Battle of Marston Moor

Battle of Marston Moor
Part of English Civil War
The Battle of Marston Moor, by J. Barker
Date July 2, 1644 Location near Long Marston, 7 miles west of York Result Decisive Parliamentarian victory
Belligerents
Scottish Covenanters, Parliamentarians	Royalists
Commanders and leaders
Earl of Leven, Earl of Manchester, Lord Fairfax	Prince Rupert of the Rhine, Marquess of Newcastle
Strength
22,500+: 7,000+ horse, 500+ dragoons, 15,000+ foot, 30 - 40 guns	17,000: 6,000 horse, 11,000 foot, 14 guns
Casualties and losses
300 killed	4,000 killed, 1,500 prisoners

The Battle of Marston Moor was fought on July 2 1644, during the First English Civil War of 1642–1646. The combined forces of the Scottish Covenanters under the Earl of Leven and the Parliamentarians under Lord Fairfax and the Earl of Manchester defeated the Royalists commanded by Prince Rupert of the Rhine and the Marquess of Newcastle.

During the summer of 1644, the Covenanters and Parliamentarians had been besieging York which was defended by the Marquess of Newcastle. Prince Rupert had gathered an army which marched through the northwest of England to relieve the city, gathering fresh recruits on the way. The convergence of these forces made the ensuing battle the largest of the Civil Wars.

On July 1, Rupert had outmanoeuvred the Scots and Parliamentarians to relieve the city. The next day, he sought battle with them, even though he was outnumbered. He was dissuaded from attacking immediately, and during the day both sides gathered their full strength on Marston Moor, an expanse of wild meadow west of York. Towards evening, the Scots and Parliamentarians themselves launched a surprise attack. After a confused fight lasting two hours, Parliamentarian cavalry under Oliver Cromwell routed the Royalist cavalry from the field and annihilated the remaining Royalist infantry.

After their defeat the Royalists effectively abandoned the north of England. Not only did they lose much of the manpower from the counties which were strongly Royalist in sympathy, and access to the continent of Europe through the ports on the North Sea coast, but they were then restricted to Wales and the southwest of England. Although they partially retrieved their fortunes with victories later in the year in the south of England, the loss of the north was to prove a fatal handicap the next year, when they tried unsuccessfully to link up with the Scottish Royalists under James Graham, 1st Marquess of Montrose.

Background

Siege of York

In late 1643, the English Civil War widened. King Charles I negotiated a "cessation" in Ireland which allowed him to reinforce his armies with English regiments sent to Ireland following the uprising in 1641. Parliament took an even greater step by signing the Solemn League and Covenant, sealing the alliance with the Scottish Covenanters. Early in 1644, a Covenanter army under the Earl of Leven invaded the north of England on behalf of Parliament. The Royalist commander in the north of England, the Marquess of Newcastle, was forced to divide his army, leaving a detachment under Sir John Belasyse to watch a Parliamentarian army under Lord Fairfax in Hull, while he led his main body north to confront Leven.

During March and early April, the Marquess of Newcastle fought several delaying actions as he tried to prevent the Scots from crossing the Tyne River and surrounding the city of Newcastle upon Tyne. Meanwhile, a Parliamentarian cavalry force under Lord Fairfax's son, Sir Thomas Fairfax, entered Yorkshire from Cheshire and Lancashire where they had been campaigning during the winter. To prevent them rejoining Lord Fairfax in Hull, Belasyse occupied the town of Selby which lay between them. On April 11, Sir Thomas Fairfax's force together with infantry under Sir John Meldrum stormed Selby, capturing Belasyse and most of his force.

Hearing the news, Newcastle realised that the city of York was threatened. York was the principal city and bastion of Royalist power in the north of England, and its loss would be a serious blow to the Royalist cause. He hastily retreated there to forestall the Fairfaxes. Leven's army, less a detachment left to mask the Royalist garrison of Newcastle upon Tyne, followed up, and on April 22 Leven joined forces with the Fairfaxes at Wetherby, to begin the Siege of York. On June 3, they were reinforced by the Parliamentarian army of the Eastern Association under the Earl of Manchester, and siege operations began in earnest as York was now completely encircled. Leven was accepted as Commander in Chief of the three combined allied armies before York (referred to by Parliament as the "Army of Both Kingdoms"). Not only were the Scots the largest single contingent, but Leven was a respected veteran of the Thirty Years' War.

