had sent 5,000 U.S. peacekeepers, more than 500,000 lives could have been saved.

The new Rwandan government, led by interim President Théodore Sindikubwabo, worked to minimize international criticism. Rwanda at that time had a seat on the Security Council and its ambassador argued that the claims of genocide were exaggerated and that the government was doing all that it could to stop it.

The UN conceded that "acts of genocide may have been committed" on May 17, 1994. By that time, the Red Cross estimated that 500,000 Rwandans had been killed. The UN agreed to send 5,500 troops, mostly from African countries, to Rwanda. This was the original number of troops requested by General Dallaire before the killing escalated. The UN also requested 50 armoured personnel carriers from the U.S., but for the transport alone they were charged 6.5 million U.S. dollars by the U.S. Army. Deployment of these forces was delayed due to arguments over their cost and other factors.

French involvement

A French soldier, one of the international force supporting the relief effort for Rwandan refugees, adjusts the concertina wire surrounding the airport.

France has been accused of substantially aiding and abetting the genocide. In the analysis of U.K. Linda Melvern, documents recently released from the Paris archive of Mitterrand show how the RPF invasion was considered as clear aggression by an Anglophone neighbour on a Francophone country. The documents are said to argue that the RPF was a part of an “Anglophone plot”, involving the President of Uganda, to create an English-speaking “Tutsi-land” and increase Anglophone influence at the expense of French influence. In Melvern's analysis, the policy of France was to avoid a military victory by the RPF. The policy had been made by a secretive network of military officers, politicians, diplomats, businessmen, and senior intelligence operatives. At its centre was French President François Mitterrand. French policy had been unaccountable to either parliament or the press.

President Mitterrand also worried that the US and UK governments would use the massacres to expand "Anglophone" influence in that Francophone part of Africa, also worked to prevent foreign intervention.

On June 22, with no sign of UN deployment taking place, the Security Council authorized French forces to land in Goma, Zaire on a humanitarian mission. They deployed throughout southwest Rwanda in an area they called "Zone Turquoise," quelling the genocide and stopping the fighting there, but often arriving in areas only after genocidaires had expelled or killed Tutsi citizens. Operation Turquoise was charged with aiding the Hutu army against the RPF. Jacques Bihozagara, the then-Rwandan ambassador to France, later testified, "Operation Turquoise was aimed only at protecting genocide perpetrators, because the genocide continued even within the Turquoise zone." The French government continues to deny that it played a role in the genocide.

Following an investigation of the plane crash of 6 April 1994 that killed both the Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira and precipitated the genocide, and during which three French crews had died, the French judge Jean-Louis Bruguière indicted eight associates of Rwandan president Paul Kagame on November 17, 2006. President Kagame himself was not indicted, as he had immunity under French law as a head of state. Kagame denied the allegations, decrying them as politically motivated, and broke diplomatic relationships with France in November 2006. He then ordered the formation of a commission of his own Rwandan Justice Ministry's employees that was officially "charged with assembling proof of the involvement of France in the genocide". The political character of that investigation was in turn further averred when the commission issued its report solely to Kagame - symbolically on November 17, 2007, exactly one year after Bruguière's announcement - and the head of the Rwandan commission, Jean de Dieu Mucyo, stated that the commission would now "wait for President Kagame to declare whether the inquiry was valid." In July 2008, Kagame threatened to indict French nationals over the genocide if European courts did not withdraw arrest warrants issued against Rwandan officials, which by then included broader indictments against 40 Rwandan army officers by Spanish judge Fernando Andreu. Findings of the commission were released at Kagame's order on August 5, 2008 and accused the French government of knowing of preparations for the genocide and helping to train the ethnic Hutu militia members; named 33 senior French military and political officials of involvement in the genocide, including then-President François Mitterrand and his then general secretary Hubert Védrine, then-Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, then-Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, and his then chief aide, Dominique de Villepin Astatement accompanying the release claimed that "French soldiers themselves directly were involved in assassinations of Tutsis and Hutus accused of hiding Tutsis... French forces committed several rapes on Tutsi survivors", though the latter was not documented in the report. A BBC report commented that French Foreign Minister, Bernard Kouchner, denied French responsibility in connection with the genocide but said that political errors had been made. Another BBC report dwelved into the motivations for the Rwandan report and stated that

Chief among them has been an iron determination to keep the world's attention focused on the genocide, rather than on the role of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the force that took power in 1994, bringing President Paul Kagame to power. In recent years uncomfortable questions have been raised about the war crimes the RPF are alleged to have committed during and after 1994. While stressing there can be no equation between genocide and war crimes, Alison Des Forges of Human Rights Watch says RPF leaders do have a case to answer. "Their victims also deserve justice," she says.

