Waco siege

Waco Siege
The Mount Carmel Center in flames during the assault on April 19, 1993.
Date February 28 – April 19, 1993 Location Mount Carmel Center, Waco, Texas, United States Result Raid: Shootout resulting in the ATF retreat Assault: Buildings burned to the ground resulting in a massive number of deaths. Walls damaged by the FBI and the Davidians' stored ammunition and explosives increased the casualties. Death of David Koresh.
Belligerents
United States Government (ATF, FBI, Texas National Guard)	Branch Davidians
Commanders and leaders
Stuart M. Gerson (to March 12) Janet Reno (from March 12) Phil Chojnacki Jeff Jamar	David Koresh (died during fire)
Casualties and losses
raid: 4 dead and 16 wounded assault: none	raid: 6 dead and 3+ wounded assault: 76 dead (fire, falling roofs and death by gunshot)

The Waco Siege began on February 28, 1993 when the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) attempted to execute a search warrant at the Branch Davidian ranch at Mount Carmel, a property located nine miles (14 km) east-northeast of Waco, Texas. An exchange of gunfire resulted in the deaths of four agents and six followers of David Koresh. A subsequent 51-day siege by the Federal Bureau of Investigation ended on April 19 when fire destroyed the compound. Seventy-six people (24 of them British nationals) died in the fire, including more than 20 children, two pregnant women, and Koresh himself.

History

Main article: Branch Davidian

The Branch Davidian Seventh Day Adventists (also known as "The Branch") are a Protestant sect that originated in 1955 from a schism in the Davidian Seventh Day Adventists ("Davidians"), a reform movement that began within the Seventh-day Adventist Church ("SDA") around 1930. As the group gained members, the leadership moved the church to a hilltop several miles west of Waco, which they named Mount Carmel, after a mountain on Israel mentioned in Joshua 19:26 in the Bible's Old Testament. A few years later, they moved again to a much larger site east of the city.

In 1959 Florence Houteff (widow of founder Victor Houteff) announced that the Second Coming of Jesus Christ was about to take place, and members were told to gather at the center to await this event. Many built houses, others stayed in tents, trucks or buses, and most sold their possessions.

Following the failure of this prophecy, control of Mt. Carmel fell to Benjamin Roden, and on his death to his wife, Lois. Lois Roden considered their son, George, unfit to assume the position of prophet. Instead, she groomed Vernon Howell, later known as David Koresh, as her chosen successor. In 1984, a meeting led to a division of the group with Howell leading one faction, calling themselves the Davidian Branch Davidian Seventh Day Adventists, and George Roden leading the competing faction. After this split, George Roden ran Howell and his followers off Mt. Carmel. Howell and his group relocated to Palestine, Texas.

After the death of Lois and the probate case, Howell attempted to gain control of the Mt Carmel center by force. George Roden had dug up the casket of Anna Hughes from the Davidian cemetery and had challenged Howell to a resurrection contest to prove who was the rightful heir. Howell instead went to the police and claimed Roden was guilty of corpse abuse. By October 31, 1987 the county prosecutors had refused to file charges without proof and so on November 3, 1987 Howell and seven armed companions attempted to access the Mt. Carmel chapel with the goal of photographing the body in the casket. George Roden was advised of the interlopers and grabbed an Uzi in response. The sheriff's department responded about 20 minutes into the gunfight. Sheriff Harwell got Howell on the phone and told him to stop shooting and surrender. Howell and his companions, dubbed the "Rodenville Eight" by the media, were tried on April 12, 1988; seven were acquitted and the jury was hung on Howell's verdict. The county prosecutors did not press the case further.

While waiting for the trial, George Roden was put in jail under contempt of court charges on March 21, 1988 because of his use of foul language in some court pleadings threatening the Texas court with AIDS and herpes if it ruled in favor of Howell. The very next day, Perry Jones and a number of Howell's other followers moved from their headquarters in Palestine, Texas to Mt. Carmel Center.

In the summer of 1989, a Davidian named Wayman Dale Adair visited George Roden to discuss Adair's vision of being God's chosen messiah. Roden killed Adair with an axe. Roden was found guilty, but insane, and committed to a mental hospital. Shortly after Roden's commitment, Howell raised money to pay off all the back taxes on Mt. Carmel owed by Roden and took legal control of the property.

Vernon Howell filed a petition in California State Superior Court in Pomona on 15 May 1990 to legally change his name "for publicity and business purposes" to David Koresh. On August 28, 1990, Judge Robert Martinez granted the petition.

By 1992, most of the land belonging to the group had been sold except a core 77 acres. Most of the buildings had been removed or were being salvaged for construction materials to convert much of the main chapel and a tall water tank into apartments for the resident members of the group. Many of the members of the group had been involved with the Davidians for a few generations, and many had large families. The new Mount Carmel Center consisted of a main church building (constructed primarily of thin plywood, taking advantage of a lack of building codes at the time), administrative and storage buildings, and homes for the leadership and important visitors.

Accusations

During the siege, the deprogrammer Rick Ross said

"[Koresh is] your stock cult leader. ... They're all the same. Meet one and you've met them all. They're deeply disturbed, have a Borderline personality disorder and lack any type of conscience. ... No one willingly enters into a relationship like this. ... So you're talking about deception and manipulation (by the leader), people being coached in ever so slight increments, pulled in deeper and deeper without knowing where it's going or seeing the total picture."

Before the raid, Rick Ross advised the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) that arresting Koresh at Mt. Carmel in the presence of his followers would likely provoke a violent response. Joyce Sparks, an investigator from the Texas agency responsible for child protective services also advised ATF against such action.

Weapons

In addition to allegations of sexual abuse and misconduct, Koresh and his followers were accused of stockpiling illegal weapons. Authorities investigated these charges and obtained a warrant to search Koresh's compound. Former Davidian Marc Breault claimed that Koresh had "...M16 lower receiver parts" (when the receiver is modified and these parts are added to an AR15 rifle it becomes a fully automatic weapon and is subject to the National Firearms Act and its $200 tax in the United States).

On August 5, 1989 Koresh (at that point still legally named Vernon Howell) released the "new light" audiotape in which Koresh stated he'd been told by God to procreate with the women in the group to establish a "House of David" of his "Special People." This involved married couples in the group dissolving their marriages and agreeing that only Koresh could have sexual relations with the wives.

Interviews with Koresh's surviving followers reveal that he was intimately versed in the Bible and "knew it like he wrote it." Koresh had taught that the U.S. government was the enemy of the Davidians and that they would have to defend themselves against it with weapons. The January 5, 1992 interview of David Koresh by Martin King of Australian TV show A Current Affair included this exchange:

"King: Would you use a gun if someone trespassed?"
"Koresh: They come in here with a gun and they start shooting at us, what would you do?"

According to the Affidavit presented by ATF investigator David Aguilera to US Magistrate Dennis G. Green on February 25, 1993, the Branch Davidian gun business (the "Mag Bag", Route 7, Box 555-B, Waco, Texas, 76705, located on Farm Road number 2491), had purchased many legal guns and gun parts from various legal vendors (such as forty-five semi-automatic AR15 lower receivers from Olympic Arms). Deliveries by UPS for the "Mag Bag" were accepted and paid for at Mount Carmel Center by Woodrow Kendrick, Paul Fatta, David Koresh or Steve Schneider. These purchases were traced by Aguilera through the normal channels used to track legal firearms purchases from legal vendors. None of the weapons and firearms were illegally obtained nor illegally owned by the "Mag Bag"; however, Aguilera affirmed to the judge that in his experience, in the past other purchasers of such legal gun parts had modified them to make illegal firearms. The search warrant was justified not on the basis that the Davidians had purchased anything illegal, but on the basis that they could be modifying legal arms to illegal arms.

"...I am God!" taken out of context to support an agenda against Koresh

King also notes that Koresh was accused of impregnating the aged widow of the founder of Branch Davidianism. He said that if the charges were true, "(if he had) made a 62 year-old woman pregnant... I do miracles, I'm God!" From the transcripts, Koresh is not identifying himself as God, instead he is presenting the paradox that if this person truly believes he was able to impregnate a 62 year old woman, then the person should also fear Koresh because he must also be God for only God could impregnate a 62 year old woman. Koresh also stated at that time that he had not had any relationships with her and called her "an ugly old hag".

