Iran Air Flight 655

Iran Air Flight 655

CG image of A300 EP-IBU
Occurrence
Date	July 3, 1988
Summary	Civilian Airliner shoot-down
Site	Persian Gulf
Aircraft type	Airbus A300B2-203
Operator	Iran Air
Registration	EP-IBU
Flight origin	Mehrabad International Airport
Last stopover	Bandar Abbas International Airport
Destination	Dubai International Airport
Passengers	275
Crew	15
Fatalities	290
Survivors	0

Iran Air Flight 655, also known as IR655, was a civilian airliner shot down by US missiles on Sunday July 3, 1988, over the Strait of Hormuz, towards the end of the Iran Iraq War.

Operated by Iran Air from Bandar Abbas, Iran, to Dubai, UAE, the aircraft flying as IR655 was destroyed by the U.S. Navy's guided missile cruiser USS Vincennes between Bandar Abbas and Dubai, killing all 290 aboard, ranking it seventh among the deadliest airliner fatalities. Both IR655 and the Vincennes were inside Iranian territorial waters at the time of the attack.

According to the US government, an inexperienced crew mistakenly identified the Iranian airbus as an attacking F-14 Tomcat fighter. However, the Iranian government maintained that the Vincennes knowingly shot down a civilian aircraft. The event generated a great deal of controversy and criticism of the US, particularly among Arab nations sympathetic to Iran's Islamic government. Some analysts have blamed US military commanders and the captain of the Vincennes for reckless and aggressive behavior in a tense and dangerous environment.

In 1996, the United States and Iran reached "an agreement in full and final settlement of all disputes, differences, claims, counterclaims" relating to the incident at the International Court of Justice. As part of the settlement, the United States agreed to pay $61.8 million in compensation for the Iranians killed. The United States did not admit responsibility or apologize to the Iranian government.

As of January 2008 Iran Air uses the flight number IR655 on the Tehran-Dubai route.

Background

Starting in May 1981 the war between Iraq and Iran had begun to witness attacks against oil tankers and merchant shipping of neighboring countries. Iran struck a Kuwaiti tanker in Bahrain's territorial waters on the 13th and a Saudi tanker in its own territory on the 16th. For the next five years, attacks continued until Kuwait petitioned the US for help in 1986. Besides the obvious damage to Kuwaiti and Saudi business interests, they also affected the flow of oil to America. In May 1987, USS Stark was struck by two missiles launched by an Iraqi Mirage F-1, killing 37. No weapons were fired in self-defense during the attack.

In July 1987 eleven Kuwaiti-owned oil tankers were reflagged under the U.S. flag, and the Navy instituted Operation Earnest Will on the orders of President Reagan to protect these and other U.S. registered shipping. They also undertook, again under Presidential directive, Operation Prime Chance. Following months of low intensity conflict, in April 1988 the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts struck an Iranian mine, leading to a retaliation by the US called Operation Praying Mantis. The US Navy was operating under what Admiral Crowe called "the air of terrorism and peril that pervaded the Gulf at that time."

On April 29, 1988 the U.S. expanded the scope of the U.S. Navy's protection to all friendly neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf outside of declared exclusion zones, which set the military scene of the shootdown incident.

At about the same time Vincennes was rushed to the area on a short-notice deployment, as a result of high-level decisions, to compensate for the lack of airborne AWACS coverage which hampered U.S. monitoring of the southern Persian Gulf. Vincennes departed San Diego on April 25 and arrived in Bahrain on May 29, under the command of Captain William C. Rogers III and fitted with the then-new Aegis combat system.

Shootdown

Locater map depicting Iran Air 655's origination point, destination and approximate location of the shootdown. (The air corridor is not necessarily a direct path)

The plane, an Airbus A300B2, registered as EP-IBU and flown by Mohsen Rezaian, a veteran captain with 7,000 hours of flight time, left Bandar Abbas at 10:17 am Iran time (UTC +03:30), 27 minutes after its scheduled departure time. It should have been a 28-minute flight. After takeoff, it was directed by the Bandar Abbas tower to turn on its transponder and proceed over the Persian Gulf. The flight was assigned routinely to commercial air corridor Amber 59, a twenty-mile-wide lane on a direct line to Dubai airport. The short distance made for a simple flight pattern: climb to 14,000 feet (about 4,300 m), cruise for a short time, and descend into Dubai.

