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Propaganda in China

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File:1950s 在毛澤柬旗幟下前進.jpg
Caption says "Let's march forward under the banner of Mao Zedong!"

Propaganda in the People's Republic of China (中华人民共和国宣传活动) refers to the PRC Central People's Government's use of propaganda to sway public and international opinion in favor of its policies.[1][2] Domestically, this includes censorship of proscribed views and an active cultivation of views that favor the government. Propaganda is considered central to the operation of the Chinese government.[3]

Aspects of propaganda can be traced back to the earliest period of Chinese history, but propaganda has been most effective in the twentieth century owing to mass media and an authoritarian government.[3] Mao-era China is known for its constant use of mass campaigns to legitimize the state and the policies of leaders. It was the first Chinese government to successfully make use of modern mass propaganda techniques, adapting them to the needs of a country which had a largely rural and illiterate population.[3]

History

Mao era

File:1953 Huang Jiguang.jpg
In the Korean War, Chinese soldier Huang Jiguang allegedly used his body to block heavy machine-gun fire

The origins of the CCP propaganda system can be traced to the Yan’an and the rectification movements carried out there[4] following which it became a key mechanism in the Party's campaigns.[2][5] The propaganda system, considered a central part of CCP’s “control system”,[2][6] drew much from Soviet, Nazi and other totalitarian states’ propaganda methods.[2] It represented a quintessential Leninist “transmission belt” for indoctrination and mass mobilization.[2]

According to Shambaugh, propaganda and indoctrination are considered to been a hallmark of the Maoist China [2][4][6], and the CCP employed a variety of "thought control" techniques, including incarceration for "thought reform", construction of role models to be emulated, mass mobilization campaigns, the creation of ideological monitors and propaganda teams for indoctrination purposes, enactment of articles to be memorized, control of the educational system and media, a nationwide system of loudspeakers, among other methods.[2] While ostensibly aspiring to a "Communist utopia," often had a negative focus on constantly searching for enemies among the people. The means of persuasion was often extremely violent, "a literal acting out of class struggle."[7]

CCP propaganda and thought work traditionally had a much broader notion of the public sphere than is usually defined by media specialists, according to Brady.[7] Chinese propagandists used every possible means of communication available in China after 1949, including electronic media such as film and television, educational curriculum and research, print media such as newspapers and posters, cultural arts such as plays and music, oral media such as memorizing Mao quotes, as well as thought reform and political study classes.[7]

China Central Television has traditionally served as a major national conduit for televised propaganda, while the People's Daily newspaper has served as a medium for print propaganda. During the Mao years, a distinctive feature of propaganda and thought work was "rule by editorial," according to Brady. Political campaigns would be launched through editorials and leading articles in People's Daily, which would be followed by other papers.[7] Work units and other organizational political study groups utilized these artilces as a source for political study, and reading newspapers in China was "a political obligation". Mao used Lenin's model for the media, which had it function as a tool of mass propaganda, agitation, and organization.[7]

File:Great Leap forward poster.jpg
Chinese propaganda poster for the Great Leap Forward shows larger-than-human fruit.

During the Cultural Revolution, PRC propaganda was crucial to the formation and promotion of the cult of personality centered around Chairman Mao Zedong, as well as mobilizing popular participation in national campaigns.[8] Past propaganda also encouraged the Chinese people to emulate government approved model workers and soldiers, such as Lei Feng, Chinese Civil War hero Dong Cunrui, Korean War hero Yang Gensi, and Dr. Norman Bethune, a Canadian doctor who assisted the Communist Eighth Route Army during the Second Sino-Japanese War. It also praised Third World revolutionaries and close foreign allies such as Albania and North Korea while vilifying both the American "imperialists" and the Soviet "revisionists" (the latter of whom was seen as having betrayed Marxism-Leninism).

