Siegfried Line campaign

Siegfried Line Campaign
Part of World War II
American soldiers cross the Siegfried Line.
Date 25 August 1944 - 7 March 1945 Location Along and around the Siegfried Line, (France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Germany) Result Allied victory
Belligerents
Western Allies United States United Kingdom Poland Canada France and others	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Dwight Eisenhower (SHAEF) Bernard Montgomery (21st Army Group) Omar Bradley (12th Army Group) Jacob Devers (6th Army Group)	Gerd von Rundstedt (Oberbefehlshaber West) Walter Model (Army Group B)
Strength
5,412,000 troops	~1,500,000 troops
Casualties and losses
U.S.: 240,082 casualties (50,410 killed, 172,450 wounded, 24,374 captured or missing) (15 September 1944 - 21 March 1945)

The Allied advance from Paris to the Rhine was one of the final Allied phases in World War II of the Western European Campaign.

This phase spans from the end of the Operation Overlord (25 August 1944) incorporating the German winter counter offensive through the Ardennes (commonly known as the Battle of the Bulge) up to the Allies preparing to cross the river Rhine in the early months of 1945. This roughly corresponds to the official U.S. European Theater of Operations Rhineland and Ardennes-Alsace campaigns.

Background

After the liberation of Paris by the Free French Army in late August 1944, the Western Allies paused to re-group and organise before continuing their advance from Paris to the Rhine. The pause by the Allies allowed the Germans to solidify their lines — something they had been unable to do west of Paris after their forces had been decimated during the Allied break out from the Normandy lodgement. This had allowed the Allies to advance rapidly against an enemy that was able to put up little resistance. Many towns and villages were liberated with little resistance.

By the middle of September 1944 the three Western Allies Army groups, the British 21st Army Group (Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery) in the north, the United States U.S. 12th Army Group (General Omar Bradley) and to the south the Franco-American Southern Group of Armies (Lieutenant General Jacob L. Devers) that had liberated southern France after landing on the French Mediterranean coast — formed a broad front under the Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower and his headquarters SHAEF.

While Generals Montgomery, Bradley and Patton all favored relatively direct thrusts into Germany (with Montgomery and Bradley each offering to be the spearhead of such an assault), Eisenhower disagreed. Instead, he favored a "broad-front" strategy which would allow the Allies to regroup and shift their forces as needed, and to protect vital supply operations in the rear.

The rapid advance through France had caused a considerable logistical strain, made worse by the lack of any major port other than the relatively distant Cherbourg in western France. Although Antwerp was seen as the key to solving the Allied logistics problems, its port was not open to Allied shipping until the Scheldt estuary was clear of German forces. As the campaign progressed, all the belligerents, Allied as well as German, felt the effects of the lack of suitable replacements for front-line troops.

There were two major defensive obstacles to the Allies. The first was the natural barriers made by the rivers of Eastern France. The second was the Siegfried Line itself, which fell under the command, along with all Wehrmacht forces in the west, of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.

Logistics and supply

Although the breakout from Normandy had taken longer than planned, the advances until September had far exceeded expectations. Bradley, for example, by September, had four more divisions than planned and all of his forces were 150 mi (240 km) ahead of their expected position. One effect was that insufficient supplies could be delivered to the fronts to maintain the advance: actual demand had exceeded the expected needs.

Much war materiel still had to be brought ashore across the invasion beaches and through the one remaining Mulberry harbour. Although small harbours, such as Isigny, Port-en-Bessin and Courcelles, were being used, the major forward ports such as Calais, Boulogne, Dunkirk and Le Havre either remained in German hands as "fortresses" or had been systematically destroyed. The availability of Cherbourg had been valuable until the breakout, but then transport to carry supplies to the rapidly advancing armies became the limiting factor.

Although fuel was successfully pumped from Britain to Normandy via the Pluto pipeline, this still had to reach the fronts, which were advancing faster than the pipelines could be extended. The railways had been largely destroyed by Allied attacks and would take much effort to repair, so fleets of trucks were needed in the interim. In an attempt to address this acute shortage of transport, three newly-arrived U.S. infantry divisions—the 26th, 95th, and 104th—were stripped of their trucks in order to haul supplies. Advancing divisions of the U.S. 12th Army Group left all their heavy artillery and half their medium artillery left west of the Seine, freeing their trucks to move supplies for other units. Four British truck companies were loaned to the Americans. Unfortunately, 1,500 British trucks were found to have critical engine faults and were unusable, limiting assistance from that quarter. The Red Ball Express was an attempt to expedite deliveries by truck but capacity was inadequate for the circumstances.

