Deepwater Horizon oil spill

"Gulf of Mexico oil spill" redirects here. For the 1979 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, see Ixtoc I.

Deepwater Horizon oil spill
The oil slick as seen from space by NASA's Terra satellite on May 17, 2010
Location	Gulf of Mexico near Mississippi River Delta
Coordinates	28.73667°N 88.38716°W / 28.73667; -88.38716
Date	April 20, 2010, to ongoing
Cause
Cause	Wellhead blowout
Casualties	17 injured 11 missing, presumed dead
Operator	Transocean under lease for BP
Spill characteristics
Volume	up to 70,000 barrels (2,900,000 US gal) per day
Area	2,500 to 9,100 sq mi (6,500 to 23,600 km2)

The Deepwater Horizon oil spill (also referred to as the BP oil spill and Gulf of Mexico oil spill) is a massive ongoing oil spill from an underwater oil gusher in the Gulf of Mexico that started on April 20, 2010. The spill followed an oil well blowout that caused an explosion on the Deepwater Horizon offshore oil platform 40 miles (64 km) southeast of the Louisiana coast. Eleven platform workers are missing and presumed dead; the explosion also injured 17 others. The oil spill originates from a deepwater oil well 5,000 feet (1,500 m) below the ocean surface. Numerous estimates have been made for the amount of oil discharging ranging from 5,000–100,000 barrels (210,000–4,200,000 US gallons; 790,000–15,900,000 litres) of crude oil per day. The exact spill flow rate is uncertain and is part of an ongoing debate. The resulting oil slick covers a surface area of at least 2,500 square miles (6,500 km²) according to estimates reported on May 3, 2010, with the exact size and location of the slick fluctuating from day to day depending on weather conditions. In addition, on May 15, researchers announced the discovery of immense underwater plumes of oil not visible from the surface.

BP was principal developer of the Macondo Prospect oil field and leased the drilling rig from Transocean Ltd. The U.S. Government has named BP as the responsible party in the incident and will hold the company accountable for all cleanup costs resulting from the oil spill. BP has accepted responsibility for the oil spill and the cleanup costs but indicated that the accident was not their fault as the rig was run by Transocean personnel.

The spill is expected to eclipse the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill as the worst US oil disaster in history. Experts fear that due to factors such as petroleum toxicity and oxygen depletion, it will result in an environmental disaster whether it reaches Gulf coast or not, damaging the Gulf of Mexico fishing industry, tourism industry, and habitat of hundreds of bird species. Crews are working to block off bays and estuaries, using anchored barriers, floating booms, and sand-filled barricades along shorelines. There are a variety ongoing efforts, both short and long term, to contain the leak and stop spilling additional oil into the Gulf.

Background

Deepwater Horizon

Main article: Deepwater Horizon

oil leak

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Location of offshore oil leak

The Deepwater Horizon was a fifth generation, ultra-deepwater, dynamically positioned, column-stabilized, semi-submersible mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU), a floating drilling rig bearing the Marshall Islands flag. The rig was 396 feet (121 m) long and 256 feet (78 m) wide and could operate in waters up to 8,000 feet (2,400 m) deep, to a maximum drill depth of 30,000 feet (9,100 m). Built by Hyundai Heavy Industries in South Korea and completed in 2001, the rig was owned by Transocean Ltd. and leased to BP until September 2013. At the time of the explosion, the rig was on BP's Mississippi Canyon Block 252, referred to as the Macondo Prospect, in the United States sector of the Gulf of Mexico, about 41 miles (66 km) off the Louisiana coast. The rig commenced drilling in February 2010 at a water depth of approximately 5,000 feet (1,500 m). The well was planned to be drilled to 18,000 feet (5,500 m), and was to be plugged and abandoned for subsequent completion as a subsea producer.

Explosion and fire

Anchor handling tugs combat the fire on the Deepwater Horizon while the United States Coast Guard searches for missing crew.

The fire aboard the Deepwater Horizon reportedly started at 9:45 p.m. CST on April 20, 2010. Survivors described the incident as a sudden explosion which gave them less than five minutes to escape as the alarm went off. Video of the fire shows billowing flames, taller than a multistory building, and a captain of a rescue boat described the heat as so intense that it was melting the paint off the boats. After burning for more than a day, Deepwater Horizon sank on April 22, 2010. The Coast Guard stated to CNN on April 22 that they received word of the sinking at approximately 10:21 am. At an April 30 press conference, BP said that it did not know the cause of the explosion.

Adrian Rose, a vice president of Transocean, Ltd., said workers had been performing their standard routines with "no indication of any problems" just prior to the explosion. According to a Transocean spokesperson, at the time of the explosion the rig was drilling but was not in production. Production casing was being run and cemented at the time of the accident. Once the cementing was complete, it was due to be tested for integrity and a cement plug set to temporarily abandon the well for later completion as a subsea producer. Halliburton has confirmed that it cemented the Macondo well but never set a cement plug to cap the bore as "operations had not reached a stage where a final plug was needed". A special nitrogen-foamed cement was used which is difficult to handle. Halliburton said that it had finished cementing 20 hours before the fire. Transocean executive Adrian Rose said the event was basically a blowout.