On February 27, 1993 the Waco Tribune-Herald began the “Sinful Messiah” series of articles. It began "If you are a Branch Davidian, Christ lives on a threadbare piece of land 10 miles east of here called Mount Carmel. He has dimples, claims a ninth-grade education, married his legal wife when she was 14, enjoys a beer now and then, plays a mean guitar, reportedly packs a 9mm Glock and keeps an arsenal of military assault rifles, and willingly admits that he is a sinner without equal." The article alleged that Koresh had physically abused children in the compound and had taken multiple underage "brides" amounting to statutory rape. Koresh was also said to advocate polygamy for himself and declared himself married to several female residents of the small community. According to the paper, Koresh declared he was entitled to at least 140 wives, that he was entitled to claim any of the females in the group as his, that he had fathered at least a dozen children by the harem and that some of these mothers became brides as young as 12 or 13 years old.

Child abuse allegations

Reports from Joyce Sparks, an investigator from the Texas agency responsible for child protective services, stated she had found significant evidence that the allegations were true in her visits to the Mount Carmel site over a period of months. However she said the investigation was difficult as she wasn't permitted to speak with the children alone nor was she permitted to inspect all areas of the site. She noted that safety concerns over construction sites at Mount Carmel were either ignored or slowly corrected.

Prelude

In May 1992, Chief Deputy Daniel Weyenberg of the McLennan County Sheriff's Department called the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) notifying that his office had been contacted by a local UPS representative. A UPS driver described a package that had broken open on delivery to the Branch Davidian residence, revealing firearms, inert grenade casings, and black powder. On June 9, 1992, a formal investigation was opened and a week later it was classified as sensitive, "thereby calling for a high degree of oversight" from both Houston and Headquarters (italics on the original).

The documentary Inside Waco claims that the investigation started when in 1992 the ATF became concerned over reports of automatic gunfire coming from the Carmel compound.

On 30 July 1992, ATF agents David Aguilera and Skinner visited the Davidian's gun dealer Henry McMahon, who tried to get them to talk with Koresh on the phone. Koresh offered to let ATF inspect the Davidians' weapons and paperwork and asked to speak with Aguilera, but Aguilera declined. Sheriff Harwell told reporters regarding law enforcement talking with Koresh, "Just go out and talk to them, what's wrong with notifying them?"

The ATF began surveillance from a house across the road from the compound several months before the siege. Their cover was noticeably poor (the "college students" were in their 30s, not registered at the local schools, and they did not keep a schedule which would have fit any legitimate employment or classes). The investigation included sending in an undercover agent, Robert Rodriguez, whose identity Koresh learned, though he chose not to reveal that fact until the day of the raid.

The affidavit of ATF investigator David Aguilera for the search warrant claimed that there were over 150 weapons and 8,100 rounds of ammunition in the compound. The paperwork on the suspected AR-15 components cited in the affidavit showed they were in fact legal semi-automatics; however, Aguilera told the judge: "I know based on my training and experience that an AR-15 is a semi-automatic rifle practically identical to the M-16 rifle.... I have been involved in many cases where defendents, following a relatively simple process, convert AR-15 semi-automatic rifles to fully automatic rifles of the nature of the M-16. ... Often times templates, milling machines, lathes and instruction guides are used by the converter." Aguilera stated in the affidavit and testified later in the trial that a neighbor had heard machine-gun fire, but Aguilera failed to tell the magistrate that the same neighbor had previously reported the noise to the local Waco sheriff, who investigated the neighbor's complaint. Paul Fatta, who was also involved in the failed takeover of the group in 1987, told the New York Times that Koresh and he had visited the sheriff after the surveillance had been spotted and claims that the sheriff's office told them their guns were legal.

Using the affidavit filed by Aguilera, alleging that the Davidians had violated federal law, the ATF obtained search and arrest warrants for Koresh and specific followers on weapons charges due to the many firearms they had accumulated (Search Warrant W93-15M for the "residence of Vernon Wayne Howell, and others" signed by "Dennis G. Green (U.S. Judge or Magistrate)" dated 25 February 1993 8:43 p.m. at Waco, Texas). The search warrant commanded a search "on or before February 28, 1993" in the daytime 6:00 am to 10:00 pm.

ATF obtained training for the raid from Special Forces at Fort Hood, Texas, February 25 though 27, by making a false claim that David Koresh was operating a methamphetamine lab. This provided the drug nexus necessary to obtain military assets under the "War on Drugs".

ATF had planned their raid for Monday, 1 March 1993, with the code name "Showtime". The ATF would later claim that the raid was moved up a day, to Sunday, February 28, 1993, in response to the Waco Tribune-Herald "Sinful Messiah" series (which the ATF had tried to prevent from being published). However, the plain text of the search warrant said it expired February 28 at 10:00 pm which meant if the raid were carried out Monday March 1, it would have been on an expired warrant. Also, in meeting with Tribune-Herald personnel a week before the raid (before a date had actually been set), ATF agent Cavanaugh felt the newspaper had held off publication at the request of the ATF for at least three weeks, but ATF could not give the newsmen a clear idea of what action was planned or when. The Tribune-Herald informed ATF they were publishing the series, which included an editorial calling for local authorities to act. Personnel of the Tribune-Herald found out about the imminent raid after the first installment of "Sinful Messiah" had already appeared on February 27. (Many of the ATF press releases on the Waco Siege were written at HQ and given to the news media without consulting the agents involved in the raid.)

Although the ATF preferred to arrest Koresh when he was outside Mount Carmel, planners received inaccurate information that Koresh rarely left it.

Economist and crisis consultant Randall Bell writes in his book Strategy 360, "Koresh was on amicable terms with the local sheriff. He could have been easily arrested or questioned during one of his frequent visits to town. Many people believe that, even if a simple phone call had been allowed between the sheriff and Koresh, the FBI's raid might not have occurred at all."

The Davidian members were well known locally and had cordial relations with other locals. The Davidians partly supported themselves by trading at gun shows and took care always to have the relevant paperwork to ensure their transactions were legal. Davidian Paul Fatta was a federal firearms licensed dealer (FFL) and the Davidians operated a retail gun business called the Mag Bag. When shipments for the Mag Bag arrived, they were signed for by Fatta, Steve Schneider or Koresh. The morning of the raid, Paul Fatta and son Kalani were on their way to the Austin, Texas gun show to conduct business.

The raid

The ATF attempted to execute their search warrant on a Sunday morning, February 28, 1993. Any advantage of surprise was lost as a reporter, who had been tipped off about the raid, asked for directions from a U.S. Postal Service mail carrier who was coincidentally Koresh's brother-in-law. Koresh then told the ATF agent Robert Rodriguez, who had infiltrated the Branch Davidians (to his astonishment as he was not aware that his cover had been blown), they knew a raid was imminent. The agent made an excuse and left the compound. When asked later what the Davidians had been doing when he left the compound, Rodriguez replied, "They were praying."

Davidian survivors have written that Koresh ordered selected male followers to begin arming and taking up defensive positions, while the women and children were told to take cover in their rooms. Koresh told them he would try to speak to the agents and what happened next would depend on the agents' intentions.

Despite being informed that the Davidians knew a raid was coming, the ATF commander ordered that the raid go ahead, even though their plan depended on reaching the compound without the Davidians having been armed and prepared. While not standard procedure, ATF agents had their blood type written on their arms or neck after leaving the staging area and before the raid because it was recommended by the military to facilitate speedy blood transfusions in the case of injury.

Agents approached the site in cattle trailers pulled by pickup trucks owned by individual ATF agents. When the ATF rolled up to the front door of the compound, Koresh emerged unarmed and asked what they wanted. At this point, shots were fired and Koresh went inside and shut the door.

It is not known who fired the first shots, but each side later claimed it had been the other. It is reported that the first firing occurred at the double front entry doors. (One door, riddled with bullet holes, was removed and lost very shortly after the siege's end). ATF agents stated they heard shots coming from within the compound, while Branch Davidian survivors claimed that the first shots came from the ATF agents outside.

A suggested reason may have been an accidental discharge of a weapon, possibly by a member of ATF personnel, causing the ATF to open fire with automatic weapons. Other reports claim the first shots were fired by the ATF "dog team" sent to "neutralize" the dogs in the Davidian kennel. The written raid plans included diversionary gunfire from the helicopters, but the government claims those plans were not followed.

Within a minute of the raid starting, the Davidian Wayne Martin, a Harvard-educated lawyer with a wife and seven children, who for seven years was an assistant professor at North Carolina Central University School of Law, called emergency services, pleading for them to stop shooting. The resident asked for a ceasefire, and audiotapes record him saying "Here they come again!" and "That's them shooting, that's not us!"

Agents took cover behind vehicles in front of the building and returned fire, while two teams of agents climbed ladders on the side of the building onto the roof. Their objective was to secure the roof within thirty seconds, and to prevent access to the firearms storage. (As later noted by one of their leaders, the ATF failed to adequately consider that the firearms would have already been issued under these circumstances.) A window was smashed, and a smoke grenade was thrown in. Three agents entered the room, but were killed. Bullets fired from the inside punctured the wall, wounding another agent. Both sides continued to fire at each other.

