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Vistula–Oder offensive

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Vistula-Oder Offensive
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II

Soviet troops enter Łódź, led by an SU-152 tank destroyer
Date12 January–2 February 1945
Location
Central Poland and eastern Germany
Result Decisive Soviet-Polish victory
Belligerents
Nazi Germany Germany Soviet Union Soviet Union
Poland Poland
Commanders and leaders
Nazi Germany Ferdinand Schörner,
Nazi Germany Josef Harpe
(Army Group A)		 Soviet Union Georgy Zhukov
(1st Belorussian Front),
Soviet Union Ivan Konev
(1st Ukrainian Front)
Strength
450,000[1] 2,203,600[2]
Casualties and losses
unknown 43,476 killed or missing
150,715 wounded and sick[2]

The Vistula–Oder Offensive was a successful Red Army operation on the Eastern Front in the European Theatre of World War II; it took place between 12 January and 2 February 1945. The offensive took Soviet forces from their start lines on the Vistula River, 70 km (43 mi) from the capital Berlin.

Background

In the wake of the successful Operation Bagration the 1st Belorussian Front managed to secure two bridgeheads west of the Vistula river between 27 July and 4 August 1944.[3] The Soviets remained inactive during the failed Warsaw uprising that started on 1 August, though their frontline was not far from the insurgents. The 1st Ukrainian Front captured an additional large bridgehead at Sandomierz (known as the Baranow bridgehead in German accounts) during the Lvov-Sandomierz Offensive.[4]

Preceding the offensive, the Soviets had built up large amounts of materiel and manpower in the three bridgeheads. The Soviets greatly outnumbered the opposing German army in infantry, artillery, and armour. All this was known to German intelligence. General Reinhard Gehlen, head of Fremde Heere Ost passed his assessment to Heinz Guderian. Guderian in turn presented the intelligence results to Adolf Hitler, who refused to believe them, dismissing the apparent Soviet strength as "the greatest imposture since Genghis Khan".[5] Guderian had proposed to evacuate the divisions of Army Group North trapped in the Courland Pocket to the Reich via the Baltic Sea to get the necessary manpower for the defence, but Hitler forbade it. In addition, Hitler commanded that one major operational reserve, the troops of Sepp Dietrich's Sixth SS Panzer Army, were moved to Hungary to support Operation Frühlingserwachen.

Forces Involved

Delegation of German officers walking for negotiations before capitulation of Festung Breslau

Red Army

Two Fronts of the Red Army were directly involved. The 1st Belorussian Front, holding the sector around Warsaw and southward in the Magnuszew and Puławy bridgeheads, was led by Marshal Georgy Zhukov; the 1st Ukrainian Front, occupying the Sandomierz bridgehead, was led by Marshal Ivan Konev.

Zhukov and Konev had 163 divisions for the operation with a total of:[6]

Deployments

Wehrmacht

Soviet forces in this sector were opposed by Army Group A, defending a front which stretched from positions east of Warsaw southwards along the Vistula, almost to the confluence of the San. At that point there was a large Soviet bridgehead over the Vistula in the area of Baranow before the front continued south to Jasło.

There were three Armies in the Group, the Ninth Army deployed around Warsaw, the Fourth Panzer Army opposite the Baranow salient in the Vistula Bend, and the Seventeenth Army to their south.[7] The group had a total force of 450,000 troops, 4,100 artillery pieces, and 1,150 tanks.[8] Army Group A was led by Colonel-General Josef Harpe (who was replaced, after the offensive had begun, by Colonel-General Ferdinand Schörner on 20 January).[9]

Order of battle

German intelligence had estimated that the Soviet forces had a 3:1 numerical superiority to the German forces; there was in fact a 5:1 superiority.[11] In the large Baranow/Sandomierz bridgehead, the Fourth Panzer Army was required to defend from 'strongpoints' in some areas, as it lacked the infantry to man a continuous front line.[12] In addition, on Hitler's express orders, the two German defence lines (the Grosskampflinie and Hauptkampflinie) were positioned very close to each other, placing the main defences well within striking range of Soviet artillery.[13]

The offensive

File:Attack of the Red Army 1-4 1945.jpg
Eastern front in 1945 (includes the Vistula-Oder offensive)

