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==The Sarajevo Crisis and the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia==
==The Sarajevo Crisis and the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia==
Wilhelm was a close friend of the Austrian [[Archduke Franz Ferdinand]], and he was deeply shocked by his assassination in July of [[1914]]. The Kaiser offered to support Austria-Hungary in crushing the secret organization that had plotted the slaying, and even sanctioned the use of force by Austria against the percieved source of the movement - [[Serbia]]. The Kaiser wanted to remain in Berlin until the crisis was resolved, but his courtiers persuaded him instead to go on his annual cruise of the North Sea on July 6, [[1914]]. It was perhaps realised that Wilhelm's presence would be more of a hinderance to those elements in the government who wished to use the crisis to increase German prestige, even at the risk of general war - something of which Wilhelm, for all his bluster, was extremely apprehensive.
Wilhelm was a close friend of the Austrian [[Archduke Franz Ferdinand]], and he was deeply shocked by his assassination on June 28, [[1914]]. The Kaiser offered to support Austria-Hungary in crushing the secret organization that had plotted the slaying, and even sanctioned the use of force by Austria against the percieved source of the movement - [[Serbia]]. The Kaiser wanted to remain in Berlin until the crisis was resolved, but his courtiers persuaded him instead to go on his annual cruise of the North Sea on July 6, [[1914]]. It was perhaps realised that Wilhelm's presence would be more of a hinderance to those elements in the government who wished to use the crisis to increase German prestige, even at the risk of general war - something of which Wilhelm, for all his bluster, was extremely apprehensive.


The Kaiser made erratic attempts to stay on top of the crisis via telegram, and when the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was delivered to Serbia, he hurried back to Berlin. The Kaiser reached Berlin on July 28th, read a copy of the Serbian reply, and wrote on it:
The Kaiser made erratic attempts to stay on top of the crisis via telegram, and when the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was delivered to Serbia, he hurried back to Berlin. The Kaiser reached Berlin on July 28th, read a copy of the Serbian reply, and wrote on it:

Revision as of 12:52, 17 April 2006

Wilhelm II
German Emperor and King of Prussia
Template:House of Hohenzollern

German Emperor Wilhelm (born Friedrich Wilhelm Viktor Albrecht, Prince of Prussia 27 January, 18594 June 1941), was the last German Emperor and King of Prussia (de: Deutscher Kaiser und König von Preußen), ruling from 15 June1888 to 9 November1918. Some English-language biographies anglicize his name as William II, or in full, Frederick William Victor Albert of Hohenzollern.

Early life and background

Wilhelm was born in Berlin to Crown Prince Friedrich and his wife, Victoria, Princess Royal of Britain. His mother was the aunt of Empress Alexandra (wife of Tsar Nicholas II), and sister of King Edward VII. A traumatic breech birth left him with a withered left arm due to Erb's Palsy, which he tried with some success to conceal. (In the photograph opposite, one hand is holding the withered one, concealing it. In many other photos he carries a pair of white gloves in his left hand to make the arm seem longer, or has his crippled arm on the hilt of a sword or clutching a cane to give the effect of the limb being poised at a dignified angle).

Recent analyses of records of his birth in the Imperial Archives have also suggested that he may have experienced some brain trauma, possibly leading to damage. Historians are divided on whether such a mental incapacity may have contributed to his frequently aggressive, tactless, headstrong, and occasionally bullying approach to problems and people, which was evident in both his personal and political life. Such an approach certainly marred German policy under his leadership, most notably in his dismissal of the cautious Otto von Bismarck. He also had a very difficult relationship with his mother, who was somewhat cold towards him and whose guilt over his deformity led her to try to "beat" it out of him through a regimen of rigorous exercise. It is interesting that, given her English origins, Victoria did much to instill in her son a sense of British supremacy in many respects. She insisted on calling her sons by their Anglicised names - thus "Wilhelm" was known as "William", and her second son "Heinrich" was called "Henry". The future Kaiser harboured mixed feelings for Britain and the British throughout his life, many of which may be traced to this very early stage of his development.

