Israeli West Bank barrier

The barrier route as of May 2005. Some previously-approved portions have become uncertain due to Supreme Court decisions and are subject to re-design. As of January 2006 the length of the barrier as approved by the Israeli government is 670 kilometers. Approximately 36% has been constructed, 25% is under construction, 20% has been approved but construction has not yet begun, and the remaining 19% awaits final approval

The Israeli West Bank barrier is a physical barrier being constructed by Israel consisting of a network of fences with vehicle-barrier trenches (95%) and concrete walls (5%).

The barrier is a very controversial project, with little common ground between supporters and opponents.

Supporters regard it as a necessary tool protecting Israeli civilians from terrorist attacks in Israel that increased significantly during the al-Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 [1][2] and regard it as a major causal factor in reducing incidents of terrorism by 90% from 2002 to 2005.Template:Fn

Opponents argue that it violates international humanitarian and human rights law, and regard it as an attempt to annex land occupied by illegal settlements, and to pre-empt final status negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Opposition to the barrier is focused on the route of the barrier and its impact on the Palestinians who live nearby, particularly on their ability to travel freely within the West Bank and to get access to work in Israel.

A similar barrier, the Israeli Gaza Strip barrier, was constructed parallel to the Gaza Strip portion of the 1949 armistice line in 1994. This barrier did not stray significantly from the armistice line, and it has not been as controversial as the West Bank barrier has been.

Overview

Names of, and epithets for, the barrier

The name of the barrier is itself a political issue to some people. Israel most commonly refers to the barrier as the "separation fence" (גדר ההפרדה, gader ha'hafrada^ⓘ or geder ha'hafrada) in Hebrew and "security fence" or "anti-terrorist fence" or sometimes Hafrada fence or wall[3] in English, with "seam zone" referring to the land between the fence and the 1949 armistice lines. Palestinians most commonly refer to the barrier in Arabic as "jidar al-fasl al-'unsuri"^ⓘ, (racial segregation wallTemplate:Fn), and some opponents of the barrier refer to it in English by the epithet, "apartheid wall". The United Nations and the international community use various names including separation/security and fence/wall/barrier.

History and stated purpose

Since its inception, Israel has erected physical barriers as a means of protection against fedayeen and guerrilla attacks.

File:JeninFence.jpg

The barrier near Jenin, northern West Bank, July 2003

The idea of creating a physical barrier between the Israeli and Palestinian populations was first proposed by Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, following the murder of an Israeli teenage girl in Jerusalem. Rabin said that Israel must "take Gaza out of Tel Aviv", in order to minimize friction between the peoples. Following an outbreak of violent incidents in Gaza in October 1994, Rabin announced his stance that "we have to decide on separation as a philosophy. There has to be a clear border. Without demarcating the lines, whoever wants to swallow 1.8 million Arabs will just bring greater support for Hamas." [4]

To this end, the government of Yitzhak Rabin built the Israeli Gaza Strip barrier in 1994. Following an attack on Bet Lid, near the city of Netanya, Rabin made his goals more specific:

This path must lead to a separation, though not according to the borders prior to 1967. We want to reach a separation between us and them. We do not want a majority of the Jewish residents of the state of Israel, 98% of whom live within the borders of sovereign Israel, including a united Jerusalem, to be subject to terrorism.

In early 1995, the Shahal commission was established by Yitzhak Rabin to discuss how to implement a barrier separating Israelis and Palestinians. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, prior to the Camp David 2000 Summit with Yasser Arafat, vowed to build a separation barrier, stating that it is "essential to the Palestinian nation in order to foster its national identity and independence without being dependent on the State of Israel". [1, p54]

Israeli Supreme Court made reference to the conditions and history that led to the building of the barrier. In the September 2005 decision [5], it described the history of violence against Israeli citizens since the breakout of Al-Aqsa Intifada and the loss of life that ensued on the Israeli side. The court ruling also cited the attempts Israel had made to defend its citizens, including "military operations" carried out against "terrorist acts", and stated that these actions...

...did not provide a sufficient answer to the immediate need to stop the severe acts of terrorism. . . . Despite all these measures, the terror did not come to an end. The attacks did not cease. Innocent people paid with both life and limb. This is the background behind the decision to construct the separation fence (Id., at p. 815)

Grassroots effort

In June 2001 a grass roots organization called "Fence for Life - The Public Movement for The Security Fence" [6] began the grassroots effort for the construction of a continuous security fence. The movement was founded by people from all over Israel following the Dolphinarium terror attack.

The goal of the Movement, is to encourage the government to construct a Security Fence along Israel's borders. "Fence for Life" urged the government to build a continuous Fence as speedily as possible, and without any connection to the political future of the areas it separates, with a goal of hermetically sealing off the Palestinian territories from Israeli population center to prevent the terrorist acts by Palestinians against the people living in Israel.

From the very beginning of its public campaign , "Fence for Life" emphasized that any Security Fence has no connection whatsoever to the political future of the settlements. The Movement for the Security Fence for Israel included protests, demonstrations, conferences with public figures, media blitzes, lobbying in the Knesset as well as legal battles in the High Court of Justice, both with demands to quickly build the Security Fence as well as appeals not to cause further delay in construction. The Movement does not support any specific path for the Barrier, as this is subject to a government decision. "Fence for Life" was of the opinion that “politicization” of the Fence by various groups was delaying the completion of the Security Barrier and is likely to block its construction. At the end of 2002, due to government inaction several localities who suffered the most from lack of a border barrier have started to build the barrier using their own funds directly on the green-line. [7]

Government action

Although at the beginning the Israeli government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was hesitant to construct the barrier, it finally embraced the plan. The stated purpose of the barrier is to prevent terrorists from entering Israeli cities, a problem which has plagued Israel since the start of the Second Intifada. A secondary purpose of the barrier is to prevent illegal infiltrations by Palestinians, mainly illegal immigrants and car thieves. The Israeli government says that the high concrete portions are to protect cars and people on the Israeli side from gunfire. Many Israelis note the danger of terrorist incursions from the area, such as waves of suicide bombings in early 2002. (see Netanya suicide attack).