Aegis screen displays on Ticonderoga-class cruiser USS Vincennes

On the morning of July 3, the Vincennes was passing through the Strait of Hormuz returning from an escort duty. A helicopter from the USS Vincennes received warning fire after it buzzed Iranian patrol vessels. The Vincennes then crossed into Iranian territorial waters and opened fire on Iranian gunboats. The USS Sides (FFG-14) and USS Elmer Montgomery (FF-1082) were nearby.

It was shortly after this gunfire exchange that Iran Air Flight 655 approached to begin its transit of the Straits. The USS Vincennes fired missiles at the airliner, destroying it and causing it to fall into the waters of the Gulf.

The event triggered an intense controversy, with Iran condemning the shootdown as a "barbaric act." In mid-July 1988, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati asked the United Nations Security Council to condemn the United States saying the downing "could not have been a mistake" and was a "criminal act," an "atrocity" and a "massacre." George H.W. Bush, at the time Vice President of the United States in the Reagan Administration, defended his country at the United Nations by arguing that the shootdown had been a wartime incident and that the crew of the Vincennes had acted appropriately to the situation at the time. The Soviet Union asked the US to withdraw from the area and supported efforts made by the Security Council to end the Iran-Iraq war. The remainder of the 13 delegates that spoke echoed the US position saying one of the problems was that a 1987 resolution to end the Iran-Iraq war had been ignored. Following the debate, Security Council Resolution 616 was passed expressing "deep distress" over the downing, "profound regret" for the loss of life, and stressed the need to end the Iran-Iraq war as resolved in 1987.

US government accounts

A missile departs the forward launcher of Vincennes during a 1987 exercise. The forward launcher was also used in the downing of Iran Air 655.

According to the US government, the Vincennes mistakenly identified the Iranian airliner as an attacking military fighter. The officers identified the flight profile being flown by the Airbus A300B2 as being similar to that of an F-14A Tomcat during an attack run. The commercial flight had originated at Bandar Abbas, which served dual roles as a base for Iranian F-14 operations and as a hub for commercial, civilian flights. According to the same reports, the Vincennes tried unsuccessfully to contact the approaching aircraft, four times on the military emergency frequency and three times on the civilian emergency frequency, but never on air traffic control frequencies.

At 10:24 am, with the civilian jet 11 nautical miles (20 km) away, the Vincennes fired two SM-2MR surface-to-air missiles which both hit Flight 655. After the engagement, the Vincennes' crew realized that the plane had been a civilian airliner.

This version was finalized in a report by Admiral William Fogarty, entitled Formal Investigation into the Circumstances Surrounding the Downing of Iran Air Flight 655 on 3 July 1988. Only parts of this report have been released (part I in 1988 and part II in 1993), which has drawn criticism from many observers. The Fogarty report stated, "The data from USS Vincennes tapes, information from USS Sides and reliable intelligence information, corroborate the fact that [Iran Air Flight 655] was on a normal commercial air flight plan profile, in the assigned airway, squawking Mode III 6760, on a continuous ascent in altitude from takeoff at Bandar Abbas to shoot-down."

When questioned in a 2000 BBC documentaay, the US government stated in a written answer that they believed the incident may have been caused by a simultaneous psychological condition amongst the 18 bridge crew of the Vincennes called 'scenario fulfilment', which is said to occur when persons are under pressure. In such a situation, the men will carry out a training scenario, believing it to be reality while ignoring sensory information that contradicts the scenario. In the case of this incident, the scenario was an attack by a lone military aircraft.

The U.S. government issued notes of regret for the loss of human life and in 1996 paid reparations to settle a suit brought in the International Court of Justice regarding the incident. It never admitted wrongdoing, accepted responsibility, nor apologized for the incident. In August 1988 Newsweek quoted the vice president as saying; "I'll never apologize for the United States of America. Ever, I don't care what the facts are." in regard to the shoot down or any other mistakes. Bush used the phrase frequently during the 1988 campaign and promised to "never apologize for the United States" months prior to the July 1988 shootdown and as early as January 1988. An independent investigation by the ICAO concluded that the US was at fault by cultivating an unstable battle scenario with no regard for civilian air traffic.