Wilhelm II German Emperor and King of Prussia

Wilhelm was educated at Kassel at the Friedrichsgymnasium and the University of Bonn. Wilhelm was possessed of a quick intelligence, but unfortunately this was often overshadowed by a cantankerous temper. Wilhelm also took a certain interest in the science and technology of the age, but though he liked to pose, in conversation, as a man of the world, he remained convinced that he belonged to a distinct order of mankind, designated for monarchy by the grace of God. Wilhelm was accused of megalomania as early as 1894, by German pacifist Ludwig Quidde. As a scion of the royal house of Hohenzollern, Wilhelm was also exposed from an early age to the military society of the Prussian aristocracy. It hardly needs to be said that this was to be a major part of his life, and in maturity Wilhelm was to be seen out of uniform very infrequently. The hyper-masculine military culture of Prussia in this period did much to frame Wilhelm's political ideals as well as his personal relationships.

Wilhelm's relationship with the male members of his family was equally as interesting as that with his mother. Crown Prince Friedrich was viewed by his son with a deeply-felt love and respect. His father's status as a hero of the wars of unification was largely responsible for the young Wilhelm's attitude, as in the circumstances in which he was raised, close emotional contact between father and son was not encouraged. Later, as he came into contact with the Crown Prince's political opponents, Wilhelm came to adopt more ambivalent feelings toward his father, given the perceived influence of Wilhelm's mother over a figure who should have been possessed of masculine independence and strength.

Wilhelm also idolised his grandfather, Wilhelm I, and he was instrumental in later attempts to foster a cult of the first Kaiser as "Wilhelm the Great". Kaiser Wilhelm I died in Berlin on March 9 1888, and Prince Wilhelm's father was subsequently proclaimed emperor as Friedrich III. Wilhelm's father was dying of throat cancer, and on 15th June of that same year his 29 year-old son succeeded him as German Emperor and King of Prussia.

1888-1900—social and political

Although in his youth he had been a great admirer of Otto von Bismarck, Wilhelm's characteristic impatience soon brought him into conflict with the "Iron Chancellor", the dominant figure in the foundation of his empire. Furthermore, the young Kaiser had come to the throne with the determination that he was going to rule as well as reign, unlike his grandfather, who had largely been content to leave day-to-day administration to the brilliant Bismarck.

Early conflicts between the young Kaiser and his chancellor soon poisoned the relationship between the two men. Bismarck believed that Wilhelm was a lightweight who could be dominated, and he showed scant respect for Wilhelm's ambitions in the late 1880s. Following an attempt by Bismarck to implement a far-reaching anti-Socialist law in early 1890, the final split between monarch and statesman occurred soon after. Wilhelm was unwilling to open his reign with a wholesale massacre of striking industrial workers, and he dismissed Bismarck in March of 1890.

Wilhelm appointed Leo Graf von Caprivi in Bismarck's place, who in turn was replaced by Prince Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst in 1894. In appointing Caprivi and then Hohenlohe, Wilhelm was embarking upon what is known to history as "the New Course", in which the Kaiser hoped to exert decisive influence in the government of the empire. There is debate amongst historians as to the precise degree to which Wilhelm succeeded in implementing "personal rule" in this era, but what is clear is the very different dynamic which existed between the crown and its chief political servant (the chancellor) in the "Wilhelmine" period. These chancellors were senior civil servants and not seasoned politician-statesmen like Bismarck. Wilhelm wanted to preclude the emergence of another Iron Chancellor, whom he ultimately detested as being "a boorish old killjoy" who had not permitted any minister to see the Kaiser except in his presence, keeping a stangehold on effective political power. Upon his enforced retirement and until his dying day, Bismarck was to become a bitter critic of Wilhelm's policies, but without the support of the supreme arbiter of all political appointments (the emperor) there was little chance of Bismarck exerting a decisive influence on policy.

Something which Bismarck was able to effect was the creation of the "Bismarck myth". This was a view - which some would argue was confirmed by subsequent events - that with the dismissal of the Iron Chancellor, Wilhelm II effectively destroyed any chance Germany had of stable and effective government. In this view, the Kaiser's "New Course" was characterised far more as the German ship of state going out of control, eventually leading through a series of crises to the carnage of the First and Second World Wars. In reality, Wilhelm was probably correct to dismiss a man whose political abilities were on the wane, and who had become dangerously confrontational towards socialist elements within the Reich.


