Dual inheritance theory
Dual inheritance theory (DIT), also known as gene–culture coevolution or biocultural evolution, was developed in the 1960s through early 1980s to explain how human behavior is a product of two different and interacting evolutionary processes: genetic evolution and cultural evolution. Genes and culture continually interact in a feedback loop, changes in genes can lead to changes in culture which can then influence genetic selection, and vice versa. One of the theory's central claims is that culture evolves partly through a Darwinian selection process, which dual inheritance theorists often describe by analogy to genetic evolution.
'Culture', in this context is defined as 'socially learned behavior', and 'social learning' is defined as copying behaviors observed in others or acquiring behaviors through being taught by others. Most of the modelling done in the field relies on the first dynamic (copying) though it can be extended to teaching. Social learning at its simplest involves blind copying of behaviors from a model (someone observed behaving), though it is also understood to have many potential biases, including success bias (copying from those who are perceived to be better off), status bias (copying from those with higher status), homophily (copying from those most like ourselves), conformist bias (disproportionately picking up behaviors that more people are performing), etc.. Understanding social learning is a system of pattern replication, and understanding that there are different rates of survival for different socially learned cultural variants, this sets up, by definition, an evolutionary structure: cultural evolution.
Because genetic evolution is relatively well understood, most of DIT examines cultural evolution and the interactions between cultural evolution and genetic evolution.
- 1 Theoretical basis
- 2 View of culture
- 3 Genetic influence on cultural evolution
- 4 Cultural influences on genetic evolution
- 5 Mechanisms of cultural evolution
- 6 Social learning and cumulative cultural evolution
- 7 Cultural group selection
- 8 Historical development
- 9 Current and future research
- 10 Relation to other fields
- 11 Shortcomings and Criticisms
- 12 See also
- 13 References
- 14 Further reading
- 15 External links
DIT holds that genetic and cultural evolution interacted in the evolution of Homo sapiens. DIT recognizes that the natural selection of genotypes is an important component of the evolution of human behavior and that cultural traits can be constrained by genetic imperatives. However, DIT also recognizes that genetic evolution has endowed the human species with a parallel evolutionary process of cultural evolution. DIT makes three main claims:
Culture capacities are adaptations
The human capacity to store and transmit culture arose from genetically evolved psychological mechanisms. This implies that at some point during the evolution of the human species a type of social learning leading to cumulative cultural evolution was evolutionarily advantageous.
Social learning processes give rise to cultural evolution. Cultural traits are transmitted differently from genetic traits and, therefore, result in different population-level effects on behavioral variation.
Genes and culture co-evolve
Cultural traits alter the social and physical environments under which genetic selection operates. For example, the cultural adoptions of agriculture and dairying have, in humans, caused genetic selection for the traits to digest starch and lactose, respectively. As another example, it is likely that once culture became adaptive, genetic selection caused a refinement of the cognitive architecture that stores and transmits cultural information. This refinement may have further influenced the way culture is stored and the biases that govern its transmission.
DIT also predicts that, under certain situations, cultural evolution may select for traits that are genetically maladaptive. An example of this is the demographic transition, which describes the fall of birth rates within industrialized societies. Dual inheritance theorists hypothesize that the demographic transition may be a result of a prestige bias, where individuals that forgo reproduction to gain more influence in industrial societies are more likely to be chosen as cultural models.
View of culture
This view of culture emphasizes population thinking by focusing on the process by which culture is generated and maintained. It also views culture as a dynamic property of individuals, as opposed to a view of culture as a superorganic entity to which individuals must conform. This view's main advantage is that it connects individual-level processes to population-level outcomes.
Genetic influence on cultural evolution
Genes affect cultural evolution via psychological predispositions on cultural learning. Genes encode much of the information needed to form the human brain. Genes constrain the brain's structure and, hence, the ability of the brain to acquire and store culture. Genes may also endow individuals with certain types of transmission bias (described below).
Cultural influences on genetic evolution
Culture can profoundly influence gene frequencies in a population.
One of the best known examples is the prevalence of the genotype for adult lactose absorption in human populations, such as Northern Europeans and some African societies, with a long history of raising cattle for milk. Until around 7,500 years ago, lactase production stopped shortly after weaning, and in societies which did not develop dairying, such as East Asians and Amerindians, this is still true today. In areas with lactase persistence, it is believed that by domesticating animals, a source of milk became available while an adult and thus strong selection for lactase persistence could occur, in a Scandinavian population the estimated selection coefficient was 0.09-0.19. This implies that the cultural practice of raising cattle first for meat and later for milk led to selection for genetic traits for lactose digestion. Recently, analysis of natural selection on the human genome suggests that civilization has accelerated genetic change in humans over the past 10,000 years.
Culture has driven changes to the human digestive systems making many digestive organs, like our teeth or stomach, smaller than expected for primates of a similar size, and has been attributed to one of the reasons why humans have such large brains compared to other great apes. This is due to food processing. Early examples of food processing include pounding, marinating and most notably cooking. Pounding meat breaks down the muscle fibres, hence taking away some of the job from the mouth, teeth and jaw. Marinating emulates the action of the stomach with high acid levels. Cooking partially breaks down food making it more easily digestible. Food enters the body effectively partly digested, and as such food processing reduces the work that the digestive system has to do. This means that there is selection for smaller digestive organs as the tissue is energetically expensive, those with smaller digestive organs can process their food but at a lower energetic cost than those with larger organs. Cooking is notable because the energy available from food increases when cooked and this also means less time is spent looking for food.
Humans living on cooked diets spend only a fraction of their day chewing compared to other extant primates living on raw diets. American girls and boys spent on average 8 and 7 percent of their day chewing respectively, compared to chimpanzees who spend more than 6 hours a day chewing. This frees up time which can be used for hunting. A raw diet means hunting is constrained since time spent hunting is time not spent eating and chewing plant material, but cooking reduces the time required to get the day's energy requirements, allowing for more subsistence activities. Digestibility of cooked carbohydrates is approximately on average 30% higher than digestibility of non cooked carbohydrates. This increased energy intake, more free time and savings made on tissue used in the digestive system allowed for the selection of genes for larger brain size.