Iranian government account

A 45 rial postage stamp released by Iran on 11 August 1988, in commemoration of the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 by the USS Vincennes.

According to the Iranian government, the shooting down of IR 655 by the Vincennes was an intentionally performed and unlawful act. Even if there was a mistaken identification, which Iran has not accepted, it argues that this constituted gross negligence and recklessness amounting to an international crime, not an accident. Source gallery provides no caption for this image. The photo's author, the date it was taken and what the image depicts is not known.</ref>]]

Independent sources

John Barry and Roger Charles of Newsweek wrote that Rogers acted recklessly and without due care in their July 13, 1992 article. They also accused the U.S. government of a cover-up which Admiral Crowe refuted. An analysis of the events by the International Strategic Studies Association described the deployment of an Aegis cruiser in the zone as irresponsible and felt that the expense of the ship had played a major part in the setting of a low threshold for opening fire. The Vincennes had been nicknamed 'Robocruiser' by crew members and other US Navy ships, both in reference to its AEGIS system, and to the supposed aggressive tendencies of its captain.

On November 6, 2003 the International Court of Justice ruled that "the actions of the United States of America against Iranian oil platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States of America." However, the case relating to the Airbus downing, "the Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America)", was dropped 22 February, 1996 following settlement and reparations by the United States.

Three years after the incident, Admiral William J. Crowe admitted on American television show Nightline that the Vincennes was inside Iranian territorial waters when it launched the missiles. This contradicted earlier Navy statements.

Commander David Carlson, commanding officer of the USS Sides, the warship stationed near to the Vincennes at the time of the incident, is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have said that the destruction of the aircraft "marked the horrifying climax to Captain Rogers' aggressiveness, first seen four weeks ago." His comment referred to incidents on June 2, when Rogers had sailed the Vincennes too close to an Iranian frigate undertaking a lawful search of a bulk carrier, launched a helicopter within 2-3 miles (3.2-4.8 km) of an Iranian small craft despite rules of engagement requiring a four-mile (6.4 km) separation, and opened fire on a number of small Iranian military boats. Of those incidents, Carlson commented, "Why do you want an Aegis cruiser out there shooting up boats? It wasn't a smart thing to do." He also said of Iranian forces he'd encountered in the area a month prior to the incident were "...pointedly non-threatening" and professional. At the time of Rogers' announcement to higher command that he was going to shoot down the plane, Carlson is reported (Fisk, 2005) to have been thunderstruck: "I said to folks around me, 'Why, what the hell is he doing?' I went through the drill again. F-14. He’s climbing. By now this damn thing is at 7,000 feet." However, Carlson thought the Vincennes might have more information, and was unaware that Rogers had been wrongly informed that the plane was diving.

Craig, Morales & Oliver, in a slide presentation published in M.I.T.'s Spring 2004 Aeronautics & Astronautics, as the "USS Vincennes Incident," commented that Captain Rogers had "an undeniable and unequivocal tendency towards what I call 'picking a fight.'" On his own initiative, Rogers moved the Vincennes 50 miles (80 km) northeast to join the USS Montgomery. An angry Captain McKenna ordered Rogers back to Abu Musa, but the Vincennes helicopter pilot, Lt Mark Collier, followed the Iranian speedboats as they retreated north, eventually taking some fire:

"…the Vincennes jumps back into the fray. Heading towards the majority of the speedboats, he is unable to get a clear target. Also, the speedboats are now just slowly milling about in their own territorial waters. Despite clear information to the contrary, Rogers informs command that the gunboats are gathering speed and showing hostile intent and gains approval to fire upon them at 0939. Finally, in another fateful decision, he crosses the 12-mile (19 km) limit off the coast and enters illegally into Iranian waters."

Radio communication

Throughout its final flight IR655 was in radio contact with various air traffic control services using standard civil aviation frequencies, and had spoken in English to Bandar Abbas Approach Control seconds before the Vincennes launched its missiles. According to the U.S. Navy investigation the Vincennes at that time had no equipment suitable for monitoring civil aviation frequencies, other than the International Air Distress frequency. Subsequently U.S. Navy warships in the area were equipped with dialable VHF radios, and access to flight plan information was sought, to better track commercial airliners.