According to interviews with rig workers conducted during BP's internal investigation, a bubble of methane gas escaped from the well and shot up the drill column, expanding quickly as it burst through several seals and barriers before exploding.

Transocean chief executive Steven Newman described the cause: "there was a sudden, catastrophic failure of the cement, the casing or both." According to Transocean executive Adrian Rose, "undoubtedly abnormal pressure" accumulated inside the marine riser and as it came up it "expanded rapidly and ignited". The heavy drilling mud in the pipes initially held down the gas of the leaking well. When managers believed they were almost done with the well, they decided to displace the mud with seawater; the gas was then able to overcome the weight of the fluid column and rose to the top.

Casualties and rescue efforts

Supply boats continued to battle the fire, viewed from a Coast Guard helicopter

Nine rig crew on the rig floor and two engineers died during the explosion. According to officials, 126 individuals were on board, of whom 79 were Transocean employees, six were from BP, and 41 were contracted; of these, 115 individuals were evacuated. Most of the workers evacuated the rig and took diesel-powered fiberglass lifeboats to the M/V Damon B Bankston, a workboat that BP had hired to service the rig; 17 were then evacuated from the workboat by helicopter. Most survivors were brought to Port Fourchon for a medical check-up and to meet their families. Although 94 workers were taken to shore with no major injuries, four were transported to another vessel, and 17 were sent to trauma centers in Mobile, Alabama and Marrero, Louisiana. Most were soon released.

A group of BP executives were on board the rig celebrating the project's safety record when the blowout occurred; they were injured but survived.

Initial reports indicated between 12 to 15 workers were missing. The United States Coast Guard launched a massive rescue operation involving two cutters, four helicopters and a rescue plane. Two Coast Guard cutters continued searching overnight. By the morning of April 22 the Coast Guard had surveyed nearly 1,940 miles (3,120 km) in 17 separate air and sea search missions. On April 23, the Coast Guard called off the search for the 11 missing persons, concluding that the "reasonable expectations of survival" had passed. Officials concluded that the missing workers may have been near the blast and not been able to escape the sudden explosion.

Investigation

On April 22, 2010, the United States Coast Guard and the Minerals Management Service launched an investigation on possible causes of the explosion. On May 11, 2010, the Obama administration requested the National Academy of Engineering to conduct an independent technical investigation to determine the root causes of the disaster so that corrective steps can be taken to address the mechanical failures underlying the accident. The United States House of Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee has asked Halliburton for a briefing on 5 May and by 7 May to provide any documents it might have related to its work on the Macondo well.

Attention has focused on the novel cementing procedure and the Cameron TL blowout preventer (BOP) which failed to engage. At least four significant problems have been identified with the BOP:

• There was a leak in the hydraulic system that provides power to the shear rams.
• The BOP had been modified in unexpected ways. The underwater control panel had been disconnected from the bore ram, and instead connected to a test ram. Drawings of the BOP provided by Transocean to BP do not correspond to the structure that is on the ocean bottom.
• The BOP's shear ram is not powerful enough to cut through joints in the well pipe. It is only effective on the body of a drill pipe. Since 10% of the drill pipe is threaded joints, the BOP is expected to succeed on only 90% of the drill pipe.
• Emergency control to the BOP may have failed in multiple ways. Cameron, the BOP's manufacturer, has stated that the explosion may have severed the communication link so the BOP never received the instruction to engage. Before the backup dead man's switch will engage, communications, power and hydraulic lines must all be severed; Cameron, has stated it is possible BOPs hydraulic lines were intact after the explosion, in which case the unit would not engage. Of the two control pods for the deadman switch, the one that has been inspected so far had a dead battery.

In other testimony, the Minerals Management Service officials said there have been 39 fires or explosions offshore in the Gulf of Mexico in the first five months of 2009, the last period with statistics available. There had been numerous previous spills and fires on the Deepwater Horizon, which had been issued citations for "acknowledged pollution source" by the Coast Guard 18 times between 2000 and 2010. The previous fires were not considered unusual for a Gulf rig and have not been connected to the April 2010 explosion and spill. The Deepwater Horizon did, however, have other serious incidents including a 2008 incident where 77 persons were evacuated from the rig after it listed over and began to sink after a section of pipe was accidentally removed from the rig's ballast system.

Pre-spill precautions

In February 2009, BP filed a 52-page exploration and environmental impact plan for the Macondo well with the Minerals Management Service, an arm of the U.S. Interior Department that oversees offshore drilling. The plan stated that it was "unlikely that an accidental surface or subsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed activities" and that "due to the distance to shore (48 miles (77 km)) and the response capabilities that would be implemented, no significant adverse impacts are expected".