The local sheriff attempted to contact the ATF force, but initially could not get through because the ATF communications officer had turned his radio off. Eventually, the sheriff got through and negotiated a ceasefire. This conflicts with Gazecki's documentary, where the sheriff of McLennan county at the time states that the ATF agents withdrew only after they were out of ammunition."

After the ceasefire, the Davidians, who still had ample ammunition, allowed the ATF dead and wounded to be removed and held their fire during the ATF retreat. ATF agents Steve Willis, Robert Williams, Todd McKeehan and Conway LeBleu were killed during the raid. Another sixteen were wounded. Surviving Davidians claim some ATF deaths and casualties were caused by 'friendly fire'. The five Davidians killed in the 9:45 am raid were Winston Blake, Peter Gent, Peter Hipsman, Perry Jones, and Jaydean Wendel. Nearly six hours after the 11:30 am ceasefire, Michael Schroeder was shot dead by ATF agents who alleged he fired a pistol at agents as he attempted to re-enter the compound with Woodrow Kendrick and Norman Allison. His wife claimed that he was merely returning from work and had not participated in the day's earlier altercation.

The local sheriff, in audiotapes broadcast after the incident, said he was not apprised of the raid.

Alan A. Stone's report states that the Davidians didn't ambush the ATF, that they "apparently did not maximize the kill of ATF agents" and that they were "willing to kill but (were) not cold-blooded killers." It explains that they were rather "desperate religious fanatics expecting an apocalyptic ending, in which they were destined to die defending their sacred ground and destined to achieve salvation."

Chronology of events February 28

Time	Event
05:00	76 agents assemble at Fort Hood for the drive to the staging area at the Bellmead Civic Center. According to a later Treasury Department Review, the agents drove in an 80-vehicle convoy that stretched for a mile (1.6 km) with a cattle trailer at either end.
09:45	ATF agents move in on the compound. A gun battle begins.
09:48	Branch Davidian Wayne Martin, a Waco attorney, calls 9-1-1.
11:30	Ceasefire reached.
16:00 (4:00 p.m.)	The first message from Koresh is relayed over KRLD Radio In Dallas.
16:55 (4:55 p.m.)	Michael Schroeder is shot dead returning to the compound.
17:00 (5:00 p.m.)	ATF spokesman Ted Royster says gunfire has continued sporadically through the afternoon.
19:30 (7:30 p.m.)	David Koresh is interviewed by CNN. The FBI instructs CNN not to conduct further interviews.
20:15 (8:15 p.m.)	ATF spokesperson Sharon Wheeler says negotiations continue with Davidians and gunfire has ended.
22:00 (10:00 p.m.)	By now 4 children have exited (2 Sonobe children, 2 Fagan children).
22:05 (10:05 p.m.)	Koresh talks for about 20 minutes on KRLD, describing his beliefs and saying he is the most seriously wounded of the Davidians.

Fatalities

Following the 28 February 1993 raid, the dead included:

• ATF fatalities:
  • Todd McKeehan
  • Conway LeBleu
  • Robert Williams
  • Steve Willis

• Davidian fatalities:
  • Jaydean Wendel
  • Winston Blake
  • Peter Gent
  • Michael Schroeder
  • Peter Hipsman
  • Perry Jones

The siege

ATF agents established contact with Koresh and others inside the compound after they withdrew. The FBI took command soon after as a result of the deaths of federal agents. FBI placed Jeff Jamar, head of the Bureau's San Antonio field office, in charge of the siege as Site Commander. The FBI Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) was headed by HRT Commander Richard Rogers, who had previously been criticized for his actions at the Ruby Ridge incident. As at Ruby Ridge, Rogers often overrode the Site Commander at Waco.

At first, the Davidians had telephone contact with local news media and Koresh gave phone interviews. The FBI cut Davidian communication to the outside world. For the next 51 days, communication with those inside was by telephone by a group of 25 FBI negotiators. The final Justice Department report found that negotiators criticized the tactical commanders for undercutting negotiations.

In the first few days the FBI believed they had made a breakthrough when they negotiated with Koresh an agreement that the Davidians would peacefully leave the compound in return for a message, recorded by Koresh, being broadcast on national radio. The broadcast was made, but Koresh then told negotiators that God had told him to remain in the building and "wait".

Despite this, soon afterwards negotiators managed to facilitate the release of 19 children, ranging in age from five months to 12 years old, without their parents. These children were released in groups of two. This was considered an allusion to Noah's Ark by Koresh, while 98 people remained in the building. The children were then interviewed by the FBI and Texas Rangers, some for hours at a time. Allegedly, the children had been physically and sexually abused long before the standoff, Although allegations of child abuse were never substantiated, this was the key justification offered by the FBI, both to President Bill Clinton and Janet Reno, as justification for launching tear gas attacks on the compound to force the Davidians out.

During the siege, the FBI sent a video camera to the Davidians. In the video tape made by Koresh's followers, Koresh introduced his children and his "wives" to the FBI negotiators including several minors who claimed to have had babies fathered by Koresh. (Koresh had fathered perhaps 14 of the children who stayed with him in the compound.) Several Davidians made statements in the video. On day nine the Davidians sent out the video tape to show the FBI that there were no hostages, but in fact everyone seemingly was staying inside on their own free will. This video also included a message from Koresh. Videos also showed the 23 children still inside Ranch Apocalypse, and child care professionals on the outside prepared to take care of those children as well as the previous 21 released.

As the siege continued, Koresh negotiated more time, allegedly so he could write religious documents he said he needed to complete before he surrendered. His conversations, dense with biblical imagery, alienated the federal negotiators who treated the situation as a hostage crisis.

As the siege wore on, two factions developed within the FBI, one believing negotiation to be the answer, the other, force. Increasingly aggressive techniques were used to try to force the Davidians out. Outside the compound nine disarmed Bradley Fighting Vehicles and five M-60 combat engineering vehicles (CEVs) obtained from the US Army began patrolling. The armored vehicles were used to destroy perimeter fencing and outbuildings and crush cars belonging to the Davidians. The tanks repeatedly drove over the grave of Davidian Peter Gent despite protests by the Davidians and the negotiators. Two of the three water storage tanks on the roof of the main building had been shot at and holed in the initial ATF raid. Eventually the FBI cut all power and water to the compound, forcing those inside to survive on rain water and stockpiled United States Army Meal, Ready-to-Eat rations.

Criticism was later leveled at the tactic of using sleep and peace-disrupting sound against the Davidians by Schneider's attorney, Jack Zimmerman:

The point was this - they were trying to have sleep disturbance and they were trying to take someone that they viewed as unstable to start with, and they were trying to drive him crazy. And then they got mad 'cos he does something that they think is irrational!

Despite the increasingly aggressive tactics, Koresh ordered a group of followers to leave. Eleven people left and were arrested as material witnesses, with one person charged with conspiracy to murder.

The children's willingness to stay with Koresh disturbed the negotiators who were unprepared to work around the Davidians' religious zeal. However, as the siege went on, the children were aware that an earlier group of children who had left with some women were immediately separated, and the women arrested.

During the siege a number of scholars who study Apocalypticism in religious groups attempted to persuade the FBI that the siege tactics being used by government agents would only create the impression within the Davidians that they were part of a Biblical "end-of-times" confrontation that had cosmic significance. This would likely increase the chances of a violent and deadly outcome. The religious scholars pointed out that while on the outside, the beliefs of the group may have appeared to be extreme, to the Davidians, their religious beliefs were deeply meaningful, and they were willing to die for them.

Koresh's discussions with the negotiating team became increasingly difficult. He proclaimed that he was the second coming of Christ and had been commanded by his father in heaven to remain in the compound.

The final assault

The FBI suggested that the Davidians might commit mass suicide, as had happened at Jonestown where 900 people killed themselves at their leader's behest, although Koresh had repeatedly denied any plans for this when confronted by negotiators during the standoff, and people escaping the compound hadn't seen any such preparation. Newly-appointed U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno approved recommendations by the FBI to mount an assault after being told that conditions were deteriorating and that children were being abused inside the compound. Because the Davidians were heavily armed, the FBI's arms included .50 caliber (12.7 mm) rifles and armored vehicles (CEVs). The assault took place on April 19.

Combat Engineering tanks used booms to puncture holes in the walls of buildings of the compound so they could pump in CS gas ("tear gas") and try to flush out the Davidians without harming them. The stated plan called for increasing amounts of gas to be pumped in over two days to increase pressure. Officially, no armed assault was to be made, and loudspeakers were used to tell the Davidians that there would be no armed assault and to ask them not to fire on the vehicles. When several Davidians allegedly opened fire, the FBI's response was to increase the amount of gas being used.