Relief moves

Prince Rupert of the Rhine (1619 - 1682) - Prince Rupert was tasked with retaking the north from Parliament and their Scottish allies

News of the siege soon reached Oxford, where King Charles had his wartime capital. From April 24 to May 5, he held a council of war attended by his nephew and most renowned field commander, Prince Rupert. It was settled that, while Charles attempted to play for time in Oxford, Rupert would relieve York.

Rupert set out from Shrewsbury with a small force on May 16. His first moves were intended to gather reinforcements along the way to bolster his army, and secure Lancashire for the troops heading over from Ireland for the Royalist cause. At Chester, he assumed command of a small Royalist army under Lord John Byron, raising his force to 2,000 horse and 6,000 foot. Having forced a crossing of the River Mersey at Stockport, he stormed Bolton, allegedly killing 1,600 of the Parliamentarian defenders and citizens. Resting at Bury nearby, Rupert was joined by the Marquess of Newcastle's cavalry under Lord George Goring, and several regiments which were being freshly raised in Lancashire by the Earl of Derby. Having sidestepped the Parliamentarian stronghold of Manchester, Prince Rupert approached Liverpool on June 6, and after a five-day siege wrested control from Parliament.

With Liverpool secured, Rupert now hesitated, unsure whether to continue on to York or to consolidate the Royalist hold on Lancashire, securing more reinforcements in the process. He was also distrustful of Charles’s council of war, and was wary of being so far from the King's side. On June 16 Rupert received a dispatch from the King which contained troubling news. The King’s advisors on the council of war had overturned Rupert’s defensive policies, sending the garrisons in Reading and Abingdon on an offensive in the West Country. This had left Oxford exposed to a sudden threat by Parliamentarian armies and forced the King to hastily leave the city and head to Worcester. Together with this unfortunate news, the letter contained some ambiguous orders regarding Rupert’s northern offensive and future plans:

But now I must give the true state of my affairs, which, if their condition be such as enforces me to give you more peremptory commands than I would willingly do, you must not take it ill. If York be lost I shall esteem my crown little less; unless supported by your sudden march to me; and a miraculous conquest in the South, before the effects of the Northern power can be found here. But if York be relieved, and you beat the rebels' army of both kingdoms, which are before it, then (but otherwise not) I may possibly make a shift upon the defensive to spin out time until you come to assist me. Wherefore I command and conjure you, by the duty and affection that I know you bear me, that all new enterprises laid aside, you immediately march according to your first intention, with all your force to the relief of York. But if that be either lost, or have freed themselves from the besiegers, or that for want of powder, you cannot undertake that work, that you immediately march with your whole strength, directly to Worcester to assist me and my army; without which, or you having relieved York by the beating the Scots, all the successes you can afterwards have must infallibly be useless onto me.

File:Marston-moor-campaign.jpg

The York March

Rupert understood the letter to be an order to relieve York and defeat the allied army before heading south once more in aid of the King. By this time Rupert’s army numbered 14,000, and he set off on the last stage of the gruelling "York march", crossing the Pennines and arriving at Knaresborough on June 30, 14 miles northwest of York. The allies had been hoping that reinforcements from the Midlands under Sir John Meldrum and the Earl of Denbigh could ward off this threat, but they learned that these forces could not intervene in time. Therefore they abandoned the siege on the night of June 30, and on July 1 they concentrated their forces at Marston Moor, in an attempt to block Rupert's expected direct march to York (along the old Roman road named Ermine Street, the modern A59), or any move to the south via Wetherby.

However, Rupert made a 22-mile flank march to the northeast, crossing the River Ure at Boroughbridge and the River Swale at Thornton Bridge. These two rivers merge to form the River Ouse, which Rupert had put between himself and the allied armies. Late on July 1 his forces defeated Manchester's dragoons, left to guard a bridge of boats across the Ouse at the village of Poppleton a few miles north of York. This had been the only crossing available to the allies above York and its capture prevented the allies crossing the Ouse to engage Rupert.