Route and Route Timeline

The barrier generally runs along or near the 1949 Jordanian-Israeli armistice/Green Line, but diverges in many places [8] to include on the Israeli side several of the highly populated areas of Jewish settlements in the West Bank such as East Jerusalem, Ariel, Gush Etzion, Emmanuel, Karnei Shomron, Givat Ze'ev, Oranit, and Maale Adumim. Because of the complex path it follows, most of the barrier is actually set in the West Bank [9] and diverges from the "Green Line" by anywhere from 200 meters to as much as 20 kilometers, with the result that many Israeli settlements in the West Bank remain on the Israeli side of the barrier, and some Palestinian towns are nearly encircled by it. Approximately 20% is actually on the Green Line.[10]. The proponents of the barrier claim that its route is not set in stone, as it was challenged in court and changed several times. They note that the cease-fire line of 1949 was negotiated "without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines" (Art. VI.9) [11]. Security experts argue that the topography does not permit putting the barrier along the Green Line in some places, because hills or tall buildings on the Palestinian side would make the barrier ineffective against terrorism. [12]. The International Court of Justice has countered that in such cases it is only legal to build the barrier inside Israel.

As of November 2003, the barrier extends inside most of the northwestern and western edges of the West Bank, sometimes close to the Green Line, and sometimes running further east. In some places there are also secondary barriers, creating a number of completely enclosed enclaves. It is not known whether a decision has been made to build a barrier on the eastern side of the main regions of Palestinian Arab population. Depending mostly on this decision, somewhere between 6% and 45% of the West Bank will eventually be outside the barrier.

In October 2003, the region between the barrier and the Green Line was declared a special military area. Although all Israelis and all Jews regardless of nationality can enter the region freely, Palestinians can enter only with special permits even if they are residents of one of the dozen or so Arab villages in the region. Many who tried to obtain permits were refused them.

In February 2004, Israel said it would review the route of the barrier in response to U.S. and Palestinian concerns. In particular, Israeli cabinet members said modifications would be made to reduce the number of checkpoints Palestinians had to cross, and especially to reduce Palestinian hardship in areas such as Qalqilya where the barrier goes very near, and in some cases nearly encircles, populated areas.

On June 30, 2004, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that a portion of the barrier near Jerusalem violates the rights of Palestinians, and ordered 30 km of existing and planned barrier to be rerouted. However, it did rule that the barrier is legal in essence and accepted the Israeli government's claim that it is a security measure. On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion that it is a violation of international law. At the beginning of September 2004, Israel started the southern part of the barrier.

On February 18, 2005, the Israeli cabinet approved a new route. The new route is 681 kilometers and would leave approximately seven percent of the West Bank and 10,000 Palestinians on the Israeli side. Map: [13] Before that time, the exact route of the barrier had not been finalized, and it had been alleged by opponents that the barrier route would encircle the West Bank, separating it from the Jordan valley [14]. However, there is no indication in government plans or work on the ground that support such allegations.

As of January 2006, approximately 31% has been constructed; another 16.5% is under construction; 43% has been approved and the remaining 9.5% requires final approval.

A report published by Human rights group B'Tselem claims that the route was not chosen based on correct security claims and includes an area designated for expansion of settlements. The Human rights groups demanded to halt West Bank fence construction, dismantling of sections not built along Green Line. A B'Tselem member was quoted saying: ‘Report shows that not only were security reasons secondary in many areas, but in places where security and settlements traverse each other, the planners chose a route which includes an area designated for expansion of settlements.' One of the area cited by the report is north of the city of Kalkilia (see Israeli West Bank barrier#Effects on Palestinians which is a subject of new petition filled with Israeli supreme court. As a result of past rullings by the court (especially Israeli West Bank barrier#Israeli Supreme Court decision of 2005) the government announce a plan to shorten a 9.5 K"m section of the route to 1350 meters in a way that it would prevent much of the damage to Palestinian agriculture in the area around Kalkilia. Over 800 Dunams (800,000 m²) that were on the Israeli side of the fence will be returned to the Palestinians side.

See also The 1949 Cease-fire line vs. the permanent border.

Structure

The barrier at Abu Dis, east of Jerusalem, June 2004

Most of the barrier (over 95% of total length) consists of a wire fence with an exclusion area on each side, often including an anti-vehicle trench, and averaging approximately 60 m in width. Some sections (less than 5% of total length) are constructed as a wall made up of concrete slabs up to 8 m in height and 3 m in width. Occasionally, due to topographic conditions other sections of the barrier will reach up to 100 m in width.[15] Wall construction (5%) is more common in urban settings, such as areas near Qalqiliya and Jerusalem, because it is narrower, requires less land, and provides more protection against snipers. In all cases there are regular observation posts, automated sensing devices and other apparatus. Gates at various points are controlled by Israeli soldiers. The total length as officially authorized by the end of 2003 will be 650 km (403 miles).

