Three Gorges Dam
30°49′40″N 111°00′33″E / 30.82778°N 111.00917°E Template:Future building
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The Three Gorges Dam (simplified Chinese: 三峡大坝; traditional Chinese: 三峽大壩; pinyin: Sānxiá Dàbà) (30°49′33″N 111°00′25″E / 30.82583°N 111.00694°E) spans the Yangtze River at Sandouping, Yichang, Hubei province, China. Construction began in 1993. It will be the largest hydroelectric dam in the world when completed in 2009. The reservoir began filling on June 1, 2003, and will occupy the present position of the scenic Three Gorges area, between the cities of Yichang, Hubei; and Fuling, Chongqing Municipality.
As with many dams under construction, there is controversy over the costs and benefits of this project. Proponents point to the economic benefits from flood control and hydroelectric power. Opposition is mainly due to concerns about the future of the 1.2 million[citation needed] people who will be displaced by the rising waters, the loss of many valuable archaeological and cultural sites, as well as the effects on the environment.
Dam model
These are the models that were built to represent what the dam will look like in 2009, when it is completed
Funding sources
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- The Three Gorges Dam Construction Fund
- Revenue from Gezhouba Power Plant
- Policy loans from the China Development Bank
- Loans from domestic and foreign commercial banks
- Corporate bonds
History
Construction timetable
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1993-1997: The Yangtze River was diverted after four years in November 1997
1998-2003: The first group of generators began to generate power in 2003, and a permanent ship lock opened for navigation the same year.
2004-2009: The entire project is to be completed by 2009, when all 26 generators (with a combined generating capacity of 18.2 million kW) will be able to generate 84.7 billion kWh electricity annually (about one-ninth of the nation's electricity consumption)[1].
Proposal of project
Sun Yat-sen first kelli proposed building a dam on the Yangtze River in 1919 for power generation purposes and the National Defense Planning Commission under the KMT made the first survey of the proposed site in 1932, but the idea was shelved due to unfavorable political and economic conditions. Major floods resurrected the idea and the PRC government adopted it in 1954 for flood control.
Vice Minister of Electric Power Li Rui initially argued that the dam should be multipurpose, that smaller dams should be built first until China could afford such a costly project, and that construction should proceed in stages to allow time to solve technical problems, according to Chinese scholars Kenneth Lieberthal and Michel Oksenberg.
Later, Li Rui concluded that the dam should not be built at all since it would be too costly, flood many cities and fertile farmland, subject the middle and lower reaches of the river to catastrophic flooding during construction, and would not contribute much to shipping. Sichuan province officials also objected to the construction since Sichuan, located upstream, would shoulder most of the costs while downstream Hubei province would receive most of the benefits.
Lin Yishan, head of the Yangtze Valley Planning Office, which was in charge of the project, favored the dam construction, however. His optimism about resolving technical problems was further encouraged in 1958 by the favorable political climate and the support from the late chairman Mao Zedong, who wanted China to have the largest hydroelectric dam in the world, according to Lieberthal and Oksenberg. Criticisms were suppressed. But depression resulted from the disastrous Great Leap Forward and ended the preparation work in 1960.
The idea resurfaced in 1963 as part of the new policies to build a "third front" of industry in southwest China. But the Cultural Revolution erupted in 1966, and in 1969 the fear that the dam would be sabotaged by the Soviet Union, now an enemy, resulted in a construction delay. In 1970, work was resumed on Gezhouba, a smaller dam downstream, but it soon ran into severe technical problems and cost overruns that seemed likely to plague the Three Gorges Dam on an even larger scale.
The economic reforms introduced in 1978 underlined the need for more electric power to supply a growing industrial base, so the State Council approved the construction in 1979. A feasibility study was conducted in 1982 to 1983 to appease the increasing number of critics, who complained that the project did not adequately address technical, social, or environmental issues. Further feasibility studies were then conducted from 1985 to 1988 by Canadian International Project Managers Yangtze Joint Venture, a consortium of five Canadian engineering firms.
According to Lieberthal and Oksenberg, leaders from Chongqing also demanded suddenly that the dam height be raised so substantially that it would cripple the project and free them from bearing the brunt of the costs. The new height and the demand for a more reliable study with the use of international standards resulted in a new feasibility study in 1986.
Ecologist Hou Xueyu was among the few who refused to sign the environmental report because it falsely overstated the environmental benefits provided by the dam, failed to convey the real extent of environmental impact, and lacked adequate solutions to environmental concerns.
