Erwin Rommel

Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel
File:AKrommel.jpg Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, 1941
Nickname(s)	“The Desert Fox”
Allegiance	Germany
Years of service	1911 - 1944
Rank	Field Marshal
Unit	Alpen Korps
Commands	7.Panzer-Division Afrika Korps Panzer Army Africa Commander-in-chief North Italy Army Group E, Greece Army Group B
Battles/wars	World War I Battle of Caporetto (1917) World War II -Fall of France Battle of Arras (1940) -North African Campaign Siege of Tobruk (1941) Battle of Gazala (1942) Battle of Bir Hakeim (1942) First Battle of El Alamein (1942) Battle of Alam Halfa (1942) Second Battle of El Alamein (1942) Battle of Medenine (1943) Battle of the Kasserine Pass (1943) -Battle of Normandy
Awards	Pour le Mérite Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves, Swords, and Diamonds

Erwin Johannes Eugen Rommel () (15 November 1891 – 14 October 1944) was one of the most distinguished German field marshals of World War II. He was the commander of the Deutsches Afrika Korps and also became known by the nickname “The Desert Fox” (Wüstenfuchs, ) for the skillful military campaigns he waged on behalf of the German Army in North Africa. He was later in command of the German forces opposing the Allied cross-channel invasion at Normandy.

Rommel's military successes earned the respect not only of his troops and Hitler, but also that of his enemy Commonwealth troops in the North African Campaign. Following the defeat of Axis forces in North Africa, and whilst commanding the defence of Occupied France, his fortunes changed when he was suspected (correctly or incorrectly) of involvement in a failed plot to kill Hitler in 1944. He accepted the offer of taking his own life rather than face a political trial in the Nazi "People's Court".

Early life and career

File:Rommel cadet.jpg

A young Rommel as an officer cadet around 1910.

Rommel was born in Heidenheim, Germany, approximately 45 kilometers from Ulm, in the state of Württemberg. He was baptised on 17 November 1891. He was the second son of a Protestant headmaster of the secondary school at Aalen, Prof. Erwin Rommel the elder and Helene von Luz, a daughter of a prominent local dignitary. The couple also had three more children, two sons, Karl and Gerhard, and a daughter, Helene. Later, recalling his childhood, Rommel wrote that "my early years passed very happily." At the age of fourteen, Rommel and a friend built a full-scale glider that was able to fly, although not very far. Young Erwin considered becoming an engineer and would throughout his life display extraordinary technical aptitude; however, at his father's insistence, he joined the local 124th Württemberg Infantry Regiment as an officer cadet in 1910 and, shortly after, was sent to the Officer Cadet School in Danzig. While at Cadet School, early in 1911, Rommel met his future wife, 17-year-old Lucia Maria Mollin (commonly called Lucie). He graduated in November 1911 and was commissioned as a lieutenant in January 1912. Rommel and Lucie married in 1916, and in 1928 they had a son, Manfred, who would later become the mayor of Stuttgart. Scholars Bierman and Smith argue that, during this time, Rommel also had an affair with Walburga Stemmer in 1913 and that relationship produced a daughter named Gertrud. (1 p. 56).

World War I

During World War I, Rommel fought in France, as well as in Romania (see: Romanian Campaign) and Italy (see: Italian Campaign) as part of the élite Alpen Korps. While serving with that unit, he gained a reputation for making quick tactical decisions and taking advantage of enemy confusion. He was wounded three times and awarded the Iron Cross; First and Second Class. Rommel also received Prussia's highest medal, the Pour le Mérite - an honor traditionally reserved for generals only - after fighting in the mountains of west Slovenia – Battle of the Isonzo – Soca front. The award came as a result of the Battle of Longarone, and the capture of Mount Matajur, Slovenia, and its defenders, numbering 150 Italian officers, 7,000 men and 81 pieces of artillery. His battalion also played a key role in the decisive victory of the Central Powers over the Italian Army at the Battle of Caporetto. Interestingly, Rommel for a time served in the same infantry regiment as Friedrich Paulus, both of whom were to preside over catastrophic defeats for the Third Reich in their own markedly different ways.