Effects and Consequences

Effects on Israeli Security

Israeli statistics indicate that the barrier has drastically reduced the number of Palestinian infiltrations and suicide bombings and other attacks on civilians in Israel and in Israeli settlements, and Israeli officials assert that completion of the barrier will make it even more effective in stopping these attacks [16] since "An absolute halt in terrorist activities has been noticed in the West Bank areas where the fence has been constructed". [17]

Israeli officers, including the head of the Shin Bet, quoted in the newspaper Maariv, have claimed that in the areas where the barrier was complete, the number of hostile infiltrations has decreased to almost zero. Maariv also stated that Palestinian militants, including a senior member of Islamic Jihad, had confirmed that the barrier made it much harder to conduct attacks inside Israel. Since the completion of the fence in the area of Tulkarem and Qalqiliya in June 2003, there have been no successful attacks from those areas, all attacks have been intercepted or the suicide bombers have detonated prematurely. [1, p56]

During the twelve month period from August 2003 to July 2004 three suicide bombers launched attacks from areas where the fence has been completed which resulted in no deaths or injuries. In contrast during the preceding twelve months, from September 2002 to August 2003, 73 attacks were successfully carried out from these areas, in which 293 Israelis were killed and 1,950 were wounded. The decrease in casualties was not due to a decrease in attempted terrorist attacks; from August 2003 to July 2004 Israeli security forces prevented dozens of planned attacks in the final stages of their implementation and uncovered 24 explosive belts and charges intended to be used for these attacks. From July 2004 to October 2004 only one suicide bombing has resulted in casualties in areas where the barrier has been built. [18]

While there is general agreement that effects to date have coincided with improved Israeli security, the future effects on Israeli security are not known. The cease-fire agreement of December 2005 has naturally led to a decrease in Palestinian militant attacks and has offered less opportunities for Israel to test the barrier's efficacy. The Palestinian NGO MIFTA speculates that long-term effects will create more Palestinian hostility towards Israel and that the current security benefits will be "only an illusion": "although the wall may give some immediate relief from the relentless series of terrorist attacks inflicted on the state and people of Israel, building the fence on Palestinian territory will inflame tensions in the region and do nothing to solve the crisis. ... it will give only an illusion of security to the people of Israel in the longer term." [19] On the other hand, Israeli Ambassador to U.S. Daniel Ayalon speculates that the barrier will "save the political process" and lead to long-term security because otherwise "terrorist groups have the ability to hold that process hostage because of their capability to conduct these devastating acts." [20] Lt. Col. Dotan Razili of the Israeli Defense Forces speculates that the long-term effects of a security barrier around the West Bank will be similar to the long-term security effects of the security barrier around Gaza. In an interview on the PBS program The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, he says that "we have experience in other borders... since 1996 if I'm not mistaken, no suicide bombers went out of the Gaza because we have fenced it." [21]

Effects on Demography and Asset Values

According to a 2005 report published by the Jerusalem Institute for Israel Studies, the barrier being built around Jerusalem may have unintended effects on the city. According to the study, many Jerusalem Palestinians who were living in areas outside the barrier are now moving back into the city, creating housing shortages, increased real estate prices, and sprawling of Palestinians into traditionally Jewish neighborhoods of the city. [22]

Effects on Palestinians

File:Israel barrier zigzag.jpg

"The barrier on the green-line, separating the Israeli-Arab town of Baka West (inside Israel, on the left) from the Palestinian town of Nazlat Issa inside the West Bank (right.)"

The barrier has many effects on Palestinians including reduced freedoms, decreased checkpoints and closures, loss of land, change in political tactics and strategy, and economic effects.

Reduced Freedoms: in its most recent report, the UN states that:

...it is difficult to overstate the humanitarian impact of the Barrier. The route inside the West Bank severs communities, people’s access to services, livelihoods and religious and cultural amenities. In addition, plans for the Barrier’s exact route and crossing points through it are often not fully revealed until days before construction commences. This has led to considerable anxiety amongst Palestinians about how their future lives will be impacted...The land between the Barrier and the Green Line constitutes some of the most fertile in the West Bank. It is currently the home for 49,400 West Bank Palestinians living in 38 villages and towns [23]

An often-quoted example of the effects of the barrier is the Palestinian town of Qalqilya, a city of around 45,000, where an 8 meter-high concrete section is built on the Green Line between the city and the nearby Trans-Israel Highway, the wall in this section is referred to as a "sniper wall" claimed to prevent gun attacks against Israeli motorists and the Israeli town of Kfar Saba) [24] runs for more than 3 kilometers to the west of the city along the Green Line. The barrier, in the form of a series of razor wires and trenches, also dips beyond the Green Line to encircle Qalqilya from northern and southern sides [25] [26][27]. The city is accessible through a main road from the east, and an underground tunnel built in September 2004 on the south side connects Qalqilya with the adjacent village of Habla which has been cut off by another barrier. Recently, the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the government to change the route of the barrier in this area to ease movement of Palestinians between Qalqilya and 5 surrounding villages. In the same ruling, the court rejected the arguments that the fence must be built only on the Green Line. The ruling cited the topography of the terrain, security considerations, and sections 43 and 52 of The Hague Regulations 1907 and Article 53 of the 4th Geneva Convention (see section 16 in [28]) as reasons for this rejection.

File:Israelwall.jpg

A section of the Israeli West Bank barrier between Qalqiliyia and the nearby Israeli highway. This section of the barrier is on the 1949 Jordanian-Israeli armistice line.

