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Kennedy, joined by unanimous (Part I); Rehnquist, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg (Parts II–A and II–B); Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, Souter (Parts II–C, II–D, and III–A)
Concurrence
Kennedy (Part III–B), joined by Rehnquist, Blackmun, Souter
Concurrence
Blackmun
Concurrence
Stevens (in part)
Concur/dissent
O'Connor, joined by Scalia, Ginsburg; Thomas (Parts I and III)
Concur/dissent
Ginsburg
Turner Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), is the first of two United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the must-carry rules imposed on cable televisioncompanies. Turner Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission (II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997) was the second. Turner I established that cable television companies were indeed First Amendment speakers but didn't decide whether the federal regulation of their speech infringed upon their speech rights. In Turner II the court decided that the must-carry provisions were constitutional.
Under the Miami Herald v. Tornillo case, it was unconstitutional to force a newspaper to run a story the editors would not have included absent a government statute because it was compelled speech which could not pass the strict scrutiny of a compelling state interest being achieved with the least restrictive means necessary to achieve the state interest. However, under the rule of Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC the High Court held that a federal agency could regulate broadcast stations (TV and radio) with far greater discretion. In order for federal agency regulation of broadcast media to pass constitutional muster, it need only serve an important state interest and need not narrowly tailor its regulation to the least restrictive means.
Concurrence (Stevens)
Congress' policy judgment is entitled to substantial deference
Statute did not regulate the content of speech and therefore does not require the court to examine it with heightened scrutiny