The Dragoon Force advancing from southern France were supplied adequately from Toulon and Marseille because they had captured intact ports and the local railway system was less damaged. This source supplied about 25% of the Allied needs.

The U.S. supply organization—Communications Zone (COMZ)—is perceived to have failed to expedite solutions and to have been far too bureaucratic, employing 11,000 staff. COMZ and its commander—General John C. H. Lee—were roundly criticised by American field generals. Failures to supply forward units led to unofficial arrangements, with pressed units "diverting" supplies intended for elsewhere. Eisenhower felt he could not exert authority since COMZ was directly answerable to Washington and not to SHAEF, but Eisenhower has been criticised for not exerting more pressure and influence than he did.

The mere occupation of Antwerp was not enough, as the lands surrounding the Scheldt would have to be liberated first to open the port of Antwerp. This was essential, since at this point the main allied supply lines still ran back to Normandy, presenting serious logistical problems. The solution was to get Antwerp into effective action quickly. The problem here was that, although this major port had been captured almost intact, its sea access was blocked by German occupation of the Scheldt islands.

The delay in securing this area was seen as a major failure of Eisenhower′s "Broad Front" strategy, in failing to allow Sir Bernard Montgomery′s 21st Army Group to advance, the German 15th Army was able to occupy and then dig in, whereas an immediate attack in September would probably have cleared the Scheldt without difficulty. The consequence was that Eisenhower was obliged to limit his army group commanders to one major advance at a time. As a result, German resistance was allowed to organise and deploy reserves. The Canadian 1st Army was given the task of clearing the Scheldt (see below).

Manpower

German armies had lost large numbers of troops in Normandy and the subsequent pursuit. To counteract this, about 20,000 Luftwaffe personnel were reallocated to the Army, invalided troops were redrafted into the front line and Volkssturm units were formed using barely trained civilians.

British manpower resources were limited after five years of war and through worldwide commitments. Replacements were no longer adequate to cover losses and formations were disbanded to maintain the strength of others. The Canadians were also short of manpower, due to a reluctance to require conscripts to serve outside Canada or Canadian waters. This had arisen from internal Canadian political difficulties during World War I and there had been a wide consensus against conscription for overseas service.

American losses now called on replacements from the U.S. Often these were inexperienced and unused to the harsh conditions of the latter part of the campaign. There were also complaints about the poor quality of troops released into the infantry from less-stressed arms of the U.S. Army. At one point, after the Battle of the Bulge had highlighted the shortage of infantrymen, the U.S. Army relaxed its embargo on the use of black soldiers in combat formations. Black volunteers performed well and prompted a permanent change in military policy.

By the beginning of the next year, the war′s outcome was clear. It became increasingly difficult to persuade Allied troops to risk their lives when peace was in sight. No one wished to be the last man killed.

Northern Group of Armies (21st Army Group)

Channel ports

Main articles: Clearing the Channel Coast, Operation Astonia, Operation Fusilade, Operation Wellhit, Operation Undergo, and Siege of Dunkirk (1944)

The Channel ports were urgently needed to maintain the Allied armies. By the time that Brussels was liberated, it had become difficult to supply the 21st Army Group adequately. Indeed, one corps—VIII Corps—was withdrawn from active service to free its transport for general use. The Canadian First Army was tasked with liberating the ports during its advance along the French coast. The ports involved were Le Havre, Dieppe, Boulogne, Calais, and Dunkirk, and also Ostend in Belgium. Adolf Hitler had appreciated their strategic value. He issued a Fuehrer Order declaring them to be "fortresses" that must receive adequate materiel for a siege and be held to the last man.

Dieppe was evacuated by the Germans before Hitler′s order had been received and, consequently, the Canadians took it with little trouble and with the port installations largely intact. Ostend had been omitted from the Führer Order and was also undefended, although demolitions delayed its use. The other ports were defended to varying degrees, however, and they required substantial work to bring them into use, except for Dunkirk which was sealed off to the rear of the Allied advance.