After more than six hours no Davidians had left the building, sheltering instead in a cinder block room within the building or using gas masks. The official FBI claim is that CEVs were used to punch large holes in the building to provide exits for those inside. Several Davidians were blocked when a floor above collapsed, and nearly all Davidians said they feared being shot were they to leave.

At around noon, three fires broke out almost simultaneously in different parts of the building. The government maintains the fires were deliberately started by Davidians. Davidian survivors maintain the fires were accidentally or deliberately started by the tank assault. As the fire spread, Davidians were prevented from escaping; others refused to leave and eventually became trapped. In all, only nine people left the building during the fire.

The remaining Davidians, including the children, were either buried alive by rubble, suffocated by the effects of the fire or shot. Many that suffocated from the fire were killed by smoke or carbon monoxide inhalation and other causes as fire engulfed the building. Footage of the incident was being broadcast worldwide via television. In all, 75 died (50 adults and 25 children under the age of 15) and nine survived the fire on 19 Apr (on 28 Feb five had been killed in the initial ATF raid and buried on the grounds, one killed by ATF after the raid while returning to Mt. Carmel and 35 had left during the FBI standoff).

Nothing remains of the buildings today, as the entire site was bulldozed by the ATF two weeks after the end of the siege. Only a small chapel, built years after the siege, stands on the site. Despite significant primary source video, much dispute remains as to the actual events of the siege.

Chronology of events April 19

Time	Event
05:50	Agents call Davidian compound to warn they are going to begin tank activity and advise residents "to take cover". Agents say the Davidian who answered the phone didn't reply, but instead threw the phone and phone line out of the front door.
05:55	FBI Hostage Rescue Team deploys two armored combat engineering vehicles (CEV) to the buildings. CEV1 goes to the left of the buildings, CEV2 to the right.
06:00	FBI surveillance tapes from devices planted in the wall of the building record a man inside the compound saying "Everybody wake up, let's start to pray", then, "Pablo have you poured it yet" ..."Huh" ... "Have you poured it yet"... "in the hallway"... "things are poured, right?" CEV1 receives orders to spray two bottles of tear gas into left corner of building.
06:04	Armored vehicle with ram and delivery device to pump tear gas into building with pressurized air rips into front wall just left of front door leaving a hole 8 feet (2.4 m) high and 10 feet (3.0 m) wide. Agents claimed the holes not only allowed insertion of the gas, but also provided a means of escape. Agents allege that 75 rounds are fired from inside building at this time. Agent sees shots from inside the compound directed at CEVs.
06:10	FBI surveillance tapes record "don't pour it all out, we might need some later"... "throw the tear gas back out" FBI negotiator Byron Sage is recorded saying "It's time for people to come out." Surveillance tapes records a man saying "what?" then, "no way."
06:12	FBI surveillance tapes record Davidians saying "They're gonna kill us", then "They don't want to kill us."
06:31	The entire building is gassed.
06:47	FBI fires plastic, nonincendiary tear gas rounds through windows.
07:23	FBI surveillance tapes record a male Davidian saying, "The fuel has to go all around to get started." Then a second male says, "Well, there are two cans here, if that's poured soon."
07:30	CEV1 is redeployed, breaching the building and inserting tear gas. Davidians fire shots at CEV1.
07:48	On FBI tapes of agents recorded during the siege, FBI agent requests permission to fire military-style tear gas shells to break through underground concrete bunker. Gets permission, fires two shells.
07:58	CEV2, with battering ram, rips hole into second floor of compound and then minutes later another hole is punched into the backside of one of the buildings of the compound. The vehicles then withdraw.
08:08	Agent in CEV reports that one military shell bounced off bunker, did not penetrate.
08:24	Audio portion of FBI videotape ends, at request of pilot.
09:00	The Davidians unfurl a banner which reads "We want our phone fixed."
09:13	CEV1 breaks through front door to deliver more gas.
09:20	FBI surveillance records a meeting starting at 7:30 AM between several unidentified males. UM: "They got two cans of Coleman fuel down there? Huh?" UM: "Empty" UM: "All of it?" UM: "Nothing left."
10:00	A man is seen waving a white flag on the southeast side of the compound. He is advised over loudspeakers that if he is surrendering he should come out. He doesn't. At the same time a man believed to be Schneider comes out to retrieve the phone and phone line.
11:30	More gas inserted through front, punching another big hole; original CEV2 has mechanical difficulties (damaged tread), replacement breaches through back side of compound.
11:43	Another gas insertion takes place, with the armored vehicle moving well into the building to reach the concrete interior room where the FBI believe Davidians are trying to avoid gas.
11:45	Wall on right rear collapses.
12:03	Armored vehicle turret knocks away first floor corner on right side.
12:07	First visible flames appear in two spots in the front of the building, first on the left of the front door on the second floor (a wisp of smoke then a small flicker of flame) then a short time later on the far right side of the front of the building, and at a third spot on the back side. Agents say Branch Davidian members ignited the fires, alleging that observers saw a man dressed in black bend over with cupped hands and then saw flames as he lifted his hands.
12:09	Ruth Riddle exits with computer disk in her jacket containing Koresh's Manuscript on the Seven Seals. Third fire detected on first floor.
12:10	Flames spread quickly through entire building, fanned by high winds. The building burns very quickly.
12:12	Emergency telephone number call placed for fire department. Two Waco FD trucks are dispatched. Shortly after, Bellmead FD dispatches two trucks.
12:22	Waco fire trucks arrive at checkpoint where they are halted; Bellmead follows shortly after.
12:25	There is a large explosion on the left side. One object hurtles into air, bounces off the top of white bus and lands on grass.
12:30	Part of the roof collapses. Around this time there are several further explosions and witnesses report the sound of gunfire, attributed by the FBI to live ammunition cooking off throughout the buildings because of fire.
12:43	Fire trucks arrive in compound according to fire department logs.
12:55	Fire begins to burn out, compound leveled.
15:45	Law enforcement source says David Koresh is dead.

Aftermath

Remains of a swimming pool are left on the grounds.

Various gun-control groups, such as Handgun Control Incorporated and the Violence Policy Center have claimed that the Branch Davidians had used .50 caliber rifles and that therefore these types of firearms should be banned. Nevertheless, the evidence of this is unclear; the US Treasury Department, in a memorandum to the press dated July 13, 1995 titled "Weapons Possessed by the Branch Davidians", provided an inventory of all the firearms and firearm-related items that were recovered from the Branch Davidian's compound, which claims no .50 caliber rifles or machine guns were recovered, only 4 magazines, 3 magazine springs and belt links for .50 caliber weapons were listed. Several years later, the General Accounting Office in response to a request from Henry Waxman released a briefing paper titled, "Criminal Activity Associated with .50 Caliber Semiautomatic Rifles" which claims that the Branch Davidians used .50 caliber rifles. The GAO's claim is based on a suspicion by the ATF that the Branch Davidians could have acquired .50 rifles. The ATF claims such rifles were used against ATF agents the day of the search warrant. There has not been a reconciliation between the Treasury Department's account and the GAO's.

Trial

The events at Waco spurred both criminal prosecution and civil litigation. On August 3, 1993, a federal grand jury returned a superseding 10-count indictment against twelve of the surviving Davidians. The grand jury charged, among other things, that the Davidians had conspired to, and aided and abetted in, murder of federal officers, and had unlawfully possessed and used various firearms.

The Government dismissed the charges against one of the twelve Davidians, Kathryn Schroeder, pursuant to a plea bargain. After a jury trial lasting nearly two months, the jury acquitted four of the Davidians on all counts with which they were charged. Additionally, the jury acquitted all of the Davidians on the murder-related charges, but convicted five of them on the lesser-included offense of aiding and abetting the voluntary manslaughter of federal agents. Eight Davidians were convicted on firearms charges.

The convicted Davidians, who received sentences of up to 40 years, were:

• Kevin A. Whitecliff—convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime.
• Jaime Castillo—convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime.
• Paul Gordon Fatta—convicted of conspiracy to possess machine guns and aiding Davidian leader David Koresh in possessing machine guns.
• Renos Lenny Avraam (British national) —convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime.
• Graeme Leonard Craddock (Australian national) —convicted of possessing a grenade and using or possessing a firearm during a crime.
• Brad Eugene Branch—convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime.
• Livingstone Fagan (British national) —convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime.
• Ruth Riddle (Canadian national) —convicted of using or carrying a weapon during a crime.
• Kathryn Schroeder—sentenced to three years after pleading guilty to a reduced charge of forcibly resisting arrest.