Environmentalists at home and abroad began to protest more vociferously. Human rights advocates criticized the resettlement plan. Archeologists balked at the submergence of a huge number of historical sites. Many mourned the loss of some of the world's finest scenery.
Increasing numbers of engineers doubted whether the dam would actually achieve its stated purposes. Chinese journalist/engineer Dai Qing published a book relentlessly criticising the project by the Chinese scientists, yet many foreign construction companies continued to press their governments to financially support the construction in hopes of winning contracts.
Approval of project
In the face of much domestic and international pressure, the State Council agreed in March 1989 to suspend the construction plans for five years. After the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, however, the government forbade public debate of the dam, accused foreign critics of ignorance or intent to undermine the regime, and imprisoned Dai Qing and other famous critics.
Premier Li Peng crusaded for the dam and pushed it through the National People's Congress in April 1992 despite the opposition or abstention from one-third of the delegates. Such actions were unprecedented from a body that usually rubberstamped all government proposals.
Resettlement soon began, and physical preparations started in 1994. While the government solicited technology, services, hardware and financing from abroad, leaders reserved the engineering and construction contracts for Chinese firms.
Corruption scandals have plagued the project. It was believed that contractors had won bids through bribery and then skimped on equipment and materials to siphon off construction funds. The head of the Three Gorges Economic Development Corp. allegedly sold jobs in his company, took out project-related loans and disappeared with the money in May 2000. Officials from the Three Gorges Resettlement Bureau were caught embezzling funds from resettlement programs in January 2000.
Much of the project's infrastructure was so shoddy that Premier Zhu Rongji ordered it ripped out in 1999 after a number of high-profile accidents including a collapse of a bridge. Zhu Rongji, who had been a harsh critic of the project, announced that the officials had a "mountain of responsibility on their heads". Around the time, a significant crack had also developed in the dam. To offset construction costs, project officials had quietly changed the operating plan approved by the NPC to fill the reservoir after six years rather than 10. In response, 53 engineers and academics petitioned President Jiang Zemin twice in the first half of 2000 to delay full filling of the reservoir and relocating the local population until scientists could determine whether a higher reservoir was viable given the sedimentation problems. Construction continued regardless.
Debate over the dam
Cost
Officials report that the plan is within its US$25 billion budget and insisted early on that the project would pay for itself through electricity generation. However, the project is thought to have cost more than any other single construction project in history, with unofficial estimates of US$100 billion or more. The estimated $100 billion figure excludes corruption, destroyed arable land, the large population displacement, and environmental damage.
Increasing wealth disparity
Critics see the dam as primarily serving the interests of east coast industrialists since they have the most need for the hydro-electric power. Unfortunately, this is at the expense of millions of people displaced from prime arable land. Making matters worse, relocation compensation has been inadequate (with corrupt officials stealing from the fund), the number of people displaced has been grossly underestimated, and their new land is of poor quality.
Environment
Although hydro-electric power is a renewable energy, the creation of large reservoirs can generate considerable quantities of greenhouse gases, including substantial amounts of methane, due to micro biotic activity. Compared to the greenhouse gas emissions of conventional natural gas power plants, emissions from northern reservoirs are typically about 5% of conventional power plants, while emissions from tropical reservoirs are typically 25%.1
The amount of power generated by the dam in 2009 is anticipated to supply about 10% of China's electricity needs. Over 80% of the country's power is currently produced by coal.[2]
Huge reservoirs by their nature alter the ecosystem and threaten some habitats while helping other habitats. The Chinese River Dolphin and the Chinese Paddlefish, for example, are on the edge of extinction and will lose habitat and suffer divided populations to the dam. Of the 3,000 to 4,000 remaining critically endangered Siberian Crane, approximately 95% currently winter in wetlands that will be destroyed by the Three Gorges Dam.
While logging in the area was required for construction which adds to erosion, stopping the periodic uncontrolled river flooding will lessen erosion in the long run. The build up of silt in the reservoir will, however, reduce the amount of silt transported by the Yangtze River to the Yangtze Delta.
Cities such as Shanghai need ever increasing electricity to power its new modern skyline. With 26 HEP Turbines generating 18000 megawatts of electricity, This Dam will be a huge benefit to this power shortage.
The long term benefits are not so promising, as eventually the dam will fill up with sediment producing less electricity
Local culture and aesthetic values
The 600 km (370 mile) long reservoir will inundate some 1,300 archeological sites, and alter the legendary beauty of the Three Gorges. Cultural and historical relics are being moved to higher ground as they are discovered but the flooding of the Gorge has potentially covered many undiscovered relics. Also many larger sites cannot be moved because of their size or design.
