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For the Second World War incarnation of this formation, see 55th (West Lancashire) Infantry Division.

West Lancashire Division
55th (West Lancashire) Division
A stylised red rose on a green stem with leaves against a khaki background
The divisional insignia, the Red Rose of Lancaster[1]
Active1908–1915
1916–1919
Country United Kingdom
Branch Territorial Force (1908–1919)
TypeInfantry
Peacetime HQLiverpool
Motto(s)"We win or die who wear the rose of Lancaster"[2]
EngagementsBattle of the Somme
Battle of Passchendaele
Battle of Cambrai
Battle of Estaires
Commanders
Notable
commanders		Hugh Jeudwine

The 55th (West Lancashire) Division was an infantry division of the British Army's Territorial Force (TF) that saw extensive combat during the First World War. It was raised initially in 1908 as the West Lancashire Division. Following the outbreak of the First World War, in 1914, the majority of the division's men volunteered for overseas service. Rather than being deployed as a whole formation, the division was slowly wound down through 1914 and 1915, as entire units were dispatched overseas. Those who did not volunteer were used to form new reserve units and eventually the 2nd West Lancashire Division.

In 1916, the division was reformed in France as the 55th (West Lancashire) Division and was reassigned the units that had been transferred. During the Battle of the Somme, the division fought several actions at Guillemont, Ginchy, and Morval. In 1917, the division fought at Pilckem and Menin Road Ridges during the Battle of Passchendaele, gaining an excellent reputation. Late in 1917, the division fought in the Battle of Cambrai. Towards the end of the battle, a major German attack forced the division back over 1 mile (1.6 km). A court of inquiry convened to examine this loss of territory and the division's conduct. It delivered findings that proved controversial with contemporary soldiers and modern historians. In 1918, the division faced the German Spring Offensive, conducting a much-lauded defence of Givenchy during the Battle of Estaires. After the German offensive stalled, the division joined in the Hundred Days Offensive, the culminating offensive of the war. The division suffered almost 36,000 casualties in over two years of combat. With the end of hostilities, the division was slowly demobilised and eventually disbanded in 1919. In 1920, the TF was reconstituted as the Territorial Army, and the division was reformed.

Formation

In 1901, following lessons learnt from the Second Boer War and increasing tension with the German Empire, the United Kingdom sought to reform the British Army to be able to fight a European adversary. This task fell to Secretary of State for War, Richard Haldane, who implemented the Haldane Reforms. The Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 1907 created a new Territorial Force (TF) by merging the Yeomanry and the Volunteer Force in 1908.[3] This resulted in the creation of 14 divisions, including the West Lancashire Division.[4] Each division was to be around 18–19,000 men strong. However, the TF was never able to recruit sufficient numbers of men to achieve this uniformly.[5] The territorials were liable to serve only in the United Kingdom, and the divisions would take over the defence of the country when the regular army was abroad on military service. In 1910, the Imperial Service Obligation was introduced. This allowed territorials to volunteer for overseas service before any national emergency. Haldane saw the primary function of the TF as a way to expand the British expeditionary forces and was confident that up to a quarter of the men would volunteer on mobilisation. It was expected that at the outbreak of war, it would take the divisions up to six months to come up to an acceptable training standard.[6]

The 4th Battalion King's Own (Royal Lancasters) assemble in rows, after disembarking from a train.
4th Battalion, King's Own (Royal Lancaster) Regiment troops disembarking at Trefnant for annual training at Caerwys, 1909

Major-General Edward Dickson commanded the new division composed of the North Lancashire, Liverpool and South Lancashire brigades. The division recruited from Lancashire included modern Merseyside, parts of modern Cheshire, and modern Greater Manchester and southern Cumbria. The divisional headquarters, two brigade headquarters, most of the divisional artillery (with elements at Seaforth Barracks), elements of other divisional assets, and five infantry battalions were based in Liverpool. The rest of the division was spread out, with garrisons in Blackpool, Blundellsands, Kendal, Lancaster (including the North Lancashire Brigade headquarters), Southport, St Helens, Warrington, and Widnes.[7] Edward VII inspected the division in July 1909 at Knowsley. A month later, it began its first annual training camp at Caerwys, Wales, the first Territorial division to conduct field training.[8]

French Général Hippolyte Langlois watched and reviewed the division at its first training camp.[9][10] Langlois lauded the soldiers' use of terrain, initiative, stamina, and a unit cohesion he believed was founded on civilian life relationships, and morale and motivation that he saw coming from a sense of patriotism. His criticisms included limited technical and tactical proficiency, especially in the field artillery. He believed the flaws were due in part to the small training areas available and inadequate live fire practise.[11] Langlois believed the division capable of meeting the TF mandate of repelling an invasion.[12] The historian Ian Beckett commented there were deficiencies with the force: in 1910 "a third ... had failed the modest musketry requirements of firing off 23 rounds"; in 1912, only around two-thirds had completed their required training and divisions failed to retain soldiers.[13] The historian Kevin Mitchinson wrote there were pre-war concerns that members of the division were not physically fit enough to soldier, that the division "was not particularly highly rated", and in 1914 was 2,900 men below establishment.[14]

First World War

Early years

Due to their proximity, the pre-war deployment plan for the West and East Lancashire Divisions was for them to be sent to Ireland to relieve regular army formations. At the outbreak of the First World War in 1914, the West Lancashire Division returned from its annual training in Wales to barracks and depots in Lancashire. Advanced elements were to depart for Ireland to establish billets at various locations, including Limerick. This move was called off on 5 August, and five days later it was announced that local Irish reserve forces would ideally relieve the regular army formations instead. The cancellation resulted mostly from the logistical difficulties of transporting inbound and outbound troops, and a lack of equipment and transport between the two Lancashire divisions.[15] Mitchinson wrote an extra dimension existed, as "there was concern among the authorities that some of the King's Liverpool battalions might have rather too much sympathy with potentially rebellious sections of Irish society".[16]

With the move to Ireland cancelled, the division was immediately dispersed around the country. The South Lancashire Brigade went to bolster defences around the Firth of Forth, Scotland; the Liverpool Brigade was assigned to Central Force and moved to Canterbury, Kent; other elements of the division went to Oxfordshire. The men in England were used to guard vulnerable points, including railway lines, bridges, and tunnels.[17] With popular enthusiasm for the war high, potential recruits flooded the division's regimental depots. The divisional historian, James Ogden Coop, wrote, "every existing vacancy was filled and could have been filled ten times over".[18] Some of these recruits were used to bring the East Lancashire Division up to strength.[19] The dispersion of the division affected training, which for some units was impossible to undertake.[20] Following the outbreak of the war, territorials were invited to volunteer for overseas service. Copp wrote "every unit in the division volunteered".[18] On 13 August 1914, Secretary of State for War Lord Kitchener signalled a willingness to deploy territorial units overseas in which 80 per cent of the men (reduced to 60 per cent at the end of the month) had volunteered.[21] Two days later, the division was ordered to separate those who had volunteered from those who had not. The latter were used to form reserve units. On 31 August, these reserve formations coalesced to become the 2nd West Lancashire Division, which was based initially at the West Lancashire Division's peacetime barracks and depots.[22]

The West Lancashire Division went through a succession of general officers commanding (GOC) before Major-General John Forster was given command on 3 September 1914.[23][24] Because of the casualties suffered by the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) during the opening months of fighting on the Western Front, the division's volunteers were used as reinforcements. Between October 1914 and May 1915, the division was steadily drained; companies of engineers, artillery, medical personnel, and battalions of infantry were removed from the division to reinforce other divisions.[25] The Commander-in-Chief, Home Army, General Ian Hamilton, questioned the wisdom of using the division this way as he believed the men were "'fully 20% behind the rest' in efficiency and training".[26] However, he believed the deployment of intact battalions would not affect their esprit de corps, as he perceived there being a loyalty greater to the battalion rather than the division.[19] As battalions departed, reserve units from the 2nd West Lancashire Division replaced them. In April 1915, the North Lancashire Brigade, the division's last remaining infantry formation of volunteers, was transferred to the 51st (Highland) Division. The rest of West Lancashire Division was amalgamated into 2nd West Lancashire Division, now based around Canterbury, with the former unit ceasing to exist.[22][27]

A file of soldiers from the King's Liverpool Regiment march down a shoulder-deep trench.
Men of the King's Liverpool Regiment, moving along a communication trench leading to the front line near Wailly, 16 April 1916.