In early October 2003, the OC Central Command declared the area between the separation barrier in the northern section of the West Bank (Stage 1) and the Green Line a closed military area for an indefinite period of time. New directives stated that every Palestinian over the age of twelve living in the enclaves created in the closed area have to obtain a “permanent resident permit” from the Civil Administration to enable them to continue to live in their homes. Other residents of the West Bank have to obtain special permits to enter the area.[29]

Decreased Checkpoints and Closures: in June 2004, the Washington Times[30] reported that the reduced need for Israeli military incursions in Jenin have prompted efforts to rebuild damaged streets and buildings and a gradual return to a semblance of normalcy, and in a letter [31] dated October 25, 2004, from the Israeli mission to Kofi Annan, Israel's government pointed out that a number of restrictions east of the barrier have been lifted as a result of the barrier, including a reduction in checkpoints from 71 to 47 and roadblocks from 197 to 111. The Jerusalem Post reports that, for some Palestinians who are Israeli citizens living in the Israeli Arab town of Umm El-Fahm (pop. 42,000) near Jenin, the barrier has "significantly improved their lives" because, on one hand, it prevents would-be thieves or terrorists from coming to their town and, on the other hand, has increased the flow of customers from other parts of Israel who would normally have gone to the West Bank, resulting in an economic boon. The report states that the downsides are that the barrier has divided families in half and "damaged Israeli Arabs' solidarity with the Palestinians living on the other side of the Green Line" [32].

A UN report released in August 2005 observed that the existence of the barrier "replaced the need for closures: movement within the northern West Bank, for example, is less restrictive where the Barrier has been constructed. Physical obstacles have also been removed in Ramallah and Jerusalem governorates where the Barrier is under construction." The report notes that more freedom of movement in rural areas may ease Palestinian access to hospitals and schools, but also notes that restrictions on movement between urban population centers have not significantly changed [33].

Loss of Land: parts of the barrier are built on land confiscated from Palestinians. [34] [35]. In a recent report, the UN noted that the most recent barrier route allocates more segments to be built on the Green Line itself compared to previous draft routes of the barrier. [36]

As of May 2004, the fence construction had already uprooted an estimated 102,320 Palestinian olive and citrus trees, demolished 75 acres (0.3 km²) of greenhouses and 23 miles (37 km) of irrigation pipes. At that point, it rested on 15,000 dunums (3,705 acres or 15 km²) of confiscated land, only meters away from a number of small villages, or hamlets. In early 2003, in order to move a section of the barrier to the Green Line, a ramshackle mall of 63 shops was demolished by the IDF in the village of Nazlat Issa [37][38][39]. In August of that year, an additional 115 shops/stalls (an important source of income for several communities) and five to seven homes were also demolished there [40][41]. The United Nations has established a registry to register claims of property damage caused by the separation barrier. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, said, "...we are establishing that register to be able in time to help those with claims." [42] The Israeli Government has promised that trees affected by the construction will be replanted [43]. According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 15 communities were to be directly affected, numbering approximately 138,593 Palestinians, including 13,450 refugee families, or 67,250 individuals. In addition to loss of land, in the city of Qalqilya one-third of the city's water wells lie on the other side of the barrier. The Israeli Supreme Court notes the Israeli government's rejection of accusations of a de facto annexation of these wells, stating that "the construction of the fence does not affect the implementation of the water agreements determined in the (interim) agreement" (Section 67d).

Change In Political Tactics and Strategy: Members of Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad have been less able to conduct terrorist attacks, the numbers of which have decreased in areas where the barrier has been completed. [44] [45] Daniel Ayalon, Israel's ambassador to the United States, suggested that reduced ability to conduct terrorist attacks would "save the political process" because the barrier would neutralize the ability of terrorist groups "to hold that process hostage" by conducting these devastating acts.[46]

Figure 1: Real Annual GDP Growth, West Bank. Source: CIA World Factbook

Economic Effects: GDP in the West Bank declined significantly from $3.3 billion in 1999 [47] to $1.7 billion in 2002 [48]Template:Fn. In 2005, the PNA Ministry of Finance cited "the construction of the separation wall", started in the second half of 2002, as one reason for the depressed Palestinian economic activity.[49]. Real GDP growth in the West Bank declined substantially in 2000, 2001, and 2002, and increased modestly in 2003 and 2004 (see Figure 1); about a third of the barrier had been completed by late 2005 [50]. The World Bank attributes the modest economic growth since 2003 to "diminished levels of violence, fewer curfews, and more predictable (albeit still intense) closures, as well as adaptation by Palestinian business to the contours of a constrained West Bank economy". Under a "disengagement scenario" the Bank predicts a real growth rate of -0.2% in 2006 and -0.6% in 2007. (The World Bank Group West Bank and Gaza Update, November 2005, p. 9)

According to the Palestinian Negotiations Affairs Department (NAD) and other sources, 45% of Qalqilya's farmland [51][52] now lie outside the barrier, and farmers require permits from Israeli authorities to access their lands that are on the opposite side. There are three gates in the barrier for the purpose of admitting farmers with permits to their fields that are open 3 times a day for a total of 50 minutes [53], although according to the NAD they have often been arbitrarily closed for extended periods leading to loss of crops, and one of these gates has been closed since August 2004 due to a suicide attack that took place near the gate. The Israeli Human Rights center B'Tselem notes that "thousands of Palestinians have difficulty going to their fields and marketing their produce in other areas of the West Bank . Farming is a primary source of income in the Palestinian communities situated along the Barrier's route, an area that constitutes one of the most fertile areas in the West Bank . The harm to the farming sector is liable to have drastic economic effects on the residents – whose economic situation is already very difficult – and drive many families into poverty" [54][55].

Legal issues

On two occasions the Israeli government has been instructed by the Supreme Court of Israel to alter the route of the barrier to ensure that negative impacts on Palestinians would be minimized and proportional [56] [57].