The official ICAO report stated that 10 attempts were made to contact Iran Air flight 655: seven on military frequencies and three on commercial frequencies, addressed to an "unidentified Iranian aircraft" and giving its speed as 350 knots (650 km/h). Indeed both Sides and Vincennes tried contacting flight 655 on several civilian and military frequencies.

However IR655 was arguably not "unidentified" as its commercial Mode III Transponder was active and squawking its assigned 6760 identifier code. It was traveling at an airspeed of 300 knots (560 km/h). The reference to "350 knots" was its speed over ground, as observed by radar.

International investigations concluded that the crew of IR655 assumed that the three calls that they received before the missiles struck must have been directed at an Iranian P3 (see below).

Potential factors

• The ship's crew did not efficiently consult commercial airliner schedules, due to confusion over which time zone the schedules referred to. The airliner's departure was 27 minutes later than scheduled. "The CIC was also very dark, and the few lights that it did have flickered every time the Vincennes fired at the speedboats. This was of special concern to Petty Officer Andrew Anderson, who first picked up Flight 655 on radar and thought that it might be a commercial aircraft. As he was searching in the Navy's listing of commercial flights, he apparently missed Flight 655 because it was so dark."
• An Iranian P-3 was in the area some time before the attack, thought to be flying a "classic targeting profile", and in some reports providing an explanation no radar signals were detected from Iran Air Flight 655. Other reports state that the Airbus was immediately detected after takeoff by Vincennes's AN/SPY-1 radar at a range of 47 miles.
• The crew of the Vincennes Combat Information Center (CIC) confusingly reported the plane as ascending and descending at the same time (there were two "camps"). This seems to have happened because the Airbus' original CIC track, number 4474, had been replaced by the Sides track, number 4131, when the computer recognised them as one and the same. Shortly thereafter, track 4474 was re-assigned by the system to an American A-6, several hundred miles away, which was following a descending course at the time. Apparently not all the crew in the CIC realized the track number had been switched on them.
• The psychology and mindset after engaging in a battle with Iranian gunboats. There are claims that Vincennes was engaged in an operation using a decoy cargo ship to lure Iranian gunboats to a fight. However, those claims are denied by Fogarty in "Hearing Before The Investigation Subcommittee and The Defense Policy Panel of The Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session, July 21, 1992". Also, the initial claims of Vincennes being called for help by a cargo ship attacked by Iranian gunboats have been ruled out. That leads to claims that the Iranian gunboats were provoked by helicopters inside Iranian waters and not the other way around. This might have contributed to the mistakes made. The actual reasons for the Vincennes' engagement with gunboats is not so clear to this date.
• Software development expert Steve McConnell said:

• Iran Air Flight 655 was shot down by the USS Vincennes' Aegis system in 1988, killing 290 people. The error was initially attributed to operator error, but later some experts attributed the incident to the poor design of the Aegis user interface.

• A lack of training contributed to the disaster.

  It was, however, a known fact that many of the senior officers on board the Vincennes knew very little about computerized warfare. The tactical officer for surface warfare, Lt Cmdr Guillory, knew so little that he routinely used his computer screens as a surface for sticky notes instead. Petty Officer Anderson, who missed Flight 655 on the schedule because it was so dark, also later claimed that he was confused by the gulf's four different time zones, something proper training could have easily helped with. Lt Clay Zocher was the boss of Air Alley, which was responsible for air warfare, but he had only stood watch at that post twice before and had never fully learned and mastered the console routines. In fact, when he was finally given the green light to fire upon the incoming aircraft, he pressed the wrong keys 23 times, until a veteran petty officer leaned over and hit the right ones. Nerves were shattered, and the training seemed nonexistent."