1900-1914—social and political

Following the dismissal of Hohenlohe in 1900, Wilhelm appointed the man who he regarded as "his own Bismarck", Prince Bernhard von Bülow. Wilhelm hoped that in Bülow, he had found a man who would combine the ability of the Iron Chancellor with the respect for Wilhelm's wishes which would allow the empire to be governed as the Kaiser saw fit. Bülow had already been identified by Wilhelm as possessing this potential, and many historians regard his appointment as chancellor as being merely the conclusion of a long "grooming" process. Over the succeeding decade however, Wilhelm became disillusioned with his choice, and following Bülow's opposition to the Kaiser over the "Daily Telegraph Affair" of 1908 and on other issues, Wilhelm dismissed him in favour of Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg in 1909.

Bethmann was a career bureaucrat, at whose family home Wilhelm had stayed as a youth. The Kaiser especially came to show great respect for Bethmann-Hollweg, acknowledging the latter's superior foresight in matters of internal governance, though he disagreed with certain of Bethmann's policies, such as his attempts at the reform of the Prussian electoral laws. However, it was only reluctantly that he parted ways with Bethmann-Hollweg in 1917, after three years of World War I.

Wilhelm's involvement in the domestic sphere was more limited in the early twentieth century than it had been in the first years of his reign. In part, this was due to the appointment of Bülow and Bethmann - arguably both men of greater force of character than Wilhelm's earlier chancellors - but also because of his increasing interest in foreign affairs.


1888-1914—Foreign policy

German Foreign policy under Wilhelm II was faced with a number of significant problems. Perhaps the most apparent was that Wilhelm, by nature an impatient man, subjective in his reactions and affected strongly by sentiment and impulse, was personally ill-equipped to steer German foreign policy along a rational course. This weakness also made his vulnerable to manipulation by interests within the German foreign policy elite, as subsequent events were to prove.

Following his dismissal of Bismarck, Wilhelm and his new chancellor became aware of the existence of the secret Reinsurance Treaty with the Russian empire, which Bismarck had concluded in 1887. Wilhelm’s refusal to renew this agreement – which guaranteed Russian neutrality in the event of an attack by France – was seen by many historians as the worst offence committed by the Kaiser in terms of foreign policy. In reality, the decision to allow the lapse of the treaty was largely the responsibility of Caprivi, though Wilhelm supported his chancellor’s actions. It is important not to overestimate the influence of the Kaiser in matters of foreign policy after the dismissal of Bismarck, but it is certain that his involvement helped contribute to the general lack of coherence and consistency in the policy of the German Empire towards other powers.

A typical example of this was his "love-hate" relationship with Great Britain and in particular with his British cousins. Open armed conflict with Britain was never what Wilhelm had in mind—"a most unimaginable thing", so he once quipped—yet he often gave in to the generally anti-British sentiments within the upper echelons of the German government, conforming as they did to his own prejudices towards Britain whcih arose from his youth. When war came about in 1914 Wilhelm sincerely believed that he was the victim of a diplomatic conspiracy set up by his late uncle, Edward VII, in which Britain had actively sought to “encircle” Germany through the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and a similar arrangement with Russia in 1907. This is indicative of the fact that Wilhelm had a highly unrealistic belief in the importance of “personal diplomacy” between European monarchs, and could not comprehend that the very different constitutional position of his British cousins made this largely irrelevant.

Similarly, he believed that his personal relationship with his cousin Tsar Nicholas II of Russia was sufficient to prevent war between the two powers. At a private meeting at Björkö in 1905, Wilhelm concluded an agreement with his cousin which amounted to a treaty of alliance, without first consulting with Bülow. A similar situation confronted Tsar Nicholas on his return to St. Petersburg, and the treaty was, as a result, a dead letter. But Wilhelm believed that Bülow had betrayed him, and this contributed to the growing sense of dissatisfaction he felt towards the man he hoped would be his foremost servant. In broadly similar terms to the "personal diplomacy" at Björkö, his attempts to avoid war with Russia by an exchange of telegrams with Nicholas II in the last days before the outbreak of the First World War came unstuck due to the reality of European power politics. His attempts to woo Russia were also seriously out of step with existing German commitments to Austria-Hungary. In a chivalrous fidelity to the Austro-German alliance, Wilhelm informed the Austrian Kaiser Francis Joseph in 1889 that "the day of Austro-Hungarian mobilisation, for whatever cause, will be the day of German mobilisation too". Given that Austrian mobilisation for war would most likely be against Russia, a policy of alliance with both powers was obviously impossible.