24 British nationals were among the 76 fatalities. Two more British nationals who survived the siege were immediately arrested as "material witnesses" and imprisoned without trial for months. One, Derek Lovelock, was held in McLennan County Jail for seven months, often in solitary confinement. Livingston Fagan, another British citizen, who was among those convicted and imprisoned, recounts multiple beatings at the hands of prison guards, particularly at Leavenworth. He claims to have been doused with cold water from a high-pressure hose, which soaked both him and the contents and bedding of his cell, after which an industrial fan was placed outside the cell, blasting him with cold air. He was repeatedly moved between at least nine different facilities. He was strip-searched every time he took exercise, so refused exercise. Released and deported back to UK in July 2007, he still holds on to his religious beliefs.

Six of the eight Davidians appealed both their sentences and their convictions. They raised a host of issues, challenging the constitutionality of the prohibition on possession of machine guns, the jury instructions, the district court’s conduct of the trial, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the sentences imposed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated the defendants’ sentences for use of machine guns, determining that the district court had made no finding that they had “actively employed” the weapons. The Court of Appeals left the verdict undisturbed in all other respects. United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied (1997).

On remand, the district court found that the defendants had actively employed machine guns, and re-sentenced five of them to substantial prison terms. The defendants again appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Castillo, 179 F.3d 321 (5th Cir. 1999). The Davidians pressed this issue before the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the term “machine gun” in the relevant statute created an element of the offense to be determined by a jury, rather than a sentencing factor to be determined by a judge, as had happened in the trial court. Castillo v. United States, 530 U.S. 120 (2000). On September 19, 2000 Judge Walter Smith followed the Supreme Court's instructions and cut 25 years from the sentences of 5 convicted Davidians and five years from the sentence of another. All Davidians were released from prison as of July 2007.

Several of the surviving Davidians, as well as more than a hundred family members of those who had died or were injured in the confrontation, brought civil suits against the United States Government, numerous federal officials, the former governor of Texas, and members of the Texas National Guard. They sought monetary damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), civil rights statutes, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and Texas state law. The bulk of these claims were dismissed because they were insufficient as a matter of law or because the plaintiffs could advance no material evidence in support of them. Only FTCA claims related to the initial raid on the compound, the actions of the FBI during the insertion of tear gas on April 19, 1993, and the final fire proceeded to trial.

The court, after a month-long trial, rejected the Davidians’ case. The court found that, on February 28, 1993, the Davidians initiated a gun battle when they fired at federal officers who were attempting to serve lawful warrants. ATF agents returned gunfire to the building, the court ruled, in order to protect themselves and other agents from death or serious bodily harm. The court found that the government's planning of the siege – i.e. the decisions to use tear gas against the Davidians; to insert the tear gas by means of military tanks; and to omit specific planning for the possibility that a fire would erupt – was a discretionary function for which the government could not be sued. The court also found that the use of tear gas was not negligent. Further, even if the United States Government were negligent by causing damage to the buildings before the fires broke out, thus either blocking escape routes or enabling the fires to speed faster, that negligence did not legally cause the plaintiffs' injuries because the Davidians started the fires. The court found that the FBI's decision not initially to allow fire trucks on the property was reasonable because of the risk of injury or death to firefighters who might encounter hostile gunfire from the Davidian building.

The Davidians appealed. Their only serious contention was that the trial court judge, Walter S. Smith, Jr., should have recused himself from hearing their claims on account of his relationships with defendants, defense counsel, and court staff; prior judicial determinations; and comments during trial. The Fifth Circuit concluded that these allegations did not reflect conduct that would cause a reasonable observer to question Judge Smith’s impartiality, and it affirmed the take-nothing judgment. Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied (2004).

Australians killed during the siege

Eighteen year old Shari Doyle died in the fire on day 51. Clive Doyle and Edna Doyle, Shari's father and grandmother respectively, both Branch Davidians are Waco survivors.

Peter Gent was allegedly shot through the heart from Helicopter snipers.

British nationals killed or injured during the siege

33 British citizens were among the members of the Branch Davidians during the siege. 24 died, including at least one child. The following is an incomplete list:

• Derek Lovelock, arm burned during escape from compound on Day 51, detained for 200 days at McClennan County Jail, later released.
• Norman Allison, Manchester, arrested outside compound on Day 1, detained at McClennan for 8 months.
• Renos Avraam, London, detained at McClennan 4 months, then sentenced to 40 years.
• Livingstone Fagan, a social worker and Theology MA, from Nottingham. Left compound to talk to press on Day 30, detained at McClennan for 7 months, then sentenced to 40 years. His 2 small daughters also left the compound.
• Yvette Fagan, Livingstone's wife, died on Day 51.
• Doris Fagan, Livingstone's mother, died on Day 51.
• Zilla Henry, nurse, Nottingham, died on Day 51.
• Phillip Henry, Zilla's husband, died on Day 51.
• Novellette Hipsman, died on Day 51.
• Winston "Bigboy" Blake, decorator, Nottingham, died in his bedroom on Day 1 during the initial ATF attack.
• Beverley Elliot, Nottingham, girlfriend of Winston Blake, died on Day 51.
• Sue Benta, Nottingham, died on Day 51.
• Malcolm "Stone" Livingstone, London, a cousin of Bob Marley, died on Day 51.
• Marjorie Thomas, London, sustained 50% burns on Day 51 but survived.
• Rose Morrison, died on Day 51.
• Mellisa Morrison, infant daughter of Rose, died on Day 51.
• Victoria Hollingsworth, London, died on Day 51.

Controversies

Who fired first?

Helicopters had been obtained from the Texas National Guard on the pretext that there was a drug laboratory at Mount Carmel. There were, however, no drug related charges on the arrest warrant served on the morning of February 28, 1993." While the official version of events has always stated that the helicopters were merely used as a diversion, and that the Davidians were not targeted by sharpshooters within them, in transcripts of the negotiations, one negotiator admitted that the occupants were armed and that they might have opened fire:

Koresh: "No! Let me tell you something. That may be what you want the media to believe, but there's other people that saw too! Now, tell me Jim, again - you're honestly going to say those helicopters didn't fire on any of us?"
Jim Cavanaugh: "What I'm saying is the helicopters didn't have mounted guns. Ok? I'm not disputing the fact that there might have been fire from the helicopters."

An Austin Chronicle article noted, "Long before the fire, the Davidians were discussing the evidence contained in the doors. During the siege, in a phone conversation with the FBI, Steve Schneider, one of Koresh's main confidants, told FBI agents that "the evidence from the front door will clearly show how many bullets and what happened." Houston attorney Dick DeGuerin, who went inside Mount Carmel during the siege, testified at the trial that protruding metal on the inside of the right-hand entry door made it clear that the bullet holes were made by incoming rounds. DeGuerin also testified that only the right-hand entry door had bullet holes, while the left-hand entry door was intact. The government presented the left-hand entry door at the trial, claiming that the right-hand entry door had been lost. The left-hand door contained numerous bullet holes made by both outgoing and incoming rounds. Texas Trooper Sgt. David Keys testified that he witnessed two men loading what could have been the missing door into a U-Haul van shortly after the siege had ended, but he did not see the object itself. And Michael Caddell, the lead attorney for the Davidians' wrongful death lawsuit explained, "The fact that the left-hand door is in the condition it's in tells you that the right-hand door was not consumed by the fire. It was lost on purpose by somebody." Caddell offered no evidence to support this allegation, which has never been proved. However, fire investigators stated that it was "extremely unlikely" that the steel right door could have suffered damage in the fire much greater than did the steel left door, and both doors would have been found together. The right door remains missing, and the entire site was under close supervision by law enforcement officials until the debris—including both doors—had been removed.."

The fire

Critics suggest that during the final raid the CS gas was injected into the building by armored vehicles in an unsafe manner, which could have started a fire. While two of the three fires were started well inside the building, away from where the CS gas was pumped in, survivor David Thibodeau claimed in a 1999 interview with Reason Magazine that damage to the building allowed the gas to spread, stating that "They started to break the walls, break the windows down, spread the CS gas out."

Attorney General Reno had specifically directed that no pyrotechnic devices be used in the assault. Between 1993 and 1999, FBI spokesmen denied (even under oath) the use of any sort of pyrotechnic devices during the assault; however, pyrotechnic Flite-Rite CS gas grenades had been found in the rubble immediately following the fire. In 1999, FBI spokesmen were forced to admit that they had used the grenades, however they claimed that these devices, which dispense CS gas through an internal burning process, had been used during an early morning attempt to penetrate a covered, water-filled construction pit 40 yards away, and were not fired into the building itself. According to FBI claims, the fires started approximately three hours after the grenades had been fired. When the FBI's documents were turned over to Congress for an investigation in 1994, the page listing the use of the pyrotechnic devices was missing. The failure for six years to disclose the use of pyrotechnics despite her specific directive led Reno to demand an investigation. A senior FBI official told Newsweek that as many as 100 FBI agents had known about the use of pyrotechnics, but no one spoke up until 1999.