According to Barbara Mittler, Maoist era propaganda left memories of violence and slander upon many Chinese, and their psychological strains drove many to madness and death.[9] Today, Maoist era propaganda are no longer used by the CCP, and are largely commercialized for the purposes of nostalgia.[10]

Modern era

Following the death of Mao in 1976, propaganda was used to blacken the character of the Gang of Four, which was blamed for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. During the era of economic reform and modernization that was initiated by Deng Xiaoping, propaganda promoting "socialism with Chinese characteristics" was distributed.

The events of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 were an indication to many elders in the CCP that liberalization in the propaganda sector had gone too far, and that the Party must re-establish its control over ideology and the propaganda system.[7]

Anne-Marie Brady, an Associate Professor at the University of Canterbury’s School of Political Science and Communication, writes that propaganda and thought work have become the "life blood" of the Party-State since the post-1989 period, and one of the key means for guaranteeing the CCP's continued legitimacy and hold on power.[7]

In the 1990s, propaganda theorists described the challenges to China's propaganda and thought work as "blind spots"; mass communication was advocated as the antidote. From the early 1990s, selective concepts from mass communications theory, public relations, advertising, social psychology, and other areas of modern mass persuasion were introduced into China's propaganda system for the purpose of creating a modern propaganda model.[7]

Kurlantzick and Link noted that through cultivating economic growth and Chinese nationalism, the CCP has modernized authoritarianism to maintain their political control.[11] They asserted that elite business leaders, who has benefited from China's economic growth, has accepted the CCP's authoritarian control as a result, largely preventing the new rich and emerging middle class from challenging their rule. Fenby argues that the latter, rather than accepting the system per se, have learnt to use it to their advantage. Kurlantzick and Link also noted that dissent still largely exist in the Chinese populace in regards to government policies on the economy, environment and society, particularly in rural areas, as they are becoming more aware of the constitutional rights. A recent poll in 2007 shown that 70% of Chinese consider the new rich to be corrupt and unworthy of respect.[12]

Recent developments

In early 2009 the CCP embarked on a multi-billion dollar global media expansion, including a 24-hour English language news channel supposed to embrace other internationally renown news agency's style. According to Nicholas Bequelin, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch, it was part of Hu Jintao's plan to "go global" and make "the voice of China better heard in international affairs." Bequelin notes that in recent years CCTV and the People's Daily have come to look "slicker, more contemporary and less political than in the past," but that the fundamental premise is still the same: "all information on state-run channels must reflect the government's views."[13]

In the lead-up to the Olympics, the government allegedly issued guidelines to the local media for their reporting during the Games: most political issues not directly related to the games were to be downplayed; topics such as pro-Tibetan independence and East Turkestan movements were not to be reported on, as were food safety issues such as "cancer-causing mineral water."[14] As the 2008 Chinese milk scandal broke in September 2008, there was widespread speculation that China's desire for a perfect Games may have been a factor contributing towards the delayed recall of contaminated infant formula.[15][16]

The 2008 Summer Olympics were portrayed by the Chinese government as a symbol of China's pride and place in the world[17], and seem to have bolstered some domestic support for the Chinese government, and support for the policies of the Communist Party of China, giving rise to concerns that the state will possibly have more leverage to disperse dissent.[18]

Terminology

The Chinese term for propaganda, xuanchuan (宣传) first appeared in the historical text Records of the Three Kingdoms, written in the 3rd century. While in the Western world the term 'propaganda' bears negative connotations, the Chinese term "xuanchuan", which is liberally translated as "propaganda", actually means "to broadcast" or "to propagate (information)", without negative connotations.[19]

Mechanics

Control of media

Media operations and content are tightly controlled,[20][21] and the Party largely determines what appears in news reports. Controlling media content allows the Communist Party to disseminate propaganda supportive of government policies, censor controversial news stories, and have reports published criticizing political adversaries, including advocates of religious freedom and democracy, supporters of Taiwanese and Tibetan independence, and representatives of the United States government.[20] In 2005, Reporters Without Borders published a report about the state-run news agency Xinhua, calling it "the world's biggest propaganda agency".[22]