It is now widely recognised that the various spectacular acts which Wilhelm undertook in the international sphere were often partially encouraged by the German foreign policy elite. There were a number of key exceptions, such as the famous 1896 telegram of 1896 in which the Kaiser congratulated President Kruger of the Transvaal on the suppression of the Jameson Raid, and thus aggravated British public opinion. Though its full impact was to be felt many years later, his speech of 27 July 1900 exhorting German troops sent to quell the Boxer Rebellion to emulate the ancient Huns is another example of his unfortunate propensity for impolitic public utterances.

Perhaps Wilhelm's most damaging personal blunder in the arena of foreign policy had a far greater impact in Germany than internationally. The Daily Telegraph Affair of 1908 stemmed from the publication of some of Wilhelm's opinins in edited form in the British daily newspaper of that name. The Kaiser saw it as an opportunity to promote his views and ideas on Anglo-German friendship, but instead, due to his emotional outbursts during the course of the interview, Wilhelm ended up further alienating not only the British people, but also the French, Russians, and Japanese all in one fell swoop by implying, inter alia, that the Germans cared nothing for the British; that the French and Russians had attempted to instigate Germany to intervene in the Second Boer War; and that the German naval buildup was targeted against the Japanese, not Britain. (One memorable quote from the interview is "You English are mad, mad, mad as March hares.") The effect in Germany was quite massive, with serious calls for his abdication being mentioned in the press. Quite understandably, Wilhelm kept a very low profile for many months after the Daily Telegraph fiasco, and later exacted his revenge by enforcing the resignation of Prince Bülow, who had abandoned the Kaiser to public criticism by publicly accepting some responsibility for not having edited the transcript of the interview before its publication.

The Daily Telegraph crisis had deeply wounded Wilhelm's previously unimpaired self-confidence, so much that the Kaiser soon suffered a severe bout of depression from which he never really recovered (photographs of Wilhelm in the post-1908 period show a man with far more haggard features and greying hair, and he in fact lost much of the influence he had previously exercised in terms of both domestic and foreign policy.

In some cases, Wilhelm II's diplomatic "blunders" were often part of a more wide-reaching policy emanating from the German governing elite. One such action sparked the Moroccan Crisis of 1906, when Wilhelm was persuaded (largely against his wishes) to make a spectacular visit to Tangier, in Morocco. Wilhelm's presence was seen as an assertion of Germa interests in Morocco and in a speech he even made certain remarks in favour of Moroccan independence. This led to friction with France, which had expanding colonial interests in Morocco, and led to the Algeciras Conference, which served largely to further isolate Germany in Europe. However, nothing Wilhelm II did in the international arena was of more influence than his decision to pursue a policy of massive naval construction.


A powerful navy was Wilhelm's pet project. He had inherited from his mother a love of the British Royal Navy (the world's largest), and once confided to his uncle Edward VII that his dream was to have a "fleet of my own some day" like the British. Wilhelm's frustration over his fleet's poor showing at the Fleet Review at his grandmother Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee celebrations, combined with his inability to exert German influence in South Africa following the 1896 telegram led to the Kaiser taking definitive steps towards the construction of a fleet to rival that of his British cousins. Wilhelm was fortunate to be able to call on the services of the dynamic naval officer Alfred von Tirpitz, whom he appointed to the head of the Reich Naval Office in 1897.

The new admiral had conceived of what came to be known as the "Risk theory" or the Tirpitz Plan, by which Germany could force Britain to accede to German demands in the international arena through the threat posed by a powerful battlefleet concentrated in the North Sea. Tirpitz enjoyed Wilhelm's full support in his advocacy of successive naval bills of 1897 and 1900, by which the German navy was built up to contend with that of the United Kingdom. Naval expansion under the Fleet Acts eventually led to severe financial strains in Germany by 1914, as by 1906 Wilhelm had committed his navy to construction of the much larger, more expensive Dreadnought type of battleship.