Market Garden

Main article: Operation Market Garden

The first operation of the Rhineland Campaign, Market Garden was commanded by Montgomery and had the objective to secure a bridgehead in the north, at Arnhem, over the Rhine which would outflank the Siegfried Line.

Market Garden was composed of two distinct parts. Operation Market was to be the largest airborne operation in history, dropping three and a half divisions of U.S., British and Polish paratroopers to capture key bridges and prevent their demolition by the Germans. Operation Garden was a follow up ground attack by the British 2nd Army which would then more heavily garrison the area and relieve the paratroopers for new duties. It was assumed that the German forces would still be in a rout from the previous campaign and opposition would not be very stiff for either operation.

If successful, the Allies would have a direct route into Germany and by-pass German defences farther south. Further, Montgomery would be in a good position to aid with clearing German forces from Western Scheldt. Doing so would allow Antwerp, a major port captured earlier, to be used as well as seizing territory from which the Germans launched V-1 and V-2 weapons against London, Antwerp and elsewhere.

Eisenhower approved of Market Garden, giving supply priority to the 21st Army Group and diverted the U.S. 1st Army to the north of the Ardennes to stage limited attacks to draw German defenders south, away from the target sites.

At first, it went well. The 101st and 82nd Airborne Divisions took their objectives at Eindhoven, Veghel and Nijmegen. Although their landings outside Arnhem were on target, the British 1st Airborne landing zones were some distance from Arnhem bridge and only on the north side of the river. Problems arose when the British 1st Airborne lost vital equipment—jeeps and heavy anti-tank guns—when gliders crashed. There had also been a severe underestimation of German strength in the area. To make matters worse, poor weather prevented aerial reinforcements and drastically reduced resupply. German resistance to the forces driving to Arnhem was highly effective, and a copy of the Allied battle plan had been captured.

In the end, Market Garden was unsuccessful. The Arnhem bridge was not held and the British paratroops absorbed tremendous casualty rates, approximately 77%.

Battle of the Scheldt

Main article: Battle of the Scheldt

The logistics situation was becoming critical, so opening Antwerp was now among the highest priorities. On 12 September 1944, the Canadian 1st Army—under the command of Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds—was given the task of clearing the Scheldt of German forces. The 1st Army was the Canadian II Corps, which included the Polish 1st Armoured Division, the British 49th, the 52nd Divisions and the British I Corps.

The task involved four main operations. The first was to clear the area north of Antwerp and secure access to South Beveland. The second was to clear the Breskens pocket north of the Leopold Canal ("Operation Switchback"). The third—"Operation Vitality"—was the capture of South Beveland. The final phase was the capture of Walcheren Island, which had been fortified into a powerful German stronghold.

On 21 September 1944, the advance began. The Canadian 4th Armoured Division, moving north toward the south shore of the Scheldt around the Dutch town of Breskens were the first Allied troops to face the formidable obstacle of the double line of the Leopold and Dérivation de la Lys Canals. The canals were crossed and a bridgehead established, but fierce counter-attacks by the Germans forced them to withdraw with heavy casualties. The 1st Polish Armoured Division had greater success, moving northeast to the coast, occupying Terneuzen and clearing the south bank of the Scheldt eastward to Antwerp. It was by then clear, however, that any further advances would be at tremendous cost.

The Canadian 2nd Infantry Division began its advance north from Antwerp on 2 October. Heavy casualties ensued, including the almost total destruction of the Canadian 5th Infantry Brigade′s Black Watch Battalion on 13 October. However, on 16 October Woensdrecht was taken by the Canadians, following an immense artillery barrage which forced the Germans back. This cut South Beveland and Walcheren off from the mainland and achieved the objective of the first operation.

Field-Marshal Montgomery issued a directive that made the opening of the Scheldt estuary the top priority. To the east, the British 2nd Army attacked westward to clear the Netherlands south of the Maas River. This helped secure the Scheldt region from an outside counter-attack.

In Operation Switchback, the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division mounted a two-pronged attack, with the Canadian 7th Infantry Brigade crossing the Leopold Canal and the Canadian 9th Infantry Brigade launching an amphibious assault from the coastal side of the pocket. Despite fierce resistance from the Germans, the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade crossed the Leopold and the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade moved southwards, opening a supply route into the pocket.