Israeli Supreme Court decision of 2004

In February 2004, Israel's High Court of Justice began hearing petitions from two Israeli human rights organizations, the Hamoked Centre for the Defense of the Individual and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, against the building of the barrier, referring to the distress it will cause to Palestinians in the area. The Israeli High Court of Justice has heard several petitions related to the barrier, sometimes issuing temporary injunctions or setting limits on related Israeli activities.

The most important case was a petition brought in February 2004 by Beit Sourik Village Council, and responded to by the Government of Israel and the Commander of the IDF Forces in the West Bank, concerning a 40 km stretch of existing and planned barrier north of Jerusalem. Several other people and organizations also made submissions. After a number of hearings, judgment was made on June 30. The court agreed with both parties that the West Bank was held by Israel in a state of "belligerent occupation" and that "military administration, headed by the military commander, continues to apply" flowing from "the principles of the Israeli administrative law" and "provisions of public international law... established principally in..." the Hague Conventions. [58] The court did not rule on "[t]he question of the application of the Fourth Geneva Convention" because "[t]he question is not before us now, since the parties agree that the humanitarian rules of the Fourth Geneva Convention apply to the issue under review."

The first claim made by the petitioners was that construction of the barrier was itself illegal. The court ruled that construction of the barrier for security reasons would be legal even though it would be illegal for political, economic, or social purposes. Since the court accepted the respondent's argument that the part of the barrier under discussion was designed for security purposes, this claim of the petitioners was lost.

The petitioners "by pointing to the route of the Fence, attempt to prove that the construction of the Fence is not motivated by security considerations, but by political ones" argued that if the Fence was primarily motivated by security considerations, it would be constructed on the Green Line. The court rejected their claims, stating: "We cannot accept this argument. The opposite is the case: it is the security perspective – and not the political one – which must examine a route based on its security merits alone, without regard for the location of the Green Line" (Article 30) and noted that "The commander of the area detailed his considerations for the choice of the route. He noted the necessity that the Fence pass through territory that topographically controls its surroundings, that, in order to allow surveillance of it, its route be as flat as possible, and that a 'security zone' be established which will delay infiltration into Israel. These are security considerations par excellence. ... We have no reason not to give this testimony less than full weight, and we have no reason not to believe the sincerity of the military commander." (Article 29)

The second claim made by the petitioners was that the route of the barrier in the region covered by the petition "illegally infringed on the rights of the Palestinian inhabitants". In this case the court ruled that the existing and planned route failed the principle of "proportionality" in both Israeli and international law: that harm caused to an "occupied population must be in proportion to the security benefits". On the contrary, the court listed ways in which the barrier route "injures the local inhabitants in a severe and acute way, while violating their rights under humanitarian international law". Accordingly the court ordered that a 30 km portion of the existing and planned barrier must be rerouted.

Although many in the Israeli government and security establishment reacted with anger to the court's ruling, the public reaction of the government was one of satisfaction that the court had considered the barrier legal in principle. Prime Minister Sharon promised that the court's order would be followed.

Israeli Supreme Court decision of 2005

The Israeli Supreme Court (sitting as "High Court of Justice") in the case of Palestinian petitioners against the Government of Israel determined that the government must find an alternative route to lessen the impact on the rights of the resident Palestinian civilians. The petition to the court was submitted on behalf of five villages that are currently trapped in an enclave created by the existing route of the barrier. The court also ruled that the Advisory Opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in The Hague (which relates to the legal status of the barrier) is not legally binding in Israel. The ruling is the second principled ruling regarding the route of the separation barrier (the first was a ruling on the case of Beit Sourik). The petition which was deliberated on by an expanded panel of nine judges, headed by the President of the Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, was directed against the route of the barrier in the area of the Alfei Menashe enclave, to the south and east of Qalqilya. The court conducted a review of accounts by the IDF, Israelis architects, Palestinian petitioners, military experts and the International Court of Justice, and ruled that the Government of Israel must find an alternative route to lessen the impact on the rights of the resident Palestinian civilians:

Therefore, we turn the order nisi into an order absolute in the following way: (respondents) must, within a reasonable period, reconsider the various alternatives for the separation fence route at Alfei Menashe, while examining security alternatives which injure the fabric of life of the residents of the villages of the enclave to a lesser extent. In this context, the alternative by which the enclave will contain only Alfei Menashe and a connecting road to Israel, while moving the existing road connecting Alfei Menashe to Israel to another location in the south of the enclave, should be examined.

For the first time, the court expressed skepticism regarding the security considerations that guided the state in determining the route.

Based on the factual infrastructure presented to us, the existing route of the separation fence raises questions (...) We were completely unconvinced that there is a decisive military-security reason for placing the route of the fence where it currently runs (...) There is, admittedly, a plan in the initial stage [of the approval process] to expand Alfei Menashe's development toward the southwest portion of the enclave (...) This is not a factor that should be taken into consideration.

The court took upon itself the job of examining the fence section by section, even in places where it has already been completed. The International Court of Justice in The Hague determined that all parts of the barrier not on the green line violates international law because it has been built in occupied territory, the Supreme Court determined that the state is entitled to defend itself and its citizens, even in terrotories defind as "under belligerent occupation" according to the 4th Geneva convention - but it cannot build a fence in order to annex land.

The court conclusion is different from that of the ICJ. According to the Supreme Court:

The main difference between the two judgments stems primarily from the difference in the factual basis upon which each court made its decision. Once again, the simple truth is proven: Facts lie at the foundation of the law, and the law arises from the facts (ex facto jus oritur). The ICJ drew the factual basis for its opinion from the Secretary-General's report, his written statement, the Dugard report, and the Zeigler report. The Supreme Court drew the facts from the data brought before it by the Palestinian petitioners on the one hand, and the State on the other.