Despite its benefits, brain tissue requires a large amount of calories, hence a main constraint in selection for larger brains is calorie intake. A greater calorie intake can support greater quantities of brain tissue. This is argued to explain why human brains can be much larger than other apes, since humans are the only ape to engage in food processing. The cooking of food has influenced genes to the extent that, research suggests, humans cannot live without cooking. A study on 513 individuals consuming long term raw diets found that as the percentage of their diet which was made up of raw food and/or the length they had been on a diet of raw food increased, their BMI decreased. This is despite access to many non thermal processing, like grinding, pounding or heating to 48 deg. c. (118 deg. F). With approximately 86 billion neurons in the human brain and 60–70 kg body mass, an exclusively raw diet close to that of what extant primates have would be not viable as, when modelled, it is argued that it would require an infeasible level of more than nine hours of feeding everyday. However, this is contested, with alternative modelling showing enough calories could be obtained within 5–6 hours per day. Some scientists and anthropologists point to evidence that brain size in the Homo lineage started to increase well before the advent of cooking due to increased consumption of meat and that basic food processing (slicing) accounts for the size reduction in organs related to chewing. Cornélio et al. argues that improving cooperative abilities and a varying of diet to more meat and seeds improved foraging and hunting efficiency. It is this that allowed for the brain expansion, independent of cooking which they argue came much later, a consequence from the complex cognition that developed. Yet this is still an example of a cultural shift in diet and the resulting genetic evolution. Further criticism comes from the controversy of the archaeological evidence available. Some claim there is a lack of evidence of fire control when brain sizes first started expanding. Wrangham argues that anatomical evidence around the time of the origin of Homo erectus (1.8 million years ago), indicates that the control of fire and hence cooking occurred. At this time, the largest reductions in tooth size in the entirety of human evolution occurred, indicating that softer foods became prevalent in the diet. Also at this time was a narrowing of the pelvis indicating a smaller gut and also there is evidence that there was a loss of the ability to climb which Wrangham argues indicates the control of fire, since sleeping on the ground needs fire to ward off predators. The proposed increases in brain size from food processing will have led to a greater mental capacity for further cultural innovation in food processing which will have increased digestive efficiency further providing more energy for further gains in brain size. This positive feedback loop is argued to have led to the rapid brain size increases seen in the Homo lineage.
Mechanisms of cultural evolution
In DIT, the evolution and maintenance of cultures is described by five major mechanisms: natural selection of cultural variants, random variation, cultural drift, guided variation and transmission bias.
Cultural differences among individuals can lead to differential survival of individuals. The patterns of this selective process depend on transmission biases and can result in behavior that is more adaptive to a given environment.
Random variation arises from errors in the learning, display or recall of cultural information, and is roughly analogous to the process of mutation in genetic evolution.
Cultural drift is a process roughly analogous to genetic drift in evolutionary biology. In cultural drift, the frequency of cultural traits in a population may be subject to random fluctuations due to chance variations in which traits are observed and transmitted (sometimes called "sampling error"). These fluctuations might cause cultural variants to disappear from a population. This effect should be especially strong in small populations. A model by Hahn and Bentley shows that cultural drift gives a reasonably good approximation to changes in the popularity of American baby names. Drift processes have also been suggested to explain changes in archaeological pottery and technology patent applications. Changes in the songs of song birds are also thought to arise from drift processes, where distinct dialects in different groups occur due to errors in songbird singing and acquisition by successive generations. Cultural drift is also observed in an early computer model of cultural evolution.
Cultural traits may be gained in a population through the process of individual learning. Once an individual learns a novel trait, it can be transmitted to other members of the population. The process of guided variation depends on an adaptive standard that determines what cultural variants are learned.
Understanding the different ways that culture traits can be transmitted between individuals has been an important part of DIT research since the 1970s. Transmission biases occur when some cultural variants are favored over others during the process of cultural transmission. Boyd and Richerson (1985) defined and analytically modeled a number of possible transmission biases. The list of biases has been refined over the years, especially by Henrich and McElreath.
Content biases result from situations where some aspect of a cultural variant's content makes them more likely to be adopted. Content biases can result from genetic preferences, preferences determined by existing cultural traits, or a combination of the two. For example, food preferences can result from genetic preferences for sugary or fatty foods and socially-learned eating practices and taboos. Content biases are sometimes called "direct biases."
Context biases result from individuals using clues about the social structure of their population to determine what cultural variants to adopt. This determination is made without reference to the content of the variant. There are two major categories of context biases: model-based biases, and frequency-dependent biases.
Model-based biases result when an individual is biased to choose a particular "cultural model" to imitate. There are four major categories of model-based biases: prestige bias, skill bias, success bias, and similarity bias. A "prestige bias" results when individuals are more likely to imitate cultural models that are seen as having more prestige. A measure of prestige could be the amount of deference shown to a potential cultural model by other individuals. A "skill bias" results when individuals can directly observe different cultural models performing a learned skill and are more likely to imitate cultural models that perform better at the specific skill. A "success bias" results from individuals preferentially imitating cultural models that they determine are most generally successful (as opposed to successful at a specific skill as in the skill bias.) A "similarity bias" results when individuals are more likely to imitate cultural models that are perceived as being similar to the individual based on specific traits.
Frequency-dependent biases result when an individual is biased to choose particular cultural variants based on their perceived frequency in the population. The most explored frequency-dependent bias is the "conformity bias." Conformity biases result when individuals attempt to copy the mean or the mode cultural variant in the population. Another possible frequency dependent bias is the "rarity bias." The rarity bias results when individuals preferentially choose cultural variants that are less common in the population. The rarity bias is also sometimes called a "nonconformist" or "anti-conformist" bias.