The FBI had planted surveillance devices in the walls of the building which captured a number of conversations which the government claims are evidence the Davidians started the fire. According to reporter Diana Fuentes, when the FBI’s April 19 tapes were played in court during the Branch Davidian trials, few people heard what the FBI audio expert claimed to hear; the tapes "were filled with noise, and voices only occasionally were discernible. . .The words were faint; some courtroom observers said they heard it, some didn't."

The Branch Davidians had given ominous warnings involving fire on several occasions. This may or may not be indicative of the Davidians' future actions, but was the basis for the conclusion of Congress that the fire was started by the Davidians, "absent any other potential source of ignition." This was prior to the FBI admission that pyrotechnics were used, but a yearlong investigation by the Office of the Special Counsel after that admission nonetheless reached the same conclusion, and no further congressional investigations followed.

During a 1999 desposition for civil suits by Davidian survivors, fire survivor Graeme Craddock was interviewed. He stated he saw some Davidians moving about a dozen one gallon cans of fuel so they would not be run over by tanks, heard talk of pour fuel outside the building, and, after the fire had started, something that sounded like "light the fire" from another individual.

Professor Kenneth Newport's book The Branch Davidians of Waco attempts to prove that starting the fire themselves was pre-planned and consistent with the Branch Davidians' theology. He cites as evidence conversations the FBI recorded during the siege, testimonials of survivors Clive Doyle and Graeme Craddock and the buying of diesel fuel one month before the start of the siege.

On May 12, less than a month after the incident, Texas state authorities bulldozed the site, rendering further gathering of forensic evidence impossible.

Escaping from the fire

A large concentration of bodies, weapons and ammunition were found in the bunker. The arson report assumes that many of the occupants were either denied escape from within or refused to leave until escape was not an option. The arson report also mentions that the structural debris from the breaching operations on the west end of the building could have blocked a possible escape route through the tunnel system.

An independent investigation concluded that the compound residents had sufficient time to escape the fire, if they had so desired.

Evaluation by FBI of mass suicide possibility

The FBI received contradictory reports on the possibility of Koresh's suicide and wasn't sure about whether he would commit suicide. The evidence made them believe that there was no possibility of mass suicide, with Koresh and Scheinider repeatedly denying to the negotiators that they had plans to commit mass suicide, and people leaving the compound saying that they had seen no preparations for such a thing. There was a possibility that some of his followers would follow Koresh if he committed suicide.

According to Alan A. Stone's report, during the siege the FBI used an incorrect psychiatric perspective to evaluate Davidians' responses, which caused them to over-rely on Koresh's statements that they wouldn't commit suicide. They treated the Davidians as if they were a band of criminals, a military force or, generically, as the aggressor. The Davidians were instead

"an unconventional group in an exalted, disturbed, and desperate state of mind (...) devoted to David Koresh as the Lamb of God (...) willing to die defending themselves in an apocalyptic ending and, in the alternative, to kill themselves and their children (...) neither psychiatrically depressed, suicidal people nor cold-blooded killers (...) ready to risk death as a test of their faith." and should have been evaluated as such. According to Stone, this caused the FBI to not make the pertinent questions to Koresh and to others on the compound about whether they were planning a mass suicide. A more pertinent question would have been

"What will you do if we tighten the noose around the compound in a show of overwhelming power, and using CS gas, force you to come out?"

Autopsies

Autopsies of the dead revealed that some women and children found beneath a fallen concrete wall of a storage room died of skull injuries. Photographs taken after the fire show that the M728 CEV that penetrated the building while injecting CS gas did not come close enough to cause the collapse, which was more likely the result of the fire; photographs show signs of spalling on the concrete, which suggests that it was damaged by the intense heat.

Autopsy photographs of other children locked in what appear to be spasmic death poses are consistent with cyanide poisoning, one of the results produced by burning CS gas. The DOJ report indicated that only one body had traces of benzene, one of the components of solvent-dispersed CS gas, but that the gas insertions had finished nearly one hour before the fire ended, and that it was enough time for solvents to dissipate from the bodies of the Davidians that had inhaled the tear gas.

Autopsy records indicate that at least 20 Davidians were shot, including six children under the age of 14, and three-year-old Dayland Gent was stabbed in the chest. The medical examiner who performed the autopsies believed these shootings were mercy killings by Davidians trapped in the fire with no escape. The expert retained by the Office of Special Counsel concluded that many of the gunshot wounds "support self-destruction either by overt suicide, consensual execution (suicide by proxy), or less likely, forced execution." Another explanation, offered by survivor Clyde Doyle (himself a burn victim) is that the gunshots were mercy killings. In a 1995 press conference in Las Vegas, Nevada, Doyle stated that

"I can understand why someone would end the suffering of someone, especially a child, who had been gassed and was burning to death. That makes more sense than these claims of a 'suicide pact.' The people who are saying that have never been on fire." (Las Vegas Review-Journal)

Documentary films and related issues

The Waco siege has been the subject of a number of documentary films and books:

The first film was a made-for-television docudrama film, In the Line of Duty: Ambush at Waco, which was made during the siege before the April 19 assault on the church. It essentially promoted the government's view of the initial ambush of February 28, 1993. The scriptwriter, Phil Penningroth, has since disowned his screenplay.

In June 1993, Signet published Inside the Cult co-authored by ex-Davidian Marc Breault who left the group in September 1989 and by Martin King who interviewed Koresh for Australian TV "A Current Affair" in January 1992.

In July 1993, St. Martin's Paperbacks published Massacre at Waco, Texas by true crime author Clifford L. Linedecker.

The first documentary film that was critical of the official reports was Waco: The Big Lie, produced by Linda Thompson followed by Waco II: The Big Lie Continues. The Linda Thompson videos were controversial and made a number of allegations, the most famous of which was footage of a tank with what appears to be light reflected from it; Thompson's narration claimed this was a flame-thrower attached to the tank. Thompson's subsequent activities, such as declaring an armed march on Washington, D.C. and her denunciation of many other researchers into the Waco siege as part of a cover-up, limited her credibility in most circles.

Michael McNulty, of the Citizens' Organization for Public Safety, released footage showing the "flame" to have been a reflection on aluminized insulation that was torn from the wall and snagged on the M728 CEV, which is a vehicle that does not come equipped with a flamethrower. In fact, no flamethrowers were in service in the US military at the time or even today.

Thompson's "creative editing" was exposed by the film Waco: An Apparent Deviation (produced by Michael McNulty, as the result of a comprehensive investigation by people associated with COPS). Thompson worked from a VHS copy of the surveillance tape; McNulty was given access to a beta original.

The next film was Day 51: The True Story of Waco, which featured Ron Cole, a self-proclaimed militia member from Colorado who was later prosecuted for weapons violations. The Linda Thompson and Ron Cole films, along with extensive coverage given to the Waco siege on some talk radio shows, galvanized support for the Branch Davidians among some sections of the right including the Nascent Militia Movement, while critics on the left also denounced the government siege on civil liberties grounds.

In March 1993, Timothy McVeigh drove from Arizona to Waco in order to observe firsthand the federal standoff. Along with other protesters, he was photographed by the F.B.I. McVeigh cited the Waco incident as a primary motivation for the Oklahoma City bombing and was known to be a fan of both the Linda Thompson and Ron Cole videos.

Mainstream media tended to discount the critical views presented in early documentary films, because they were seen as coming from the political fringes of the right and left. This changed in 1997, when professional film makers Dan Gifford and Amy Sommer produced their Emmy Award winning documentary, Waco: The Rules of Engagement. This film presents a history of the Branch Davidian movement and, most importantly, a critical examination of the conduct of law enforcement, both leading up to the raid and through the aftermath of the fire. The film features footage of the Congressional hearings on Waco, and juxtaposition of official government spokespeople with footage and evidence often directly contradicting the government spokespeople. The documentary also shows infra-red footage demonstrating that the FBI likely used incendiary devices to start the fire which consumed the building and that the FBI did indeed fire on, and kill, Branch Davidians attempting to flee the fire.

Waco: The Rules of Engagement was nominated for a 1997 Academy Award for best documentary and was followed by another film: Waco: A New Revelation.

Subsequent government-funded studies contend that the infra-red evidence does not support the view that the FBI improperly used incendiary devices or fired on Branch Davidians. Infra-red experts continue to disagree, and film maker Amy Sommer stands by the original conclusions presented in the Waco: The Rules of Engagement documentary.