The ruling by the court will have an impact on roughly 40 different petitions which are now pending before the court asking for changes of the barrier route in several additional sections.

United Nations and International Court of Justice

See related article International law and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In 2004, the United Nations passed a number of resolutions and the International Court of Justice issued a ruling calling for the barrier to be removed and the Arab residents to be compensated for any damage done: "The Court finds that the construction by Israel of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and its associated régime are contrary to international law" [59]. Israel had submitted a document stating that it did not recognize the jurisdiction of the ICJ and supporting its claim that the issue of the barrier is political and not under the authority of the ICJ.

Opinions on the barrier

Israeli opinions

Israeli public opinion has been very strongly in favor of the barrier, partly in the hope that it will improve security and partly in the belief that the barrier marks the eventual border of a Palestinian state. Due to the latter possibility, the settler movement opposes the barrier, although this opposition has waned since it became clear the barrier would be diverted to the east of major Israeli settlements such as Ariel. According to Haaretz, a survey conducted by of the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University, there is an overwhelming support for the barrier among the Jewish population of Israel: 84% on March 2004 and 78% on June 2004. [60]

Most Israelis believe the barrier, and intensive activity by the Israel Defense Forces, to be the main factors in the decrease in successful suicide attack from the West Bank. The proponents of the barrier insist that reversible inconveniences to Palestinians should be balanced with the threats to lives of Israeli civilians and point out that the barrier is a non-violent way to stop terrorism and save innocent lives. [61]

Some Israelis, however, believe the barrier will have unintended consequences. Col. (res.) Shaul Arieli, who was the last commander of the Gaza regional brigade of the IDF, speculates that the effectiveness of the barrier will only be short-term. "The fence provides a partial security response to the terror threats and a good response to prevention of illegal immigration and prevention of criminal acts," he explains, "but on the other hand, in its current format it creates the future terror infrastructure because this terror infrastructure is precisely those people living in enclaves who will support acts of terror as the only possible tool that they perceive as being able to restore them the land, production sources and water wells taken from them." Arieli also said that the barrier is designed to induce the Arabs of the border region to leave so that Israel can expand. (Haaretz, February 18, 2004)

Haim Ramon, the Israeli Cabinet Minister for Jerusalem, said that while the barrier "was born, first and foremost, to prevent them from continuing to murder us" he added that the barrier "also makes it [Jerusalem] more Jewish. The safer and more Jewish Jerusalem will be, it can serve as a true capital of the state of Israel." [62] [63]

On August 17, 2005, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz said of the barrier: "Sharon has tried in vain to describe it as 'only another counterterrorism measure.' Nevertheless, it looks like a border and behaves like one, with barbed wire, electronic devices, concrete walls, watchtowers and checkpoints. Its creation set a crucial precedent in the unilateral division of the land, which came to fit Sharon perfectly."

Palestinian opinions

File:Rockboy.jpg

Example of Banksy's artwork on the Palestinian side of the barrier.

The Palestinian population and its leadership are essentially unanimous in opposing the barrier. A significant number of Palestinians have been separated from their own farmlands or their places of work or study, and many more will be separated as the barriers near Jerusalem are completed. Furthermore, because of its planned route as published by the Israeli government, the barrier is perceived as a plan to confine the Palestinian population to specific areas, causing further humiliation [64] [65]. They state that Palestinian institutions in Abu Dis will be prevented from providing services to residents in the East Jerusalem suburbs, and that a 10-minute walk has become a 3-hour drive in order to reach a gate, to go (if allowed) through a crowded military checkpoint, and drive back to the destination on the other side [66].

More broadly, Palestinian spokespersons, supported by many in the Israeli left wing and other organizations, claim that the hardships imposed by the barrier will breed further discontent amongst the affected population and add to the security problem rather than solving it. Some Palestinian organizations and the International Solidarity Movement have organized nonviolent resistance to the construction of the barrier.

Graffiti on the Palestinian side of walled sections of the barrier has consistently been one of many forms of protest against its existence. Large areas of the walls feature messages relating to the conflict, demanding an end to the barrier, or criticizing its builders and its existence ('Welcome to the Ghetto-Abu Dis'). In August 2005, a graffiti artist named Banksy painted nine images on the Palestinian side of the barrier. [67] He describes the barrier as "the ultimate activity holiday destination for graffiti writers".

International opinions

Most international governments agree that Israel should have the right to self-defence, but oppose the construction of the barrier outside the 1949 armistice lines as a violation of Palestinian rights.

On July 25, 2003, President George W. Bush said "I think the wall is a problem. And I discussed this with Ariel Sharon. It is very difficult to develop confidence between the Palestinians and Israel with a wall snaking through the West Bank." [68] The following year, addressing the issue of the barrier as a future border, he said in a letter to Sharon on April 14 2004 that it "should be a security rather than political barrier, should be temporary rather than permanent and therefore not prejudice any final status issues including final borders, and its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities." [69] President Bush reiterated this position during a May 26, 2005 joint press conference with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas in the Rose Garden. [70] For additional detail on Bush's statements regarding final borders, see Road map for peace.

On February 18, 2004, The International Committee of the Red Cross stated that the Israeli barrier "causes serious humanitarian and legal problems" and goes "far beyond what is permissible for an occupying power" [71].