Social learning and cumulative cultural evolution
In DIT, the evolution of culture is dependent on the evolution of social learning. Analytic models show that social learning becomes evolutionarily beneficial when the environment changes with enough frequency that genetic inheritance can not track the changes, but not fast enough that individual learning is more efficient. For environments that have very little variability, social learning is not needed since genes can adapt fast enough to the changes that occur, and innate behaviour is able to deal with the constant environment. In fast changing environments cultural learning would not be useful because what the previous generation knew is now outdated and will provide no benefit in the changed environment, and hence individual learning is more beneficial. It is only in the moderately changing environment where cultural learning becomes useful since each generation shares a mostly similar environment but genes have insufficient time to change to changes in the environment. While other species have social learning, and thus some level of culture, only humans, some birds and chimpanzees are known to have cumulative culture. Boyd and Richerson argue that the evolution of cumulative culture depends on observational learning and is uncommon in other species because it is ineffective when it is rare in a population. They propose that the environmental changes occurring in the Pleistocene may have provided the right environmental conditions. Michael Tomasello argues that cumulative cultural evolution results from a ratchet effect that began when humans developed the cognitive architecture to understand others as mental agents. Furthermore, Tomasello proposed in the 80s that there are some disparities between the observational learning mechanisms found in humans and great apes - which go some way to explain the observable difference between great ape traditions and human types of culture (see Emulation (observational learning)).
Cultural group selection
Although group selection is commonly thought to be nonexistent or unimportant in genetic evolution, DIT predicts that, due to the nature of cultural inheritance, it may be an important force in cultural evolution. Group selection occurs in cultural evolution because conformist biases make it difficult for novel cultural traits to spread through a population (see above section on transmission biases). Conformist bias also helps maintain variation between groups. These two properties, rare in genetic transmission, are necessary for group selection to operate. Based on an earlier model by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, Boyd and Richerson show that conformist biases are almost inevitable when traits spread through social learning, implying that group selection is common in cultural evolution. Analysis of small groups in New Guinea imply that cultural group selection might be a good explanation for slowly changing aspects of social structure, but not for rapidly changing fads. The ability of cultural evolution to maintain intergroup diversity is what allows for the study of cultural phylogenetics.
The idea that human cultures undergo a similar evolutionary process as genetic evolution goes back at least to Darwin In the 1960s, Donald T. Campbell published some of the first theoretical work that adapted principles of evolutionary theory to the evolution of cultures. In 1976, two developments in cultural evolutionary theory set the stage for DIT. In that year Richard Dawkins's The Selfish Gene introduced ideas of cultural evolution to a popular audience. Although one of the best-selling science books of all time, because of its lack of mathematical rigor, it had little effect on the development of DIT. Also in 1976, geneticists Marcus Feldman and Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza published the first dynamic models of gene–culture coevolution. These models were to form the basis for subsequent work on DIT, heralded by the publication of three seminal books in the 1980s.
The first was Charles Lumsden and E.O. Wilson's Genes, Mind and Culture. This book outlined a series of mathematical models of how genetic evolution might favor the selection of cultural traits and how cultural traits might, in turn, affect the speed of genetic evolution. While it was the first book published describing how genes and culture might coevolve, it had relatively little effect on the further development of DIT. Some critics felt that their models depended too heavily on genetic mechanisms at the expense of cultural mechanisms. Controversy surrounding Wilson's sociobiological theories may also have decreased the lasting effect of this book.
The second 1981 book was Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman's Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Borrowing heavily from population genetics and epidemiology, this book built a mathematical theory concerning the spread of cultural traits. It describes the evolutionary implications of vertical transmission, passing cultural traits from parents to offspring; oblique transmission, passing cultural traits from any member of an older generation to a younger generation; and horizontal transmission, passing traits between members of the same population.
The next significant DIT publication was Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson's 1985 Culture and the Evolutionary Process. This book presents the now-standard mathematical models of the evolution of social learning under different environmental conditions, the population effects of social learning, various forces of selection on cultural learning rules, different forms of biased transmission and their population-level effects, and conflicts between cultural and genetic evolution. The book's conclusion also outlined areas for future research that are still relevant today.
Current and future research
In their 1985 book, Boyd and Richerson outlined an agenda for future DIT research. This agenda, outlined below, called for the development of both theoretical models and empirical research. DIT has since built a rich tradition of theoretical models over the past two decades. However, there has not been a comparable level of empirical work.
In a 2006 interview Harvard biologist E. O. Wilson expressed disappointment at the little attention afforded to DIT:
"...for some reason I haven't fully fathomed, this most promising frontier of scientific research has attracted very few people and very little effort."
"In many ways the most complex and potentially rewarding of all approaches, [DIT], with its multiple processes and cerebral onslaught of sigmas and deltas, may appear too abstract to all but the most enthusiastic reader. Until such a time as the theoretical hieroglyphics can be translated into a respectable empirical science most observers will remain immune to its message."
Economist Herbert Gintis disagrees with this critique, citing empirical work as well as more recent work using techniques from behavioral economics. These behavioral economic techniques have been adapted to test predictions of cultural evolutionary models in laboratory settings as well as studying differences in cooperation in fifteen small-scale societies in the field.
Since one of the goals of DIT is to explain the distribution of human cultural traits, ethnographic and ethnologic techniques may also be useful for testing hypothesis stemming from DIT. Although findings from traditional ethnologic studies have been used to buttress DIT arguments, thus far there have been little ethnographic fieldwork designed to explicitly test these hypotheses.
Herb Gintis has named DIT one of the two major conceptual theories with potential for unifying the behavioral sciences, including economics, biology, anthropology, sociology, psychology and political science. Because it addresses both the genetic and cultural components of human inheritance, Gintis sees DIT models as providing the best explanations for the ultimate cause of human behavior and the best paradigm for integrating those disciplines with evolutionary theory. In a review of competing evolutionary perspectives on human behavior, Laland and Brown see DIT as the best candidate for uniting the other evolutionary perspectives under one theoretical umbrella.
Relation to other fields
Sociology and cultural anthropology
Two major topics of study in both sociology and cultural anthropology are human cultures and cultural variation. However, Dual Inheritance theorists charge that both disciplines too often treat culture as a static superorganic entity that dictates human behavior. Cultures are defined by a suite of common traits shared by a large group of people. DIT theorists argue that this doesn't sufficiently explain variation in cultural traits at the individual level. By contrast, DIT models human culture at the individual level and views culture as the result of a dynamic evolutionary process at the population level.