Davidian survivor David Thibodeau wrote his account of life in the Branch Davidian and of the siege in A Place Called Waco, PublicAffairs, 1999.

America Wake Up (Or Waco) was a film released in 2000 by Alex Jones which documents the 1993 Waco incident with the Branch Davidians.

The Assault on Waco was released on September 16, 2006 on the Discovery channel, and it details the entire attack on Waco.

Inside Waco is an Anglo-American documentary that attempts to show what really happened inside by piecing together accounts from the parties involved. It was produced jointly by Channel 4 and HBO. It aired on More4 in the UK on February 1, 2007 and then February 10, 2007.

Investigation and the Danforth Report

By 1999, as a result of certain aspects of the documentaries discussed above, as well as allegations made by advocates for Davidians during litigation, public opinion held that the federal government had engaged in serious misconduct at Waco. A Time magazine poll conducted on August 26, 1999, for example, indicated that 61 percent of the public believed that federal law enforcement officials started the fire at the Branch Davidian complex. In September of that year, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed former United States Senator John C. Danforth as Special Counsel to investigate the matter. In particular, the Special Counsel was directed to investigate charges that government agents started or spread the fire at the Mt. Carmel complex, directed gunfire at the Branch Davidians, and unlawfully employed the armed forces of the United States.

A yearlong investigation ensued, during which the Office of the Special Counsel interviewed 1,001 witnesses, reviewed over 2.3 million pages of documents, and examined thousands of pounds of physical evidence. In the final Danforth Report of November 8, 2000, Special Counsel Danforth concluded that the allegations were meritless. The report found, however, that certain government employees had failed to disclose during litigation against the Davidians the use of pyrotechnic devices at the complex, and had obstructed the Special Counsel’s investigation. Disciplinary action was pursued against those individuals.

Allegations that the government started the fire were based largely on an FBI agent’s having fired three “pyrotechnic” tear gas rounds, which are delivered with a charge that burns. The Special Counsel concluded that, because the FBI fired the rounds nearly four hours before the fire started, at a concrete construction pit partially filled with water, 75 feet (23 m) away and downwind from the main living quarters of the complex, the rounds did not start or contribute to the spread of the fire. The Special Counsel noted, by contrast, that recorded interceptions of Davidian conversations included such statements as “David said we have to get the fuel on” and “So we light it first when they come in with the tank right . . . right as they’re coming in.” Davidians who survived the fire acknowledged that other Davidians started the fire. FBI agents witnessed Davidians pouring fuel and igniting a fire, and noted these observations contemporaneously. Lab analysis found accelerants on the clothing of Davidians, and investigators found deliberately punctured fuel cans and a homemade torch at the site. Based on this evidence and testimony, the Special Counsel concluded that the fire was started by the Davidians.

Charges that government agents fired shots into the complex on April 19, 1993, were based on Forward Looking Infrared (“FLIR”) video recorded by FBI Nightstalker aircraft. These tapes showed 57 flashes, with some occurring around government vehicles that were operating near the complex. The Office of Special Counsel conducted a field test of FLIR technology on March 19, 2000, to determine whether gunfire caused the flashes. The testing was conducted under a protocol agreed to and signed by attorneys and experts for the Davidians and their families, as well as for the government. Analysis of the shape, duration, and location of the flashes indicated that they resulted from a reflection off debris on or around the complex, rather than gunfire. Additionally, independent expert review of photography taken at the scene showed no people at or near the points from which the flashes emanated. Interviews of Davidians, government witnesses, filmmakers, writers, and advocates for the Davidians found that none had witnessed any government gunfire on April 19. Finally, none of the Davidians who died on that day displayed evidence of having been struck by a high velocity round, as would be expected had they been shot from outside of the complex by government sniper rifles or other assault weapons. In view of this evidence, the Special Counsel concluded that the claim that government gunfire occurred on April 19, 1993, amounted to “an unsupportable case based entirely upon flawed technological assumptions.”

The Special Counsel considered whether the use of active duty military at Waco violated the Posse Comitatus Act or the Military Assistance to Law Enforcement Act. These statutes generally prohibit direct military participation in law enforcement functions, but do not preclude indirect support such as lending equipment, training in the use of equipment, offering expert advice, and providing equipment maintenance. The Special Counsel noted that the military provided “extensive” loans of equipment to the ATF and FBI including, among other things, two tanks the offensive capability of which had been disabled. Additionally, the military provided more limited advice, training, and medical support. The Special Counsel concluded that these actions amounted to indirect military assistance within the bounds of applicable law. The Texas National Guard, in its state status, also provided substantial loans of military equipment, as well as performing reconnaissance flights over the Davidian complex. Because the Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the National Guard in its state status, the Special Counsel determined that the National Guard lawfully provided its assistance.

Criticism of the Danforth Report

Critics of the government have called the Danforth report a whitewash. The most prominent of these critics is Ramsey Clark, former U.S. Attorney General, who was representing one of the plaintiffs in a civil lawsuit brought by Branch Davidian survivors and relatives. Clark commented:

“History will clearly record, I believe, that these assaults on the Mt. Carmel church center remain the greatest domestic law enforcement tragedy in the history of the United States.”

The introduction to the Danforth Report notes that it is focused on answering two questions about FBI conduct on Day 51 of the siege, 19 Apr 1993: first, did FBI use incendiary devices that could have ignited the fire (as alleged by Assistant US Attorney Bill Johnston in a letter to US Attorney General Janet Reno); second, did FBI direct small arms fire at the Davidians (as alleged by documentary filmmaker Mike McNulty in Waco: The Rules of Engagement). Evidence concerning these allegations by Johnston and McNulty is in the Texas Rangers Branch Davidian Evidence Reports. The FBI fired a few hundred 40 mm Ferret gas grenades into the building and Davidian survivor Clive Doyle witnessed a fellow Davidian hit in the face with a 40 mm gas grenade. The introduction to the Danforth report states that the gas grenades did not count as small arms fire even though the Texas Rangers had documentation that 40 mm Ferret will penetrate plywood siding.

On the issue of possible Posse Comitatus violations, the comments of Col. Thomas Lujan, JAG, in the U.S. Army War College publication Parameters is a sharp contrast to the Danforth Report.

Equipment and manpower

The ATF suspected that the Branch Davidians could have acquired .50 caliber rifles, so they asked for Bradley armored vehicles, which could resist that caliber. Koresh said during the siege that he could destroy the Bradleys, so they were supplemented with two M1A1 Abrams tanks and five M728 Combat Engineer Vehicles.

Government agencies

Raid (February 28): 75 ATF agents,
3 helicopters manned by 10 Texas National Guard counterdrug personnel as distraction during the raid and filming
ballistic protection equipment, fire retardant clothing, regular flashlights, regular cameras (i.e. flash photography), shotguns and flash bangs

Siege:
hundreds of federal agents,
100 PVF7B5 Night Vision Goggles
2 UH-1 Helicopters

Assault (April 23):
Hundreds of federal agents,
military vehicles (with their normal weapon systems removed): 9-10 M3 Bradleys, 4-5 M728 Combat Engineering Vehicles (CEVs) armed with CS gas, 2 M1A1 Abrams tanks, 1 M88 tank retriever

Support:
1 Britten-Norman Defender surveillance aircraft,
unknown number of Texas National Guard personnel, for maintenance of military vehicles and training on the use of the vehicles and their support vehicles (Humvees and flatbed trucks),
surveillance from Texas National Guard Counterdrug UC-26 surveillance aircraft and from Alabama National Guard,
2 members of the 22nd Regiment of the British Army's Special Air Service (SAS) as observers,
10 active duty Special Forces soldiers as "observers" (sic) and trainers, also present during assault,
Two senior Army officers as advisers
50+ men (trained in the use of weapons),

Davidian Branch Davidian's

75+ (including women and children)
weapons:
243 total firearms, including two 50 caliber semi-automatic rifles, numerous tactical rifles (semiautomatic AK-47s and AR-15s), shotguns, revolvers and pistols
46 semiautomatic firearms modified to fire in full automatic mode (included on above list): 22 M-16 Type Rifles, 20 AK-47 Type Rifles, 2 Heckler and Koch SP-89, 2 M-11/Nine
two AR-15 lower receivers also modified to fire in full automatic mode
4 Live M-21 Practice Hand Grenades

Material bought prior to raid:
16 handguns,
10 rifles
39 "full auto sears" devices used to convert semi-automatic weapons into automatic weapons,
parts for fully automatic AK-47 and M16 rifles,
30 round magazines and 100 round magazines for M-16 and AK-47 rifles,
pouches to carry large ammunition magazines,
substantial quantities of ammunition of various sizes (including .50 caliber armor piercing ammunition, 10,000 rounds of 9 mm ammunition and 10,000 rounds of .223 caliber ammunition),
grenade launcher parts,
flare launchers,
Ka-bar fighting knives,
night vision equipment,
hundreds of practice hand grenades hulls and components (including 200+ Inert M31 Practice Rifle Grenades, 100+ Modified M-21 Practice Hand Grenade bodies, 219 Grenade Safety Pins, 243 Grenade Safety Levers found after the fire),
kevlar helmets,
bullet proof vests
other similar equipment.
88 lower receivers for the AR-15 rifle
21 Sound suppressors or silencers (found after assault)

Related incidents

Main article: Oklahoma City bombing

Main article: Columbine High School massacre

The Oklahoma City bombing was a terrorist attack on April 19, 1995 aimed at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, a U.S. government office complex in downtown Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The attack claimed 168 lives and left over 800 injured. Until the September 11, 2001 attacks, it was the deadliest act of terrorism on U.S. soil, and remains the deadliest act of domestic terrorism in American history. Within days after the bombing, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were both in custody for their roles in the bombing. Investigators determined that McVeigh and Nichols were sympathizers of an anti-government militia movement and that their motive was to avenge the government's handling of the Waco siege and Ruby Ridge incidents.