While in the past the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department and its local branches sent faxes to all media throughout the country with instructions indicating subjects that the media should stress or avoid entirely, directives are now imparted to ranking media managers or editors during phone conversations—a move designed to reduce the paper trail.[20] Media in China faces few restrictions on content that is not deemed to be politically damaging.[20]

Wu Xuecan, a former editor of the People's Daily Overseas Edition,[23] reports that through control of the "ideological domain, material means and living necessities," editors and reporters are conditioned to keep news and reports aligned with the interests of the Chinese Communist Party.[23] Wu further reports that, political study sessions ensures that editors first practice self-censorship.[23] He Qinglian writes that long years of media control have bred in Chinese journalists a habit of "self-discipline," and that most Chinese journalists resign themselves to playing the role of "Party mouthpieces."[21] Control is also directed at sources of information, as ordinary people are restricted from providing news to Chinese media, and more so to foreign media.[21]

Thought reform

Main article: Thought reform in the People's Republic of China

Propaganda and thought work in the Maoist era had a number of distinctive features, according to Brady, such as "ideological remolding" or "thought reform" (思想改造), ideological purges, ritual humiliation of ideological opponents, an emphasis on political study to raise levels of awareness of the current line, and targeting high-profile individuals as symbols of negative tendencies which must be eradicated.[7]

The experiences of propaganda and thought work in the Cultural Revolution provided the CCP with a "profound lesson," according to Brady. Virtually all post-Mao era Party leaders had been under attack during that time, and drew two seemingly contradictory lessons: the rejection of mass movements and thought reform as means of transforming China, and the recognition of the "vital role of propaganda and thought work in China's political control." The administration of propaganda and thought work was plagued by these issues through the 1980s, and up to the events of June 4, 1989.[7]

Biderman and Meyers wrote in 1968 that while some kind of thought reform is characteristic of all totalitarian regimes, the CCP "set about it more purposefully, more massively, and more intensively than have other ruling groups," including through employing known techniques in new ways. They note the presence of such techniques in Maoist political campaigns, such as daily meetings for criticism and self-criticism; surveillance and sanctions were connected with education to find and correct deficiencies in personal conducts. In the military, political leaders attacked all personal connections between soldiers that were not based on political conviction, thus exploiting social pressures and personal anxieties to build a sense of conformity.[24]

In terms of intensity and scope, spiritual control has been reinforced under the CCP's rule, and has become a basic feature of citizens' daily life, according to Victor Shaw.[25] To an extent, the "freedom of silence" cherished by some older Chinese scholars was not even possible for an illiterate peasant in a remote area under the CCP mass propaganda.[25]

According to Shaw, the CCP utilizes propaganda to spread its policies, build social consensus, and mobilize the population for social programs. Ideological tensions result in mass movements, and the resulting spiritual control legitimizes the political establishment.[25] "Political studies, legal education, heroic models, and thought reform provide the CCP with effective weapons to propagandize rules and legal codes, normalize individual behaviour, and rehabilitate deviants in labor camps."[25]

Kurlantzick and Link stated that the CCP uses the technique of "thoughtwork" (sixiang gongzuo) to maintain popular obedience, dating back to the Mao Zedong era.[11] They noted that while Mao-era campaigns are aimed at transforming the Chinese society and people's natures, the modern approach to thoughtwork are more subtle and only focuses on issues important to the CCP's rule. According to Kurlantzick and Link, it consists largely of cultivating pro-government views in the media and other influential people in Chinese society, and as such complaints against the government becomes distracted with pro-government propaganda. The government also attempts to distance itself from local issues by blaming them on corrupt local officials, says Kurlantzick and Link.