Navigation
The installation of ship locks is intended to increase river shipping from 10 million to 50 million metric tons annually, with transportation costs cut by 30 to 37 percent. Shipping will become safer, since the gorges have historically been notoriously dangerous to navigate. Each ship lock is made up of 5 stages taking around 4 hours in total to complete. Critics argue, however, that heavy siltation will clog ports such as Chongqing within a few years based on the evidence from other dam projects.
The canal locks are designed to be 280 meters (918 feet) long, 35 meters (114 feet) wide, and 5 meters (16.4 feet) deep.[3] That is 30 meters longer, than the St Lawrence Seaway, but half the depth. The canal locks are designed to handle 10,000 ton barges.
The project also includes a ship lift, a kind of elevator, which will be capable of lifting ships of up to 3,000 tons. In the original plan the ship lift would carry 10,000 ton vessels.
Flood control
The reservoir's 22,202,673,076 m³ (18 million acre-foot) (24,452,283 U.S. Tons of Flood water) flood storage capacity will lessen the frequency of big downstream floods from once every 10 years to once every 100 years. But critics believe that the Yangtze will add 530 million metric tons of silt into the reservoir on average per year and it will soon be useless in preventing floods, the system designed to flush out the silt relies on an unproven sequence of sluice gates that many people believe will be ineffective. Increased sedimentation resulting from the dam could increase the already high flood level at Chongqing.
There is also a contradiction between the roles of the dam as flood control and hydroelectricity production. Flood control requires dam levels to be kept low, allowing for increased flow throughout flood times, whereas hydroelectricity requires higher levels to allow for continual escape of water to produce the electricity. Probe International asserts that the dam does not address the real source of flooding, which is the loss of forest cover in the Yangtze watershed and the loss of 13,000 km² of lakes (which had greatly helped to alleviate floods) due to siltation, reclamation and uncontrolled development.
Potential hazards
Concerns exist about the quality of construction materials used, highlighted by a major crack appearing in the dam in 2000, this has led some critics to fear a potential catastrophe similar to the Banqiao Dam failure in 1975.
In an annual report [4] to the United States Congress, the Department of Defense cited that Taiwanese "proponents of strikes against the mainland apparently hope that merely presenting credible threats to China's urban population or high-value targets, such as the Three Gorges Dam, will deter Chinese military coercion." The notion that the ROC military would seek to destroy the Dam provoked an angry response from the mainland state media. PLA General Liu Yuan was quoted [5] in the China Youth Daily saying that the PRC would be "seriously on guard against threats from Taiwan independence terrorists". Despite a claim by ROC Deputy Defence Minister Tsai Ming Hsian on the contrary, most analysts believe the Taiwanese neither have the ability nor will seek such technology to bomb the Three Gorges Dam due to the threat by Beijing to respond with overwhelming force. A group of 53 Chinese engineers campaigned for the government to rethink plans for the dam. If the reservoir level is filled to 156 metres instead, 520,000 less people will have to be displaced, causing the government less hassle. The original plan for the Three Gorges Dam, approved by the National People's Congress in 1992, aimed to keep water levels behind the Three Gorges dam at 156 meters for the first ten years. In 1997, dam officials changed the plans to maximize the dam's power output.
In September 2004 the China Times reported that heavily armed guards had been deployed to the area to fend off a possible terrorist attack, but made no mention of who might want to target the dam. Threat concerning the Three gorges Dam if China move to suppress Taiwan under their rule. The Three Gorges dam lies around 1,500km (932 miles) from Taiwan, while most of Taiwan's military aircraft have a combat radius of between 900 and 1,200km.
There are two hazards uniquely identified with the dam 2; sedimentation modeling is unverified, and the dam sits on a seismic fault. Excessive sedimentation can block the sluice gates, which can cause dam failure under some conditions. This was a contributing cause of the Banqiao Dam failure in 1975 that precipitated the failure of 61 other dams and resulted in over 200,000 deaths. Also, the weight of the dam and reservoir can theoretically cause induced seismicity, as happened with the Katse Dam in Lesotho.
See also
Notes
References
- Tremblay, Varfalvy, Roehm and Garneau. 2005. Greenhouse Gas Emissions - Fluxes and Processes, Springer, 732 p. ISBN 3-540-23455-1
- Topping, Audrey Ronning. Environmental controversy over the Three Gorges Dam. Earth Times News Service.
- article by ABB on use of HVDC-technology for distribution of power generated at the Three Gorges Dam
- ^ "China's Mega Dam" (documentary). The Discovery Channel. Broadcast 28 Jan 2006. http://shopping.discovery.com/product-59110.html
External links