After concluding that a massive oil spill was unlikely, the Interior Department exempted BP's Gulf of Mexico drilling operation from a detailed environmental impact analysis last year. The decision by the department's Minerals Management Service to give BP's lease at Deepwater Horizon a "categorical exclusion" from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) on April 6, 2009 – and BP's lobbying efforts just 11 days before the explosion to expand those exemptions—show that neither federal regulators nor the company anticipated an accident of the scale of the one unfolding in the gulf.

Although the BP wellhead had a blowout preventer (BOP) installed, it was not fitted with additional remote-control or acoustically activated triggers for use in case of an emergency requiring a rig to be evacuated: it did have a "deadman" switch designed to automatically cut the pipe and seal the well if communication from the rig is lost, but this switch did not activate. Both Norway and Brazil require the device on all offshore rigs, but when the Minerals Management Service considered requiring the remote device, a report commissioned by the agency, as well as drilling companies, questioned its cost (approximately $500,000) and effectiveness. In 2003 the agency ultimately determined that the device would not be required because rigs had other back-up systems to cut off a well.

Discovery of oil spill

A remotely operated underwater vehicle (ROV) attempting to turn on the Deepwater Horizon blowout preventer

On the morning of April 22, 2010, CNN quoted Coast Guard Petty Officer Ashley Butler as saying that "oil was leaking from the rig at the rate of about 8,000 barrels (340,000 US gallons; 1,300,000 litres) of crude per day." That afternoon, as a large oil slick spread, Senior Chief Petty Officer Michael O'Berry used the same figure. Asked by CNN if the oil that had been fueling the fire would be escaping into the sea, O'Berry said, "That is correct ... The potential, right now, is you've got almost 336,000 US gallons (8,000 bbl) of sweet, light crude oil per day that was coming out of that well, so that oil will be, you know, released into the water now." O'Berry stated that two Remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) had been sent down both that day and the day before to attempt to cap the well, but had been unsuccessful. Butler warned of a leak of up to 700,000 US gallons (17,000 bbl) of diesel fuel, and BP Vice President David Rainey termed the incident as being a potential "major spill."

BP on April 22 announced that it was deploying an ROV to the site to assess whether oil was flowing from the well. Other reports indicated that BP was using more than one ROV and that the purpose was to attempt to plug the well pipe. The next day, April 23, a Reuters article titled "Oil spill not growing" referred to an unnamed "spokeswoman" and an ROV that "found no oil leaking from the sunken ... rig and no oil flowing from the well." Coast Guard Rear Adm. Mary Landry, interviewed by CBS, when specifically asked how much oil was emanating from the ocean floor wellhead or the broken pipes or risers, stated that no oil was emanating from either. On another TV interview the same day, Landry stated, "The fact that there is no oil spilled other than that small amount we were able to work with, that's a good thing," and expressed "cautious optimism" of zero environmental impact. Subsequently, news stories of April 23 quoted Admiral Landry as saying that no oil appeared to be leaking from either the undersea wellhead or at the water's surface, and that oil spilled from the explosion and sinking was being contained. The following day, April 24, Landry announced that a damaged wellhead was indeed leaking oil into the Gulf. Landry described it as "a very serious spill, absolutely."

Volume and extent of oil spill

Spill flow rate

BP initially estimated that the wellhead was leaking 1,000 barrels (42,000 US gallons; 160,000 litres) a day. On April 28, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimated the leak was likely 5,000 barrels (210,000 US gallons; 790,000 litres) a day, five times larger than initially estimated by BP. John Amos, a geologist who has worked as a consultant with oil companies on measuring oil spills, said that figure is the "extremely low end" of their estimates, putting a more realistic figure at 20,000 barrels (840,000 US gallons; 3,200,000 litres) a day. Other sources using satellite imagery have put that number as high as 25,000 barrels (1,000,000 US gallons; 4,000,000 litres) a day. Ian MacDonald, an oceanography specialist at Florida State University, estimated that oil might be leaking at that rate and that the oil slick (as of May 2, 2010) might already contain more than 210,000 barrels (8,800,000 US gal). He later estimated the spill to be about 290,000 barrels (12,000,000 US gallons; 46,000,000 litres). Mike Miller of Safety Boss, a fire-fighting company that specializes in oil wells, suggested that the oil spill may become the biggest in history.