Operation Vitality—the third major phase of the Battle of the Scheldt—began on 24 October. The Canadian 2nd Infantry Division began its bridgeheads against South Beveland, but was slowed by mines, mud and strong enemy defences. The British 52nd (Lowland) Division made an amphibious attack to get in behind the Germans′ Beveland Canal defensive positions. Thus this formidable defence was outflanked, and the Canadian 6th Infantry Brigade began a frontal attack in assault boats. The engineers were able to bridge the canal on the main road. With the canal line gone, the German defence crumbled and South Beveland was cleared. The third phase of the Battle of the Scheldt was now complete.

The final phase, Operation Infatuate was the attack on the heavily fortified island of Walcheren at the mouth of the West Scheldt. The island′s dykes were breached by attacks from RAF Bomber Command on 3, 7, and 11 October. This flooded the central part of the island, forcing the German defenders onto the high ground and allowing the use of amphibious vehicles. Units of the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division attacked the causeway on 31 October, and after a grim struggle, established a precarious foothold. They were relieved by a battalion of the British 52nd (Lowland) Division. In conjunction with the waterborne attacks, the 52nd continued the advance.

The amphibious landings began on 1 November with units of the British 155th Infantry Brigade landing on a beach in the south-eastern area of Vlissingen. During the next few days, they engaged in heavy street fighting against the German defenders. Also on 1 November, after a heavy naval bombardment by the British Royal Navy, troops of 4th Commando Brigade, (with units for 10th Inter Allied Commando, consisting mainly of Belgian and Norwegian troops) supported by specialised armoured vehicles of the 79th Armoured Division were landed on both sides of the gap in the sea dyke. Heavy fighting ensued. A smaller force moved south-eastward, toward Vlissingen, while the main force went north-east to clear the northern half of Walcheren to link up with the Canadian troops who had established a bridgehead on the eastern part of the island. Fierce resistance was again offered by German troops defending the area, and fighting continued until 7 November. However, the fighting ended on 8 November after a force of amphibious vehicles entered Middelburg, the capital of Walcheren.

Meanwhile, the Canadian 4th Armoured Division had pushed eastwards past Bergen-op-Zoom to Sint Philipsland where it sank several German vessels in Zijpe harbor. With the approaches to the port of Antwerp free, the fourth phase of the Battle of the Scheldt was completed and on 28 November, the first convoy entered the port of Antwerp.

Veritable and Grenade

Main articles: Operation Veritable and Operation Grenade

Montgomery′s 21st Army Group were tasked with clearing the west bank of the Rhine downstream from the Krefeld area. The approach was for the Canadian 1st Army—strengthened by XXX Corps—to advance south-eastward between the Rhine and Maas rivers while the U.S. 9th Army advanced north eastwards from the Roer. The two armies would meet in the Geldern area. The British 2nd Army stayed west of the Maas, apart from two divisions that reinforced the Anglo-Canadian advance, but the German High Command were initially convinced that they were the principle threat and deployed their reserves in anticipation of an assault from Venlo.

The two operations were delayed by the Battle of the Bulge but they were rescheduled for 8 February 1945. Although the Anglo-Canadian attack (Operation Veritable) started on time, the U.S. one (Operation Grenade) was delayed by the threat and then the actuality of flooding by water released from the Roer dams. This delay allowed the Germans to concentrate their defence on the Anglo-Canadian assaults, but they were unable to do much more than to slow it in localised areas. When the Americans were able to advance, some two weeks later, there were few reserves left to face them and they made rapid progress until they encountered the German rearguard near the Rhine.

The two prongs met at Geldern, then pushed towards Rees, finally expelling German forces on 21 March.

Central Group of Armies (12th Army Group)

Aachen

Main article: Battle of Aachen

The U.S. 1st Army was focused on capturing the city of Aachen, which had to be dealt with before advancing on to assault the Siegfried Line itself. Initially, the city of Aachen was to be bypassed and cut off in an attempt by the allies to imitate the Blitzkrieg tactics the Germans had so effectively used (see below). However, the city was the first city to be assaulted on German soil and so had huge historical and cultural significance to the German people. Hitler personally ordered that the garrison there be reinforced and the city held. This forced allied commanders to re-think their strategy.