The suspicions about United Nations and French policies in Rwanda between 1990 and 1994 and allegations that France supported the Hutus led to the creation of a French Parliamentary Commission on Rwanda, which published its report on December 15, 1998. In particular, François-Xavier Verschave, former president of the French NGO Survie, which accused the French army of protecting the Hutus during the genocide, was instrumental in establishing this Parliamentary commission. The commission released its final report on December 15, 1998. It documented ambiguities and confusion in both the French and UN responses. Regarding Operation Turquoise, it regretted that the intervention took place too late, though it noted that this was better than the non-response from the UN and the opposition by the U.S. and U.K. governments to such a response. The report documented mixed success at disarming the Rwandan Army and militias, but a definite and systematic attempt (though not fast enough as far as then-General Paul Kagame of the opposing RPF forces was concerned, in documentation of the latter's communications with the French forces). It did not find any evidence of French participation in the genocide, of collaboration with the militias, or of willful disengagement from endangered populations, to the contrary. It documented multiple French operations, all at least partly successful, to disable genocide-inciting radio broadcasts, tasks which the UN and the U.S. had rejected calls for assistance with. The report concluded that there had been errors of judgment pertaining to the Rwanda Armed Forces, but before the genocide only; further errors of judgment about the scale of the threat, at the onset of the genocide; over-reliance on the UNIMAR mission without awareness that it would be undercut by U.S. and other parties; and ineffective diplomacy. Ultimately, it concluded that France had been the foreign power most involved in limiting the scale of the genocide once it got started, though it regretted that more had not been done.

American role

Unlike French and U.N. troops, there were no U.S. troops officially in Rwanda at the onset of the genocide. Nevertheless, the U.S. government and military made a number of decisions, some of commission and some of omission, that had the effect of facilitating and extending the genocide.

Prior to the war, the U.S. government had aligned itself with Tutsi interests, in turn raising Hutu concerns about potential U.S. support to the opposition. Paul Kagame, a Tutsi officer in exile in Uganda who had co-founded the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1986 and was in open conflict with the incumbent Rwandan government, was invited to receive military training at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, home of the U.S. Army Command & General Staff School. In October 1990, while Kagame was at Fort Leavenworth, the RPF started an invasion of Rwanda. Only two days into the invasion, his close friend and RPF co-founder Fred Rwigema was killed, upon which the U.S. arranged the return of Kagame to Uganda from where he became the military commander of the RPF. An article in the Washington Post of August 16, 1997, authored by its Southern African bureau chief Lynne Duke, indicates that the connection continued as RPF elements received counterinsurgency and combat training from U.S. Special Forces - though this claim is less widely acknowledged.

At the onset of the genocide, the U.S. military took no overt action. However, a National Security Archive report points out five ways in which decisions made by the U.S. government contributed to the slow U.S. and worldwide response and to the continuation of the genocide:

1. Contrary to later public statements, the U.S. lobbied the U.N. for a total withdrawal of U.N. (UNAMIR) forces in Rwanda in April 1994;
2. Secretary of State Warren Christopher did not authorize officials to use the term “genocide” until May 21, and even then, U.S. officials waited another three weeks before using the term in public;
3. Bureaucratic infighting slowed the U.S. response to the genocide in general;
4. The U.S. refused to jam extremist radio broadcasts inciting the killing because of costs and concern with international law;
5. U.S. officials knew exactly who was leading the genocide, and actually spoke with those leaders to urge an end to the violence but did not follow up with concrete action.

Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) renewed invasion

Main article: Rwandan Civil War

See also: Great Lakes refugee crisis

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) battalion of Tutsi rebels stationed in Kigali under the Arusha Accords came under attack immediately after the shooting down of the president's plane. The battalion fought its way out of Kigali and joined up with RPF units in the north. The resulting civil war raged concurrently with the genocide for two months. The nature of the genocide was not immediately apparent to foreign observers, and was initially explained as a violent phase of the civil war. Mark Doyle, the correspondent for the BBC News in Kigali, tried to explain the complex situation in late April 1994 thus:

Look you have to understand that there are two wars going on here. There's a shooting war and a genocide war. The two are connected, but also distinct. In the shooting war, there are two conventional armies at each other, and in the genocide war, one of those armies, the government side with help from civilians, is involved in mass killings.

The victory of the RPF rebels and overthrow of the Hutu regime ended the genocide in July 1994, 100 days after it started.

Aftermath

Refugee camp in Zaire, 1994

Approximately two million Hutus, participants in the genocide, and the bystanders, with anticipation of Tutsi retaliation, fled from Rwanda, to Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda, and for the most part Zaire. Thousands of them died in epidemics of diseases common to the squalor of refugee camps, such as cholera and dysentery. The United States staged the Operation Support Hope airlift from July to September 1994 to stabilize the situation in the camps.

After the victory of the RPF, the size of UNAMIR (henceforth called UNAMIR 2) was increased to its full strength, remaining in Rwanda until March 8, 1996.

In October 1996, an uprising by the ethnic Tutsi Banyamulenge people in eastern Zaire marked the beginning of the First Congo War, and led to a return of more than 600,000 to Rwanda during the last two weeks of November. This massive repatriation was followed at the end of December 1996 by the return of 500,000 more from Tanzania after they were ejected by the Tanzanian government. Various successor organizations to the Hutu militants operate in eastern DR Congo to this day.

Political development

After its military victory in July 1994, the Rwandese Patriotic Front organized a coalition government similar to that established by President Juvénal Habyarimana in 1992. Called The Broad Based Government of National Unity, its fundamental law is based on a combination of the constitution, the Arusha accords, and political declarations by the parties. The MRND party was outlawed. Political organizing was banned until 2003. The first post-war presidential and legislative elections were held in August and September 2003 respectively.

The current government prohibits discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race or religion. The government has also passed laws prohibiting emphasis on Hutu or Tutsi identity in most types of political activity.

In March 1998, on a visit to Rwanda, U.S. President Bill Clinton spoke to the crowd assembled on the tarmac at Kigali Airport: "We come here today partly in recognition of the fact that we in the United States and the world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit what occurred" in Rwanda. Four years after the genocide, Clinton issued what is now known as the "Clinton apology," acknowledging his failure to efficiently deal with the situation in Rwanda, but not formally apologizing for inaction by the U.S. government or the international community.

Despite substantial international assistance and political reforms, the country continues to struggle to boost investment and agricultural output and to foster reconciliation. In March 2000, after removing Pasteur Bizimungu, Paul Kagame became President of Rwanda. On August 25, 2003 Kagame won the first national elections since the RPF took power in 1994. A series of massive population displacements, a nagging Hutu extremist insurgency, and Rwandan involvement in the First and Second Congo Wars in the neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo continue to hinder Rwanda's efforts.

Economic and social developments

Graph showing the population of Rwanda from 1961 to 2003. (Data from U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization)

The biggest problems facing the government are reintegration of the more than two million refugees, ending the insurgency among ex-soldiers and Interahamwe militia fighters and the Rwandan Patriotic Army in the north and southwest of the country, and the shift away from crisis to medium and long-term development planning. The prison population will continue to be an urgent problem for the foreseeable future, having swelled to more than 100,000 in the three years after the war. Trying this many suspects of genocide will tax Rwanda's resources sorely.