Late on the same day, more of Rupert's cavalry arrived at York, to gain touch with the garrison. With York definitely relieved, Newcastle sent Rupert a fulsome letter of welcome and congratulations. Rupert replied, not in person but through Goring, with a peremptory demand for Newcastle to march his forces to Rupert's assistance on the following morning.

Battle

Prelude

On July 2, the allied commanders debated their options. They decided to march south to Tadcaster and Cawood, where they could both protect their own supply lines from Hull, and also block any move south by Rupert. The Parliamentarian foot, ordnance and baggage set off early, leaving the horse as rearguard. At about 9 am, the allied generals learned that Rupert's army had crossed the captured bridge of boats at Poppleton, and was advancing onto Marston Moor. The Parliamentarian foot, some of whom had already reached Tadcaster, were hastily recalled.

Meanwhile, there was tension between Rupert and Newcastle, who was strongly opposed to a pitched battle. Newcastle counselled that the allied army would eventually dissolve and an engagement was unnecessary, but Rupert was adamant that the King's letter (which he never showed to Newcastle) was a command to engage and defeat the enemy immediately. Furthermore, Rupert wished to compensate for the Royalists' numerical inferiority by catching the enemy unawares, and before further Parliamentarian reinforcements could increase their superiority in numbers.

However, Newcastle’s soldiers had refused to fight unless given their delayed payment. A number were also absent, pillaging the abandoned trenches outside the city, and had yet to return. The late arrival of Newcastle's troops and a number of other factors thwarted Rupert's plans for a quick strike. His men were exhausted from their long march on the previous day, as were the soldiers from York who had undergone the strain of 10 weeks of siege. Rupert therefore did not attack; and during the day, the odds against him lengthened as the Parliamentarians returned from their aborted move south and took position.

Deployment

Further information: [[:Marston Moor order of battle]]

Scots and Parliamentarians

Alexander Leslie, 1st Earl of Leven (1580 - 1661) - Leslie commanded the Covenanter and Parliamentarian armies

The Covenanters and Parliamentarians occupied Marston Hill, a low but nevertheless prominent feature in the flat Vale of York, between the villages of Long Marston and Tockwith. They had the advantage of height, but cornfields stretching between the two villages hampered their deployment.

At some point in the day, the Royalists attempted to seize a rabbit warren to the west of the cornfields from where they might enfilade the Parliamentarian position, but they were driven off and the Parliamentarian left wing of horse occupied the ground. The wing was under the command of Manchester's Lieutenant General Oliver Cromwell. The first two lines consisted of over 3,000 horse from the Eastern Association, including Cromwell's own Regiment of Ironsides. There were also 600 attached musketeers, in platoons of 60 between the "divisions" of horse. Their purpose was to disrupt attacking cavalry or dragoons. This was a common practice in the Swedish army of the Thirty Years' War, and was also adopted by the Royalists at Marston Moor. No surviving map or account states who commanded the second line, but Colonel Nathaniel Vermuyden was Manchester's Commissary General, or second in command of the Eastern Association horse. One thousand lighter Scots horse under Sir David Leslie formed a third line to Cromwell's rear, and 500 Scots dragoons were deployed on the extreme left.

The centre, under the three generals-in-chief with no overall commander, consisted of over 14,000 foot, with 30 to 40 pieces of artillery. The various regiments had been hastily deployed as they returned to the field and were considerably mixed up, but most of Manchester's infantry under Sergeant Major General Lawrence Crawford were on the left of the front line, and Lord Fairfax's in the centre. Scots brigades, the "Vanguard" of their army, made up the right of the front line under Lieutenant General William Baillie. The second line consisted entirely of Scots, their "Main Battle" or simply "Battle", under Sergeant Major General James Lumsden. The weaker third and fourth lines consisted of some of Fairfax's infantry, a single Scots brigade, and the Earl of Manchester's own Regiment of Foot.

The right wing was commanded by Sir Thomas Fairfax (with John Lambert as his second in command). He had at least 2,000 horse from Yorkshire and Lancashire and 600 musketeers, with 1,000 Scots horse to his rear.