The offensive commenced in the Baranow bridgehead at 04:35 on 12 January with an intense bombardment by the guns of the 1st Ukrainian Front against the positions of the Fourth Panzer Army.[14] Concentrated against the divisions of XLVIII Panzer Corps, which had been deployed across the face of the bridgehead, it effectively destroyed their capacity to respond; a battalion commander in the 68th Infantry Division stated that "I began the operation with an understrength battalion [...] after the smoke of the Soviet preparation cleared [...] I had only a platoon of combat effective soldiers left".[15]

The initial barrage was followed by probing attacks and a further heavy bombardment at 10:00. By the time the main armored exploitation force of the 3rd Guards and 4th Tank Armies moved forward four hours later, the Fourth Panzer Army had already lost up to ⅔ of its artillery and ¼ of its troops.[16]

The Soviet units made rapid progress, moving to cut off the defenders at Kielce. The armored reserves of the Fourth Panzer Army's central corps, the XXIV Panzer Corps, were committed, but had suffered serious damage by the time they reached Kielce, and were already being outflanked. The XLVIII Panzer Corps, on the Fourth Panzer Army's southern flank, had by this time been completely destroyed, along with much of Recknagel's LXII Corps in the north. By 14 January, the 1st Ukrainian Front had forced crossings of the Nida river, and began to exploit towards Radomsko and the Warthe. The Fourth Panzer Army's last cohesive formation, the XXIV Panzer Corps held on around Kielce until the night of 16 January, before its commander made the decision to withdraw.

WWII Eastern Front during the 1945 Vistula-Oder offensive; the map also shows the East Prussian Offensive, Lower Silesian Offensive, the East Pomeranian Offensive, and the battles in Courland. See here for an accurate map.

The 1st Belorussian Front, to Konev's north, opened its attack on the German Ninth Army from the Magnuszew and Puławy bridgeheads at 08:30, again commencing with a heavy bombardment.[17] The 33rd and 69th Armies broke out of the Puławy bridgehead to a depth of 30 km (19 mi), while the 5th Shock and 8th Guards Armies broke out of the Magnuszew bridgehead. The 2nd and 1st Guards Tank Armies were committed after them to exploit the breach. The 69th Army's progress from the Puławy bridgehead was especially successful, with the defending LVI Panzer Corps disintegrating after its line of retreat was cut off. Though the Ninth Army conducted many local counter-attacks, they were all brushed aside; the 69th Army ruptured the last lines of defence and took Radom, while the 2nd Guards Tank Army moved on Sochaczew and the 1st Guards Tank Army was ordered to seize bridgeheads over the Pilica and attack towards Łódź.[18] In the meantime, the 47th Army had crossed the Vistula and moved towards Warsaw from the north, while the 61st and 1st Polish Armies encircled the city from the south.[19]

The only major German response came on 15 January, when Hitler (against the advice of Guderian) ordered the Grossdeutschland Division of Dietrich von Saucken from East Prussia to cover the breach made in the sector of the Fourth Panzer Army, but the advance of Zhukov's forces forced it to detrain at Łódź without even reaching its objective. After covering Ninth Army's retreat, it was forced to withdraw southwest toward the Warthe.[20]

Taking of Kraków; escape of the XXIV Panzer Corps

On 17 January, Konev was given new objectives: to advance towards Breslau using his mechanised forces, and to use the combined-arms forces of the 60th and 59th Armies to open an attack on the southern flank towards the industrial heartland of Upper Silesia through Kraków. Kraków was secured undamaged on 19 January after an encirclement by the 59th and 60th Armies, in conjunction with the 4th Guards Tank Corps, forced the German defenders to withdraw hurriedly.[21]

The second stage of the 1st Ukrainian Front's objective was far more complex, as they were required to encircle and secure the entire industrial region of Upper Silesia, where they were faced by Schulz's Seventeenth Army. Konev ordered that the 59th and 60th Armies advance frontally, while the 21st Army encircled the area from the north. He then ordered Rybalko's 3rd Guards Tank Army, moving on Breslau, to swing southwards along the upper Oder from 20 January, cutting off Seventeenth Army's withdrawal.[22]

In the meantime, the shattered remnants of the Fourth Panzer Army were still attempting to reach German lines. By 18 January, Nehring and the XXIV Corps found that their intended route northwards had been blocked, so pulled back to the west, absorbing the remnants of LXII Corps that had escaped encirclement.[23] Much of the remainder of LXII Corps was destroyed after being trapped around Przysucha. Screened by heavy fog, the lead elements of XXIV Panzer Corps reached the Warthe on 22 January, and having linked up with von Saucken, were finally able to cross the Oder, some 350 km (220 mi) from their positions at the start of the Soviet offensive.