Human sociobiology and evolutionary psychology
Evolutionary psychologists study the evolved architecture of the human mind. They see it as composed of many different programs that process information, each with assumptions and procedures that were specialized by natural selection to solve a different adaptive problem faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors (e.g., choosing mates, hunting, avoiding predators, cooperating, using aggression). These evolved programs contain content-rich assumptions about how the world and other people work. As ideas are passed from mind to mind, they are changed by these evolved inference systems (much like messages get changed in a game of telephone). But the changes are not random. Evolved programs add and subtract information, reshaping the ideas in ways that make them more "intuitive", more memorable, and more attention-grabbing. In other words, "memes" (ideas) are not like genes. Genes are copied faithfully as they are replicated, but ideas are not. It’s not just that ideas mutate every once in awhile, like genes do. Ideas are transformed every time they are passed from mind to mind, because the sender's message is being interpreted by evolved inference systems in the receiver. There is no necessary contradiction between evolutionary psychology and DIT, but evolutionary psychologists argue that the psychology implicit in many DIT models is too simple; evolved programs have a rich inferential structure not captured by the idea of a "content bias". They also argue that some of the phenomena DIT models attribute to cultural evolution are cases of "evoked culture"—situations in which different evolved programs are activated in different places, in response to cues in the environment.
Human sociobiologists try to understand how maximizing genetic fitness, in either the modern era or past environments, can explain human behavior. When faced with a trait that seems maladaptive, some sociobiologists try to determine how the trait actually increases genetic fitness (maybe through kin selection or by speculating about early evolutionary environments). Dual inheritance theorists, in contrast, will consider a variety of genetic and cultural processes in addition to natural selection on genes.
Human behavioral ecology
Human behavioral ecology (HBE) and DIT have a similar relationship to what ecology and evolutionary biology have in the biological sciences. HBE is more concerned about ecological process and DIT more focused on historical process. One difference is that human behavioral ecologists often assume that culture is a system that produces the most adaptive outcome in a given environment. This implies that similar behavioral traditions should be found in similar environments. However, this is not always the case. A study of African cultures showed that cultural history was a better predictor of cultural traits than local ecological conditions.
Memetics, which comes from the meme idea described in Dawkins's The Selfish Gene, is similar to DIT in that it treats culture as an evolutionary process that is distinct from genetic transmission. However, there are some philosophical differences between memetics and DIT. One difference is that memetics' focus is on the selection potential of discrete replicators (memes), where DIT allows for transmission of both non-replicators and non-discrete cultural variants. DIT does not assume that replicators are necessary for cumulative adaptive evolution. DIT also more strongly emphasizes the role of genetic inheritance in shaping the capacity for cultural evolution. But perhaps the biggest difference is a difference in academic lineage. Memetics as a label is more influential in popular culture than in academia. Critics of memetics argue that it is lacking in empirical support or is conceptually ill-founded, and question whether there is hope for the memetic research program succeeding. Proponents point out that many cultural traits are discrete, and that many existing models of cultural inheritance assume discrete cultural units, and hence involve memes.
Shortcomings and Criticisms
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (February 2016)
Serious criticisms have been levelled against DIT. Use of the term ‘dual inheritance’ to refer to not just traits that are transmitted by way of a self-assembly code (as in genetic evolution) but also traits that are not transmitted by way of a self-assembly code (as in cultural evolution) is misleading, because this second use does not capture the algorithmic structure that makes an inheritance system require a particular kind of mathematical framework. The population genetics framework was designed to solve the problem of how does evolution occur—i.e., how are fit traits preserved in a lineage—in a system wherein acquired change is discarded at the end of each generation. Darwin noticed that there are two kinds of traits: acquired traits (e.g., a tattoo, or knowledge of the layout of a particular city) which are discarded, while inherited traits (e.g., blood type) are preserved. His ingenious solution was to develop a population level explanation, and show that evolution was due to differential replication of heritable variation in response to selection. We now know that the reason for the distinction between these two kinds of traits is that some traits (inherited traits) are encoded in genes which collectively constitute self-assembly code and are transmitted to offspring, while all other traits (acquired traits) are shed at the end of a generation with the deaths of those who bore them. Thus, the reason that horizontal transmission of ideas is algorithmically dissimilar to vertical transmission (reproduction) in genetic evolution is that it does not provide a means of preserving fit traits in a system wherein those traits would otherwise be lost from the lineage. Proponents of DIT argue that 1) even genetic evolution uses non-vertical transmission through the environmental alteration of the genome during life by acquired circumstance: epigenetics, and 2) genetic evolution is also affected by direct horizontal transmission between separate species of plants and strains of bacteria: horizontal gene transfer. However, these arguments are irrelevant to the issue of whether a Darwinian (or selectionist, or population genetics) mathematical framework is appropriate to the description of cultural evolution, since these aspects of biological evolution are themselves not accommodated by such a framework. The point is that although it is not essential that ‘inherited traits’ be transmitted by way of genes (necessarily) for a population genetics framework to be applicable, but they need to be transmitted by way of a self-assembly code, or some other such mechanism that may exist out there in the universe that does the same thing: preserving traits that would otherwise be lost from a lineage due to the death of individuals.
The above criticism of DIT arises due to the choice of Darwinian selection as an explanatory framework for culture. Cultural evolution does not possess the algorithmic structure of a process that can be modeled in a Darwinian framework as characterized by John von Neumann and used by John Holland to design the genetic algorithm. Forcing culture into a Darwinian framework gives a distorted picture of the process for several reasons. First, Darwinian selection only works as an explanatory framework when variation is randomly generated. To the extent that transmission biases are operative in culture, they mitigate the effect of Darwinian change, i.e. change in the distribution of variants over generations of exposure to selective pressures. Second, since acquired change can accumulate orders of magnitude faster than inherited change, if it is not getting regularly discarded each generation, it quickly overwhelms the population-level mechanism of change identified by Darwin; it ‘swamps the phylogenetic signal’. DIT proponents reply that their theory includes a very important role for decision-making forces. As a point of history, Darwin had a rather sophisticated theory of human cultural evolution that depended on natural selection "to a subordinate degree" compared to "laws, customs, and traditions" supported by public opinion. Critics do not see the relevance of this reply to the point they are making. When critics claim that DIT is too "Darwinian" they are claiming that culture does not have the algorithmic structure of the kind of process that the formalisms of population genetics were developed to capture.