Royalists

The Royalists occupied the low-lying moor, behind a drainage ditch that Rupert noted as an effective obstacle for a cavalry charge. There is some dispute over the course of ditch at the time of the battle. Some contemporary accounts support the contention by later historians that it was non-existent on the Royalists' right wing. On the other hand, a plan of the Royalist dispositions by Rupert's chief engineer, Bernard de Gomme, shows the ditch in its present-day alignment. It is generally accepted that it was at least less of an obstacle on the Royalist right.

When the contingent from York belatedly arrived, accompanied by Newcastle's Lieutenant General Lord Eythin, Rupert's dispositions were criticised by Eythin as being drawn up too close to the enemy. King's main concern was that a fold in the ground between the ridge and the track between Long Marston and Tockwith concealed the front line of the Allied infantry from both view and artillery fire, allowing them to attack suddenly from a comparatively close distance. Rupert and Eythin already knew and disliked each other. Both had fought at the Battle of Vlotho in 1638, where Rupert had been captured and held prisoner for several years. Rupert blamed Eythin's caution for the defeat; Eythin blamed Rupert's rashness. When Rupert proposed to either attack or move his army back as Eythin suggested, Eythin then pontificated that it was too late in the day for such a move. The Royalist army prepared to settle down for the night, close to the allied armies.

The Royalist left wing was commanded by Lord Goring. It consisted of 2,100 cavalry, mainly from the Marquess of Newcastle's cavalry, the "Northern Horse", and 500 musketeers. The first line was commanded by Goring and the second by Sir Charles Lucas.

Their centre was nominally commanded by Eythin. A forlorn hope of musketeers lined the ditch. The infantry units of Rupert's army, 7,000 strong under Rupert's Sergeant-Major General Henry Tillier, formed the first line. The 3,000 infantry from Newcastle's army under Sergeant Major General Francis Mackworth formed behind their right when they arrived, and a brigade of "Northern Horse" numbering 600 under Sir William Blakiston, was behind their left. There were also 14 field guns.

The right wing was commanded by Lord Byron, with 2,600 horse and 500 musketeers. The second line, which included some comparatively inexperienced regiments, was commanded by Lord Molyneaux, but the unprincipled Sir John Hurry apparently acted as Byron's second in command.

Rupert personally commanded a reserve of 600 cavalry, including his elite Lifeguard of Horse.

Events

File:Marston-moor-battle.gif

Map of Battle

Delayed by the late arrival of the York garrison, it was late evening before the Royalists were fully deployed. A flurry of rain showers and the discouragement of Newcastle and Eythin persuaded Rupert to delay his attack until the next day; from the ranks of the allied army he could hear the singing of psalms. As the Royalist troops broke ranks for their supper, Leven noted the lack of preparation among his opponents, and ordered his men to attack at shortly after 7:30 pm, just as a thunderstorm broke out over the moor.

On the allied left, Cromwell's horse quickly defeated Byron's wing. Though under orders to stand his ground and rely on the ditch and musket fire to slow the progress of an enemy attack, Byron instead ordered a hasty counter-charge which disordered his own troops and prevented his musketeers firing without fear of hitting their own cavalry. In the clashes which followed, Cromwell was slightly wounded in the neck, by a pistol ball in most accounts, and briefly left the field to have the wound dressed.

Noting the setback on this flank, Rupert led his reserve towards the right, rallying his own fleeing Regiment of Horse and leading them in a counter-attack. A Parliamentarian officer wrote:

Cromwell's own division had a hard pull of it; for they were charged by Rupert's bravest men both in front and flank; they stood at the sword's point a pretty while, hacking one another; but at last (it so pleased God) he [Cromwell] brake through them, scattering them before him like a little dust.

— Watson to Henry Overton, quoted in Young, Marston Moor 1644

Sir David Leslie's Scots eventually swung the balance for Cromwell. Rupert's right wing and reserve were routed and he himself narrowly avoided capture by hiding in a nearby bean field.

In the centre, Crawford's, Lord Fairfax's and most of Baillie's foot initially succeeded in crossing the ditch, capturing at least three pieces of artillery. On the right, Sir Thomas Fairfax's wing fared less well. Sir Thomas Fairfax himself later wrote:

Our Right Wing had not, all, so good success, by reason of the whins and ditches which we were to pass over before we could get to the Enemy, which put us into great disorder: notwithstanding, I drew up a body of 400 Horse. But because the intervals of Horse, in this Wing only, were lined with Musketeers; which did us much hurt with their shot; I was necessitated to charge them. We were a long time engaged with one another, but at last we routed that part of their Wing ... [I] myself only returned presently, to get to the men I left behind me. But that part of the Enemy which stood, perceiving the disorder they were in, had charged and routed them, before I could get to them.