Spin doctors

According to Anne-Marie Brady, the Foreign Ministry first set up a system of designated officials to give information in times of crisis in 1983, and greatly expanded the system to lower levels in the mid 1990s. Previously, China's spin had been directed only at foreigners, but in the 1990s leaders realised that managing public crises was useful for domestic politics; this included setting up provincial level "News Coordinator Groups," and inviting foreign PR firms to give seminars.[7]

Brady writes that Chinese foreign propaganda officials took cues from the Blair government's spin doctoring during the mad cow disease crisis of 2000-2001, and the Bush government's use of the U.S. media after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. According to her, the Blair model allows for a certain amount of negative coverage to be shown during a crisis, which is believed to help release some of the "social tension" surrounding it. She believes information managers in China used this approach during coal mining disasters of 2005.[7]

According to Brady, trained official spokespeople are now available on call in every central government ministry, as well as in local governments, to deal with emerging crises; these spin doctors are coordinated and trained by the Office of Foreign Propaganda/State Council Information Office.[7]

During the July 2009 Ürümqi riots, Communist Party officials moved swiftly in a public relations campaign. According to Newsweek, Party officials felt that the recent riots risked tarnishing China's global image, and underwent a public relations program involving quickly getting out the government's official version of the events, as well as transporting foreign journalists to riot affected areas. The growth in new technologies, such as email and SMS, forced the CCP's hand into taking up spin.

Instead of attempting a media blackout as with the 2008 Tibetan unrest, the Party has adopted a series of more advanced techniques to influence the information leaving China. The day after violence in Urumqi, the State Council Information Office set up a Xinjiang Information Office in Urumqi to assist foreign reporters. It invited foreign media to Xinjiang to tour the riot zones, visit hospitals, and look at the aftermath themselves. Journalists were also given CDs with photos and TV clips. "They try to control the foreign journalists as much as possible by using this more sophisticated PR work rather than ban[ning] them," according to Professor Xiao Qiang, quoted by Newsweek.[26]

Structure and mechanics

According to David Shambaugh, professor of political science and international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs[27] and a fellow of the Brookings Institution,[28] the CCP's propaganda system extends itself as a sprawling bureaucratic establishment, into virtually every medium concerned with the dissemination of information.[2] Shambaugh notes that according to the CCP publication Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe dazidian.[2][29] numerous public places, such as media and news organizations, educational institutions, literature and art centers, and cultural exhibitions come under CCP's propaganda oversight. Shambaugh believes that this expansive definition implies that every conceivable medium which transmits and conveys information to the people of China falls under bureaucratic purview of the CCP Propaganda Department (CCPPD).[2] Shambaugh states that the writ of the CCPPD has remained unchanged since the Maoist era, although the mechanics of oversight and active censorship have undergone considerable evolution.[2]

According to official government reports in 2003, channels of propaganda dissemination of the CCPPD included 2,262 television stations (of which 2,248 were “local”), 2,119 newspapers, 9,074 periodicals and 1,123 publishing houses,[2][30] in addition to internal circulation papers and local gazetteers, approximately 68 million internet accounts with more than 100 million users, and more than 300 million mobile phone users who fall under the system's purview.[31]

According to Brady, propaganda work by the CCP has been historically divided into two categories: directed towards Chinese people (internal or duinei) and directed towards foreigners and the outside world (external or duiwai) as well as four types: political, economic, cultural and social.[1] The Central Propaganda Department oversees internal propaganda, and, the closely linked bureaucracy, The Office of Foreign Propaganda matters relating to external propaganda.[1]

Shambaugh states that the propaganda system, including the Central Propaganda Department, are highly secret and does not appear in officially published diagrams of the Chinese Bureaucratic System, whether in Chinese or in other languages.[1][2] The Office of Foreign Propaganda itself is more commonly known as 'Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China', under the dual nameplate system, according to Brady.[1]

Propaganda on the Internet

Traditionally, the CCP propaganda apparatus had been based around suppressing news and information, but this often meant the Party found itself in a reactive posture, according to Chinese media expert David Bandurski.[32] In later years the Internet played a key role in the spread of propaganda to Chinese diaspora. PRC-based Internet sites remain a leading source of Chinese language and China-related news for overseas Chinese. The Internet is an extremely effective tool for guiding and organizing overseas Chinese public opinion, according to Anne-Marie Brady.[33]

Brady cites an example of the role of the Internet in organizing popular protests by overseas Chinese, its usage by the state against a perceived bias of the Western media in its coverage of unrest in Tibetan areas in March 2008 and, a month later, in organizing a series of worldwide demonstrations in support of China during the Olympic torch relay.[33]