According to BP, estimating the flow is very difficult as there is no metering of the flow underwater. In their permit filed with the Minerals Management Service, BP quotes a worst case daily discharge of 3,900 barrels (160,000 US gallons; 620,000 litres) per day. Before Congress, BP revised their figure upwards to 60,000 barrels (2,500,000 US gallons; 9,500,000 litres) per day if the blowout preventer and other equipment restricting the current flow were removed. Experts contacted by National Public Radio and shown underwater footage of oil and gas gushing out of the broken pipe put the leak rate substantially higher. Steven Wereley, an associate professor at Purdue University used a computer analysis (particle image velocimetry) to arrive at a rate of 70,000 barrels (2,900,000 US gallons; 11,000,000 litres) per day (plus or minus 20%). Timothy Crone, an associate research scientist at the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory, used another well-accepted method to calculate fluid flows, estimating the flow is "at least 50,000 barrels a day," and Eugene Chaing, a professor of astrophysics at the University of California, Berkeley, got a similar answer just using pencil and paper, stating "I would peg it at around 20,000 to 100,000 barrels per day," and the earlier figure of 5,000 barrels a day is "almost certainly incorrect."

Spill area

Approximate oil locations from April 28, 2010, to May 2, 2010 – NOAA

The spread of the oil was increased by strong southerly winds caused by an impending cold front. By April 25, the oil spill covered 580 square miles (1,500 km²) and was only 31 miles (50 km) from the ecologically sensitive Chandeleur Islands. An April 30 estimate placed the total spread of the oil at 3,850 square miles (10,000 km²). The spill quickly approached the Delta National Wildlife Refuge and Breton National Wildlife Refuge, where dead animals, including a sea turtle, were found.

On May 14, the AP reported that a publicly available model called the Automated Data Inquiry for Oil Spills indicates about 35 percent of a hypothetical 114,000 barrels (4,800,000 US gal) spill of light Louisiana crude oil released in conditions similar to those found in the Gulf now would evaporate, that between 50 percent and 60 percent of the oil would remain in or on the water, and the rest would be dispersed in the ocean. In the same report, Ed Overton says he thinks most of the oil is floating within 1 foot (30 cm) of the surface. On May 15, researchers from the University of Southern Mississippi aboard the research vessel RV Pelican identified enormous oil plumes in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, including one as large as 10 miles (16 km) long, 3 miles (4.8 km) wide and 300 feet (91 m) thick in spots. The shallowest oil plume the group detected was at about 2,300 feet (700 m), while the deepest was near the seafloor at about 4,200 feet (1,300 m). Other researchers from the University of Georgia have found that the oil may occupy multiple layers "three or four or five layers deep". It is thought that the underwater plumes may explain why satellite images of the ocean surface have calculated a flow rate of only 5,000 barrels (210,000 US gal) a day, whereas the studies of the video of the gushing oil well have tentatively calculated that it could be flowing at a rate of 25,000–80,000 barrels (1,000,000–3,400,000 US gal) a day.

Robert Bea, who serves on a National Academy of Engineering panel on oil pipeline safety, has said, "There's an equal amount that could be subsurface too," and that the oil below the surface "is damn near impossible to track." On May 13 Garland Robinette from New Orleans reported on NBC News that tarballs about the size of softballs —Template:In to cm circumference— were washing up on the shores of three Louisiana parishes and may be coming in from under the surface of the water.

Expansion predictions

Scientists predict that the Gulf Stream could pick up the oil and carry it around Florida to the East Coast, but on May 5, Robert Weisberg of The University of South Florida said winds would take the oil away from the Loop Current, which becomes the Gulf Stream. Ruoying He of North Carolina State University, head of the Ocean Observing and Monitoring Group, said if the oil reached the Gulf Stream, then south Florida, including the Keys, would likely be affected. Whether it comes ashore farther north depends on local winds, but the Gulf Stream moves away from the coast southeast of Charleston, South Carolina, at a formation called the Charleston Bump. Susan Lozier of Duke University said in late spring off the Carolinas, the winds would blow away from the shore. Rich Luettich, director of the University of North Carolina Institute of Marine Sciences in Morehead City, said the oil could remain a problem for as much as a year, or even longer. He did say in the unlikely event the oil reached North Carolina's coast, the Outer Banks would provide significant protection.

Activities to stop the oil leak

The rig's blowout preventer (BOP), a fail-safe device fitted at source of the well, did not automatically cut-off the oil flow as intended when the explosion occurred. BP attempted to use ROVs to close the blowout preventer valves on the well head 5,000 feet (1,500 m) below sea level, a valve closing procedure taking 24–36 hours. BP engineers predicted it would take six attempts to close the valves. As of May 2, 2010, they had sent six ROVs to close the blowout preventer valves, but all attempts were ultimately unsuccessful.

Oil was known to be leaking into the gulf from three different locations. On May 5, BP announced that the smallest of three known leaks had been capped. This did not reduce the spread of oil into the Gulf, but it did allow the repair group to focus their efforts on the two remaining leaks.