Inter-war years

After the war, Rommel held battalion commands and was an instructor at the Dresden Infantry School from 1929 to 1933 and the Potsdam War Academy from 1935 to 1938. Rommel's war diaries, Infanterie greift an (Infantry Attacks), published in 1937, became a highly regarded military textbook, and attracted the attention of Adolf Hitler, who placed him in charge of the War Ministry liaison with the Hitler Jugend’s Headquarters of Military Sports, the Hitler Jugend branch involved with paramilitary activities: terrain exercises and marksmanship. Rommel applied himself energetically to the new task. The army provided instructors to the Hitler Jugend Rifle School in Thuringia, which in turn supplied qualified instructors to the HJ's regional branches. In 1937 Rommel conducted a tour of HJ meetings and encampments, delivered lectures on German soldiering while inspecting facilities and exercises. Simultaneously he was pressuring Baldur von Schirach, the Hitler Jugend leader, to accept an agreement expanding the army's involvement in Hitler Jugend training. Schirach interpreted this as a bid to turn the Hitler Jugend into an army auxiliary, a "junior army" in his words. He refused and Rommel, whom he had come to dislike personally and apparently envy for his "real soldier"'s appeal to the youngsters, was denied access to the Hitler Jugend. An army-Hitler Jugend agreement was concluded, but on a far more limited scope than Rommel had sought; cooperation was restricted to the army providing personnel to the Rifle School, much to the army's chagrin. By 1939 the Hitler Jugend had 20,000 rifle instructors. Simultaneously Rommel retained his place at Potsdam. In his class Rommel was awarded the highest war ribbons for excellent performance.

In 1938, Rommel, now a colonel, was appointed commandant of the War Academy at Wiener Neustadt (Theresian Military Academy). Here he started his follow-up to Infantry Attacks, Panzer greift an (Tank Attacks, sometimes translated as The Tank In Attack). Rommel was removed after a short time however, to take command of Adolf Hitler's personal protection battalion (FührerBegleitbataillon), assigned to protect him in the special railway train (Führersonderzug) used during his visits to occupied Czechoslovakia and Memel. It was at this period that he met and befriended Joseph Göbbels, the Reich's minister of propaganda. Goebbels became a fervent admirer of Rommel and later ensured that Rommel's exploits were celebrated in the media.

World War II

Poland 1939

Rommel continued as Führerbegleitbataillon commander during the Polish campaign, often moving up close to the front in the Führersonderzug, and seeing much of Hitler. After the Polish defeat, Rommel returned to Berlin to organize the Führer's victory parade, taking part himself as a member of Hitler's entourage. During the Polish campaign Rommel was asked to intervene on behalf of one of his wife's relatives, a Polish Priest who had been arrested. He has been criticised for not doing enough on the man's behalf, though he did at least apply to the Gestapo for information, only to be, inevitably, brushed off with the reply that no information on the man existed.

France 1940

Rommel asked Hitler for command of a panzer division and, on 6 February 1940 only three months before the invasion, Rommel was given command of the 7.Panzer-Division for Fall Gelb ("Case Yellow"), the invasion of France and the Low Countries. This string-pulling provoked resentment among fellow officers, the more so as Rommel had no experience with armor. He had, however, emphasised the mobile use of infantry, and had come to recognise the great use of amorored forces in Poland. He set about adapting himself and learning the techniques of armored warfare rapidly and with great enthusiasm.

On 10 May 1940 the 7th Panzer Division, a part of 15th Panzer Corps under General Hoth, advanced into Belgium to proceed to the Meuse river near Dinant. At the Meuse 7th Panzer was held up, due to the bridge having been destroyed and determined sniper and artillery fire from the French defenders. The Germans lacked smoke grenades, so Rommel, having assumed personal command of the crossing, ordered a few nearby houses to be torched to conceal the attack. The German Panzer Grenadiers crossed the rivers in rubber boats, with Rommel leading the second wave across the river. The Division dashed further inland, always spurred on by Rommel, and far in front of any friendly forces.

By 18 May the Division had captured Cambrai, and on 20 May it reached Arras. Here Rommel wanted to cut of the British Expeditionary Force path to the coast, and Hans von Luck, commanding the reconnaissance battalion of the Division, was tasked with forcing a crossing over the La Bassée canals near the city. Supported by Stuka dive bombers the unit managed to force a crossing. The British launched a counterattack, leading to the Battel of Arras, with Matilda tanks, and the Germans found their 3.7 cm antitank and tank guns useless against its heavy armour. A battery of 88 mm guns had to be brought up to deal with the threat. The crossing was secured after several days of fierce fighting.

The 7th Panzer continued its advance, and on 27 May it reached Lille. The following day the Division came under heavy fire from German artillery due to the rapidity of the advance. While the British evacuated the troops at Dunkirk, the 7th Panzer Division was given a few days rest. On 5 June the Division resumed its advance, in a drive for the Seine river to secure the bridges near Rouen. Advancing 100 km in two days, the Division reached Rouen, only to find the bridges destroyed. On 9 June Rommel reached the coast, sending his "Am at coast" signal to the German HQ.

On 15 June 7th Panzer started advancing on Cherbourg. On 17 June the division advanced 350 km, and on 18 June the town was captured. The Division then proceeded towards Bordeaux, but stopped when the armistice was signed on 21 June. In July the Division was sent to the Paris area to start preparations for Operation Seelöwe. The preparations were half-hearted however, as it became clearer and clearer that the Luftwaffe would not be able to secure air auperiority over the British coast.

