Princelings
| Princelings | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Traditional Chinese | 太子黨 | ||||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 太子党 | ||||||||
| Literal meaning | Crown Prince Party | ||||||||
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In contemporary usage, The Princelings, also translated as the Crown Prince Party, refers to the descendants of prominent and influential senior communist officials in the People's Republic of China. It is not a political party, but an informal, and often derogatory, categorization to signify those benefiting from nepotism and cronyism, by analogy with Crown Princes in hereditary monarchies. Many of its members now hold high-level political and business positions in the upper echelons of power. However, there is currently no discernible political cohesion within the group, and as such they should not be compared to other informal groupings such as the Shanghai clique or the Tsinghua clique, which resemble inner-party factions.
The term was coined in the early 20th century, referring to the son of Yuan Shikai (a self-declared Emperor) and his cronies. It was later used to describe the relatives of the top four nationalist families; Chiang Kai-shek's kin, Soong May-ling's kin, Chen Lifu's kin, and Kong Xiangxi's kin. After the 1950s, the term was used to describe Chiang Ching-kuo, son of Chiang Kai-shek, and his friends in Taiwan. Today's Princelings include the children of the Eight Elders and other recent senior national and provincial leaders.
History
The latest "crown princes" are in mainland China. Many senior leaders often lobby directly or indirectly for their descendants and relatives to succeed them. Although some manage to keep a low profile, many of them are perceived to be arrogant and undeserving of the fortune or the prominence they hold. By utilizing their parents' privileges, they often place themselves above the law and foster the contagion of corruption.
Xiang Lanxin, professor of international history and politics at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, explains it thus:
Historically, how to control local officials who possessed imperial lineage was always a problem. The Politburo is equivalent to the inner circle of the imperial household. Its members, if assigned a local administrative position, can easily overrule any opposition in their jurisdictions as no other party officials can match them in rank and prestige.[1]
Some of these crown princes hold senior positions at the vice-ministerial level or above in their thirties, for which other ordinary cadres would struggle for decades. Others run companies involved in large scale corruption and smuggling schemes. All of these misdeeds raise widespread sentiments of resentment and jealousy, and some "crown princes" have fallen victim to the trend towards enmity that is apparent in China. Most political observers see the Crown Prince Party as having been at the pinnacle of their power in the 1980s and to have had their power reduced after 1989 for a number of reasons:
First, not only did the Crown Prince Party cause some resentment among the general public, but they also caused resentment within the vast major of Party members who did not have a powerful relative; for example, Chen Yuan, son of Chen Yun; and Chen Haosu, son of Chen Yi lost their election in Beijing and had to be transferred to other positions.
Second, the booming Chinese economy caused a new wealthy class to emerge, many of whom demanded fair play and protection of their property.
Third, as the public was unsatisfied with the plague of corruption and cronyism, with resentment and discontent mounting to a degree that could wreak havoc on the CCP's reign, the CCP had to take some measures to appease these strong feelings.
One watershed event occurred during the 15th National Congress of the CCP in 1997. Some prominent figures of the Crown Prince Party suffered great losses as candidates. Xi Jinping, son of Xi Zhongxun, and Deng Pufang, eldest son of Deng Xiaoping, were narrowly elected as alternate members of the Central Commission of the CCP, but were listed on the tail end, due to the low number of votes received. Bo Xilai, son of Bo Yibo, was unable to get elected as an alternate member. Interestingly, both Xi and Bo have emerged as major figures in China's next generation of leadership in 2007 (though Bo fell from power in 2012). Indeed, Xi is widely considered to have been tapped to succeed Hu Jintao as General Secretary at the 18th Party Congress in 2012, and President in 2013.
It is speculated that when Jiang Zemin was close to the end of his term for his age, he put many members of the Crown Prince Party into important positions to appeal to senior leaders of the CCP and win their support for his continued influence. There is a trend towards members of the Crown Prince Party taking over power step by step. Of these, Yu Zhengsheng, son of Huang Jing (黄敬), former mayor of Tianjin, was already a member of the powerful politburo of the CCP; Wang Qishan, son-in-law of Yao Yilin (former vice premier and member of politburo), mayor of Beijing; Xi Jinping, Bo Xilai, Zhou Xiaochuan, son of Zhou Jiannan (former minister of First Machinery Ministry and Jiang Zemin’s former boss), governor of the People's Bank of China, have also occupied important positions since the 17th Party Congress.
Examples
The following are some of the most famous crown princes:
- Son and daughters of Deng Xiaoping: Deng Pufang (邓朴方), chairman of the Handicapped Association; Deng Nan (邓楠), former vice minister Science and Technology
- Son of Chen Yun: Chen Yuan (陈元), governor of the State Development Bank of China
- Son of Bo Yibo: Bo Xilai (薄熙来), secretary of the CCP of Chongqing, and by extension, his own son, Bo Guagua.[2]
- Son of Xi Zhongxun: Xi Jinping (习近平), Vice President of China.
- Son of Zeng Shan (曾山, former interior minister of CCP): Zeng Qinghong, former Vice-President of China
- Son of Zeng Qinghong: Zeng Wei, who purchased a AU$32.4 million property in Sydney, Australia. Zeng's source of income is unknown.[3][4]
- Son of Huang Jing: Yu Zhengsheng (俞正声), secretary of the CCP of Shanghai, member of the politburo
- Son in law of Yao Yilin: Wang Qishan, Executive Vice Premier
- Son and daughter of Li Peng (as son of a martyr and adopted by Zhou Enlai, a member of Crown Prince Party, too): Li Xiaopeng (李小鹏), chairman of Huaneng Power Group; Li Xiaolin (李小琳), president of China Power International.
- Sons of Jiang Zemin: Jiang Mianheng (江绵恒), vice dean of the Chinese Academy of Science, director of several major SOEs such as Shanghai Auto, and the real controller of China Netcom; Jiang Miankang (江绵康), a major general of the PLA
- Son of Wang Zhen, Wang Jun (王军) chairman of CITIC; Wang Zhi (王之), former chairman of Great Wall Group
- Son of Liu Shaoqi: Liu Yuan (刘源), lieutenant general of the military police
- Son of He Long, He Pengfei (贺鹏飞), Deputy Commander in Chief of the Chinese Navy, Vice-Admiral
- Former son-in-law of Liu Huaqing (刘华清): Pan Yue (潘岳), vice director of the State Environmental Protection Administration
- Son of Chen Yi: Chen Haosu (陈昊苏), former vice minister of the Ministry of Culture
- Grandson of Mao Zedong, Mao Xinyu (毛新宇), major general of the PLA.
A list of 226 crown princes has been published (see link below).
References
- ^ Xiang, Lanxin (Apr 20, 2012). "Bo Xilai probe shows up China's outdated system of government". South China Morning Post
- ^ Children of the Revolution, Jeremy Page, The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2011.
- ^ Lifting the lid on the secret life of Point Piper's grand princeling, John Garnaut, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 October 2010.
- ^ A Home Fit for a Princeling, Dinny McMahon, The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2011.
See also
External links
- 中共太子党名单及任职一览表 (2004版) (A list of names of "Crown Princes").
- China's former 'first family' about the children of Deng Xiaoping
- The Princelings, John Garnaut, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 October 2010]
- "China's 'Princelings' Pose Issue for Party, Jeremy Page, The Wall Street Journal, 26 November 2011