Short term efforts

BP engineers have attempted a number of techniques to control or stop the oil spill. The first and fastest was to place a subsea oil recovery system over the well head. This involved placing a 125-tonne (276,000 lb) container dome over the largest of the well leaks and piping it to a storage vessel on the surface. This option would have collected as much as 85% of the leaking oil but was an option that was untested at such depths. BP deployed the system on May 7–8 but it failed when gas leaking from the pipe mixed with water to form methane hydrate crystals that blocked up the steel canopy at the top of the dome. The excess buoyancy of the crystals clogged the opening at the top of the dome where the riser was to be connected.

Following the failure of the 125-tonne (276,000 lb) containment dome, a smaller containment dome, dubbed a "top hat", was lowered to the seabed. The dome was lowered on May 11 but is currently being kept away from the leaking oil well. The dome is meant to funnel some of the escaping oil to a waiting tanker on the surface. Like the past containment dome, they have been used to tackle well and pipeline leaks in the past but not at such a depth. At 4 feet (1.2 m) in diameter and 5 feet (1.5 m) in height, it is much smaller than the first 40 feet (12 m) 125-tonne (276,000 lb) dome. The "top hat" dome will be deployed in the event that BP fails to control the spill by inserting a six-inch wide tube inside the leaking one.

On May 14, engineers began the process of positioning a tube at the largest oil leak site. Engineers attempted to insert a 6 inches (15 cm) wide tube into a jagged 21 inches (53 cm) pipe that is leaking oil onto the Gulf seabed. BP crews tried to insert the tube, which is surrounded by a rubber seal and attached to a tanker at the surface. The tube would be inserted into the larger of two leaks, the one releasing about 85 percent of the crude oil. A BP spokesman said it should be operational within the next several days. However, initial attempts to insert the pipe failed, and BP said it would try again the following day. After three days, BP reported the tube was working. On May 17, BP announced it was funneling approximately 1,000 barrels (42,000 US gallons; 160,000 litres) a day to a waiting tanker ship.

Long term efforts

BP is also preparing to drill a relief well into the original well to relieve it. Transocean's Development Driller III has started drilling a relief well on May 2, 2010. Transocean's Discoverer Enterprise is also underway, should a second relief well be necessary. This operation will take two to three months to stop the flow of oil and will cost about US$100 million. Re-drilling the well straight down was done in Australia after the 2009 Montara oil spill. In this case, once the second drilling operation reached the original borehole the operators pumped drilling mud into the well to stop the flow of oil.

Containment and cleanup

United States Environmental Services' workers prepare oil containment booms for deployment.

BP, which was leading the cleanup, initially employed ROVs, 700 workers, four airplanes and 32 vessels to contain the oil. After the discovery that the undersea wellhead was leaking, the oil cleanup was hampered by high waves on April 24 and 25. According to BP Chief Executive, Tony Hayward, BP will compensate all those affected by the oil spill saying that "We are taking full responsibility for the spill and we will clean it up and where people can present legitimate claims for damages we will honor them. We are going to be very, very aggressive in all of that."

On April 28, the US military announced it was joining the cleanup operation. Doug Suttles, chief operating officer of BP, welcomed the assistance of the US military. The same day, the US Coast Guard also announced it would commence burning of the oil and initiated a controlled burn later that day 30 miles (48 km) east from the Mississippi River Delta, in an effort to protect environmentally sensitive wetlands. On 30 April, President Barack Obama announced that he had dispatched "the Secretaries of Interior and Homeland Security, as well as the Administrator of the EPA, my Assistant for Energy and Climate Change Policy, and the NOAA Administrator to the Gulf Coast" to assess the disaster and that the U.S. Federal Government was using "every single resource at our disposal" to control the slick.

By April 29, 69 vessels including skimmers, tugs, barges and recovery vessels were active in cleanup activities. In an attempt to minimize impact to sensitive areas in the Mississippi River Delta area, over 100,000 feet (30 km) of containment booms were deployed along the coast. By the next day, this nearly doubled to 180,000 feet (55 km) of deployed booms, with an additional 300,000 feet (91 km) staged or being deployed. On May 2, high winds and rough waves rendered oil-catching booms largely ineffective.

On April 30, approximately 2,000 people and 79 vessels were involved in the response and BP claimed that more than 6.3 million gallons of oil-water mix had been recovered. On May 4, the U.S Coast Guard estimated that 170 vessels, and nearly 7,500 personnel were involved in the cleanup efforts, with an additional 2,000 volunteers assisting.

The type of oil involved is also a major problem. While most of the oil drilled off Louisiana is a lighter crude, because the leak is deep under the ocean surface the leaking oil is a heavier blend which contains asphalt-like substances, and, according to Ed Overton, who heads a federal chemical hazard assessment team for oil spills, this type of oil emulsifies well, making a "major sticky mess". Once it becomes that kind of mix, it no longer evaporates as quickly as regular oil, does not rinse off as easily, cannot be eaten by microbes as easily, and does not burn as well. "That type of mixture essentially removes all the best oil clean-up weapons", Overton and others said.