— Sir Thomas Fairfax, quoted in Young, Marston Moor 1644

Fairfax wrote that his second-in-command, Major-General Lambert, could not get up to him, and so charged in another place. A lane, the present-day Atterwith Lane, crossed the ditch on this flank, and some accounts suggest that several units were easy targets for the Royalist musketeers as they advanced along the lane only four abreast. When a small embankment alongside the ditch at this point was removed in the 1960s, several hundred musket balls were recovered.

When Goring launched a counter-charge, the disorganised Parliamentarians were routed, although some of the Scottish cavalry behind them resisted stoutly for some time. Most of Goring's victorious wing either scattered in pursuit, or fell out to loot the Allied baggage train, but some of them under Sir Charles Lucas wheeled to attack the right flank of the Allied infantry. Meanwhile, some of Newcastle's foot counter-attacked Lord Fairfax's foot in the centre of the allied front line and threw them into confusion. Following up this advantage, Blakiston's brigade of horse (with its numbers probably augmented by a troop of "Gentleman Volunteers" under Newcastle himself) charged the allied centre. Under these assaults in the confusion and the gathering darkness, over half the Scots and Parliamentarian infantry fled. Leven and Lord Fairfax also left the field, believing all was lost. Manchester remained on the battlefield, but effectively commanded only his own Regiment of Foot near the allied rear.

One Scottish brigade at the right of their front line under the Earl of Crawford-Lindsay and Viscount Maitland stood firm against Lucas, who launched three charges against them. In the third charge, his horse was killed, and he was taken prisoner. Behind them, the Scottish Sergeant Major General Sir James Lumsden managed to reform part of the allied centre, using two Scottish brigades which had stood fast. Behind them in turn, the Earl of Manchester's regiment repulsed and scattered Blakiston's brigade of Royalist cavalry.

By now it was nearly fully dark, although the full moon was rising. The countryside for miles around was covered with fugitives from both sides. A messenger from Ireland riding in search of Prince Rupert wrote:

In this horrible distraction did I coast the country; here meeting with a shoal of Scots crying out, 'Weys us, we are all undone'; and so full of lamentation and mourning, as if their day of doom had overtaken them, and from which they knew not whither to fly; and anon I met with a ragged troop reduced to four and a Cornet; by and by with a little foot officer without hat, band, sword, or indeed anything but feet and so much tongue as would serve to enquire the way to the next garrisons, which (to say the truth) were well filled with the stragglers on both sides within a few hours, though they lay distant from the place of the fight 20 or 30 miles.

— Mr. Arthur Trevor to the Marquess of Ormonde, quoted in Young, Marston Moor 1644

With no general present in command of either side, a drawn battle might have resulted, but Cromwell's disciplined horsemen had rallied behind the Royalist right. Sir Thomas Fairfax, finding himself alone in the midst of Goring's men, removed the "Field Sign" (a handkerchief or slip of white paper which identified him as a Parliamentarian) from his hat, and made his way to Cromwell's wing to relate the state of affairs on the allied right flank. Cromwell now led his cavalry, with Leslie's Scots horse in support and Crawford's foot on his right flank, across the battlefield to attack Goring's wing from the position Goring had occupied at the start of the battle. Goring's tired and disorganised troops were driven from the field.

The triumphant allies now turned on the remains of the Royalist centre, overrunning successive units and cutting down many fugitives. Finally some of Newcastle's foot, the "Whitecoats", gathered for a last stand in a ditched enclosure. This has been suggested to be White Sike Close, in the rear of the Royalists' original position, but another strong possibility is Fox Covert, a mile north of Long Marston on the natural line of retreat towards York. The Whitecoats refused quarter and repulsed constant cavalry charges until the last 30 survivors finally surrendered.