A related problem stems from the reconstructive manner in which ideas are encoded and retrieved from memory, and the fact that ideas are interpreted in terms of existing conceptual structure and creatively adapted to their bearer's needs, views, and tastes prior to cultural transmission. This means that what biologists call 'acquired change' is ubiquitous in culture, and the population genetics framework was specifically developed to describe the evolution of inherited change in a system where acquired change is regularly discarded from the lineage. Proponents argue "But if this criticism was valid then it would be comparatively much easier to argue an unpopular or incorrect concepts than it actually is." Critics do not know what they mean by this. Proponents also claim, "In addition, nothing about DIT runs counter to the idea that an internally selective process (some would call creativity) also determines the fitness of ideas received and sent. In fact this decision making is a large part of the territory embraced by DIT proponents but is poorly understood due to limitations in neurobiology (for more information see Neural Darwinism)." Critics, however, do not view creativity as an "internally selective process", and their criticism has nothing to do with whether creativity "determines the fitness of ideas received and sent." (They also point out that there is a vast psychological literature on decision making; it would only appear to be "poorly understood" to someone whose only source for papers on decision making is the literature on Neural Darwinism.) The point critics are making in regard to creativity is that creativity introduces acquired change which is not handled by a selectionist, or Darwinian, or population genetics (it doesn't matter what you call it) type of mathematical framework.
- O'Neil, Dennis. "Glossary of Terms". Modern Theories of Evolution. Retrieved 28 October 2012.
- Laland, Kevin N. (2008-11-12). "Exploring gene–culture interactions: insights from handedness, sexual selection and niche-construction case studies". Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences. 363 (1509): 3577–3589. doi:10.1098/rstb.2008.0132. ISSN 0962-8436. PMC 2607340. PMID 18799415.
- Richerson, Peter J.; Boyd, Robert (2005). Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. University of Chicago Press.
- Campbell, D. T. (1965). "Variation and selective retention in socio-cultural evolution". Social Change in Developing Areas, A Reinterpretation of Evolutionary Theory.
- McElreath, R.; Henrich, J. (2007). "Dual inheritance theory: the evolution of human cultural capacities and cultural evolution" (PDF). In R. Dunbar and L. Barrett (ed.). Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-08-11.
- Simoons, F (1969). "Primary adult lactose intolerance and the milking habit: A problem in biologic and cultural interrelations: I. Review of the medical research". The American Journal of Digestive Diseases. 14 (12): 819–836. doi:10.1007/bf02233204. PMID 4902756.
- Simoons, F (1970). "Primary adult lactose intolerance and the milking habit: A problem in biologic and cultural interrelations: II. A culture historical hypothesis". The American Journal of Digestive Diseases. 15 (8): 695–710. doi:10.1007/bf02235991. PMID 5468838.
- Cavalli-Sforza, L., P. Menozzi and A. Piazza. 1994. The history and geography of human genes Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Holden, C.; Mace, R. (1997). "Phylogenetic analysis of the evolution of lactose digestion in adults". Human Biology. 69: 605–628.
- Durham, W. 1991. Coevolution: Genes, culture and human diversity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Chapter 5
- Perry, G., N. Dominy, K. Claw, A. Lee, H> Fiegler, R. Redon, J. Werner, F. Villanea, J. Mountain, R. Misra, N. Carter, C. Lee, A. Stone. Diet and the evolution of human amylase gene copy number variation. Nature Genetics 39:1256-1260.
- Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 199-202.
- Richerson, P. J. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp. 169-182.
- Kroeberm A. and C. Kluckhohn. 1952. Culture; A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University.
- Fox, R. and B. King. 2002. Anthropology Beyond Culture Oxford: Berg.
- Richerson, P. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pg 6.
- Boyd, R. and P. Richerson. 2000. Memes: Universal Acid or a Better Mouse Trap? In R. Aunger, Ed. Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 143-162. Full text
- Richerson, P.J. and R. Boyd. 2001. Culture is Part of Human Biology: Why the Superorganic Concept Serves the Human Sciences Badly. In Science Studies: Probing the Dynamics of Scientific Knowledge, In S. Maasen and M. Winterhager, Ed. Bielefeld: Verlag.
- Richerson, P. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pg 7.
- Sasaki, Joni Y. (2013). "Promise and Challenges Surrounding Culture–Gene Coevolution and Gene–Culture Interactions". Psychological Inquiry. 24: 64–70. doi:10.1080/1047840X.2013.764814.
- Itan, Yuval; Powell, Adam; Beaumont, Mark A.; Burger, Joachim; Thomas, Mark G. (2009-08-28). "The Origins of Lactase Persistence in Europe". PLOS Computational Biology. 5 (8): e1000491. Bibcode:2009PLSCB...5E0491I. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000491. ISSN 1553-7358. PMC 2722739. PMID 19714206.
- Malmström, Helena; Linderholm, Anna; Lidén, Kerstin; Storå, Jan; Molnar, Petra; Holmlund, Gunilla; Jakobsson, Mattias; Götherström, Anders (2010-01-01). "High frequency of lactose intolerance in a prehistoric hunter-gatherer population in northern Europe". BMC Evolutionary Biology. 10: 89. doi:10.1186/1471-2148-10-89. ISSN 1471-2148. PMC 2862036. PMID 20353605.
- "Maps". www.ucl.ac.uk. Retrieved 2017-03-27.
- Gerbault, Pascale; Roffet-Salque, Mélanie; Evershed, Richard P.; Thomas, Mark G. (2013-12-01). "How long have adult humans been consuming milk?". IUBMB Life. 65 (12): 983–990. doi:10.1002/iub.1227. ISSN 1521-6551. PMID 24339181.
- Bersaglieri, Todd; Sabeti, Pardis C.; Patterson, Nick; Vanderploeg, Trisha; Schaffner, Steve F.; Drake, Jared A.; Rhodes, Matthew; Reich, David E.; Hirschhorn, Joel N. (2017-03-27). "Genetic Signatures of Strong Recent Positive Selection at the Lactase Gene". American Journal of Human Genetics. 74 (6): 1111–1120. doi:10.1086/421051. ISSN 0002-9297. PMC 1182075. PMID 15114531.
- Laland, K. N. and G. R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 260
- Cochran, G. and H. Harpending. 2009. The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution. Basic Books.
- Aiello, Leslie C.; Wheeler, Peter (1995-01-01). "The Expensive-Tissue Hypothesis: The Brain and the Digestive System in Human and Primate Evolution". Current Anthropology. 36 (2): 199–221. doi:10.1086/204350. JSTOR 2744104.