Dispersants

A C-130 Hercules drops an oil-dispersing chemical into the Gulf of Mexico.

On May 1 two United States Department of Defense C-130 Hercules aircraft were employed to spray oil dispersant. The main oil dispersants used were two forms of Corexit 9500 and 9527, made by the Nalco Holding Company, Naperville, Illinois. These contain propylene glycol, 2-butoxyethanol and a proprietary organic sulfonic acid salt. On May 7, Secretary Alan Levine of the Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality Secretary Peggy Hatch, and Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries Secretary Robert Barham sent a letter to BP outlining their concerns related to potential dispersant impact on Louisiana's wildlife and fisheries, environment and public health. Officials are also requesting BP release information on the effects of the dispersants they are using to combat the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

Coast Guard Rear Admiral Mary Landry said the Environmental Protection Agency approved the use of dispersants, or chemicals to break up the oil, after three tests. The chemicals would be sprayed into the leak 1500 m (5000ft) below the surface. By May 15, 436,000 gallons of Corexit EC9500A and EC9527A had been released into the Gulf. Though these products were neither the least toxic nor the most effective among the dispersants approved by the EPA, they had been stockpiled in advance by BP and were available for immediate use, possibly because of close business relationships between Nalco, BP, and Exxon. Shortly afterward inquiries were made whether the underwater injection of dispersants led to the formation of the undersea oil plumes, though NOAA scientist Jane Lubchenco said that there was no information supporting this conclusion.

Consequences

Threat to the Gulf Coast

The slick just off the Louisiana coast on April 30, 2010 (approx. 100 miles (160 km) across).

On April 29, 2010, Governor of Louisiana Bobby Jindal declared a state of emergency in the state after weather forecasts predicted the slick would reach the Louisiana coast by April 30. More than 400 species, including whales and dolphins, are threatened, along with Louisiana's barrier islands and marshlands. In the national refuges most at risk, about 34,000 birds have been counted, including gulls, pelicans, roseate spoonbills, egrets, shore birds, terns, and blue herons. By April 30, the Coast Guard received reports that oil had begun washing up to wildlife refuges and seafood grounds on the Louisiana Gulf Coast. It is possible the Gulf Stream sea currents can spread the oil into the Atlantic Ocean.

Samantha Joye of the University of Georgia indicated that the oil could harm fish directly, and microbes used to consume the oil would also add to the reduction of oxygen in the water, with effects felt higher up the food chain. Professor Joye stated that "It could take years, possibly decades, for the system to recover from an infusion of this quantity of oil and gas. We've never seen anything like this before. It's impossible to fathom the impact."

Financial impact

Initial cost estimates to the fishing industry were $2.5 billion, while the impact on tourism along Florida's Paradise coast could be $3 billion. Because of the risk that the oil spill can affect the shrimping industry, an emergency shrimping season was opened on April 29, 2010, so that a catch could be brought in before the oil advanced too far. On May 2 the NOAA closed commercial and recreational fishing in affected federal waters between the mouth of the Mississippi River and Pensacola Bay, increasing the closed area by approximately 50% on May 7. On May 18 the NOAA more than doubled the area under the fishing ban to include approximately 19% of federal waters, or 46,000 square miles of the Gulf.

An April 30 Merrill Lynch report found that five companies connected to the disaster, BP, Transocean, Anadarko Petroleum, Halliburton and Cameron International, had lost a total of $21 billion in market capitalization since the explosion. It noted that Halliburton, which had lost $1.5 billion, "generally does not take environmental risk" and includes a limited liability clause in its contracts, and that Cameron's loss of $1.8 billion in market value was out of proportion to its involvement as manufacturer of the blowout preventer, as "most manufacturers are not responsible for consequential damages." Currently, United States federal law limits BP's liability for non-cleanup costs to $75 million unless gross negligence is proven.

On May 13 BP reported that the cost of the oil spill alone had reached $450 million, and the price tag for the spill was rising by at least $10 million a day.

Litigation

On April 22, the families of two missing workers filed lawsuits in federal and state court in Louisiana against BP and Transocean, alleging negligence and failure to meet federal regulations. As of April 30, at least four lawsuits had been filed and insurers were bracing for years of claims. One report put the number of lawsuits at "more than two dozen." Another article counted three dozen, including 31 attempts to file class action lawsuits.

Speaking on National Public Radio on May 6, lawyers for some survivors of the blast claim that their clients were kept in boats and on another rig for 15 hours or more before being brought to shore, and when they did get to shore, "they were zipped into private buses, there was security there, there was no press, no lawyers allowed, nothing, no family members. They drove them to this hotel and they escorted them into the back of this hotel, once again under escort". Secluded at the hotel for several hours, they were questioned by company consultants and investigators and given a form to sign.