Medals awarded

The men of the Vincennes were all awarded combat-action ribbons. Lustig, the air-warfare co-ordinator, received the navy's Commendation Medal for "heroic achievement," noting his "ability to maintain his poise and confidence under fire" that enabled him to "quickly and precisely complete the firing procedure". The Legion of Merit was presented to Rogers and Lustig on 3 July 1988, according to a 23 April 1990 article in The Washington Post. The citations did not mention the Iran Air flight. It should be noted that the Legion of Merit is often awarded to high-ranking officers upon successful completion of especially difficult duty assignments and/or last tours of duty before retirement.

The incident overshadowed U.S.-Iran relations for many years. Following the explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 six months later, the British and American governments initially blamed the PFLP-GC, a Palestinian militant group backed by Syria, with assumptions of assistance from Iran in retaliation for Iran Air Flight 655. The cause of the crash was later determined to be a bomb associated with the Libyan intelligence service.

The Flight 655 incident has often been compared to the downing of Korean Air Flight 007 by the Soviet Air Force in 1983.

Compensation

The U.S. government issued notes of regret for the loss of innocent human life. The government never admitted wrongdoing, accepted responsibility, nor apologized to the Iranian government.

In February 1996 the United States agreed to pay Iran US$131.8 million in settlement to discontinue a case brought by Iran in 1989 against the U.S. in the International Court of Justice relating to this incident, together with other earlier claims before the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. US$61.8 million of the claim was in compensation for the 248 Iranians killed in the shootdown ($300,000 per wage-earning victim, $150,000 per non-wage-earner). It was not disclosed how the remaining $70 million of the settlement was apportioned. Further compensation was paid for the 38 non-Iranian deaths. The payment of compensation was explicitly characterised by the US as being on an ex gratia basis, and the U.S. denied having any responsibility or liability for what happened.

Additional resources

1. Nunn Wants to Reopen Inquiry into Vincennes’ Gulf Location. Washington Times, July 4, 1992. Abstract: Senator Sam Nunn called on the Pentagon to probe allegations that the Navy "deliberately misled Congress" about the location of the USS Vincennes when it shot down an Iranian civilian airliner four years ago.
2. Fisk, Robert. The Great War for Civilisation — The Conquest of the Middle East. London: Fourth Estate, 2005. 318–328. ISBN 1-84115-007-X
3. Marian Nash Leich, "Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a Humanitarian Basis" American Journal of International Law Vol. 83 p. 319 (1989)
4. USS Vincennes Incident; Dan Craig, Dan Morales, Mike Oliver; M.I.T. Aeronautics & Astronautics, Spring 2004

See also

• Lists of accidents and incidents on commercial airliners
• List of airliner shootdown incidents

External links

• "The Vincennes Incident" Letter by Commander David R Carlson, published in the Proceedings of the US Naval Institute, Sept 1989
• ABC Nightline interview with Admiral William Crowe aired 1 July 1992, in which Crowe admits that the Vincennes was inside Iranian waters at the time of the shooting, despite what the Navy had been claiming.
• US Senate, Armed Services Committee hearing, 8 September 1988
• A collection of US government statements on Iran Air Flight 655
• Tragedy over the Persian Gulf, from Chapter 9 of Trapped in the Net:The Unanticipated Consequences of Computerization by Gene I. Rochlin
• Vincennes A Case Study, Lieutenant Colonel David Evans, U.S. Marine Corps (Retired)
• Iran Air shot down, The History Channel
• Iran Air 655 Shootdown, Iran Chamber
• Mehr News, Mehr News Agency
• ICJ case — Written Pleadings, Iran and U.S. cases to the International Court of Justice
• U.S. Department of State Bulletin Sept. 1988 Transcripts: July 3, 1998, President’s Statement; July 4, 1988, Letter To Congress; July 6, 1988, U.S. Letter To The UN Security Council; July 11, 1988, Herbert S. Okun, White House Statement; July 13, 1988, Assistant Secretary Richard S. Williamson, ICAO Council, Montreal; July 14, 1988, Vice-President Bush, UN Security Council
• Sea of Lies, Newsweek, July 13, 1992
• Photogallery

Further reading

• Rochlin, Gene I. (1997). Trapped in the Net: The Unanticipated Consequences of Computerization. USA: Princeton University Press.
• Wise, Harold Lee (2007). Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf 1987-88. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-970-3. {{cite book}}: External link in |title= (help)

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