Some historians, including Stephen Ambrose, have suggested that the siege of Aachen was a mistake. The battle stalled the eastward advance by the Allies and caused approximately 5,000 Allied casualties. The fighting was, by all accounts, brutal street-to-street, house-to-house style urban combat and tied up the available rescources of the advancing Allied armies. Ambrose has suggested that a more effective strategy would have been to have isolated the garrison at Aachen and continue the move east into the heart of Germany. In theory, this would have eliminated the ability of the German garrison in Aachen to operate as a fighting force by cutting off their supply lines. This might have forced the garrison to surrender or to move out of the city in an attempt to re-establish their supply lines. In the case of the latter, a confrontation in a more neutral setting would probably have resulted in fewer military and civilian casualties.

Lorraine

Main article: Lorraine Campaign

In late August, the U.S. 3rd Army started to run low on fuel. This situation was caused by the rapid Allied advance through France, and compounded by the shift of logistical priority to the northern forces to secure Antwerp. By 1 September 1944, with the last of its fuel, the 3rd Army managed one final push to capture key bridges over the Meuse River at Verdun and Commercy. For five days after, however, the critical supply situation effectively ground the 3rd Army to a halt, allowing previously routed German forces to regroup and the reinforcement of their strongholds in the area.

Soon after, the 3rd Army came against Metz, part of the Maginot Line and one of the most heavily fortified cities in Western Europe. The city could not be bypassed, as several of its forts had guns directed at Moselle crossing sites and the main roads in the area. It could be also be used as a stronghold to organize a German counter-attack to the 3rd Army′s rear. In the following Battle of Metz, the 3rd Army, while victorious, took heavy casualties.

Following Metz, the 3rd Army continued eastwards to the Saar River and soon began their assault on the Siegfried Line.

Hurtgen Forest

Main article: Battle of Hurtgen Forest

The Hurtgen Forest was seen as a possible source of incursions into the American flank and the river dams in the area were a threat to the Allied advance downstream, so an assault to clear the area was started on 19 September 1944. The German defence was more stubborn than expected and the terrain was highly favorable to defence, largely negating American advantages in numbers and quality of troops. The battle—expected to last a few weeks—continued until February 1945 and cost 33,000 casualties (from all causes).

The value of the battle has been disputed. Recent historians argue that the outcome was not worth the foreseeable losses and, in any case, the American tactics played into German hands.

Operation Queen

Main article: Operation Queen

Operation Queen was an Allied combined air-ground offensive against the German forces at the Siegfried Line, which was conducted mainly by the combined effort of the U.S. 9th and 1st Armies. The principal goal of the operation was to advance to the Rur River and to establish several bridgeheads over it, for a subsequent thrust into Germany to the Rhine River. Parts of this operation also included further fighting in the Hurtgen Forest. The offensive commenced on 16 November with one of the heaviest tactical air bombing by the western Allies of the war. Although the German forces were heavily outnumbered, the Allied advance was only very slow. After four weeks of intensive fighting, the Allies reached the Rur, but were not able to establish any bridgeheads over it. Fighting in the Hurtgen Forest also bogged down. The exhaustive fighting during Queen let the Allied troops suffer heavy casualties and eventually the Germans launched their own counteroffensive—Operation Wacht am Rhein—on 16 December, which would lead to the Battle of the Bulge.

Winter counter-offensives

Main articles: Battle of the Bulge and Operation Nordwind

American soldiers taking up defensive positions in the Ardennes during the Battle of the Bulge.

The Germans had been preparing a massive counter-attack in the West since the Allied breakout from Normandy. The plan called Wacht am Rhein ("Watch on the Rhine") was to attack through the Ardennes and swing North to Antwerp, splitting the American and British armies. The attack started on 16 December in what became known as the Battle of the Bulge. Defending the Ardennes were troops of the U.S. 1st Army. After initial successes in bad weather, which gave them cover from the Allied air forces, the Allies launched a counterattack to clear the Germans from the Ardennes. The Germans were eventually pushed back to their starting points by 25 January 1945.