Withdrawal of Seventeenth Army from Upper Silesia

On 25 January, Schulz requested that he be allowed to withdraw his 100,000 troops from the developing salient around Katowice/Kattowitz. This was refused, and he repeated the request on 26 January. Schoerner eventually permitted Schulz to pull his forces back on the night of 27 January, while Konev — who had allowed just enough room for the 17th Army to withdraw without putting up serious resistance — secured the area undamaged.[24]

On Konev's northern flank, the 4th Tank Army had spearheaded an advance to the Oder, where it secured a major bridgehead at Steinau. Troops of the 5th Guards Army established a second bridgehead upstream at Ohlau.

Advance of 1st Belorussian Front; taking of Warsaw by Soviets

In the northern sector of the offensive, Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front also made rapid progress, as Ninth Army was no longer able to offer coherent resistance. Its XXXVI Panzer Corps, which was positioned behind Warsaw, was pushed over the Vistula into the neighbouring Second Army sector.[25] Warsaw was taken by 17 January, as Army Group A's headquarters issued orders for the city to be abandoned; units of the 2nd Guards and 3rd Shock Armies entering the city were profoundly affected by the devastation wrought by German forces after the Warsaw Uprising.[26] Hitler, on the other hand, was furious at the abandonment of the 'fortress', arresting Colonel Bogislaw von Bonin, head of the Operations Branch of OKH, and sacking both the Ninth Army and XXXVI Panzer Corps commanders, Generals Smilo Freiherr von Lüttwitz and Walter Fries.

The 2nd Guards Tank Army pressed forward to the Oder, while to the south the 8th Guards Army reached Łódź by 18 January, and took it over by January 19. The 1st Guards Tank Army moved to encircle Poznań by 25 January, and the 8th Guards Army began to fight its way into the city on the following day, though there was protracted and intense fighting in the Siege of Poznań before the city would finally be taken.

To the northeast of Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, the lead elements of Marshal Rokossovsky's 2nd Belorussian Front taking part in the East Prussian Offensive reached the Baltic coast of the Vistula delta by 23 January and so succeeded in isolating Army Group Centre in East Prussia.[27]

Zhukov's advance to the Oder

After encircling Poznań, the 1st Guards Tank Army advanced deep into the fortified region around the Obra River against patchy resistance from a variety of Volkssturm and Wehrmacht units. There was heavier resistance, however, on the approaches to the fortress of Küstrin.

The German reorganisation of command structure that resulted in the creation of Army Group Vistula was accompanied by the release of a few extra formations for the defense; the V SS Mountain Corps, with two reserve infantry divisions, was deployed along the Obra and the prewar border fortifications known as the Tierschtigel Riegel, while the Panzergrenadier-Division Kurmark was ordered to reinforce it.[28]

The military historian Earl Ziemke described the advance thus:

On the 25th, Zhukov's main force passed Poznań heading due west towards Kuestrin, on the Oder forty miles east of Berlin. The path of the Soviet advance looked like the work of a gigantic snowplough, its point aimed on a line from Warsaw to Poznań, to Berlin. All of Army Group A was being caught up by the point and the left blade and thrown across the Oder. On the right the German had nothing except a skeleton army group that Hitler had created some days earlier and named Army Group Vistula.

— Earl Ziemke[29]

On 25 January, Hitler renamed three army groups. Army Group North became Army Group Courland; Army Group Centre became Army Group North and Army Group A became Army Group Centre.[30]

The 2nd Guards Tank and 5th Shock Armies reached the Oder almost unopposed; a unit of the 5th Shock Army crossed the river ice and took the town of Kienitz as early as 31 January.[31]

Stavka declared the operation complete on February 2. Zhukov had initially hoped to advance directly on Berlin, as the German defences had largely collapsed. However the exposed northern flank of 1st Belorussian Front in Pomerania, along with a German counter-attack (Operation Solstice) against its spearheads, convinced the Soviet command that it was essential to clear German forces from Pomerania in the East Pomeranian Offensive before the Berlin offensive could proceed.

Liberation of Auschwitz

On 27 January, troops of Konev's First Ukrainian Front (322nd Rifle Division, 60th Army) liberated the Auschwitz concentration camp, finding graphic evidence of the Holocaust there.

Flight of ethnic Germans

Main article: Evacuation of German civilians during the end of World War II

According to Anthony Beevor and several other commentators the soldiers of the Red Army looted and committed many atrocities. In anticipation of the Soviet advance, many millions of Germans fled west at the last moments attempting to avoid the counter-invasion, seeking to survive by reaching central or western Germany, or to the American and British lines.[32] This was the largest and fastest migration in history.