The long-term effects of war rape in Rwanda for the victims include social isolation (social stigma attached to rape meant some husbands left wives who had become victims of war rape, or that the victims were rendered unsuitable for marriage), unwanted pregnancies and babies (some women resorted to self-induced abortions), sexually transmitted diseases, including syphilis, gonorrhoea and HIV/Aids (access to anti-retroviral drugs remains limited). The Special Rapporteur on Rwanda estimated that between 2,000 and 5,000 pregnancies resulted from war rape (between 250,000 and 500,000 Rwandese women and girls had been raped). Rwanda is a patriarchal society and children therefore take the ethnicity of the father, underlining that war rape occurred in the context of genocide. The main issue involving reintegration is the fact that the violence that had occurred often involved neighbors; people lived next to rapists, murderers and torturers. It was very difficult right after the genocide for Tutsis to trust Hutus, whether or not they had any involvement in the genocide.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

Main article: International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

File:Rwanda genocide wanted poster 2-20-03.jpg

Wanted poster for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

With the return of the refugees, the government began the long-awaited genocide trials, which had an uncertain start at the end of 1996 and inched forward in 1997. In 2001, the government began implementing a participatory justice system, known as Gacaca, in order to address the enormous backlog of cases. Meanwhile, the UN set up the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, currently based in Arusha, Tanzania. The UN Tribunal has jurisdiction over high level members of the government and armed forces, while Rwanda is responsible for prosecuting lower level leaders and local people. Tensions arose between Rwanda and the UN over the use of the death penalty, though these were largely resolved once Rwanda abolished the punishment in 2007. However, domestic tensions continued over support for the death penalty, and the interest in conducting the trials at home. In ten years the Arusha tribunal only succeeded in sentencing 20 people. In 2003, in an attempt to redress this mismanagement, the UN appointed Hassan Bubacar Jallow chief prosecutor with exclusive jurisdiction over Rwanda. Faced with the local criminal system's inability to cope with a number of detainees awaiting trial in Rwandan jails reaching 90,000, in 2000 a series of popular tribunals called gacaca courts were setup. The convicted are invited to admit their guilt in exchange for significant reductions in their sentences. Catholic priests are also among the accused.

Media and popular culture

Lieutenant-General Roméo Dallaire became the most well-known eyewitness to the genocide after co-writing the 2003 book Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda describing his experiences with depression and post-traumatic stress disorder. Another firsthand account of the Rwandan genocide is offered by Dr. James Orbinski in his book "An Imperfect Offering: Humanitarian Action in the Twenty-first Century." The critically acclaimed and multiple Academy Award-nominated 2004 film Hotel Rwanda is based on the experiences of Paul Rusesabagina, a Kigali hotelier at the Hôtel des Mille Collines who sheltered over a thousand refugees during the genocide. It is listed by the American Film Institute as one of the 100 most inspirational movies of all time.

In 2005, Alison Des Forges wrote that eleven years after the genocide, films for popular audiences on the subject greatly increased the "widespread realization of the horror that had taken the lives of more than half a million Tutsi". In 2007, Charlie Beckett, Director of POLIS, made the following observation: "How many people saw the movie Hotel Rwanda? [it is] ironically the way that most people now relate to Rwanda."

See also: Filmography of the Rwandan Genocide

Accusations of revisionism

The context of the 1994 Rwandan genocide continues to be a matter of historical debate. There have been frequent charges of revisionism. A "double genocides" theory, accusing the Tutsis of engaging in a "counter-genocide" against the Hutus, is promulgated in Black Furies, White Liars (2005), the controversial book by French investigative journalist Pierre Péan. Jean-Pierre Chrétien, a French historian whom Péan describes as an active member of the "pro-Tutsi lobby," criticizes Péan's "amazing revisionist passion" ("étonnante passion révisioniste").

Charging of Theoneste Bagosora

On Thursday, December 18, 2008, Theoneste Bagosora was found guilty of crimes against humanity. He was charged by UN judge Erik Moses, and sentenced to life in prison. The court also found Bagosora responsible for the deaths of former Rwandan Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and 10 Belgian peacekeepers.

The exemplary figures opposing the Rwandan genocide

A few people have stood out for their humanity in the course of the Rwandan genocide. Among them there are Pierantonio Costa, Antonia Locatelli, Jacqueline Mukansonera, Paul Rusebagina, Carl Wilkens, and André Sibomana.