The Germans launched a second, smaller offensive (Nordwind) into Alsace on 1 January 1945. Aiming to recapture Strasbourg, the Germans attacked the 6th Army Group at multiple points. Because Allied lines had become severely stretched in response to the crisis in the Ardennes, holding and throwing back the Nordwind offensive was a costly affair that lasted almost four weeks. The culmination of Allied counter-attacks restored the front line to the area of the German border and collapsed the Colmar Pocket.

Germany west of the Rhine

The pincer movement of the Canadian 1st Army in Operation Veritable advancing from Nijmegen area of the Netherlands and the U.S. 9th Army crossing the Ruhr in Operation Grenade was planned to start on 8 February 1945, but it was delayed by two weeks when the Germans flooded the river valley by destroying the dam gates upstream. During the two weeks that the river was flooded, Hitler would not allow Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt to withdraw East behind the Rhine arguing that it would only delay the inevitable fight. Hitler ordered him to fight where his forces stood.

By the time the water had subsided and the U.S. 9th Army was able to cross the Rur on 23 February, other Allied forces were also close to the Rhine′s west bank. Von Rundstedt′s divisions which had remained on the west bank of the Rhine were cut to pieces and 280,000 men were taken prisoners. With a large number of men captured, the stubborn German resistance during the Allied campaign to reach the Rhine in February–March 1945 had been costly. Total losses reached an estimated 400,000 men.

US soldiers cross the Rhine river in assault boats.

The crossing of the Rhine was achieved at four points: One was an opportunity taken by U.S. forces when the Germans failed to blow up the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, one crossing was a hasty assault, and two crossings were planned.

• General Omar Bradley′s U.S. forces aggressive pursuit of the disintegrating German troops resulted in the capture of the Ludendorff Bridge across the Rhine River at Remagen by the U.S. 1st Army. Bradley and his subordinates quickly exploited the crossing made on 7 March and expanded the bridgehead into a full scale crossing.
• Bradley told General George S. Patton—whose U.S. 3rd Army had been fighting through the Palatinate—to "take the Rhine on the run". The 3rd Army did just that on the night of 22/23 March crossing the river with a hasty assault south of Mainz at Oppenheim.
• In the North, Operation Plunder was the crossing of the Rhine river at Rees and Wesel by the British 21st Army Group on the night of 23/24 March. It included the largest airborne operation in history codenamed Operation Varsity. At the point the British crossed the Rhine, it is twice as wide, with a far higher volume of water, than the points where the Americans crossed and Montgomery decided it could only be crossed safely with a carefully planned operation.
• In the Allied 6th Army Group area, the U.S. 7th Army assaulted across the Rhine in the area between Mannheim and Worms on 26 March. A fifth crossing on a smaller scale was later achieved by the French First Army at Speyer.

After crossing the Rhine the Allies fanned out over West Germany (see Western Allied invasion of Germany).

Bibliography

• Ballard, Ted (1990?). Rhineland 15 September 1944-21 March 1945. CMH Online bookshelves: World War II Commemorative Brochures. Washington: United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 72-25. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
• Neillands, Robin (2005). The Battle for the Rhine. Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-297-84617-8.
• Zaloga, Steve and Dennis, Peter (2006). Remagen 1945: endgame against the Third Reich. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 1-84603-249-0.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
• Ziemke, Earl F. (1990) [1975]. "ChapterX: The Rhineland Campaign". The U.S. Army in the Occupation of Germany 1944-1946. Army Historical Series. Washington: United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 30-6. {{cite book}}: External link in |chapterurl= (help); Unknown parameter |chapterurl= ignored (|chapter-url= suggested) (help)
• Weigley, Russell F. (1981). Eisenhower's Lieuitenants: The Campaign of France of Germany, 1944-1945. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana Univ. Press. ISBN 0-253-20608-1. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

Further reading

• MacDonald, Charles B. (1990 (reissue of 1963)). The Siegfried Line Campaign. United States Army in World War II. Washington, D.C: United States Army Center of Military History. CMH Pub 7-7-1. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link) - full text

External links

• Military.com
• Bombing Duren on 16 November 1944 to aid a major breakthrough of the Siegfried Line
• 44th Division: Vosges Mountain & Siegfried Line Campaign
• The battle for Aachen