The Oil Pollution Act will likely play a key role in determining responsibility according to an attorney in New Orleans not involved in the litigation. The cases are likely to be combined into one court for evidence-gathering and pretrial decisions, according to Michael G. Stag, a lawyer for the Louisiana Environmental Action Network, which sued on April 30. BP Plc, Transocean Ltd., Cameron International Corp., and Halliburton Energy Services Inc. have all been named in one or more of the lawsuits.

Media analysis

According to a May 16 2010 report on CBS News “60 Minutes,” the blowout preventer was damaged in a previously unreported accident four weeks before the April 20 explosion, and BP overruled the drilling operator on key operations. BP declined to comment on the 60 Minutes report.

A May 18th Wall Street Journal story said that disaster plans for oil rigs are “lacking” and have been for many years. The article said that in 2004, BP managers warned in a trade journal that “the company wasn't prepared for the long-term, round-the-clock task of dealing with a deep-sea spill.” Six years later, BP still wasn’t ready. Speaking of the Deepwater Horizon incident, BP chief executive Tony Hayward said it's "probably true" that BP didn't do enough planning in advance of the disaster. There are some capabilities, he said, "that we could have available to deploy instantly, rather than creating as we go."

U.S. and Canadian offshore drilling policy

Main article: United States offshore drilling debate

Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar stated that the disaster "has huge ramifications about what happens to energy development in the ocean all around the world." Salazar ordered immediate inspections of all deep-water operations in the Gulf of Mexico. An Outer Continental Shelf safety review board within the Department of the Interior will provide recommendations for conducting drilling activities in the Gulf. According to President Obama, no new offshore drilling leases will be issued until a thorough review determines whether more safety systems are needed.

On May 3, California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, reacting to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, withdrew his support for a proposed plan to allow offshore drilling in California to be expanded, stating, "I see on TV the birds drenched in oil, the fishermen out of work, the massive oil spill and oil slick destroying our precious ecosystem."

On April 28, the National Energy Board of Canada, which regulates offshore drilling on the Arctic and B.C. coasts, issued a letter to oil companies. It said the Board "intends to ask questions about this incident" during upcoming talks on offshore drilling and asked them to explain their argument against safety rules which require same-season relief wells. Five days later the Canadian Environment Minister, Jim Prentice, said the talks should not proceed as the government would not approve a decision to relax safety or environment regulations for large energy projects.

Atlantis Oil Field safety practices

Main article: Atlantis Oil Field

The Deepwater Horizon disaster has given new impetus to an effort by Rep. Raúl M. Grijalva (D-AZ) and 18 fellow Democrats to pressure the Minerals Management Service to investigate safety practices on the BP offshore platform in the Atlantis Oil Field. According to Common Dreams NewsCenter, a whistleblower report to the Minerals Management Service in March 2009 that was confirmed by an independent expert, said that "a BP database showed that over 85 percent of the Atlantis Project's Piping and Instrument drawings lacked final engineer-approval, and that the project should be immediately shut down until those documents could be accounted for and are independently verified." According to Grijalva, "MMS and congressional staff have suggested that while the company by law must maintain 'as-built' documents, there is no requirement that such documents be complete or accurate." BP and other oil industry groups wrote letters objecting to a proposed Minerals Management Service rule last year that would have required stricter safety measures. The Minerals Management Service changed rules in April 2008 to exempt certain projects in the central Gulf region, allowing BP to operate in the Macondo Prospect without filing a "blowout" plan.

See also

• Aban Pearl
• Gulf War oil spill
• Ixtoc I
• List of oil spills
• Offshore oil and gas in the US Gulf of Mexico
• Oil Pollution Act of 1990
• 2005 Texas City Refinery explosion (a BP-owned facility)
• 2006 Prudhoe Bay oil spill (A BP owned pipeline in Alaska)