The Sarajevo Crisis and the Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia

Wilhelm was a close friend of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and he was deeply shocked by his assassination on June 28, 1914. The Kaiser offered to support Austria-Hungary in crushing the secret organization that had plotted the slaying, and even sanctioned the use of force by Austria against the percieved source of the movement - Serbia. The Kaiser wanted to remain in Berlin until the crisis was resolved, but his courtiers persuaded him instead to go on his annual cruise of the North Sea on July 6, 1914. It was perhaps realised that Wilhelm's presence would be more of a hinderance to those elements in the government who wished to use the crisis to increase German prestige, even at the risk of general war - something of which Wilhelm, for all his bluster, was extremely apprehensive.

The Kaiser made erratic attempts to stay on top of the crisis via telegram, and when the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was delivered to Serbia, he hurried back to Berlin. The Kaiser reached Berlin on July 28th, read a copy of the Serbian reply, and wrote on it:

"A brilliant solution--and in barely 48 hours! This is more than could have been expected. A great moral victory for Vienna; but with it every pretext for war falls to the ground, and [the Ambassador] Giesl had better have stayed quietly at Belgrade. On this document, I should never have given orders for mobilization." [Emil Ludwig, "Wilhelm Hohenzollern: The last of the Kaisers," G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1927 (trans. by Ethel Colburn Mayne), p. 444]

Unknown to The Kaiser, Austro-Hungarian ministers and generals had already convinced the 84-year-old Emperor Francis Joseph to sign a declaration of war against Serbia.


The Great War

It is difficult to argue that Wilhelm actively sought to unleash the First World War. Though he had ambitions for the German Empire to be a world power, it was never Wilhelm's intention to conjure a large-scale conflict to achieve such ends. As soon as his better judgment dictated that a world war was imminent, he made strenuous efforts to preserve the peace (such as the "Willy and Nicky" correspondence mentioned earlier, and his optimistic interpretation of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum that Austro-Hungarian troops should go no further than Belgrade, thus limiting the conflict). But by then it was far too late, for the eager military officials of Germany and the German Foreign Office were successful in persuading him to sign the mobilisation order and initiate the Schlieffen Plan. The contemporary British reference to the First World War as "the Kaiser's War"* in the same way that the Second was "Hitler's War" is now seen as unfounded (and even somewhat unfair) in its suggestion that Wilhelm was personally responsible for unleashing the conflict. Nevertheless, his own love of the culture and trappings of militarism and push to endorse the German military establishment and industry (most notably the Krupp corporation), which was the key support which enabled his dynasty to rule helped push his empire into an armaments race with competing European powers. Similarly, though on signing the mobilisation order, Wilhelm is reported as having said "You will regret this, gentlemen", he had encouraged Austria to pursue a hard line with Serbia, was an enthusiastic supporter of the subsequent German actions during the war and revelled in the title of "Supreme War Lord".

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The "Shadow-kaiser"

The role of ultimate arbiter of wartime national affairs proved too heavy a burden for Wilhelm to sustain. As the war progressed, the Kaiser's influence receded and inevitably his lack of ability in military maters led to an ever-increasing reliance upon his generals, so much that after 1916 the Empire had effectively become a military dictatorship under the control of Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff. Increasingly cut-off from reality and the political decision-making process, Wilhelm vacillated between defeatism and dreams of victory, depending upon the fortunes of "his" armies. The Kaiser remained a useful figurehead, and he toured the lines and munitions plants, awarded medals and gave encouraging speeches.

Nevertheless, Wilhelm still retained the ultimate authority in matters of political appointment, and it was only after his consent had been gained that major changes to the high command could be effected. Wilhelm was in favour of the dismissal of Helmuth von Moltke the Younger in 1915 and his replacement by Erich von Falkenhayn. Similarly, Wilhelm was instrumental in the policy of inactivity adopted by the High Seas Fleet after the Battle of Jutland in 1916. Likewise, it was largely owing to his sense of grievance at having been pushed into the shadows that Wilhelm attempted to take a leading role in the crisis of 1918. He realised the necessity of an capitulation and did not insist that the German nation should bleed to death for a dying cause.