Brady noted that these protests were genuine and popular, demonstrating the effectiveness of China’s efforts to rebuild positive public opinion within the Chinese overseas diaspora, but the demonstrations nevetheless received official support both symbolically and in practice [33] While there was no compulsion for overseas Chinese to attend the rallies, those who did were given free t-shirts, souvenirs, transport, and accommodation, donated by local embassy officials and China-based donors.[33]

Online spin doctors

Main article: 50 Cent Party

China is known for using internet "spin doctors", specially trained internet users who comment on blogs, public forums or wikis, to shift the debate in favor of the Communist Party and influence public opinion.[32] They are sometime called the "50-cent party" - named so because they are allegedly paid 50 Chinese cents for each comment supporting the CCP they make.[34]

An internal government document released by the BBC outlines the requirements for those employed as spin-doctors, which include having "relatively good political and professional qualities, and have a pioneering and enterprising spirit", being able to react quickly, etc.[34]

It is believed that such government-sponsored Internet commentators have now become widespread and their numbers could be in the tens of thousands;[34] Bandurski suggests the number may be up to 280,000[32] while The Guardian puts the estimate as 300,000.[35] According to The Guardian, the growth in popularity of such astroturfing owes to the ease with which web 2.0 technologies such as Twitter, Wikipedia and YouTube can be employed to sway public opinion. The BBC reports that special centres have been set up to train China's 'army of internet spin doctors'.[34]

External propaganda

The Chinese state refers to all media work abroad as wai xuan, or "external propaganda."[13] In a 2008 report, the U.S. State Department’s International Security Advisory Board declared that China was in the midst of a "comprehensive strategic deception campaign," which was said to include "Psychological Warfare (propaganda, deception, and coercion), Media Warfare (manipulation of public opinion domestically and internationally), and Legal Warfare (use of ‘legal regimes’ to handicap the opponent in fields favorable to him)."[36]

On its official Chinese Web site, CCTV describes itself as "the mouthpiece of the Party and the government," and lists its main operations under the heading "propaganda situation," referring to new foreign language channels as "reaching a new stage in external propaganda."[13]

Propaganda in the arts

Further information: Revolutionary opera

As in the Soviet Union, the CCP under Mao Zedong took socialist realism as its basis for art, making clear its goal was the 'education' of the people in communist ideology. This included, as during the Cultural Revolution, transforming literature and art to serve these ends.

Maoist propaganda art has been remade and modernized for almost two decades, and old Cultural Revolution era propaganda productions have appeared in new formats such as DVDs and karaoke versions. They appear in rock and pop versions of revolutionary songs in praise of Mao, as well as T-shirts, watches, porcelain, and other memorabilia.[9] The works of propaganda from the Cultural Revolution have been selling extremely well in recent years,[9] largely for nostalgia, social, patriotic or entertainment purposes [10]

Propaganda songs and music have a long and storied history in the PRC, featuring prominently in the popular culture of the 1950s to the 1970s. Many of these songs were collected and performed as modern rock adaptations for several albums that were released during the 1990s, including "Red Rock" and "Red Sun: Mao Zedong Praise Songs New Revolutionary Medley". The latter sold 6-10 million copies in China.[37] Most of the older songs praise Mao, the CCP, the 1949 revolution, the Chinese Red Army and the People's Liberation Army, the unity of the ethnic groups of China, and the various ethnic groups' devotion to Mao and the CCP.

Famous propaganda works

Novel

"Red Crag" (红岩), a famous 1961 Chinese novel featuring underground communist agents fighting an espionage battle against the Kuomintang.

Sculpture

Rent Collection Courtyard (收租院), a 1965 sculpture depicting former landlord Liu Wencai as an evil landlord collecting rent from poor, although this depiction has been disputed by modern accounts.