Time Line

1990

• December-kangura-"wake up" publishes 10 commandments of the Hutu
• Tutsi rebels (armed exiles) invade from Uganda (RPF)

1991

• New multi-party constitution promulgated

1992

• Hutu militia purchases munitions & distributes amongst populace

1993

• Tanzania (with support of West) brokers Peace talks
• Arusha Accords: Rwandan government agreed to govern with Hutu opposition parties and Tutsi minority
• UN Peacekeepers deployed to patrol ceasefire and assist in demilitarization and demobilization
• March-report found that 10,000 Tutsi detained and 2,000 murdered since RPF 1990 invasion
• August- Dallaire makes reconnaissance trip to evaluate. Requests 5,000 troops; he was given 2,500. Sees situation as standard peacekeeping mission (walk the line).
• October- 50,000 civilian deaths in Burundi

1994

• January- NSC member Richard Clark develops formal US peacekeeping doctrine, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25)
• January- Anonymous Hutu informant steps forward to Dallaire, informing him the grave nature of the situation. Informant provides details such as weapons caches, etc.
• February, 21- extremists assassinate Minister of Public Works. President of Coalition for the Defense of the Republic (CDR) UNAMIR fails to gain approval to investigate murder
• April, 6- President Juvenal Habyarimana's jet shot down
• April, 7- Five Ghanaian and ten Belgian peacekeepers arrive at Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana's house to deliver her to radio station in order to appeal for calm. At 9pm, Daillaire learns that Belgians had been killed and Ghanaians brought to safety by Hutu forces
• Beginning of the official policy of 'ethnic cleansing'
• April, 8- Dallaire sends cable to NY indicating ethnicity is driving force of killings. Cable details killings of politicians and peacekeepers (Chairman of Liberal party, Minister of Labor, Minister of Agriculture and dozens more). Dallaire informs UN that campaign of violence is well organized, deliberate--conducted primarily by presidential guard.
• April, 9- UN observers witness massacre of children at Polish church.
• April, 9- 1000 highly armed and trained European troops to arrive to escort European civilian personnel out of country. Troops did not stay to assist UNAMIR.
• April, 9- Media coverage picks up. Washington Post story reports execution of Rwandan employees of relief agencies in front of their horrified expatriate colleagues.
• April, 9-10- Ambassador Rawson and 250 of the Americans evacuated leaving locals (unarmed convoy).

See also

• Command responsibility
• French Parliamentary Commission on Rwanda
• List of wars and disasters by death toll
• Religion in Rwanda
• Our Lady of Kibeho
• Alison Des Forges