- Fonseca-Azevedo, Karina; Herculano-Houzel, Suzana (2012-11-06). "Metabolic constraint imposes tradeoff between body size and number of brain neurons in human evolution". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. 109 (45): 18571–18576. Bibcode:2012PNAS..10918571F. doi:10.1073/pnas.1206390109. ISSN 0027-8424. PMC 3494886. PMID 23090991.
- Gorman, Rachael Moeller (2008). "Cooking Up Bigger Brains". Scientific American. 298 (1): 102–105. Bibcode:2008SciAm.298a.102G. doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0108-102.
- Farrell, J. H. (1956-05-01). "The effect on digestibility of methods commonly used to increase the tenderness of lean meat". British Journal of Nutrition. 10 (2): 111–115. doi:10.1079/BJN19560019. ISSN 1475-2662.
- Henrich, Joseph (2015). The Secret of Our Success: How Culture Is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter. Princeton: Princeton University Press. p. 66. ISBN 9780691166858.
- Wrangham, Richard (2009). Catching Fire How Cooking Made Us Human. London: Profile Books. p. 40. ISBN 9781846682865.
- Carmody, Rachel N.; Wrangham, Richard W. (2009-10-01). "The energetic significance of cooking". Journal of Human Evolution. 57 (4): 379–391. doi:10.1016/j.jhevol.2009.02.011. ISSN 1095-8606. PMID 19732938.
- Carmody, Rachel N.; Weintraub, Gil S.; Wrangham, Richard W. (2011-11-29). "Energetic consequences of thermal and nonthermal food processing". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 108 (48): 19199–19203. Bibcode:2011PNAS..10819199C. doi:10.1073/pnas.1112128108. ISSN 1091-6490. PMC 3228431. PMID 22065771.
- Wrangham, Richard (2010-08-06). Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human (Main ed.). Profile Books. p. 140.
- Wrangham, Richard (2010-05-27). Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human (Main ed.). London: Profile Books. p. 142. ISBN 9781846682865.
- University of California Television (UCTV) (2013-03-21), CARTA: The Evolution of Human Nutrition -- Richard Wrangham: Fire Starch Meat and Honey, retrieved 2017-03-27
- Koebnick, C.; Strassner, C.; Hoffmann, I.; Leitzmann, C. (1999-01-01). "Consequences of a long-term raw food diet on body weight and menstruation: results of a questionnaire survey". Annals of Nutrition & Metabolism. 43 (2): 69–79. doi:10.1159/000012770. ISSN 0250-6807. PMID 10436305.
- Cornélio, Alianda M.; de Bittencourt-Navarrete, Ruben E.; de Bittencourt Brum, Ricardo; Queiroz, Claudio M.; Costa, Marcos R. (2016-04-25). "Human Brain Expansion during Evolution Is Independent of Fire Control and Cooking". Frontiers in Neuroscience. 10: 167. doi:10.3389/fnins.2016.00167. ISSN 1662-4548. PMC 4842772. PMID 27199631.
- "06.14.99 - Meat-eating was essential for human evolution, says UC Berkeley anthropologist specializing in diet". www.berkeley.edu. Retrieved 2017-03-27.
- Zink, Katherine D.; Lieberman, Daniel E. (2016-03-24). "Impact of meat and Lower Palaeolithic food processing techniques on chewing in humans". Nature. 531 (7595): 500–503. Bibcode:2016Natur.531..500Z. doi:10.1038/nature16990. ISSN 0028-0836. PMID 26958832.
- Roebroeks, Wil; Villa, Paola (2011-03-29). "On the earliest evidence for habitual use of fire in Europe". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America. 108 (13): 5209–5214. Bibcode:2011PNAS..108.5209R. doi:10.1073/pnas.1018116108. ISSN 0027-8424. PMC 3069174. PMID 21402905.
- Wrangham, Richard (2010-05-27). Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human (Main ed.). London: Profile Books. pp. 98–102. ISBN 9781846682865.
- Wrangham, Richard (2010-08-06). Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human (Main ed.). Profile Books. p. 127.
- Wrangham, Richard (2010-05-27). Catching Fire: How Cooking Made Us Human (Main ed.). London: Profile Books. p. 127. ISBN 9781846682865.
- Koerper, H.; Stickel, E. (1980). "Cultural Drift: A Primary Process of Culture Change". Journal of Anthropological Research. 36: 463–469.
- Cavalli-Sfornza, L. and M. Feldman. 1981. Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Bentley, R.A.; Hahn, M.W.; Shennan, S.J. (2004). "Random drift and culture change" (PDF). Proceedings of the Royal Society B. 271 (1547): 1443–1450. doi:10.1098/rspb.2004.2746. PMC 1691747. PMID 15306315.
- Hahn, M.W.; Bentley, R. A. (2003). "Drift as a mechanism for cultural change: An example from baby names" (PDF). Proceedings of the Royal Society B. 270: S120–S123. doi:10.1098/rsbl.2003.0045. PMC 1698036. PMID 12952655.
- Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp.9, 69
- P.J.B. Slater, V.M. Janik. Vocal Learning. In "Encyclopedia of Animal Behavior", 2010, Pages 551-557. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/referenceworks/9780080453378
- Gabora, L. (1995). Meme and variations: A computer model of cultural evolution. In (L. Nadel & D. Stein, Eds.) 1993 Lectures in Complex Systems, Addison-Wesley, 471-486.
- Feldman, M.; Cavalli-Sforza, L. (1976). "Cultural and biological evolutionary processes, selection for a trait under complex transmission". Theoretical Population Biology. 9 (2): 238–259. doi:10.1016/0040-5809(76)90047-2. PMID 1273802.
- Feldman, M; Cavalli-Sfornza, L. (1977). "The evolution of continuous variation: II, complex transmission and assortive mating". Theoretical Population Biology. 11 (2): 161–181. doi:10.1016/0040-5809(77)90024-7.
- Boyd, R., and P. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Henrich, J.; McElreath, R. (2003). "The Evolution of Cultural Evolution" (PDF). Evolutionary Anthropology. 12 (3): 123–135. doi:10.1002/evan.10110.