Abdication and flight

Wilhelm was at the Imperial Army headquarters in Spa, Belgium, when the uprisings in Berlin and other centres occurred in late 1918. Mutiny among the ranks of his beloved Kaiserliche Marine, the Imperial Navy, profoundly shocked him. After the outbreak of the German Revolution, Wilhelm could not make up his mind whether or not to abdicate. Up to that point, he was confident that even if he were obliged to vacate the Imperial German throne, he would still retain the Prussian kingship. The unreality of this claim was revealed when, for the sake of preserving some form of government in the face of anarchy, Wilhelm's abdication both as Kaiser of the German Empire and King of Prussia was abruptly announced by the Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, on November 9, 1918. (Prince Max himself was forced to resign later the same day, when it became clear that only Friedrich Ebert, leader of the SPD could effectively exert control).

File:Kaiser Wilhelm car.jpg
The former car of Wilhelm, with its new Dutch owners, the Schunck family

Kaiser Wilhelm consented to the abdication only after Ludendorff's replacement, General Wilhelm Groener, had informed him that the officers and men of the army would march back in good order under Paul von Hindenburg's command, but would certainly not fight for Wilhelm's throne on the home front. The monarchy's last and strongest support had been broken, and finally even Hindenburg, himself a lifelong royalist, was obliged (with some embarrassment) to advise the Kaiser to give up the crown.

The following day, the now ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II crossed the border by train and went into exile in the Netherlands, which had remained neutral throughout the war. Upon the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles in early 1919, Article 227 expressly provided for the prosecution of Wilhelm "for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties", but Queen Wilhelmina refused to extradite him, despite appeals from the Allies. The erstwhile Kaiser first settled in Amerongen, and then was subsequently provided with a small castle in the municipality of Doorn, which was to be his home for the remainder of his life. From this residence, Huis Doorn, Wilhelm absolved his officers and servants of their oath of loyalty to him, however the Kaiser himself never formally relinquished his titles, and hoped to return to Germany in the future.


Life in exile

In 1922 Wilhelm published the first volume of his memoirs -a disappointingly slim volume which nevertheless revealed the posession of a remarkable memory (Wilhelm had no archive on which to draw). In them, he asserted his claim that he was not guilty of initiating the Great War, and defended his conduct throughout his reign, especially in matters of foreign policy. For the remaining twenty years of his life, the ageing Kaiser regularly entertained guests (often of some standing) and kept himself updated on events in Europe. Much of his time was spent chopping wood (a hobby he discovered upon his arrival at Doorn) and observing the life of a country squire. It would seem that his attitude towards Britain and the British finally coalesced in this period into a warm desire to ape British custom. Wilhelm's first reported desire upon entering his exile was for "a cup of good English tea". No longer able to call upon the services of a court barber, and partly out of a desire to disguise his features, Wilhelm grew a beard and allowed his famous moustache to droop.

In the early 1930s, Wilhelm apparently hoped that the successes of the Nazis would stimulate interest in the revival of the monarchy. His second wife, Hermine (see below), actively petitioned the Nazi government on her husband's behalf, but the scorn which Adolf Hitler felt for the man who had contributed to Germany's greatest defeat, and his own desire for power would prevent the Kaiser's restoration. Though he hosted Hermann Göring at Doorn on at least one occasion, Wilhelm grew to distrust Hitler, though he greatly admired the success which he was able to achieve in the opening months of the Second World War, and even sent a congratulatory telegram on the fall of Paris. Nevertheless, after the Nazi conquest of the Netherlands in 1940, the ageing Wilhelm retired completely from public life.