Bibliography

See: Bibliography of the Rwandan Genocide

Filmography

See: Filmography of the Rwandan Genocide

External links

• Through My Eyes Website Imperial War Museum - Online Exhibition (including images, video and interviews with people affected by the Rwandan Genocide)
• Amnesty International Online Documentation Archive: Rwanda
• Human Rights Watch "Leave None to Tell the Story"
• "Intended Consequences" by Jonathan Torgovnik on MediaStorm
• (As We Forgive Those) Documentary telling of Rwanda’s rebirth through the reconciliation of victims and killers.
• (Rwandan Genocide Background) Rwandan Genocide Background
• GenoDynamics Compilation of Data and Analysis of Political Violence in 1994
• Web site of the annual revue "La nuit rwandaise" dedicated to the question of the french implication in the last genocide of the 20th century
• Aegis Trust (genocide prevention trust) An independent international organisation dedicated to eliminating genocide
• The 800,000 Project Information on a humanitarian art-in-action installation piece memorializing the victims of the Rwandan genocide and raising funds to establish local water wells.
• 100 Days of Rwanda. Daily weblog chronicling the Genocide.
• "Arming Genocide in Rwanda," by Stephen D. Goose and Frank Smyth. Online posting. Foreign Affairs. September/October 1994. [Searchable online index and menu: Region: Africa and Foreign Affairs.]
• The Arms Fixers
• BBC News In Depth - Rwanda genocide Collection of articles, analyses and video materials
• BBC News Panorama - When Good Men Do Nothing Article about the genocide by BBC Panorama reporter Steve Bradshaw.
• BBC Witness: Stench of Blood A personal account of the events.
• Case Study: Genocide in Rwanda, 1994. An at times speculative account, with analysis focusing particularly on aspects that the website Gender Watch calls "gendercide." Gender Watch is " a project of the Gender Issues Education Foundation (GIEF), a registered charitable foundation based in Edmonton, Alberta."
• Evidence of Inaction: A National Security Archive Briefing Book. Ed. William Ferroggiaro. Hosted on the website of George Washington University, Washington, DC. 20 Aug. 2001. Links sixteen declassified government documents showing what the U.S. government knew about the Rwandan Genocide.
• From idealism to genocide
• Ghosts of Rwanda, documentary produced by PBS Frontline. Features interviews with many heads of state and policymakers. Summer 2004.
• Hirondelle Foundation: Media for Peace and Human Dignity: Information, Documentation and Training Agency (IDTA) (Hirondelle News Agency [Arusha, Tanzania]: Since 1996 "has covered . . . all major judiciary events related to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, mainly the proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) but also the gacaca tribunals and the trials conducted according to classic justice procedures in Rwanda.")
• Holocaust and Genocide Studies Oxford Journals Archive of All Online Issues: 1986 - March 2006. (Subscription access.)
• Institute for the Study of Genocide/International Association of Genocide Scholars
• Interactive Guide: Rwanda - remembering the genocide - The Guardian
• The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience, by the Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. Jour. of Humanitarian Assistance. Online posting. 14 Apr. 1996.
• Leave None To Tell The Story: Genocide In Rwanda. Online publication by Human Rights Watch. Mar. 1999. ISBN 1-56432-171-1.
• National University of Rwanda: Genocide Memorial
• Remembering Rwanda and Defending Darfur: A Film Screening Guide (pdf file). Africa Action 7 Apr. 2006.
• Resources on the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda: the Akazu "Hutu Power" Genocide of Tutsis. Prevent Genocide International.
• Rwandan Genocide Reconciliation by development scholar Andrew Bell. 22 August 2008.
• Rwandan Initiative: Symposium: The Media and the Rwandan Genocide. Carleton University (Ottawa, Canada) and the National University of Rwanda. Bell Theatre, Minto Centre, Carleton U. 13 Mar. 2004.
• Rwandan Overview. Committee on Conscience: Rwandan Genocide. United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
• Rwanda Partners: Connecting Resources for Rwanda's Future. "A non-profit corporation committed to coming alongside the people of Rwanda as they seek to rebuild, reconcile, and restore their nation."
• United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
• bbc.co.uk - Rwanda remembers genocide victims
• Survivors Fund Representing and supporting survivors of the genocide.
• pbs.org The Triumph of Evil
• pbs.org Frontline Ghost of Rwanda
• bbc.com How the Genocide Happened
• hrw.org Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda
• Symposium: The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, Carleton University School of Journalism and Communication, Canada.
• Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting Rwanda Human Conflict and Environmental Consequences (Video)
• Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting Mountain Gorillas Managed to Survive Genocide
• MASSACRE AT NYARUBUYE CHURCH, BBC
• TAKEN OVER BY SATAN, BBC
• The Media and the Rwanda Genocide, Allan Thompson, ed., Pluto Press: London, 2007, ISBN ISBN 1–55250–338–0 (full text of ebook)
• – Discovering God Amidst the Rwandan Holocaust. This is the inspiring autobiography of survivor Immaculee Ilibagiza
• At Issue: Survivor of Rwanda. Interview of Immaculee Ilibagiza on "At Issue" produced by PBS station WTVP in Peoria, Illinois
• "Mitterrand's role revealed in Rwandan genocide warning" by Alex Duval Smith, The Independent, July 3, 2007
• UN Reflection on the Rwandan Genocide
• Crisis briefing on the legacy of genocide in Rwanda from Reuters AlertNet
• Documentary 52': Rwanda, How History can lead to genocide
• The Rwandan Genocide on Gardens of the Righteous Worldwide - Gariwo
• Profiles of exemplary figures in the Rwanda genocide - Gariwo