In November 1915, the Army Council authorised the reformation of the West Lancashire Division in France. Beginning on 3 January 1916, the division's former units assembled near Hallencourt. On 27 January 1916, the reformation was completed. With these experienced troops, no longer completely made up of the men who had left in 1915 due to casualties and new drafts, the division was reformed as the 55th (West Lancashire) Division with Major-General Hugh Jeudwine in command.[28] By the end of March, the division was still 3,000 men under establishment.[29] The division's infantry comprised: the 164th Brigade, consisting of the 1/4th Battalion, King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment) (1/4KORL), the 1/4th Battalion, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (1/4LR), the 2/5th Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers (2/5LF) and the 1/8th (Irish) Battalion, King's (Liverpool Regiment) (Liverpool Irish); the 165th Brigade consisted of the 1/5th Battalion, King's (Liverpool Regiment) (1/5KR), the 1/6KR, the 1/7KR, and the 1/9KR; and the 166th Brigade consisted of the 1/10th (Scottish) Battalion, King's (Liverpool Regiment) (Liverpool Scottish), the 1/5th Battalion, the South Lancashire Regiment (1/5SL), the 1/5th Battalion, King's Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment) (1/5KORL) and the 1/5th Battalion, Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (1/5LR).[30] During the year, Jeudwine adopted the Red Rose of Lancaster as the divisional emblem, to foster county pride in the division.[2]

First trench tour

Members of the Liverpool Irish pose for a photograph
A raiding party of the Liverpool Irish, on the morning after the first large trench raid by the division.

On 16 February 1916, the division took over a sector of the front line between Brétencourt and Wailly, near Arras, relieving the French 88th Division. They held this area until July, carrying out several trench raids.[31] The Liverpool Irish launched the first on 17 April. Attacking at night, the battalion inflicted significant damage; its 56 casualties included the loss of Second Lieutenant Edward Felix Baxter.[32] For his actions during the raid, Baxter was awarded the Victoria Cross (VC), the highest gallantry award available to British military personnel.[33] A further VC was awarded to Private Arthur Procter in the aftermath of a raid on the night of 3/4 June.[34][35]

Another large raid was launched on 28 June, this time during the day. Elements of six battalions crossed no man's land behind a smokescreen. A shift in the wind dispersed the smoke, and the raiders came under heavy German fire. Two of the attacking parties were repelled while the other four entered the German trenches and inflicted casualties before returning.[36] Private James Hutchinson of the 2/5LF earned the VC for his actions during this raid.[37][38] Losses for this raid are not reported. On 25 July, the division was relieved by the 11th (Northern) Division. During this period in the trenches, the division suffered 1,110 casualties.[39][a]

Battle of the Somme

Main article: Battle of the Somme
see text
The division's positions in the Guillemont sector. British positions are shown in blue, and the German positions in red.

The division moved south to participate in the Battle of the Somme, which began on 1 July. It was given the objective of capturing the village of Guillemont and the nearby German trenches. The German defenders, dug in at the village and its environs, had already repulsed two large attacks. These attacks, and those launched by the division, formed the prelude to the Battle of Guillemont.[41] In August, the division fought three actions in this effort. The attacks were unsuccessful, and the division suffered 4,126 casualties.[42] The division's Second Lieutenant Gabriel Coury and Captain Noel Godfrey Chavasse were awarded VCs for their actions during the fighting.[43]

After a period resting out of the line, the division returned to the front line during the night 4/5 September, relieving the 24th Division near Delville Wood, and took part in the Battle of Ginchy on 9 September with mixed results. The overall British effort resulted in the village's capture the next day.[44][45] An attack was launched on 11 September to improve the local position, but failed. Between 10 and 12 September, the New Zealand Division relieved the 55th.[46] The division returned to the front, on 17 September, relieving the 41st Division.[27] On 25 September, the division took part in the Battle of Morval, a general offensive launched by the Fourth Army and attacked north-west of Gueudecourt.[47] During two days, the division overran several German positions and repulsed a counter-attack. However, the overall Fourth Army effort failed to capture the village. On 28 September, the division was relieved and transferred north to the Ypres Salient.[48]

Battle of Passchendaele

Main article: Battle of Passchendaele
see text
Division front line and objectives during the Battle of Pilckem Ridge. The blue line on the left denotes the British front line, with the German frontline outposts denoted in red. The additional coloured lines, east of the front line, show successive objectives of the division and the rough positions of the German first, second, and third line of trench systems.

The division re-entered the front line in October 1916, manning a section of the Ypres Salient. It rested, re-equipped, and limited itself to raiding.[49] Towards the end of the year, in line with the British Army's evolving infantry doctrine, Jeudwine "recognized that many of his soldiers had held responsible positions in civilian life that required independent thought" and "by devolving decision-making down the chain of command he was able to harness their skills and experience to enhance tactical performance on the battlefield".[50] In June 1917, Jeudwine authorised publication of the divisional magazine Sub Rosa (Under the rose). This was a further effort to foster a link between county pride and the division; the magazine contained poetry based on Lancashire history, county tales, and cartoons.[51]

By July, the division was part of Fifth Army and assigned to the opening assault (known as of the Battle of Pilckem Ridge) of the Third Battle of Ypres (also known as the Battle of Passchendaele).[52] The division's objective was to advance through to the third line of German trenches opposing them.[53] In preparation, an intensive artillery barrage was fired. At 03:50 on 31 July, the attack began. Supported by artillery and at least one Mark IV tank, the attack overran the German first and second-line positions. By 10:00, the division was advancing towards their final objective. The third line positions were captured, along with five German 77 mm (3 in) gun batteries.[54] German counter-attacks during the afternoon forced the division to abandon the captured third line.[55] For their actions on 31 July, Lieutenant-Colonel Bertram Best-Dunkley and Lance Sergeant Tom Mayson were awarded the VC.[56][57] During the next two days, the division consolidated the ground seized. On 2 August, the Germans began a counter-attack to push back the 55th. The attack was repulsed, during which Chavasse earned a second VC. After the fighting had died down, the division was relieved.[55][58] During the battle, the division suffered 3,552 casualties and took 600 German prisoners.[55]

Several British soldiers, knee deep in mud, carry a wounded comrade on a stretcher.
Stretcher bearers during the Battle of Pilckem Ridge