Wilhelm II died of pulmonary embolism in Doorn, Netherlands on June 5, 1941 with German soldiers at the gates of his estate. He was buried in a mausoleum in the grounds of Huis Doorn, which has since become a place of pilgrimage for German monarchists, though there is concern at its growing popularity with adherents of the extreme right. Hitler hoped to bring the Kaiser's body back to Berlin for a lavish funeral, in which Hitler could act as chief mourner and thus demonstrate to Germans the direct succession of the Third Reich from the old Kaiserreich. The Kaiser's wishes, that he would never return to germany until the restoration of the monarchy, were respected, and the Nazi occupation authorities granted a small military funeral, the mourners at which included the hero of the First World War August von Mackensen and Rupprecht of Bavaria, along with a few other military advisors. Wilhelm's request that the swastika and other Nazi regalia not be displayed at the final rites was ignored however.

Marriages and Issue

Wilhelm and his first wife Augusta Viktoria

Wilhelm and his first wife, Augusta Viktoria, Princess of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg, were married on February 27, 1881. Throughout their life together, they had seven children:

Known affectionately as "Dona", Augusta was a close and constant companion to Wilhelm throughout his life, and her death on April 11, 1921 was a devastating blow. It also came less than a year after their son, Joachim, had committed suicide, unable to accept his lot after the abdication of his father, the failure of his own marriage to Marie-Auguste of Anhalt, and the heavy depression felt after his service in the Great War.

The following January, Wilhelm received a birthday greeting from a son of Prince Johann Georg of Schönaich-Carolath. He invited the boy and his mother, Princess Hermine, daughter of Prince Henry XXII of Reuss and a descendant of William the Conqueror, to Doorn. Wilhelm found her very attractive, and greatly enjoyed her company. By early 1922, he was determined to marry her and the couple were eventually wed on November 9, 1922 despite grumblings from Wilhelm's monarchist supporters and the objections of his children. Hermine's daughter, Henriette, eventually married Joachim's son, Karl Franz Josef, on October 5, 1940 (Wilhelm's step-daughter and grandson respectively), though they divorced in 1946. Hermine remained a constant companion to the ageing ex-Kaiser until his death.

Extramarital Affairs

Prior to his marriage, Wilhelm had fallen in love with his cousin, Elisabeth of Hesse and by Rhine, daughter of his aunt Alice, and even wrote her a series of love poems. Elizabeth was initially intrigued, but soon found him to be intolerable, always demanding that she always be at his side. During the Great War, he continually tried to aid Elizabeth in an escape from Russia, she refused to leave her adopted country and stayed there until she was executed by the Bolsheviks in 1918. Although she rejected his hand in marraige, as an old man, he confessed that he never forgot her.

Wilhelm was implicated in some degree in the scandal over his aide and great friend, Philip Fürst zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, which revealed homosexual activities (then illegal under German law) within the Kaiser's inner circle (the Harden-Eulenburg Affair). Bismarck, among others, suggested that there was an inappropriate relationship between Wilhelm and Eulenburg, though this is most likely idle speculation. Wilhelm himself seems to have possessed a fascination for women's hands, and though he revelled in the barely-disguised homoerotic all-male culture of the Prussian army, there is no compelling evidence for his own homosexuality.