Death marches of concentration camp prisoners

Main article: Death marches (Holocaust)

In January, the Germans also began to 'evacuate' remaining concentration camp and POW camp inmates from areas throughout Poland, East Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania in the path of the Soviet offensive, sending them on forced marches for hundreds of kilometers westwards. Large numbers died in the process.

Outcome

The Vistula–Oder Offensive was a major success for the Soviet military. Within a matter of days the forces involved had advanced hundreds of kilometers, taking much of Poland and striking deep within the borders of the Reich. The offensive broke Army Group A, and much of Germany's remaining capacity for military resistance. However the stubborn resistance of German forces in Silesia and Pomerania, as well as continuing fighting in East Prussia, meant that the final offensive towards Berlin was delayed by several months, by which time the Wehrmacht had once again built up a substantial force on this axis.

Aftermath

On 31 January, the Soviet offensive was stopped, though Berlin was undefended and only approximately 70 km (43 mi) away from the Soviet bridgeheads on the West side bank of Oder river. After the war a debate raged, mainly between Vasily Chuikov and Georgy Zhukov whether it was wise to stop the offensive. Chuikov argued Berlin should have been taken then, while Zhukov defended the decision to stop. The controversy is fueled by the fact that the Battle of the Seelow Heights (16–19 April) and the battle in the city of Berlin (April until early May) were costly to the Soviets.

According to Soviet information (one Ukrainian and one Belorussian front), the German losses were 150.000 soldiers killed and 69,600 captured, 1,537 tanks and 341 planes lost through 24 January 1945.[33]

See also

Footnotes

  1. ^ Duffy pp. 51, 59
  2. ^ a b Glantz (1995), p. 300
  3. ^ Duffy, p.11
  4. ^ Duffy, p.12
  5. ^ Beevor, p.
  6. ^ Duffy pp. 24, 25
  7. ^ Web map copy of Ziemke p. 26
  8. ^ Ziemke, p. 23
  9. ^ Duffy[page needed]
  10. ^ Only two divisions of this corps, the 16th and 17th Panzer Divisions, were allocated to Fourth Panzer Army, where they were committed in the attempted defence of Kielce. The remaining two formations, the 19th and 25th Panzer Divisions constituted Army Group A's general reserve, and were committed in support of Ninth Army.
  11. ^ Duffy, pp. 51, 59
  12. ^ Sims and Schilling, p. 23
  13. ^ Duffy [page needed]
  14. ^ Duffy, p.67
  15. ^ Captain Reinhardt Mueller, interviewed in Sims and Schilling, p.24
  16. ^ Hastings, p.280
  17. ^ Duffy, p.72
  18. ^ Duffy, p.75
  19. ^ Duffy, p.78
  20. ^ Duffy, p.80
  21. ^ Duffy, p.88
  22. ^ Duffy, p.91
  23. ^ Duffy, p.82
  24. ^ Beevor, p.60
  25. ^ Duffy, p.103
  26. ^ Duffy, p.104
  27. ^ Ziemke p. 31
  28. ^ Le Tissier, p.32
  29. ^ Ziemke pp. 30,31
  30. ^ Ziemke p. 32
  31. ^ Hastings, p.295
  32. ^ Beevor [page needed]
  33. ^ http://9may.ru/26.01.1945/inform/m2929

References

  • Beevor, A. Berlin: The Downfall 1945, Penguin Books, 2002, ISBN 0-670-88695-5
  • Duffy, C. Red Storm on the Reich: The Soviet March on Germany, 1945 Routledge 1991 ISBN 0-415-22829-8
  • Glantz, David M. & House, Jonathan (1995), When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler, Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, ISBN 0700608990
  • Hastings, Max (2004). Armageddon. New York: Macmillan. ISBN 9780333908365.
  • Le Tissier, T. Zhukov at the Oder, Greenwood, 1996, ISBN 0275952304
  • Rees, Laurence (2005). Auschwitz. London: BBC Books. ISBN 9780563522966.
  • Sims, A; Schilling (October 1990), "Breakout from the Sandomierz Bridgehead" (PDF), Field Artillery {{citation}}: More than one of |first1= and |first= specified (help)
  • Ziemke, Earl (1969). Battle for Berlin. London: Macdonald. ISBN 9780356029603.

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