The 55th was given a period of rest, during which it received reinforcements and conducted training. Field Marshal Douglas Haig, commander of the BEF, visited the division. On 12 September, the division returned to the same sector of the front with orders to take the final objective that had eluded them on 31 July. This included an important ridge and a strongpoint known as Schuler Farm. In the division's absence, two abortive attacks had been made on these locations. The division moved during the night of 19/20 September and manned the front line trenches and the water-logged shell holes that dotted the area. While a 24-hour bombardment hit the German positions, indicating an imminent assault, German prisoners reported the attack was anticipated having spotted tape the British had laid to aid the division in moving into the correct area.[27][59] On 20 September, the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge began.[27] During the day, the division captured the ridge and fought off counter-attacks.[60] Schuler Farm fell the following day. During the afternoon of 21 September, the Germans launched a major counter-attack, aiming to retake all lost ground. The effort failed. Coop called the German losses in this battle "appalling", while divisional losses amounted to 2,730.[61]

During the night of 22/34 September, the 39th Division relieved the 55th Division, ending its role in the battle. The division moved south towards Cambrai, where it joined VII Corps in the Third Army.[62] The historian Helen McCartney wrote that by the end of this period, "the 55th Division was described as 'a good fighting division, possessing the right spirit' and a 'first rate division' by its army and corps commanders in their reports to GHQ".[50]

Battle of Cambrai

Main article: Battle of Cambrai (1917)

The division took over 8,000 yards (7,300 m) of the front line adjacent to the village of Épehy.[63] Rather than a continuous trench line, the division occupied a series of fortified posts, each capable of holding a platoon, that were connected by communication trenches to facilitate movement.[64] On 18 November, following a heavy bombardment, a 200-strong German raiding party entered the division's trenches in three places.[65] During the raid, 40 members of the division were captured.[66] Coop stated it was believed that the Germans obtained information about the division's upcoming attack from these prisoners.[65] However, the historian Bryan Cooper wrote that the men provided no information, and the German 184th Infantry Regiment gleaned this information from six prisoners taken from the 36th (Ulster) Division.[66] The division was assigned a supporting role in the Battle of Cambrai, tasked with preventing German forces from moving north to reinforce their comrades against the main British effort. This would be accomplished by the 164th  Brigade assaulting two German strongpoints: Gillemont Farm, and a position known as the "Knoll".[67][68] As a consequence of the acquired intelligence, the Germans abandoned their front line trenches and reinforced their second line positions. In addition, new, deep, narrow trenches were dug east of Gillemont Farm where counter-attacking forces were massed, and from where they could launch rifle grenades upon the attacking force.[69]

Cut outs that resemble British soldiers and tanks are arrayed across the center of the photograph.
An example of British deception methods

On 20 November, the artillery bombarded the German positions. A smokescreen was deployed on one flank to cover attacking forces, thermite rounds were used to silence German machine gun positions, and 1,320 gas shells were fired into other German positions. The division also utilised deception measures that included dummies and a mock tank, to attract German fire away from the attack. Behind creeping barrages two attacks were launched, one towards the Knoll and the second towards Gillemont Farm. Back and forth fighting lasted throughout the morning at both positions. By 13:00, German counter-attacks had retaken both positions and fighting ceased for the day, except for bombardments. During the night, patrols were dispatched without incident. The following morning, a ten-minute bombardment of the German positions took place at 05:00, followed by a three-minute hurricane bombardment at 06:30. A creeping barrage was then laid on to simulate a British attack that resulted in the Germans manning their positions. These efforts aided in keeping the Germans from being redeployed. This ended the division's effort in support of the battle, which had resulted in it suffering around 600 casualties.[70]

Cambrai counterattack

Regular nightly patrols followed thereafter. On 28 November, German artillery fire on the division's positions increased. This was judged to be additional German batteries registering their guns and coincided with low-flying reconnaissance flights by the Luftstreitkräfte (German Air Force) and a reported build-up of German forces behind their lines. Jeudwine judged this to be an indication that the division was about to be attacked, reported this up the chain of command, and ordered an artillery bombardment to commence on the morning of 29 November.[71] His judgement was correct; the German 2nd Army intended to use seven divisions to retake the territory lost in earlier fighting.[72] The following day, the division was ordered to take over part of the front held by 20th (Light) Division, resulting in it being responsible for 13,000 yards (12,000 m) of the front line.[73] Three divisions would normally hold this length of line.[74] The 166th Brigade held the left (from north to south: the 1/5SL, the 1/5LF, the Liverpool Scottish; the 1/5KORL in reserve), and the 165th Brigade on the right flank (from north to south: the 1/6KR, the 1/5KR, the 1/7KR; the 1/9KR in reserve).[65]

see text
Positions of the division before (red and green), and after the German attack on 30 November (blue line).

At 07:00 on 30 November, the German counter-attack began with a heavy barrage across the entire divisional front. An hour later, German machine guns opened fire on divisional positions, supported by aerial attacks. On the division's left, the Germans broke through and were able to use this to outflank the 55th Division's positions.[75] The 166th Brigade was heavily engaged, with some positions coming under attack after being outflanked and surrounded. At least two companies of infantry, one each from the 1/5SL and the Liverpool Scottish, were overrun during the attack.[76] Despite fierce resistance from the brigade, slowing the German advance, they were unable to stop the Germans from penetrating the front to a depth of 800 yards (730 m). Despite many casualties, front line troops were able to fall back. Some launched minor counter-attacks, which denied high ground to the Germans. In one sector, a composite group of the 1/5KORL, the 1/5KR, and the Liverpool Scottish were cut off but held their position until 05:00 the next morning when they fought their way back to the main divisional positions. The 166th Brigade, reinforced with elements of the 164th Brigade which had been held in reserve, was ordered to dig new trench lines and lay wire in front of Épehy, to deny the village to the Germans.[77][78]

The 165th Brigade also came under heavy attack, and its battalions had varied experiences. The 1/5KR threw back the German attack on their front, the 1/7KR stalled the assault in their sector, and despite having their lines penetrated, the 1/6KR were able to launch counter-attacks to retake their lost positions. Much heavy back and forth fighting took place throughout the afternoon, while VII Corps organised assets for a counter-attack.[79] During the fighting, German infantry advanced to within 300 yards (270 m) of Sergeant Cyril Edward Gourley's howitzer battery of the 276th Brigade Royal Field Artillery (RFA) of the divisional artillery, and snipers infiltrated behind it. Despite this, he kept one gun in action from 10:30 until dark, firing over open sights at German troops. Under constant fire, he held the Germans back in his area and destroyed one machine-gun. His actions resulted in the battery being saved, which was then withdrawn after nightfall, and earned him the VC.[80][81]

Depending on the source, the division was pushed back between 2,000 yards (1,800 m)-4,000 yards (3,700 m) during the fighting.[74][82] Later in the day, a VII Corps counter-attack allowed the front to be held and stemmed the German attack.[83] In the following days, the division was withdrawn from the front line to the Flamicourt area to rest.[84] Before leaving, Lieutenant-General Thomas Snow (VII Corps) wrote that he

...cannot allow the 55th Division to leave... without expressing... his satisfaction at the way they fought and worked during the recent operations. It is not at present quite clear what happened on the left of the Division, but, from the enquiries made ..., he knows that ... in spite of the heavy losses incurred, [the 30th] was a day which will always reflect credit on the 55th Division.[85]