Eric Harris, one of the high school seniors responsible for the Columbine High School massacre, wrote in his journal about how he and his co-conspirator Dylan Klebold wished to "outdo" tragic events like the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the siege in Waco, and the Oklahoma City bombing.

See also

• CIRG
• Jonestown
• Ken Ballew raid
• Militia movement
• MOVE
• Religious cults
• Ruby Ridge
• YFZ Ranch

Further reading

• Christopher Whitcomb. Cold Zero: Inside the FBI Hostage Rescue Team. ISBN 0-552-14788-5.
• David Thibodeau. A Place Called Waco: A Survivor's Story. ISBN 1-891620-42-8
• The Waco Holocaust Museum http://www.public-action.com/SkyWriter/WacoMuseum/

Bibliography

Government investigations and hearings

• "Hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress regarding Administration's fiscal year 1994 budget proposals for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Tax Court, and Internal Revenue Service, April 22 and 28, 1993." Link to online and PDF versions.
• "Events surrounding the Branch Davidian cult standoff in Waco, Texas: hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, first session, April 28, 1993." Archive.org Link to online and PDF versions.
• "Raid on the Branch Davidian Compound, Waco, Texas. Hearing before House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations subcommittee on the Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations, June 9, 1993."
• "Texas Department of Public Safety, Texas Rangers Branch Davidian Evidence Reports", released online September 1999 and January 2000.
• "Wikisource:Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell Also Known as David Koresh September 1993."
• "Wikisource:Report to the Justice and Treasury Departments regarding law enforcement interaction with the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas," by Nancy T. Ammerman, September 1993 and "Wikisource:Correspondence to Deputy Attorney General Heymann regarding Waco Report - Addendum" from Nancy T. Ammerman, September 10, 1993.
• "Wikisource:Report to the Deputy Attorney General on the Events at Waco, Texas" (redacted version), USDOJ, October 8, 1993. Also available from Department of Justice.
  • "Wikisource:Lessons of Waco: Proposed changes in Federal Law Enforcement" by Philip B. Heymann Deputy Attorney General. October 8, 1993. (Washington: USDOJ, 1993). ISBN 0-16-042977-3 Also available from Department of Justice.
  • "Wikisource:Evaluation of the Handling of the Branch Davidian Stand-off in Waco, Texas" (redacted version), Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., USDOJ, October 8, 1993. Department of Justice version.
  • "Recommendations of Experts for Improvements in Federal Law Enforcement after Waco," October 8, 1993 (Washington: USDOJ, 1993). ISBN 0-16-042974-9 (not available online)
  • Wikicommons FBI photos of April 19, 1993 siege and fire at Mount Carmel
• "Wikisource:Branch Davidian Negotiation Transcript from April 18," the day before the 1993 FBI actions and the Mount Carmel fire.
• "Report and Recommendations. Concerning the Handling of Incidents Such As the Branch Davidian Standoff in Waco Texas", Alan A. Stone, M.D., November 10, 1993. (Also known as "Stone Report")
• "House of Representatives Report 104-749 - Wikisource:Activities of federal law enforcement agencies toward the Branch Davidians." Joint report by the House of Representatives' Committee on Government Reform and Oversight and Committee on the Judiciary's July 2005 hearings. (Or see Government printing office PDF.)
  • "Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, One Hundred Fourth Congress, First Secession." Part 1-July 19, 20, 21, 24: PDF; Part 2-July 25, 26, 27: PDF; Part 3-July 28, 31, August 1: PDF
  • "Wikisource:Department of Defense: Military Assistance During the Branch Davidian Incident," August 21, 2000 letter from Carol R. Schuster of National Security Preparedness Issues, to Dan Burton, Chairman of the Committee on Government Reform. PDF version
  • "Wikisource:Remarks to Federal Law Enforcement" regarding the House hearings, July 20, 1995 by Author:Bill Clinton
• "The aftermath of Waco: changes in federal law enforcement. Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hundred Fourth Congress. October 31 and November 1, 1995." Link to online and PDF versions.
• "Wikisource:Final report to the Deputy Attorney General concerning the 1993 confrontation at the Mt. Carmel Complex, Waco Texas," by John C. Danforth, special counsel. Issued November 8, 2000. (Also known as the "Danforth Report.")
• "House Report 106-1037 - The Tragedy at Waco: New Evidence Examined, Committee on Government Reform. Thursday, December 28, 2000."

Legal proceedings

• United States v. Branch, W.D. Texas Criminal Case No. 6:93cr46, trial transcript 1/10/94 - 2/26/94; 91 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1996)
• United States v. Castillo, 179 F.3d 321 (1999); Castillo v. United States, 120 S.Ct. 2090 (2000); on remand, 220 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 2000)
• Andrade v. United States, W.D. Texas Civil Action No. W-96-CA-139, trial transcript 6/19/2000 - 7/14/2000; 116 F.Supp.2d 778 (W.D. Tex. 2000)
• Andrade v. Chojnacki, 338 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2003)
• Wikisource: Graeme Craddock Testimony on Waco Fire, October 1999 civil suit deposition regarding April 19, 1993 fire at Branch Davidian home and church.</ref>

Books

• Anthony, D. and T. Robbins (1997). "Religious totalism, exemplary dualism and the Waco tragedy." In Robbins and Palmer 1997, 261–284.
• Bell, Randall (2009), Strategy 360, Laguna Beach, CA: Owners Manual Press, ISBN 9781933969169
• Christopher Whitcomb. Cold Zero: Inside the FBI Hostage Rescue Team. ISBN 0-552-14788-5. (Also covers Ruby Ridge.)
• Docherty, Jayne Seminare. Learning Lessons From Waco: When the Parties Bring Their Gods to the Negotiation Table (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 2001). ISBN 0-8156-2751-3
• Kerstetter, Todd. "'That's Just the American Way': The Branch Davidian Tragedy and Western Religious History", Western Historical Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 4, Winter 2004.
• Kopel, David B. and Paul H. Blackman. No More Wacos: What’s Wrong With Federal Law Enforcement and How to Fix It (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1997). ISBN 1-57392-125-4
• Lewis, James R. (ed.). From the Ashes: Making Sense of Waco (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1994). ISBN 0-8476-7915-2 (cloth) ISBN 0-8476-7914-4 (paper)
• Linedecker, Clifford L. Massacre at Waco, Texas: The Shocking Story of Cult Leader David Koresh and the Branch Davidians (New York: St. Martin’s Paperbacks, 1993). ISBN 0-312-95226-0
• Lynch, Timothy. No Confidence: An Unofficial Account of the Waco Incident (Washington: Cato Institute, 2001).
• Moore, Carol. The Davidian Massacre: Disturbing Questions Abut Waco Which Must Be Answered." (Virginia: Gun Owners Foundation, 1995). ISBN 1-880692-22-8
• Newport, Kenneth G. C. "The Branch Davidians of Waco: The History and Beliefs of an Apocalyptic Sect" (Oxford University Press, 2006). ISBN 0-19-924574-6, 9780199245741
• Reavis, Dick J. The Ashes of Waco: An Investigation (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995). ISBN 0-684-81132-4
• Tabor, James D. and Eugene V. Gallagher. Why Waco?: Cults and the Battle for Religious Freedom in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). ISBN 0-520-20186-8
• Thibodeau, David and Leon Whiteson. A Place Called Waco: A Survivor's Story (New York: PublicAffairs, 1999). ISBN 1-891620-42-8
• Wright, Stuart A. (ed.). Armageddon in Waco: Critical Perspectives on the Branch Davidian Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).