- Henrich, J. and R. McElreath. 2007. Dual inheritance theory: the evolution of human cultural capacities and cultural evolution. Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, R. Dunbar and L. Barrett, eds., Ch. 38. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Henrich, J.; McElreath, R. (2003). "The evolution of cultural evolution" (PDF). Evolutionary Anthropology. 12 (3): 123–135. doi:10.1002/evan.10110.
- Richerson, P.J. and R. Boyd. 2000. Climate, culture, and the evolution of cognition. In C.M. Heyes and L. Huber, (Eds), The Evolution of Cognition. Massachusetts: MIT Press.
- Kerr, Benjamin; Feldman, Marcus W. (2003). "Carving the Cognitive Niche: Optimal Learning Strategies in Homogeneous and Heterogeneous Environments - ScienceDirect" (PDF). Journal of Theoretical Biology. 220 (2): 169–188. doi:10.1006/jtbi.2003.3146. Retrieved 2017-03-27.
- Richerson, P. J.; Boyd, R. (2000). The Pleistocene and the origins of human culture: built for speed. Perspectives in Ethology. 13. pp. 1–45. doi:10.1007/978-1-4615-1221-9_1. ISBN 978-1-4613-5447-5.
- Tomasello, M. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.
- Tomasello, M. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Williams, G.C. 1972. Adaptation and Natural Selection: A Critique of Some Current Evolutionary Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-02357-3
- Williams, G.C.. 1986. Evolution Through Group Selection. Blackwell. ISBN 0-632-01541-1
- Maynard Smith, J. (1964). "Group selection and kin selection". Nature. 201 (4924): 1145–1147. Bibcode:1964Natur.201.1145S. doi:10.1038/2011145a0.
- Uyenoyama, M.; Feldman, M. W. (1980). "Theories of kin and group selection: a population genetics perspective". Theoretical Population Biology. 17 (3): 380–414. doi:10.1016/0040-5809(80)90033-7.
- Cavalli-Sforza, L. L.; Feldman, M. W. (1973). "Models for cultural inheritance. I. Group mean and within group variation". Theoretical Population Biology. 4: 42–44. doi:10.1016/0040-5809(73)90005-1.
- Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pg. 227–240.
- Soltis, J.; Boyd, R.; Richerson, P. J. (1995). "Can group-functional behaviors evolve by cultural group selection? An empirical test" (PDF). Current Anthropology. 36 (3): 473–494. doi:10.1086/204381.
- Mace, R., C. Holden, and S. Shennan (Eds.) 2005. The evolution of cultural diversity: a phylogenetic approach. London:University College London Press.
- Darwin, C. 1874. The descent of man and selection in relation to sex. 2nd ed. 2 vols. New York: American Home Library.
- Campbell, D. 1965. Variation and selective retention in socio-cultural evolution. In Social change in developing areas: A reinterpretation of evolutionary theory, ed. H. Barringer, G. Blanksten, and R. Mack, 19-49. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Company.
- Feldman, M.; Cavalli-Sforna, L. (1976). "Cultural and biological evolutionary processes, selection for a trait under complex transmission". Theoretical Population Biology. 9 (2): 238–59. doi:10.1016/0040-5809(76)90047-2. PMID 1273802.
- Lumsden C., and E. Wilson. 1981. Genes, Mind and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Laland K. and G. Brown. 2002. Sense and Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Boyd, R.; Richerson, P. (1983). "The cultural transmission of acquired variation: effects on genetic fitness". Journal of Theoretical Biology. 100 (4): 567–96. doi:10.1016/0022-5193(83)90324-7. PMID 6876815.
- Marwick, Ben (2005). "What Can Archaeology Do With Boyd and Richerson's Cultural Evolutionary Program?". Review of Archaeology. 26 (2): 30–40. hdl:1885/44496.
- Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 2005. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 294-299.
- Haag, Allison (2006). "The synthesizer". SEED. 2 (7): 46.
- Laland, K. N. and G. R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 290.
- Herb Gintis Amazon.com review: https://www.amazon.com/review/product/0198508840/
- McElreath, R., M. Lubell, P. J. Richerson, T. M. Waring, W. Baum, E. Edsten, C. Efferson, and B. Paciotti. 2005. Applying formal models to the laboratory study of social learning: The effect of task difficulty and environmental fluctuation. Evolution and Human Behavior 26: 483-508.
- Efferson, C.; R. Lalive; P. J. Richerson; R. McElreath; M. Lubell (2008). "Conformists and mavericks: the empirics of frequency-dependent cultural transmission". Evolution and Human Behavior. 29 (1): 56–64. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.606.1789. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.08.003.
- Baum, W. M.; Richerson, P. J.; Efferson, C. M.; Paciotti, B. M. (2004). "Cultural evolution in laboratory micro-societies including traditions of rule-giving and rule-following" (PDF). Evolution and Human Behavior. 25 (5): 305–326. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.404.8710. doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.05.003.
- Henrich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, E. Fehr, H. Gintis (Eds). 2004. Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Cavalli-Sfornza, L. L. and M. Feldman. 1981. Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- McElreath, R (2004). "Social learning and the maintenance of cultural variation: An evolutionary model and data from East Africa" (PDF). American Anthropologist. 106 (2): 308–321. doi:10.1525/aa.2004.106.2.308.
- Gintis, H (2006). "A framework for the integration of the behavioral sciences" (PDF). Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 30 (1): 1–61. doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000581. PMID 17475022.
- Laland, K. N. and G. R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 287-319.
- Richerson, P. and R. Boyd. 2001. Culture is part of human biology: Why the superorganic concept serves the human sciences badly. In M. Goodman and A. S. Moffat(Eds.) Probing Human Origins. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The American Academy of Arts & Sciences.
- Gintis, H (2007). "A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences" (PDF). Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 30 (1): 1–61. doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000581. PMID 17475022.
- Richerson, P. J. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pg. 5-8
- Barkow, J., Cosmides, L, & Tooby, J. (1992) The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford University Press.
- Boyer, P. (2001) Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought. Basic Books.
- Sperber, D. (1996). Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach. Blackwell.
- Tooby, J. & Cosmides, L., (1992) Psychological foundations of culture. In The Adapted Mind.