A casualty breakdown for 30 November is not available; for the period 20 November to 8 December, the division suffered 3,259 casualties.[86] Historian Alexander Watson described the day's fighting as "one the most severe battlefield routs of the conflict", which saw "the 55th Division dissolved in the face of the attack".[87] Mitchinson wrote that "some battalions of [the division] virtually disappeared east of Épehy in what could be seen as questionable circumstances".[88] Of the opposite opinion, the historian A.J. Smithers wrote "the 55th fought off all assaults during the day".[89] Historians Jack Horsfall and Nigel Cave wrote "the 55th Division faced four German divisions", was forced "to fall back almost four thousand yards... but it had acted as a sturdy anchor in holding the basis of the British position steady".[74]

Cambrai court of inquiry

While the line outside of Épehy was not broken, the loss of terrain was a cause of concern for the Army.[82] Bryn Hammond wrote that "the German counter-attack was a major shock for the British" and had included "concerning stories of mobs of men fleeing in the face of the German attacks and, in the process, throwing away their arms". On 21 January 1918, a court of inquiry was convened. It called 25 witnesses to investigate the reasons for the German success, in addition to—per McCartney—"the collapse of a previously 'first rate fighting division' ".[82][90] The inquiry admitted the Germans were able to achieve surprise because of a thick mist, and that the division's position had become untenable since it had been forced to remove artillery to bolster other units. The inquiry was critical of the division's lack of defence in depth and the men's training.[82] The latter point was blamed on the alleged ill-trained drafts the division had received to replace the more than 7,000 casualties it had suffered previously.[87] Historian William Moore indicated that the majority of the witnesses called by the inquiry were low ranking and testified the numbers of soldiers reported to have been retreating were exaggerated. Gunner Petty, the lowest ranking witness called, reported that the majority of men he saw retreating were artillerymen. Based on their cap badges, he stated they were not from the 55th Division, and he did not see men from the West Lancashire Division retreating. Moore wrote it was "small wonder" Petty had witnessed this after it was established that the relevant field batteries were too close to the front, and "liable to be enfiladed or taken in reverse at easy range". Moore argued Petty's testimony was "unsensational in its content", and "must have been encouraging to... Jeudwine whose Lancashire Territorials had looked like being saddled with the blame for the collapse".[91]

Hammond wrote the 25 witnesses did not include the relevant Corps' commanders or staff rendering the "value of the exercise questionable". Hammond argued that the inquiry, as well as prior investigations, clouded and influenced the story of the battle for over 30 years. Hammond wrote, "Jeudwine's division was exhausted and considerably weakened in numbers and ought to have been relieved" prior to the German counter-attack; in addition, the "initial German bombardment was so violent many front-line defenders had little or no opportunity to defend themselves before they were overwhelmed" by the rapid German advance but acquitted themselves well where they could.[90] Watson wrote that the division's "exhaustion caused by the heavy fighting and appalling conditions" was the reason for their conduct.[87] The historian Tim Travers wrote that the reasons for the success of the German counter-attack "are not hard to find, and they principally relate to command failures on the part of GHQ and Third Army, who did not anticipate the attack, believing the Germans not to be capable of a major effort". Jeudwine warned of the attack, but VII Corps failed to co-ordinate their defence with flanking units. Travers wrote, "when the warnings of the attack came from 55 Division, these warnings ran into greater and greater resistance the higher they went. Hence, the divisional level was caught in the inability of the corps and army structures to communicate with each other." The use of infiltration tactics by the Germans was also ignored.[92] Smithers wrote the inquiry blamed junior officers and below, holding "no officer of field rank or above ... to blame for anything".[93] Smithers mused "one cannot wonder at the contempt this document excited once its contents became known" and wrote that Louis Oldfield (a senior officer within the 51st (Highland) Division) "probably spoke for everybody ..: 'The result of the Cambrai inquiry is very misleading and discreditable. Someone ought to be kicked'".[94]

Early 1918

A member of the 1/7KR, stands in silhouette, while leaning on the wooden wall of a covered portion of a trench. Two additional soldiers stand in the background, in an uncovered part of the trench, almost washed out by the contrast.
A 1/7KR soldier in a covered trench on the La Bassée sector, March 1918

After Cambrai, the division was assigned to the First Army and moved to the Bomy area for rest and training. In anticipation of a German attack, the 1/4SL (the divisional pioneers) and Royal Engineer (RE) troops fortified the defences in the Givenchy–Festubert sector.[95] By 1918, the number of front line infantry within the British Army in France had decreased because of casualties and a lack of eligible replacements, leading to a manpower crisis. To consolidate manpower and to increase the ratio of machine guns and artillery support available to the infantry, the number of battalions in a division was reduced from twelve to nine.[96][97] This had the effect of reducing the establishment of a division from 18,825 men to 16,035.[98] An attempt was made to consolidate battalions from the same regiment within the same brigade.[99] The Liverpool Irish (164th Brigade), the 1/9KR (165th Brigade), and the 1/5LR (166th Brigade) were transferred to the 57th (2nd West Lancashire) Division to be merged with second-line units.[100] The artillery was also reorganised: the third medium trench mortar battery was divided between the other two, and the heavy trench mortar battery became a Corps asset on 29 January.[30]

On 15 February, the division returned to the frontline. It replaced the 42nd (East Lancashire) Division northeast of Festubert. The first skirmish followed two days later, when a 30-strong German party attempted to raid a sector of the line. This attack was repulsed. A further raid was launched on 7 March, which was also driven off, but not before the 1/5SL suffered 43 casualties.[101] The same day, a further divisional reorganisation took place. The brigade and divisional machine gun companies were consolidated, with the formation of the divisional machine gun battalion.[30][102]

Several members of the 1/7KR in a deep trench. In the foreground, another member stands on a firing step peerin over the parapet composed of sandbags.
Men of the 1/7KR in the trenches of the La Bassée sector, March 1918

In early March, military intelligence had established that the Germans had vastly increased their artillery presence in the area and believed their attack would fall on the Portuguese Expeditionary Corps, on the division's left. The 55th Division's reserves were tasked with reinforcing the Portuguese in event of an attack. On 18 March, a raiding party from the 1/5KR found the German trenches deserted; a second raid, on 25 March, penetrated into the reserve line, taking nine prisoners and capturing a machine gun while suffering several wounded.[103]

On 21 March, Germany launched the opening salvo of their Spring Offensive, aimed to deliver a single, decisive, war-winning blow (a vernichtungsschlacht (battle of annihilation)) initially in the Saint-Quentin area. The intent was to inflict such a defeat upon the British Armies that the country would abandon the war, which would force the French to sue for peace. During the final days of March and the opening of April, the division was aware the Germans were preparing a major assault. Defensive preparations were undertaken, including a reorganisation of the front line and artillery barrages of German positions that included firing 500 gas shells. Nightly patrols were also conducted, with the men able to enter the German front line continually without encountering opposition.[104] On 8 April, the 166th Brigade was ordered to relieve the Portuguese brigade on the left of the division; the handover was scheduled the following day.[105] At this time, the 164th Brigade held positions on the right of the division between the La Bassée Canal and a point north of Givenchy (the 1/7KR on the right, the 1/5KR on the left, and the 1/6KR in both support and reserve positions); from which the 165th Brigade held the line north to Festubert (the 1/4KORL on the right, the 1/4LR on the left, with the 2/5LF in support).[106] Coop described the infantry as being tasked with "hold[ing] their posts to the last, no matter whether outflanked or surrounded" and with launching "immediate local counter-attack[s]", which had been rehearsed in training exercises.[107]

Defence of Givenchy

Further information: Spring Offensive
Black thrust lines on a map denote the attacks made by German forces.
German attack against XI and XV Corps, 9 April.