Films and Plays

Songs

The titles of some of the more well-known propaganda songs are as follows:

  • "Nanniwan" (《南泥湾》/《南泥灣》), a 1943 revolutionary song
  • "The East is Red" (《东方红》/《東方紅》), the de facto national anthem of the PRC during the Cultural Revolution
  • "Socialism is Good" (《社会主义好》), a modern rock adaptation of which was performed by Zhang Qu and featured on the 1990s album Red Rock.
  • "Battle Hymn of the Chinese People's Volunteers" (《中国人民志愿军战歌》/《中國人民志願軍戰歌》) –a well-known song from the Korean War period
  • "Red Sun Shining Over the Border" (《红太阳照边疆》/《紅太陽照邊疆》)–a song from the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture in Jilin Province
  • "A Wa People Sing New Songs" (阿佤唱新歌曲)–a song attributed to the Wa ethnic minority of Yunnan
  • "Laundry Song" (《洗衣歌》)–a song celebrating the liberation of Tibet
  • "Liuyang River" (《浏阳河》)–a song about a river near Mao Zedong's hometown of Shaoshan in Hunan
  • "Saliha Most Obeys Chairman Mao" (《萨利哈听毛主席的话》/《薩利哈最聽毛主席的話》)–a song attributed to the Kazakh minority of the Xinjiang
  • "The Never-Setting Sun Rises Over the Grassland" (《草原上升起不落的太阳》/草原上升起不落的太陽–from Inner Mongolia
  • "Xinjiang is Good" (新疆好)–attributed to the ethnic Uyghurs of Xinjiang
  • "I Love Beijing Tiananmen" (《我爱北京天安门》/《我愛北京天安門》)–claimed to have been translated into over 50 languages, this song is frequently taught to schoolchildren in the PRC
  • "Zhuang Brocade Dedicated to Chairman Mao" (莊錦獻給毛主席)–a song attributed to the Zhuang ethnic minority of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region
  • "Sweet-Scented Osmanthus Blooms With the Arrival of Happiness" (attributed to the Miao, or Chinese Hmong, ethnic minority group)
  • "Generations Remember Chairman Mao's Kindness" (a song celebrating the "liberation" of the ethnic Xibe people)
  • "Salaam Chairman Mao" (《萨拉姆毛主席》/《薩拉姆毛主席》)–a Xinjiang song praising Mao, a modern version of which was performed by Chinese rock singer Dao Lang
  • "Song of Mount Erlangshan" (《歌唱二郎山》)–a 1950s song celebrating the development of Tibet, which made Mount Erlangshan in western Sichuan famous
  • "Story of the Spring" (春天的故事)–a song performed by Dong Wenhua, initially at the 1997 CCTV New Year's Gala, days before his death, dedicated to late Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping
  • "The Cultural Revolution is Just Great" (《无产阶级文化大革命就是好》/《無產階級文化大革命就是好》)–a song praising the Cultural Revolution
  • "On the Golden Mountains of Beijing" (北京的金山上)–a song attributed to the Tibetan people praising Mao as the shining sun
  • "Ode to the Socialist Motherland" (《歌唱社会主义祖国》/《歌唱社會主義祖國》)– the Cultural Revolution-era modification of the well-known patriotic song "Ode to the Motherland" (《歌唱祖国》/《歌唱祖國》)。

Most of the songs listed above are no longer used as propaganda by the CCP, but are exhibited in mainland China as a means of reviving popular nostalgia for the "old times".

See also

Wikimedia Commons has media related to Chinese Propaganda posters.