- Marwick, Ben (2008). "Three styles of Darwinian evolution in the analysis of stone artefacts: Which one to use in mainland Southeast Asia?". Australian Archaeology. 67 (67): 79–86. doi:10.1080/03122417.2008.11681880. JSTOR 40288025.
- Guglielmino, C. R.; Viganotti, C.; Hewlett, B.; Cavalli-Sforza, L.L. (1995). "Cultural variation in Africa: role of mechanism of transmission and adaptation". Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA. 92 (16): 7585–7589. Bibcode:1995PNAS...92.7585G. doi:10.1073/pnas.92.16.7585. PMC 41384. PMID 11607569.
- Boyd, R. and P.J. Richerson. 2000. Memes: universal acid or better mouse trap. In R. Aunger (Ed), Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 143–162.
- Laland, K. N. and G. R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 289-290.
- Gabora, L (2008). "The cultural evolution of socially situated cognition". Cognitive Systems Research. 9 (1–2): 104–113. arXiv:0803.2568. doi:10.1016/j.cogsys.2007.05.004.
- Gabora, L (2011). "Five clarifications about cultural evolution" (PDF). Journal of Cognition and Culture. 11: 61–83. arXiv:1309.2622. doi:10.1163/156853711x568699.
- Gabora, L. (2011). How a generation was misled about natural selection. Psychology Today, Mindbloggling.
- Gabora, L (2013). "An evolutionary framework for culture: Selectionism versus communal exchange". Physics of Life Reviews. 10 (2): 117–145. arXiv:1206.4386. doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2013.03.006. PMID 23623043.
- von Neumann, J. (1966). The theory of self-reproducing automata. University of Illinois Press, Chicago.
- Holland, J. (1975). Adaptation in natural and artificial systems. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Boyd, R. and Richerson, P.J. (1985) Culture and the Evolutionary Process, Chicago University Press
- Darwin, C. 1874 (1902). The Descent of Man, second edition. American Home Library. See especially chapter 5.
- Fracchia, J.; Lewontin, R. C. (1999). "Does culture evolve?". History and Theory. 38 (4): 52–78. doi:10.1111/0018-2656.00104.
- Temkin, I.; Eldredge, N. (2007). "Phylogenetics and material cultural evolution". Current Anthropology. 48 (1): 146–153. doi:10.1086/510463.
- Kauffman, S (1999). "Darwinism, neoDarwinism, and the autocatalytic model of culture: Commentary on Origin of Culture". Psycoloquy. 10 (22): 1–4.
- Lumsden, C. J. and E. O. Wilson. 1981. Genes, Mind, and Culture: The Coevolutionary Process. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.
- Cavalli-Sforza, L. L. and M. Feldman. 1981. Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative Approach. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Durham, W. H. 1991. Coevolution: Genes, Culture and Human Diversity. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. ISBN 0-8047-1537-8
- Tomasello, M. 1999. The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.
- Shennan, S. J. 2002. Genes, Memes and Human History: Darwinian Archaeology and Cultural Evolution. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Laland, K. N. and G. R. Brown. 2002. Sense & Nonsense: Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Behavior. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Boyd, R. and P. J. Richerson. 2005. The Origin and Evolution of Cultures. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Richerson, P. J. and R. Boyd. 2005. Not By Genes Alone: How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Smith, E. A. 1999. Three styles in the evolutionary analysis of human behavior. In L. Cronk, N. Chagnon, and W. Irons, (Eds.) Adaptation and Human Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Henrich, J.; McElreath, R. (2003). "The evolution of cultural evolution" (PDF). Evolutionary Anthropology. 12 (3): 123–135. doi:10.1002/evan.10110.
- Mesoudi, A.; Whiten, A.; Laland, K. N. (2006). "Towards a unified science of cultural evolution" (PDF). Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 29 (4): 329–383. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.612.2415. doi:10.1017/s0140525x06009083. PMID 17094820.
- Gintis, H (2006). "A framework for the integration of the behavioral sciences" (PDF). Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 30 (1): 1–61. doi:10.1017/s0140525x07000581. PMID 17475022.
- Bentley, R.A., C. Lipo, H.D.G. Maschner and B. Marler 2007. Darwinian Archaeologies. In R.A. Bentley, H.D.G. Maschner & C. Chippendale (Eds.) Handbook of Archaeological Theories. Lanham (MD): AltaMira Press.
- McElreath, R. & Henrich, J. 2007. Modeling cultural evolution. In R. Dunbar and L. Barrett, (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McElreath, R. & Henrich, J. 2007. Dual inheritance theory: the evolution of human cultural capacities and cultural evolution. In R. Dunbar and L. Barrett, (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sterelny, Kim (2002). Review Genes, Memes and Human History (PDF). Stephen Shennan. London: Thames and Hudson. p. 304.
- Laland, K.N.; Odling-Smee, J.; Myles, S. (2010). "How culture shaped the human genome: bringing genetics and the human sciences". Nature Reviews Genetics. 11 (2): 137–148. doi:10.1038/nrg2734. PMID 20084086.
- R. Boyd; P. J. Richerson. P. Carruthers; S. Stich; S. Laurence (eds.). "Culture, Adaptation, and Innateness" (PDF). The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition.
- P. J. Richerson; R. Boyd (2001). "Built for Speed, Not for Comfort: Darwinian Theory and Human Culture" (PDF). History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences (23): 425–465.
Current DIT researchers
- Rob Boyd, Department of Anthropology, UCLA
- Marcus Feldman, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford
- Joe Henrich, Departments of Psychology and Economics, University of British Columbia
- Richard McElreath, Anthropology Department, UC Davis
- Peter J. Richerson, Department of Environmental Science and Policy, UC Davis
- Liane Gabora, Department of Psychology, University of British Columbia
- Russell Gray Max Planck Institute for the Science of Human History, Jena, Germany
- Herb Gintis, Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Massachusetts & Santa Fe Institute
- Kevin Laland, School of Biology, University of St. Andrews
- Ruth Mace, Department of Anthropology, University College London
- Alex Mesoudi Human Biological and Cultural Evolution Group, University of Exeter, UK
- Michael Tomasello, Department of Developmental and Comparative Psychology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology
- Peter Turchin Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Connecticut
- Mark Collard, Department of Archaeology, Simon Fraser University, and Department of Archaeology, University of Aberdeen