On February 20, 2004 the World Council of Churches adopted a statement demanding that Israel halt and reverse construction on the barrier and strongly condemning what they believe to be violations of human rights and humanitarian consequences that have resulted due to construction of the barrier. While acknowledging Israel's serious security concerns and asserting that the construction of the barrier on its own territory would not have been a violation of international law, the statement rejected what it saw as the creation of a new political boundary that confiscates Palestinian land. [72]

On March 8, 2005 the United Nations held a two day International Meeting on the Question of Palestine. The participants of this meeting released a final document that, among other things, expressed serious concern at the Israeli government's continuation of barrier construction, which they believe violates international law. The participants called on the international community "to adopt measures that would persuade the Government of Israel to comply with international law and the ruling of the International Court of Justice". [73]

On November 13, 2005 U.S. Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton said that she supports the separation barrier Israel is building along the edges of the West Bank, and that the onus is on the Palestinian Authority to fight terrorism. "This is not against the Palestinian people," Clinton, a New York Democrat, said during a tour of a section of the barrier being built around Jerusalem. "This is against the terrorists. The Palestinian people have to help to prevent terrorism. They have to change the attitudes about terrorism." [74]

Future borders opinions

Some people describe the barrier as the de facto future border of the State of Israel. James Zogby, president of the Arab American Institute, has said that the barrier has "unilaterally helped to demarcate the route for future Israeli control over huge West Bank settlement blocks and large swathes of West Bank land". [75] According to B'Tselem, "the overall features of the separation barrier and the considerations that led to determination of the route give the impression that Israel is relying on security arguments to unilaterally establish facts on the ground ..." [76] On August 17, 2005, the Israeli newspaper Haaretz commented: "Sharon has tried in vain to describe it as 'only another counterterrorism measure.' Nevertheless, it looks like a border and behaves like one, with barbed wire, electronic devices, concrete walls, watchtowers and checkpoints. Its creation set a crucial precedent in the unilateral division of the land, which came to fit Sharon perfectly."

Chris McGreal in the Guardian writes that the barrier is, "evidently intended to redraw Israel's borders". [77] Yossi Klein Halevy, Israeli correspondent for The New Republic, writes of the barrier that "[b]uilding over the green line, by contrast, reminds Palestinians that every time they've rejected compromise--whether in 1937, 1947, or 2000--the potential map of Palestine shrinks... The fence is a warning: If Palestinians don't stop terrorism and forfeit their dream of destroying Israel, Israel may impose its own map on them... and, because Palestine isn't being restored but invented, its borders are negotiable."[78]

On April 14, 2004, American President George W. Bush said "In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic to expect that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949, and all previous efforts to negotiate a two-state solution have reached the same conclusion.” [79] Some analysts interpret Bush's use of "realities on the ground" to mean "settlements".[80] [81], whereas others, as well as members of the Palestinian leadership, have interpreted it to include the Barrier. In direct reaction to Bush's comments, the leadership of the Palestinian National Authority replied: "The US assurances are being made at the expense of the Palestinian people and the Arab world without the knowledge of the legitimate Palestinian leadership. They are rewarding illegal occupation, settlement and the apartheid wall." [82]

Some analysts speculate the phrase "realities on the ground" in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to include the barrier and that the barrier will prejudice the outcome of border negotiations in favor of the Israelis. [83] [84] [85] [86]The American Task Force on Palestine, for example, says "the construction of a wall meant to separate Israel from the largest concentrations of Palestinians on the West Bank is now well under way, walling in a significant amount of territory east of Jerusalem that even moderate Palestinians hope will be a part of a future state someday. It is, to use a well-worn phrase from the region, the essence of 'creating realities on the ground'." [87]

On March 9, 2006, The New York Times reported acting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert saying that if his Kadima party wins the upcoming national elections, he would seek to set Israel's permanent borders by 2010, and that the boundary would run along or close to the barrier.[88] The New York Times continues: "Israel has insisted that its West Bank separation barrier is being built solely as a security measure. But Mr. Olmert said it would also form the basis of a border."

"Apartheid wall" epithet

"Apartheid wall" is a controversial derogatory political epithet sometimes used to describe the barrier. Some opponents of the barrier argue it prompotes apartheid in that its extension into the West Bank isolates Palestinian communities and consolidates the annexation of Palestinian land by Israeli settlements. The barrier, it is argued, is part of a "long-term policy of occupation, discrimination and expulsion," which effectively constitutes a feature of Israeli apartheid. a term used as an analogy for South African apartheid.

Although the Israeli government cites security concerns as the rationale for the construction of the barrier, opponents of the barrier claim that it also serves to separate, isolate and disenfranchise a particular ethnic group, and argue that it is therefore racially discriminatory. These concerns have been echoed by Israeli left wing groups such as Gush Shalom and more recently by the Israeli State Prosecution itself (referring only to the part built beyond the 1949 Armistice lines). According to a 2004 United Nation (UN) report, the land between the barrier and the Green Line is currently the home for over 49,400 West Bank Palestinians living in 38 villages and towns, and it is feared that they will eventually be expelled or forced to migrate.. In January 2006, a UN report by John Dugard of the Human Right Commission in Geneva, stated that "the three major settlement blocs - Gush Etzion, Ma’aleh Adumim and Ariel - will effectively divide Palestinian territory into cantons or Bantustans." Observing that 275 of the 670 km planned had been built, it criticized the transformation of Palestinian villagers into "internally displaced persons". It also declared that:

"The character of East Jerusalem is undergoing a major change as a result of the construction of the wall through Palestinian neighbourhoods. The clear purpose of the wall in the Jerusalem area is to reduce the number of Palestinians in the city by transferring them to the West Bank. This causes major humanitarian problems: families are separated and access to hospitals, schools and the workplace are denied. In November 2005, European Union missions in Jerusalem issued a report in which they accused Israel of embarking on the encirclement of the city by the wall in order to achieve 'the completion of the annexation of Jerusalem'."