When the opening attack of the Spring Offensive did not achieve the desired result, the Germans shifted their effort north (to the Ypres sector) to strike again immediately.[108] At 04:15 on 9 April, the German bombardment marking the beginning of Operation Georgette, began in the divisional sector. The engagement in the southern part of the Allied line became known as the Battle of Estaires.[109] The German bombardment, using the greatest concentration of German guns during the war, shelled the front line and transportation routes in the divisional rear as far back as Locon. It was believed that the Germans had launched a large-scale raid upon the Portuguese, and the 166th Brigade was ordered to move and reinforce them. Rather than a raid, the Portuguese division had collapsed under the weight of a full-scale attack which resulted in the 55th's flank being exposed.[110][111]

At 09:00, the German 4th Ersatz, 43rd Reserve, and 18th Reserve divisions launched an attack upon the 55th Division's 4,000-yard (3,700 m) front line.[112][113] The German divisions had circulated orders that stated the "English 55th Division", after battles on the Somme, Flanders, and Cambrai, "was described by prisoners ... as a Division ... that is below the average quality".[114] Mist limited visibility to 30 yards (27 metres), hindering the British ability to repulse the attack. German infantry pushed through the front line between strongpoints held by the 164th Brigade and within half an hour were assaulting the 1/4LR battalion headquarters. The bypassed British front-line positions, now surrounded, held out, impeding the German efforts. Local counter-attacks resulted in the reoccupation of most of the territory lost by early afternoon, with forward posts retaken at dusk. By the end of the day, the brigade had reclaimed its entire sector.[115] Second Lieutenant John Schofield earned the VC for his actions during the brigade's fighting.[116]

see text
The 55th Division's positions (red lines), at midnight on 9 April.

At 09:50, the Germans attacked the 165th Brigade, having moved around their flank after the defeat of the Portuguese. The Germans pushed through the brigade's forward positions, but their attack was disrupted by the resistance of bypassed garrisons. The German attack only partially broke through the brigade's main line of resistance in one place, and a local counter-attack quickly restored the position.[117] The German launched repeated attacks on the brigade, reinforced with several infantry companies from the 166th Brigade, throughout the afternoon, but they were unable to make any gains.[118] For his actions fighting with the brigade, Second Lieutenant Joseph Henry Collin was posthumously awarded the VC.[119]

Under artillery fire all morning, and having to dispatch troops to the division's other brigades, the 166th Brigade had moved into defensive positions on the flank of the 165th Brigade by early afternoon. Then elements of the divisional pioneer battalion and RE companies reinforced it. The 51st (Highland) Division's 154th Brigade was attached to the division and took defensive positions around Locon, with its 1/4th Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders moved forward to reinforce the 166th Brigade.[120] During the day, the Germans made several unsuccessful efforts to breach the 166th Brigade's positions.[121] Historian Don Farr wrote that the division's efforts, in conjunction with other divisions in the area, had forced major delays on the German assault plan, "their plan had called for them to be across the River Lys along the whole length of their assault" by the end of the day, instead they had made only minor gains.[122]

A column of British soldiers, most are holding the shoulder of the man in front of them. Many have bandages covering their eyes, others are covering their eyes with their hands.
Members of the division, blinded by poison gas on 10 April 1918.

Before dawn on 10 April, the 3rd Division's 9th Brigade and 42nd Brigade Royal Field Artillery were attached to the division. The artillery was moved to support the 166th Brigade (minus two batteries attached to the 51st Division for the day). One battalion of the 9th Brigade was placed in divisional reserve, and the remaining two attached to the 164th and 165th Brigades.[123] The German attacks resumed at 07:40, with a strong infantry attack under the cover of an intense artillery barrage. Despite fierce fighting throughout the day, the German attacks failed.[124] The last German attack of that day, in the evening, managed to make a temporary lodgement before being repulsed following local counter-attacks.[125] Coop described the evening shelling, with defensive positions being "subjected to a terrific bombardment with shells of heavy calibre ... [that] were practically obliterated", but despite this were still held by the division.[126]

"There is no other course open to us but to fight it out. Every position must be held to the last man: there must be no retirement. With our backs to the wall and believing in the justice of our cause each one of us must fight on to the end. The Safety of our homes and the Freedom of mankind alike depend upon the conduct of each one of us at this critical moment."

– Douglas Haig, message to the troops on 11 April in response to Georgette.[127]

During 11 April, both sides bombarded one another heavily, and two major German infantry attacks were launched by elements of four divisions—the 4th Ersatz and the 18th and 43rd Reserve Divisions—reinforced by the 44th Reserve Division. Despite back and forth fighting, the division held its positions. Except for mutual artillery bombardments, fighting died down.[128][129] This was the result of the German commanders shifting the focus of their attack further north, after failing to breach the British defences in this sector.[111] Between 14 and 17 April, the division was relieved by the 1st and 3rd Divisions, and moved to the Auchel area for rest; the divisional artillery remained on the front in support.[130][131] Divisional losses were between 3,119 and 3,871.[132][133] German losses are reported to have been heavy, with almost 1,000 prisoners being taken by the division along with the capture of 70 machine guns.[132]

see text
Soldiers of the division marching through Bethune, after being pulled out of the line.

Coop wrote "it was afterwards publicly stated by an officer of the German General Staff that the stand made by the Division on 9 April and the days which followed marked the final ruination of the supreme German effort of 1918".[132] The historian David T. Zabecki wrote that Givenchy was "one of the most impressive defensive battles of the war", where the division "stubbornly held on and never gave way" that "diverted [German] resources and combat power away from the main effort".[134] After his experience at Ypres, Jeudwine contributed his own ideas on defensive tactics to an unpublished army pamphlet in December 1917. McCartney wrote "the ideas developed there contributed directly to the success of the stand of the 55th Division at Givenchy" and "the plans, sketches and narrative of the Battle of Givenchy were subsequently circulated to other divisions as an example of good defensive practice". McCartney concluded the division "could be said to have helped indirectly to shape the tactical thinking of the British army".[135]

Local attacks in the Givenchy sector

see text
Officers, of the 1/4KORL, watch men carrying rations through a street in Givenchy, May 1918.