References

News articles

• Brenner, Noah; Guegel, Anthony; Pitt, Anthea (2010-04-30). "Congress calls Halliburton on Macondo". Upstreamonline.com. Retrieved 2010-05-01.
• Broder, John M.; Robertson, Campbell; Krauss, Clifford (2010-05-05). "Amount of spill could escalate, company admits". The New York Times. Retrieved 2010-05-05.
• Faulkner, Katherine (2010-05-14). "Our oil spill is just tiny, says BP chief". Daily Mail. p. 21. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
• Goldenberg, Suzanne (2010-05-14). "Scientists study ocean footage to gauge full scale of oil leak". The Guardian. p. 29. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
• Harris, Richard (2010-05-14). "Gulf spill may far exceed official estimates". National Public Radio. Retrieved 2010-05-16.
• Inskeep, Steve (2010-05-03). "BP will pay for Gulf oil spill disaster, CEO says". National Public Radio. Retrieved 2010-05-03.
• Owen, Jonathan (2010-05-16). "BP boss defends company against Obama's attack". The Independent. p. 12. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
• Pilkington, Ed; McKie, Robin. "Obama flies in to meet BP chief over Deepwater oil crisis". The Observer. pp. 1, 2. Retrieved 2010-05-18. {{cite news}}: Text "date - 2010-05-02" ignored (help)
• Robertson, Grant; Galloway, Gloria (2010-05-05). "Ottawa talks tough on offshore drilling". The Globe and Mail. pp. A1, A13. Retrieved 2010-05-05.
• Shapiro, Joseph (2010-05-06). "Rig survivors felt coerced to sign waivers". National Public Radio. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
• Sherwell, Philip (2010-05-02). "Waiting for the black tide". The Sunday Telegraph. p. 25. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
• Talley, Ian (2010-04-30). "Oil may be leaking at rate of 25,000 barrels a day in Gulf". The Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 2010-05-13.
• Unattributed (2010-04-30). "Worst ever oil disaster". Daily Mail. p. 45. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
• Unattributed (2010-05-03). "Florida threatened as size of slick triples". Daily Mail. p. 12. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
• Usborne, David (2010-04-30). "Oil slick may hit US coast today". The Independent. pp. 1, 12. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
• VanderKlippe, Nathan (2010-04-30). "Arctic drilling faces tougher scrutiny". The Globe and Mail. pp. B1, B8. Retrieved 2010-05-02.
• Webb, Tim (2010-05-14). "Gulf oil spill? It's just a drop in the ocean, says BP chief". The Guardian. pp. 1, 2. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
• Webb, Tim (2010-05-16). "BP fights on the beaches to save the shoreline – and its name". The Observer. pp. 36–37. Retrieved 2010-05-18.
• White, Stephen (2010-05-03). "BP's oil slickers; Bosses who earn millions claimed they could handle rig explosions". Daily Mirror. p. 14. Retrieved 2010-05-13.

Wire reports

• "Progress toward Gulf oil well cap". Reuters. 2010-05-03. Retrieved 2010-05-13.
• "Gulf Gusher Dwarfs Previous Estimates, BP Will Inject Junk to Plug It". Environment News Service. 2010-05-13. Retrieved 2010-05-16.
• "BP says its Gulf oil spill costs now $450 million". Associated Press. 2010-05-14. Retrieved 2010-05-16.
• Borenstein, Seth; Breed, Allen G. (2010-05-02). "Oil spill grows, with little success stopping flow". Associated Press. {{cite news}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help); Text "http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gIXWYBTpLtSayJtg41LKXpxSxVPAD9FESFV01" ignored (help)
• Burdeau, Cain; Holbrook, Mohr (2010-05-01). "Expert: Surface area of Gulf oil spill has tripled". Associated Press. Retrieved 2010-05-13.
• Daly, Matthew; Werner, Erica (2010-05-04). "WH pushes to lift liability limit for Gulf spill". Associated Press. Retrieved 2010-05-04.

Online resources

• "The Ongoing Administration-Wide Response to the Deepwater BP Oil Spill" (press release). Whitehouse.gov. 2010-05-05. Retrieved 2010-05-08.
• "Transocean Ltd. Reports Fire on Semisubmersible Drilling Rig Deepwater Horizon" (press release). Transocean. 2010-04-21. Retrieved 2010-04-21.
• "BP MC252 Gulf Of Mexico Response Continues To Escalate On And Below Surface" (press release). BP. 2010-04-29. Retrieved 2010-04-29.
• "BP Steps Up Shoreline Protection Plans on US Gulf Coast" (press release). BP. 2010-04-30. Retrieved 2010-04-30.
• "Fact Sheets". Deepwater Horizon Response Unified Command. Retrieved 2010-05-10.

Film

• "Deepwater Horizon's Blowout, Part 1". 60 Minutes. 2010-05-16.
• "Deepwater Horizon's Blowout, Part 2". 60 Minutes. 2010-05-16.

External links

• U.S. Government/BP/Transocean unified command site on the "Gulf of Mexico-Transocean Drilling Incident"
• NOAA Deepwater Horizon Incident website (Note: site response time may be slow due to high demand)
• Transcript of a firsthand account of a surviving petroleum engineer
• CNN iReport. Upclose video of the fire
• GOES-13 satellite images (CIMSS Satellite Blog)
• Realtime Pictures
• Mississippi's first class-action lawsuit filed over oil spill – Oil Spill – SunHerald.com (30 April 2010)
• Cases filed in Alabama matching "Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc." :: Justia Dockets & Filings
• Cases filed in Florida matching "Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc." :: Justia Dockets & Filings
• Cases filed in Georgia matching "Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc." :: Justia Dockets & Filings
• Cases filed in Louisiana matching "Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc." :: Justia Dockets & Filings
• Cases filed in Mississippi matching "Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc." :: Justia Dockets & Filings
• Cases filed in Texas matching "Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc." :: Justia Dockets & Filings