References

  1. ^ a b c d e Brady, Anne-Marie (2006). "Guiding Hand: The Role of the CCP Central Propaganda Department in the Current Era". Westminster Papers in Communication and Culture. 1 (3): 58–77.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Shambaugh, David (Jan 2007). "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy". China Journal (57): 25–58. Cite error: The named reference "Shambaugh" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  3. ^ a b c Mitter, Rana (2003). Nicholas J. Cull, David Colbert, and David Welch (ed.). Entry on "China" in Propaganda and Mass Persuasion: A Historical Encyclopedia, 1500 to the Present. ABC-ClIO. pp. 73–77.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
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  10. ^ a b Gunde, Richard. [2002] (2002) Culture and Customs of China. Greenwood Press. ISBN 0313308764
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  14. ^ Stephen Hutcheon, Was China's milk scandal hushed up?, "The full list of edicts", New Zealand Herald (September 15, 2008)
  15. ^ China accused over contaminated baby milk, The Daily Telegraph (September 15, 2008)
  16. ^ China Says Complaints About Milk Began in 2007, The New York Times (September 23, 2008) "
  17. ^ April Rabkin, (August 01, 2008). "→Beijing Olympic Games all about China, Chinese Leaders keen to impress, inspire their own people". Sfgate.com. Retrieved 17 March 2010. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link)
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  21. ^ a b c Qinglian, He (2004). "Media Control in China". Human Rights in China. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  22. ^ http://www.rsf.org/Xinhua-the-world-s-biggest.html
  23. ^ a b c Xuecan, Wu. "Turning Everyone into a Censor: The Chinese Communist Party's All- Directional Control over the Media". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  24. ^ Meyers, Samuel M. and Albert D Biderman. Mass behaviour in battle and captivity: The communist soldier in the Korean war. (1968), Chicago University Press. p.99
  25. ^ a b c d Shaw, Victor N. "Social control in China: a study of Chinese work units", Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996.
  26. ^ Hennock, Mary. "Bad Press: The Uighur riots in western China are teaching the government how to spin", Jul 7, 2009
  27. ^ David Shambaugh Elliott School of International Affairs
  28. ^ David Shambaugh Brookings Institution
  29. ^ Zhongguo Gongchandang jianshe dazidian 1921–1991 (An Encyclopedia on the Building of the CCP). Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe, 1992. p. 676.
  30. ^ National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2004. Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2004. pp. 844–46, 853.
  31. ^ Qiang, Xiao (14 April 2005). ""Prepared Statement" for hearings on "China's State Control Mechanisms and Methods", convened by the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission": 83. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  32. ^ a b c Bandurski, David. "China's Guerrilla War for the Web," Far Eastern Economic Review, July2008
  33. ^ a b c d Brady, Anne-Marie China’s Propaganda and Perception Management Efforts, Its Intelligence Activities that Target the United States, and the Resulting Impacts on U.S. National Security, U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, April 30, 2009
  34. ^ a b c d Bristow, Michael (December 16, 2008). "China's internet 'spin doctors'". BBC NEWS. Retrieved 11 February 2010.
  35. ^ Fareed, Malik (Monday 22 September 2008). "China joins a turf war". London: The Guardian. Retrieved 24 February 2010. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  36. ^ Anderson, Dr. Eric C. and Jeffrey G. Engstrom. "China’s Use of Perception Management and Strategic Deception", Science Applications International Corporation, prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission November 2009
  37. ^ Rethinking Cultural Revolution Culture, Audio-Visual Accompaniment to the Exhibit: "Picturing Power: Art and Propaganda in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) A Multi-Media Exhibition Held at Universitätsmuseum Heidelberg, 31.1.-28.2.2001
  • Min, Anchee, Duo, Duo, Landsberger, Stefan R., Chinese Propaganda Posters, 245 x 370 mm, 320 pp., ISBN 3-8228-2619-7 (softcover)
  • Wolf, Michael Chinese Propaganda Posters: From the Collection of Michael Wolf, 2003, ISBN 3-8228-2619-7
  • Harriet Evans, Stephanie Donald (eds.), Picturing Power in the People's Republic of China, ISBN 0-8476-9511-5
  • Stefan Landsberger, Chinese Propaganda Posters: From Revolution to Reform, ISBN 90-5496-009-4
  • Hunter, Edward. Brain-washing in Red China: the calculated destruction of men's minds. New York, N.Y., USA.: Vanguard Press, 1951, 1953,
  • Lincoln Cushing and Ann Tompkins, Chinese Posters: Art from the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, San Francisco, CA : Chronicle Books, 2007, ISBN 978-0-8118-5946-2
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