On 21 April, French Minister of War Georges Clemenceau visited the 55th.[136] Over the following days, the 55th relieved the 1st Division and returned to their prior sector of the front line. On 24 and 25 April, several minor attacks and raids were carried out with mixed results; 30 Germans were captured.[137][138] For his actions on 25 April, Lance-Corporal James Hewitson was awarded the VC.[139][140]

On 2 May, German air activity increased. Reports from prisoners and deserters claimed a German attack would occur around 9 May. As a result, the divisional artillery increased its shelling of German positions, blowing up an ammunition dump on 8 May, and destroying a church used as an observation post the next day. After 15 May, the British realised the Germans would not attack. Coop claimed the Germans suggested this was the result of the Spanish flu. The rest of the month remained quiet. Between 4 and 5 June, the Germans bombarded Beuvry, Givenchy, and Labourse with Yellow Cross gas shells. Prisoners taken around this time suggested an imminent attack, but it did not materialise. On 8 June, a raiding party attacked forward German positions to gather intelligence but was repulsed. Afterwards, except for sporadic raiding, the sector remained quiet until August.[141]

Crosses painted on the building denote this as an aid station. Soldiers stand around outside the building, while others are matching past.
A dressing station in a village behind the Givenchy sector, May 1918

After several weeks of relatively quiet activity, the 164th Brigade launched an attack on 24 August. Intended to retake some previously lost forward positions, the brigade captured their objectives, advancing the front 200 yards (180 metres). The brigade lost 103 casualties in the process and took 44 prisoners. The Germans repulsed two minor counter-attacks, and bombarded the captured positions, including using gas.[142] Four days later, the 166th occupied additional positions having found them deserted by the Germans.[143]

To the south, the Allied armies launched the Battle of Amiens, which marked the start of the Hundred Days Offensive, and would be the final offensive of the war.[144] The Germans in the division's sector began to withdraw, and the 55th Division was ordered to prepare for a rapid pursuit in the event of a full-scale retreat, without worrying about maintaining an unbroken line. Nevertheless, throughout September back-and-forth fighting, including increasingly brutal hand-to-hand combat, took place over the same contested ground as local German resistance continued.[145]

In anticipation of a German retreat, I Corps ordered a general advance for the morning of 30 September. After 24 hours of artillery fire, the 1/4LR (166th Brigade) launched a two-company attack. Initially successful and having taken 48 prisoners, a counter-attack pushed them back to their start line. The battalion made a second attempt on 1 October, and this time held its objective. With these gains, the divisional mainline had moved forward an estimated 4,000 yards (3,700 metres) in the left sector and 2,500 yd (2,300 m) in the right since the beginning of September. During the month, the division captured 308 prisoners and 17 machine guns.[146][147]

Advance into Belgium

The remaining column of a destroyed bridge, with surrounding rubble that has partially blocked the flow of a canal. Members of the 2/5LF walk across some of the rubble.
A La Bassée canal bridge destroyed by retreating German troops, pictured the day after the 2/5LF (164th Brigade) captured the town.

In anticipation of a German retreat, cavalry, RE, machine-gun, and medical support units were attached to the two brigades at the front line, a practise that continued for the rest of the campaign. In addition, personnel from RE tunneling companies were attached to investigate and disarm booby traps.[148] Following the capture of a German officer who revealed that a German withdrawal to the Canal de la Deûle had begun, the 164th and 166th Brigades advanced on 2 October. The advance of neighbouring divisions was mainly uncontested, but German resistance held up the 55th at La Bassée for much of 2 October. By the end of 4 October, the division had covered over 5 miles (8 kilometres) and was 500 yards (460 metres) from the canal.[147][149]

The Germans were largely dug in on the east side of the canal, supported by large numbers of machine-guns. They had destroyed most bridges and had begun to flood the low-ground to the west. The division did not assault but bombarded the German positions instead. The only infantry action during this period occurred when a company from the Liverpool Scottish attacked several pillboxes and the railway embankment near Don Station, on the west side of the canal, encountering initial success. They suffered heavy losses when a German counter-attack erased the gains and captured most of two platoons.[150]

On 8 October, the division was transferred to III Corps of Fifth Army, when the latter took over the sector.[151] The area around Don Station was raided on 14 October, and an attempt to forge the canal that night was repulsed. Patrols were sent out again the next morning, following reports of the Germans withdrawing from the canal in front of the divisions on either side of the 55th. They found the Germans still present in strength. The next day, the 164th Brigade fought against determined resistance to clear German positions on the west side of the Canal, and the division started crossing that night.[152][153]

see text
Men of 1/4SL (divisional pioneers) crossing a pontoon bridge over the Scheldt at Tournai, 9 November 1918.

With the canal crossed, the division advanced, liberating several villages. The River Marque was crossed on 18 October, after overcoming strong resistance along the river's shoreline. By the end of the next day, the division was close to the Belgian border. It crossed the border on 20 October, and captured a German divisional ammunition column at Froidmon, southwest of Tournai.[154][155] The advance continued until 22 October, when the division met heavy resistance on the outskirts of Tournai. This was viewed as a larger effort by the Germans to maintain their positions west of the town. As a result, the division formed up and started taking defensive positions.[156] A minor attack on 25 October made gains, but these were lost following a German counter-attack. No major actions took place for the remainder of the month, with activity being limited to raiding and artillery fire from both sides. On 8 November, patrols captured prisoners who stated the Germans had withdrawn to the east bank of the Scheldt. As a result, the division advanced largely unopposed to take up positions on the west bank, with the 1/6KR entering the western half of Tournai to the jubilation of its inhabitants. During the night, the division started crossing the river.[157][158] Despite sporadic fighting, the division continued to advance, captured Ath, and advanced 7 miles (11 km) by 13:30 on 11 November, when orders were received by the leading troops that the Armistice had taken effect. In total, the division had advanced over 50 miles (80 km) in the 80 days of the general advance.[159] From 27 September to the armistice, the division suffered 180 casualties.[160]

End of the war

Albert I and Jeudwine on horseback, ride between two rows of troops from the division.
Albert I and Jeudwine arrive on horseback, to review the division in the Bois de la Cambre, Brussels, January 1919.

The division received orders on 15 November to advance into Germany with the Second Army, but six days later the order was rescinded and the division transferred to the Fifth Army. During the second half of the month, the division rebuilt railways and roads around Leuze-en-Hainaut. A comrades' association for the veterans of the division was established in early December. George V reviewed the division on 7 December. Soon afterwards, it relocated to Brussels. The division's personnel filled the time with lectures, educational courses, and athletic competitions.[27][161] During January 1919, King Albert  of Belgium reviewed the 55th. It sent representatives to a Brussels ceremonial parade, while demobilisation steadily reduced its numbers. Jeudwine departed on 15 March to command an Army of Occupation division, and by the end of April the division numbered 158 officers and 2,192 men.[27] The division was disbanded shortly afterwards, although not all personnel were demobilised. For example, the Liverpool Scottish had a large number of men not eligible for immediate demobilisation. They were sent to Antwerp with the Army of Occupation to maintain a receiving camp for cadres returning to England via Antwerp for demobilisation. They remained there until demobilised at the completion of their task in November.[162][163] In April 1920, the division started to reform in Lancashire.[27]

Casualties and honours

Between January 1916 and November 1918, 6,520 of the division's officers and men were killed, 24,294 wounded, and 4,887 reported missing, more than half of the 63,923 of the individuals who had served with the division during this period.[164] Due to the way new drafts were sent to the division and despite the heavy losses, the 55th was able to maintain its link to the Lancashire area. Mitchinson, in analysing losses suffered during the fighting on the Somme, found only eight per cent of the casualties came from outside of the Lancashire area. Likewise, in reviewing the losses suffered at Ypres and Cambrai, "the policy of posting local men whenever possible continued and although there were men, especially in 165 Brigade, from Staffordshire, Surrey and Suffolk, the great majority of non-West Lancashire soldiers came from Cumberland or East Lancashire".[165]