Notable facts and Common misconceptions

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Kaiser Wilhelm II
  • Wilhelm, the first grandchild of Queen Victoria, was at her deathbed, holding her in his arms as she passed away. For this, he won some lasting affection from the Great British public which was unfortunately snuffed out in 1914.
  • Wilhelm developed a penchant for archaeology during his vacations on Corfu, a passion he harboured into his exile. He also sketched plans for grand buildings and battleships when he was bored, although experts in construction saw his ideas as grandiose and unworkable. One of Wilhelm's greatest passions was hunting, and he bagged thousands of animals, both beast and bird. While in exile, he also developed a hobby of cutting down trees. During his years in Doorn, he largely deforested his estate, the land only now beginning to recover.
  • Wilhelm owned a vast collection of uniforms and costumes. He wore different ones for each occasion, often 4 or more a day. For instance, when eating plum pudding he would dress as a British Admiral, an honorary rank he had been awarded by his grandmother in 1889.
  • Wilhelm had his summer palace in Stuttgart. When in residence, he held a parade every Sunday at noon. In full military dress, the Emperor, his officers and cavalry, marched up and down the main street; the townsfolk being encouraged to attend.
  • The Emperor loved all things Norwegian. He often spent his summer holidays on his yacht, cruising Norway's coast. When the city of Ålesund was demolished by a great fire in 1904, he oversaw and partially-financed its restoration in Jugendstil architecture.
  • Prior to the outbreak of the First World War, the young Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands visited the Wilhelm II who boasted to the child-Queen that "my guards are seven feet tall and yours are only shoulder high to them." Wilhelmina smiled politely and replied: "Quite true, Your Majesty, your guards are seven feet tall. But when we open our dikes, the water is ten feet deep!" After the armistice ending the Great War, Wilhelm had to swallow his pride and seek Wilhelmina's aid in the Netherlands, this time as a political exile.
  • Wilhelm paid for a marble sarcophagus for the Muslim hero Saladin. Although it is in the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, next to the old tomb, Saladin's remains are not interred in it, but lie in the original wooden coffin in which he was interred.
  • Wilhelm enjoyed the themes of the music of Richard Wagner, and although his patronage of the composer and his Bayreuth Festival never approached the fanatical levels of King Ludwig II of Bavaria or later of Hitler, the horn of the Kaiser's first automobile played Donner's "Heda! Heda! Hedo!" motive from Das Rheingold. The Kaiser himself though that Wagner's music made "too much noise".
  • Through Queen Victoria, Wilhelm was a first cousin to many of the crowned heads of Europe with whom he went to war, most notably George V of the United Kingdom and Nicholas II (through his consort, the Empress Alexandra). All three spoke English fluently and called each other Georgie, Willy and Nicky respectively.
  • Upon hearing that his cousin George V had changed the name of the British royal house to Windsor, he remarked that he planned to see Shakespeare's play The Merry Wives of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.
  • To this day, small but enthusiastic numbers of German monarchists gather at Huis Doorn every year on the anniversary of his death to pay their homage to the last German Emperor.


Further reading

The role of Wilhelm II in German history is a controversial issue in historical scholarship. Initially seen as an important, but embarassing figure in German histories until the late 1950s, for many years after that, the dominant view was that he had little or no influence on German policy leading up to the Great War. This has been challenged since the late 1970s, particularly by Professor John C. G. Röhl. Despite the continuing debate over the precise nature of his impact upon history, the Kaiser has been the focus of many biographies, of which the first (by Emil Ludwig) is still one of the most accessible.

  • Michael Balfour, The Kaiser and His Times, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1964.
  • E. F. Benson, The Kaiser and English Relations, London: Longmans, Green, 1936.
  • Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II: Prince and Emperor, 1859-1900, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
  • Lamar Cecil, Wilhelm II: Emperor and Exile, 1900-1941, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996.
  • Isabel V. Hull, The Entourage of Kaiser Wilhelm II, 1888-1918, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
  • Thomas A. Kohut, Wilhelm II and the Germans: A Study in Leadership, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
  • Emil Ludwig, Wilhelm Hohenzollern: The Last of the Kaisers, New York: Ames Press, 1970 (originally published 1926).
  • Giles Macdonogh, The Last Kaiser: William the Impetuous, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2001.
  • Annika Mombauer & Wilhelm Deist (eds), The Kaiser: New Research on Wilhelm II's Role in Imperial Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
  • Alan Palmer, The Kaiser: Warlord of the Second Reich, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1978.
  • James Retallack, Germany in the Age of Kaiser Wilhelm II, Basingstoke: St. Martin's Press, 1996.
  • John C. G. Röhl & Nicholaus Sombart (eds), Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations - the Corfu Papers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982 (reprinted 2005).
  • John C. G. Röhl, The Kaiser and His Court: Wilhelm II and the Government of Germany, trans. Terence F. Cole, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
  • John C. G. Röhl, Young Wilhelm: The Kaiser's Early Life, 1859-1888, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998 (Volume I of Röhl's massive new biography).
  • John C. G. Röhl, The Kaiser's Personal Monarchy, 1888-1900, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004 (Volume II of Röhl's masive new biography).
  • John Van der Kiste, Kaiser Wilhelm II: Germany's Last Emperor, Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999.
  • Tyler Whittle, The Last Kaiser: A Biography of William II, Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, London: Heinemann, 1977.
  • Wilhelm II, My Memoirs: 1878-1918, London: Cassell & Co., 1922.


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