The same UN report also noted in its introduction that "in 2004, the International Court of Justice held that Palestinians should be compensated for damage they had suffered as a result of the construction of the wall. In the same year the General Assembly resolved that a register should be compiled to allow for the registration of claims for compensation. Unfortunately, little progress has been made with this register."

Opponents of the term

Opponents of the term reject both the "Apartheid" and "wall" designations, mainly because they disagree with the implicit analogy with South Africa, but also because 93% of barrier is currently fenced while only seven percent is actually walled. Opponents of the term argue that apartheid was a system unique to South Africa, established to disenfranchise citizens — based on skin color — from their own country; the use of the term apartheid, it is argued, is not appropriate in the context of Israel, for West Bank Palestinians were never citizens of Israel, and Jews and Palestinians are not racially distinct. Opponents of the term claim that the barrier is not intended to separate Jews from Arabs, as over 1 million Arabs on the Israeli side of the barrier are full citizens of Israel, and constitute 15% of Israel's population. While apartheid involved the forced removal of about 1.5 million South Africans to Bantustans, opponents claim that the West Bank barrier will cause no transfer of population and insist that none of the estimated 10,000 Palestinians (0.5%) who will be left on the Israeli side of the barrier (based on the February, 2005 route) will be forced to migrate. Moreover, opponents argue, the Bantustans were created in order to force legal borders and eliminate the rights of the majority South African black population; however, it is claimed that the barrier is not a border but a temporary defensive measure designed to protect Israeli civilians from terrorist infiltration and attack, and can be dismantled if appropriate. Opponents also point out that the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that the barrier is indeed defensive and accepted the Israeli claim that the route is based on security considerations Accordingly, they argue that if this separation barrier is an expression of apartheid, then any number of similar defensive barriers around the world must also meet that definition.

Some opponents also take issue with the apartheid analogy because of the historical claim of the Jewish people; they argue that apartheid was an outgrowth of imperialist, colonial policy, while Israel's Jewish population consisted mostly of refugees with a deep historical relationship to the land. Others question the analogy because they view the political aspirations of Palestinians to be more extreme than those of black South Africans; they point out that South African blacks did not seek the destruction of South Africa, but merely the reformation of the government, and they claim that the majority of Palestinians in the territories dispute Israel's right to exist.

See also

• Al-Aqsa Intifada
• Anarchists Against the Wall
• Israeli Gaza Strip barrier
• Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• International law and the Arab-Israeli conflict
• Moroccan Wall
• Separation barrier
• Wall of Shame (phrase)
• Israeli apartheid (phrase)

References

• Palestinian grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign
• How to Build a Fence - Foreign Affairs Template:PDFlink
• ICJ Advisory Opinion as well as separate opinions of some judges
• Declaration of Judge Buergenthal
• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement on ICJ Advisory Opinion
• Template:He icon Reaction of Israeli leaders and politicians
• Barrier route, by Betselem Template:PDFlink

Footnotes

• Template:Fnb Wall Street Journal, "After Sharon", January 6, 2006.
• Template:Fnb It is unknown whether these numbers represent current or inflation-adjusted dollar amounts.
• Template:Fnb The root of the classical Arabic word "jidar" means "structure of height" that one can either climb or hide behind. Therefore, its translation into other languages is based on context, and can be translated as "wall", "barrier", "fence", or rarely "dam".

Note
This article has been included in the category of fences and the category of walls. There is however no implication that the West Bank barrier is a fence, nor that it is a wall - these categories merely inform the reader that the West Bank barrier contains significant elements of both.

External links

Israeli government and courts

• Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Anti-Terrorist Fence Homepage
• Israel Ministry of Defense Security Fence Homepage
• 2004 Israeli Supreme Court ruling (RTF format)
• 2005 Israeli Supreme Court ruling

United Nations

• Compilation of UN documents relating to the barrier.
• UN OCHA Humanitarian Information Centre in the occupied Palestinian territory reports, analysis, detailed maps.
• Barrier Gates: Northern West Bank (map). Template:PDFlink
• Commission on Human Rights: Report on 61st session. Template:PDFlink

Other international organizations

• International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement statement on the West Bank Barrier
• International Commission of Jurists legal analysis of the Separation Barrier, Parts I&II  Parts III&IV
• Simon Wiesenthal center.

Other organizations

• Gush Shalom site about the Separation Wall
• B'Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) page about the Separation Barrier
• Anti-Defamation League statement on ICJ ruling
• Machsom Watch daily reports on checkpoints in the barrier
• Fence for Life Public Movement for The Security Fence
• CUPE Ontario delegates support campaign against Israeli “apartheid wall release on resolution by the Canadian Union of Public Employees in Ontario.

Other opinion articles

• Israel's Security Fence on Jewish Virtual Library
• Not an "Apartheid Wall" on HonestReporting.com
• Template:He icon Know what is the Separation Fence
• A Wall as a Weapon OpEd by Noam Chomsky, originally published in The New York Times
• Q&A: What is the West Bank barrier? BBC News special feature
• Guide to the West Bank barrier BBC News
• Mideast: The new symmetry of death opinion article in The Washington Times
• Background Info: The Security Fence on imra.org.il
• Electronic Intifada
• Israeli city says barrier is 'working' BBC News
• Israel's security barrier: a safety measure or a land grab? article in The Economist describing old 2003 route
• Is Israel's Security Barrier Unique? article by Ben Thein in Middle East Quarterly
• Research articles on the ICJ decision
• Reply to the ICJ Advisory Opinion, detailed 193 page book supporting the Israeli position. Template:PDFlink
• The view point of a soldier serving in the barrier checkpoints near Tul-Karem
• Irshad Manji in New York Times

Miscellaneous

• Compilation of articles about the fence from Ha'aretz