For acts of valour, eleven soldiers were (in some cases posthumously) awarded the VC; Chavasse gained a second Victoria Cross.[166] In addition, the following awards (in several cases, multiple times) were bestowed: 80 Distinguished Service Orders, 427 Military Crosses, 200 Distinguished Conduct Medals, 1,649 Military Medals, and 70 Meritorious Service Medals.[164]

War memorials

see text
The division memorial in Liverpool. The corbels represent tank treads. The sculpture depicts an angel with a cross holding a crown above a kneeling soldier, with the divisional motto in relief.[167]

In September 1919, the division's Comrades Association decided that two memorials would be erected: one in Liverpool, and a second in Givenchy-lès-la-Bassée. The memorial in France was constructed on land near the town's church and unveiled on 15 May 1921. The ceremony included an honour guard of division veterans, including Jeudwine, and guests including the Duchess of Sutherland, the Mayor of Liverpool, Marshal of France Joseph Joffre, and the mayors of Givenchy and other nearby towns.[168] The second (pictured), is a sandstone sculpture by Walter Gilbert that was installed in Liverpool Cathedral.[167]

Battle insignia

The practise of wearing battalion specific insignia (often called battle patches) in the BEF began in mid-1915, and became widespread after the Battle of the Somme.[169] The patches shown below were adopted on 30 March 1916, and were worn on the back below the collar. The division sign was worn on the sleeves, when introduced in May 1917. The division was unusual in extending battle patches to the engineers and artillery units.[170]

164th Brigade, from left to right, top row: the 1/4KORL, the Liverpool Irish, the 2/5LF, the 1/4LR. Bottom row: the 164th Machine Gun Company, the 164th Trench Mortar Battery.[170]
165th Brigade, from left to right, top row: the 1/5KR, the 1/6KR, the 1/7KR, the 1/9KR. Bottom row: the 165th Machine Gun Company, the 165th Trench Mortar Battery.[170]
166th Brigade, from left to right, top row: the 1/5KORL, the Liverpool Scottish, the 1/5SL, the 1/5LR. Bottom row: the 166th Machine Gun Company, the 166th Trench Mortar Battery.[170]
the 429th Field Company RE, the 422nd Field Company RE, the 423rd Field Company RE, the 1/4SL.[170]
the 275th Brigade RFA, the 276th Brigade RFA, the 55th Divisional Ammunition Column.[170]

General officers commanding

Appointed General officer commanding
1 April 1908 Major-General Edward Thompson Dickson[171][172]
6 July 1909 Major-General Edward Cecil Bethune[173]
3 June 1912 Major-General Walter Lindsay[174][175]
5 August 1914 Major-General Frederick Hammersley[175][176]
3 September 1914 Major-General John Burton Forster[24][175]
3 January 1916 Major-General Sir Hugh Jeudwine[175]
29 May 1919 Major-General Sir Reginald Barnes[177][178]

Order of battle

See also

Footnotes

  1. ^ For comparison, the average casualty rate of British battalions during the First World War was 100 per month.[40]