Approximately 4,000 Royalist soldiers had been killed, many in the last stand of the "Whitecoats", and 1,500 captured, including Charles Lucas and Major General Henry Tillier. The Royalists lost all of their guns, with many hundreds of weapons and several standards also falling into the hands of the allied forces. The allied generals' dispatch, and other Parliamentarian accounts, stated that 300 of their soldiers were killed.

One of those mortally wounded among the Parliamentarians was Sir Thomas Fairfax's brother, Charles. Another was Cromwell's nephew, Valentine Walton. Cromwell was present when he died afterwards, and wrote a famous letter to the soldier's father, Cromwell's brother-in-law, also named Valentine Walton, which briefly described the battle and then informed the father of the son's last words and death.

Aftermath

Oliver Cromwell (1599–1658). Cromwell's reputation as an effective cavalry commander and leader was cemented by his success at Marston Moor.

Late at night, the Royalist generals reached York. A diary later written by one of Rupert's entourage stated:

After y^e Enemy having broken o^r horse the foot stood till night and in y^e night some of em [sic] came off after y^e P[rince] and Gen^ll King had drawn up as many as he could before y^e town of York"

Newcastle, having seen his forces broken, and having spent his entire fortune in the Royalist cause, resolved that he would not endure the "laughter of the court". He departed for Scarborough on July 3 and went into exile in Hamburg, with Eythin and many of his senior officers. Two days after the battle, Rupert rallied 5,000 cavalry and a few hundred infantry in York. He considered that, rather than attempt to restore Royalist fortunes in the north, he was required to return south to rejoin the King. Leaving York, he marched back over the Pennines, making a detour by way of Richmond to escape interception. Goring, who had accompanied him this far, headed for Scotland to aid the Royalists there under Montrose. With the departure of Newcastle and Rupert, the Royalists effectively abandoned the north.

The allies regrouped themselves and resumed the siege of York. Under the agreement that no Scottish soldiers were to be garrisoned in the city, the garrison surrendered on honourable terms on July 16. The allied army soon dispersed, and Leven subsequently took his troops north to besiege Newcastle upon Tyne, while Manchester's army returned to Lincolnshire and eventually moved into the south of England.

Over the next few months the Scots and Parliamentarians slowly eliminated the remaining Royalist garrisons throughout northern England. The Royalist cavalry from the area, the "Northern Horse", continued to fight for King Charles under Sir Marmaduke Langdale, and even made several forays from the south to relieve Royalist garrisons in south Yorkshire, but they became increasingly undisciplined and licentious, turning many former sympathisers away from the Royalist cause.

The defeat at Marston Moor was a serious blow to the Royalist cause. Prince Rupert had been decisively beaten for the first time in the war, and lost his reputation for invincibility. Deeply affected by the defeat, Rupert would keep the King's ambiguous dispatch close to him for the remainder of his life. He had suffered an additional blow through the death during the battle of his lapdog "Boye", who had been a constant companion by his side throughout his campaigns. Parliamentarian propaganda made much of this, treating Boye almost as a Devil's familiar. By contrast, Oliver Cromwell's reputation as a cavalry commander was firmly established. It was acknowledged that the discipline he had instilled into his troops, and his own leadership on the battlefield, had been crucial to the victory. Cromwell would later declare that Marston Moor was "an absolute victory obtained by God's blessing". From this moment, he was to exert increasing influence both in the House of Commons and in the Parliamentarian armies in the field.

References

Bibliography

• Dodds, Glen Lyndon, Battles in Britain, 1066-1746 (Arms and Armour, 1996)
• Kenyon, John The Civil Wars of England (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988) ISBN 0-297-79351-9
• Newman, P.R. & Roberts, P.R. Marston Moor 1644: The Battle of the Five Armies (Pickering: Blackthorn, 2003) ISBN 0-9540535-2-4
• Royle, Trevor Civil War: The Wars of the Three Kingdoms 1638-1660 (London: Abacus, 2004) ISBN 0-349-11564-8
• Warburton, Eliot Memoirs of Prince Rupert and the Cavaliers 2nd volume (London: 2003) ISBN 978-1421249407
• Woolrych, Austin Battles of the English Civil War (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1961)
• Young, Peter Marston Moor 1644: The Campaign and the Battle (Kineton: Roundwood, 1970)

External links

• British Civil War site
• "Battle of Marston Moor". English Heritage. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessmonthday= ignored (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)