Citations

  1. ^ Chappell 1986, p. 35.
  2. ^ a b McCartney 2005, pp. 81–82.
  3. ^ Perry 1988, pp. 4–6.
  4. ^ Perry 1988, p. 6; Hall 1910, p. 210.
  5. ^ Perry 1988, p. 6; National Union Gleanings 1907, p. 180.
  6. ^ Perry 1988, p. 6; Beckett 1991, p. 215; Hall 2011, p. 20.
  7. ^ Who's Who 1910, p. 527; Hart 1910, pp. 108–109; Becke 1989a, p. 138.
  8. ^ Coop 1919, p. 19.
  9. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 19–20.
  10. ^ Langlois 1910, pp. 38–42.
  11. ^ Langlois 1910, pp. 38–43, 67.
  12. ^ Langlois 1910, p. 67.
  13. ^ Beckett 1991, p. 222.
  14. ^ Mitchinson 2008, pp. 167, 217.
  15. ^ Becke 1989a, pp. 138–139; Mitchinson 2005, pp. 8, 58; Mitchinson 2008, pp. 183–184.
  16. ^ Mitchinson 2008, pp. 183–184.
  17. ^ Mitchinson 2005, p. 58; Mitchinson 2008, p. 214; Mitchinson 2014, p. 67.
  18. ^ a b Coop 1919, p. 21.
  19. ^ a b Mitchinson 2008, p. 214.
  20. ^ Mitchinson 2014, p. 67.
  21. ^ Beckett 2008, pp. 53–54.
  22. ^ a b Becke 1989b, p. 6.
  23. ^ Coop 1919, p. 22; Becke 1989a, p. 133.
  24. ^ a b "No. 28895". The London Gazette (Supplement). 8 September 1914. p. 7176.
  25. ^ Coop 1919, p. 22.
  26. ^ Mitchinson 2014, p. 79.
  27. ^ a b c d e f g Becke 1989a, pp. 138–139.
  28. ^ Coop 1919, p. 23; Becke 1989a, pp. 133, 138–139; Mitchinson 2014, p. 189.
  29. ^ Mitchinson 2014, p. 189.
  30. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z aa ab ac Becke 1989a, pp. 136–137.
  31. ^ Coop 1919, p. 25.
  32. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 25–27.
  33. ^ "No. 29765". The London Gazette (Supplement). 26 September 1916. p. 9417.
  34. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 168–169.
  35. ^ "No. 29695". The London Gazette (Supplement). 4 August 1916. p. 7744.
  36. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 26–27.
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  38. ^ "No. 29740". The London Gazette (Supplement). 8 September 1916. p. 8870.
  39. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 29–30.
  40. ^ Bond 2014, p. 72.
  41. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 29–31; Wyrall 2012a, p. 300.
  42. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 31–36; Wyrall 2012a, pp. 303–305, 309, 311–312; Miles 1992, pp. 166, 184.
  43. ^ "No. 29802". The London Gazette (Supplement). 26 October 1916. p. 10394. and "No. 29802". The London Gazette (Supplement). 24 October 1916. p. 10394.
  44. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 37, 40.
  45. ^ Miles 1992, p. 274.
  46. ^ Coop 1919, p. 40.
  47. ^ Coop 1919, p. 41.
  48. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 42–44.
  49. ^ Coop 1919, p. 46.
  50. ^ a b McCartney 2005, p. 223.
  51. ^ McCartney 2005, p. 83.
  52. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 46–48; Becke 1989a, pp. 138–139.
  53. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 46–48.
  54. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 49–52.
  55. ^ a b c Coop 1919, pp. 53–54.
  56. ^ "No. 30272". The London Gazette (Supplement). 4 September 1917. p. 9259.
  57. ^ "No. 30284". The London Gazette (Supplement). 14 September 1917. p. 9533.
  58. ^ "No. 30284". The London Gazette (Supplement). 14 September 1917. p. 9531.
  59. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 55–56.
  60. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 55–60.
  61. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 60–64.
  62. ^ Becke 1989a, pp. 138–139; Coop 1919, pp. 60–64.
  63. ^ Coop 1919, p. 65.
  64. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 65, 74.
  65. ^ a b c Coop 1919, p. 74.
  66. ^ a b Cooper 1967, p. 88.
  67. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 66–67.
  68. ^ Cowper 1957, p. 188.
  69. ^ Coop 1919, p. 71.
  70. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 66–71.
  71. ^ Coop 1919, p. 72.
  72. ^ Sheldon 2009, p. 208.
  73. ^ Coop 1919, p. 73.
  74. ^ a b c Horsfall & Cave 2012, p. 66.
  75. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 74–75.
  76. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 76–78; Horsfall & Cave 2012, p. 66; Wyrall 2012b.
  77. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 76–78.
  78. ^ Wyrall 2012b, pp. 558–559.
  79. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 79–82.
  80. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 173–174.
  81. ^ "No. 30523". The London Gazette (Supplement). 13 February 1918. pp. 2004–2005.
  82. ^ a b c d McCartney 2005, p. 228.
  83. ^ Sheldon 2009, pp. 273–297.
  84. ^ Coop 1919, p. 83.
  85. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 83–84.
  86. ^ Miles 1992, p. 382.
  87. ^ a b c Watson 2008, p. 154.
  88. ^ Mitchinson 2014, p. 217.
  89. ^ Smithers 1992, p. 161.
  90. ^ a b Hammond 2008, pp. 438–439.
  91. ^ Moore 1988, pp. 182–183, 195.
  92. ^ Travers 1992, pp. 30–31.
  93. ^ Smithers 1992, p. 171.
  94. ^ Smithers 1992, p. 173.
  95. ^ Coop 1919, p. 85.
  96. ^ Perry 1988, pp. 26–28.
  97. ^ Morrow 2005, p. 239.
  98. ^ Perry 1988, p. 26.
  99. ^ Perry 1988, pp. 28–29.
  100. ^ Coop 1919, p. 85; Becke 1989a, pp. 136–137; Becke 2007, p. 3: In attached corrigenda sheet
  101. ^ Coop 1919, p. 87.
  102. ^ Coop 1919, p. 88.
  103. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 88–89.
  104. ^ Coop 1919, p. 89.
  105. ^ Edmonds 2009, p. 148.
  106. ^ Coop 1919, p. 90.
  107. ^ Coop 1919, p. 91.
  108. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, pp. 716–718, 727.
  109. ^ James 1990, p. 29.
  110. ^ Coop 1919, p. 92.
  111. ^ a b Tucker & Roberts 2005, p. 727.
  112. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 92–94, 108.
  113. ^ Edmonds 2009, pp. 162, 164, 169.
  114. ^ Coop 1919, p. 108.
  115. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 92–94.
  116. ^ "No. 30770". The London Gazette (Supplement). 25 June 1918. p. 7618.
  117. ^ Coop 1919, p. 94.
  118. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 95–96.
  119. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 174–175.
  120. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 96–97.
  121. ^ Coop 1919, p. 98.
  122. ^ Farr 2007, p. 185.
  123. ^ Coop 1919, p. 100.
  124. ^ Edmonds 2009, p. 194.
  125. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 101–102.
  126. ^ Coop 1919, p. 102.
  127. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, pp. 727, 1530.
  128. ^ Edmonds 2009, pp. 222, 257, 285.
  129. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 104–105.
  130. ^ Coop 1919, p. 105.
  131. ^ Edmonds 2009, p. 357.
  132. ^ a b c Coop 1919, p. 106.
  133. ^ Edmonds 2009, p. 493.
  134. ^ Zabecki 2006, p. 204.
  135. ^ McCartney 2005, p. 152.
  136. ^ Coop 1919, p. 116.
  137. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 116–118.
  138. ^ Edmonds 2009, p. 371.
  139. ^ Coop 1919, p. 175.
  140. ^ "No. 31340". The London Gazette. 15 May 1919. p. 6084.
  141. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 119–120.
  142. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 125–127.
  143. ^ Coop 1919, p. 127.
  144. ^ Tucker & Roberts 2005, pp. 96–98.
  145. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 127–135.
  146. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 134–136.
  147. ^ a b Edmonds & Maxwell-Hyslop 2009, pp. 125–126.
  148. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 136–139.
  149. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 139–140.
  150. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 139–141.
  151. ^ Edmonds & Maxwell-Hyslop 2009, p. 128.
  152. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 142–144.
  153. ^ Edmonds & Maxwell-Hyslop 2009, p. 408.
  154. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 143–147.
  155. ^ Edmonds & Maxwell-Hyslop 2009, pp. 142, 417.
  156. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 147–148.
  157. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 148–153.
  158. ^ Edmonds & Maxwell-Hyslop 2009, pp. 538, 541.
  159. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 154–159.
  160. ^ Edmonds & Maxwell-Hyslop 2009, p. 561.
  161. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 160, 164.
  162. ^ McGilchrist 2005, pp. 251–252, 254–255.
  163. ^ Lord & Watson 2003, p. 171.
  164. ^ a b Coop 1919, pp. 167–168.
  165. ^ Mitchinson 2014, pp. 192, 203.
  166. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 170–172.
  167. ^ a b "55th West Lancashire Division". Imperial War Museum. Archived from the original on 23 January 2018. Retrieved 31 August 2019.
  168. ^ Tomaselli 2016, pp. 216–217.
  169. ^ Chappell 1986, pp. 5–6.
  170. ^ a b c d e f Hibbard & Gibbs 2016, pp. 55–56.
  171. ^ "No. 28126". The London Gazette. 7 April 1908. p. 2672.
  172. ^ Who's Who 1910, p. 527.
  173. ^ "No. 28269". The London Gazette. 9 July 1909. p. 5282.
  174. ^ "No. 28615". The London Gazette. 7 June 1912. p. 4135.
  175. ^ a b c d Becke 1989a, p. 133.
  176. ^ "No. 28921". The London Gazette (Supplement). 29 September 1914. p. 7787.
  177. ^ "No. 31417". The London Gazette (Supplement). 24 June 1919. p. 8014.
  178. ^ Dawnay & Headlam 1921, p. 444.
  179. ^ Hart 1910, pp. 108–109.
  180. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 20–21; Becke 1989a, pp. 136–137.
  181. ^ "War Office, Monthly Army List, August 1914". National Library of Scotland. pp. 56–57. Archived from the original on 4 February 2019.
  182. ^ Becke 1989b, p. 3.
  183. ^ a b 359 MR 1959, p. 45.
  184. ^ a b c Becke 1989a, p. 135.
  185. ^ Coop 1919, pp. 11–17, 20–24.
  186. ^ Young 2000, Annex Q.

References

Further reading

  • Gregson, Adrian (2018). From Docks and Sand: Southport and Bootle's Battalion, the 7th King's Liverpool Regiment, in the First World War. Solihull: Helion. ISBN 978-1-91151-216-5.
  • Knight, Paul (2016). Liverpool Territorials in the Great War. Barnsley: Pen & Sword. ISBN 978-1-473-83404-0.
  • Knight, Paul (2019). Lessons from the Mud: 55th (West Lancashire) Division at the Third Battle of Ypres. Warwick: Helion. ISBN 978-1-912-39005-2.
  • Shannon, Kevin (2015). The Lion and the Rose: The 4th Battalion The King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment 1914–1919. Stroud: Fonthill Media. ISBN 978-1-781-55438-8.
  • Shannon, Kevin (2017). The Lion and the Rose: The 1/5th Battalion the King's Own Royal Lancaster Regiment 1914–1919. Vol. II. Stroud: Fonthill Media. ISBN 978-1-781-55555-2.
  • Shannon, Kevin (2019). The Liverpool Rifles: A Biography of the 1/6th Battalion King's Liverpool Regiment in the First World War. Stroud: Fonthill Media. ISBN 978-1-781-55701-3.
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