7.Panzer-Division was later nicknamed Gespenster-Divisionen (the "Ghost Division"), due to the speed and surprise it was consistently able to achieve, to the point that even the German High Command lost track of where it was. He also set the record for the longest thrust in one day by Panzers up to that point, covering nearly 150 miles. Rommel's success owed partially to his misappropriating supplies and bridging tackle belonging to the neighbouring divisions. This gravely hampered their operations. His commander Hermann Hoth considered court-martialing him for this, but was dissuaded by his own commander, Hans von Kluge. The fame gained by Rommel during the campaign made a court-martial, or even a reprimand, impractical.

Rommel's reward for his success was to be promoted and appointed commander of the 5th Light Division (later reorganized and redesignated 21.Panzer-Division) and of the 15.Panzer-Division, which were sent to Libya in early 1941 to aid the hapless and demoralized Italian troops, forming the Deutsches Afrika Korps () in February 1941. It was in Africa where Rommel achieved his greatest fame as a commander.

Africa 1941-43

The first Axis offensive

His campaign in Africa earned Rommel the nickname "The Desert Fox". On 6 February 1941 Rommel was ordered to lead the Afrika Korps, sent to Libya to help shore up the Italian forces who had been driven back during Operation Compass launched by the British Commonwealth forces under Major-General Richard O’Connor during December 1940. Initially ordered to assume a defensive posture and hold the frontline, the German High Command had initially slated a limited offensive towards Agedabia and Benghazi in May, and hold the positions there. Rommel argued that such a limited offensive would be ineffective, as the whole of Cyrenaica would have to be captured if the frontlines where to be held.

The Western Desert area, showing Rommels first offensive -- March 24, 1941 - June 15, 1941.

On 24 March 1941 Rommel launched a limited offensive with only the 5th Light Division supported by Italian motorised divisions. This thrust was to be minor, in anticipation of Rommel receiving the 15th Panzer Division in May. The British fell back to Mersa el Brega and started constructing defensive works. Rommel decided to continue the attack against these positions, to prevent the British from building up the fortifications. After a day of fierce fighting the Germans prevailed, and the advance was continued, as Rommel disregarded holding off the attack on Agedabia until May. The British Commander-in-Chief, General Archibald Wavell, overestimating the strenght of the Axis forces and, already apprehensive about the extent of his advances during the previous winter, ordered a withdrawal from Benghazi in early April to avoid being cut off by Rommel's trust.

File:Rommel in Africa1941.jpg

Rommel in Africa - Summer 1941.

Rommel, seeing the British reluctance to fight a decisive action, decided on a bold move, the seizure of the whole of of Cyrenaica, despite having only light forces. He ordered the Italian Ariete armoured division to pursue the retreating British, while the 5th Light Division was to move on Benghazi. General Streich, the 5th Light Division's commander, protested this order on the grounds of the state of his vehicles, but Rommel brushed the objections aside because, in his words, "One cannot permit unique opportunities to slip by for the sake of trifles."

After Benghazi had been secured following the British withdrawal, Cyrenaica as far as Gazala had been captured by 8 April, despite fervent protests from Italian HQ, who felt Rommel were going beyond his orders, especially since he was nominally under Italian command. Rommel had received orders from the German High Command that he was not to advance past Maradah, but he turned a blind eye to this as well as protests from some of his staff and divisional commanders, grasping what he perceived to be a great possibility of largely destroying the Allied presence in North Africa and capture Egypt. Rommel decided to keep up the pressure on the retreating British, and launched an outflanking offensive on the important port of Tobruk. With Italian forces attacking along the coast, Rommel decided to sweep around to the south and attack the harbour from the south-east with the 5th Light Division, hoping to trap the bulk of the enemy force there. This outflanking could not be carried out as rapidly as was necessary due to logistical problems from lengthening supply lines and spoiling flank attacks from Tobruk, so Rommel's plan of trapping large forces at Tobruk failed. By 11 April the envelopment of Tobruk was complete, and the first attack was launched. Other forces continued pushing east, reaching Bardia and securing the whole of Libya by 15 April.

The siege of Tobruk

The following Siege of Tobruk, held by Australian forces under General Leslie Morshead and whose port facilities were logistically imperative, lasted 240 days. Impatient to secure success, Rommel launched repeated, small-scale attacks which were defeated by the Australian defenders. Furious with what he percieved as the lack of fighting spirit in his Italian allies, Rommel decided to hold off further attacks until the detailed plans of the Tobruk defences could be obtained, the 15th Panzer Division could be brought up to support the attack, and more training in positional warfare could be done. Whereas the defenders could be supplied by sea, the logistical problems of the Afrikakorps greatly hampered its operations, and a concentrated attack by the beleaguered forces might have succeded in breaking the siege. General Morshead, however, was misled by intelligence overestimates of the German forces opposing Tobruk, thus no major action was attempted. Reflecting on this period, General Kircheim, the then commander of the 5th Light Division, said: "I do not like to be reminded of that time because so much blood was needlessly shed." Kirchheim had been reluctant to launch attacks on Tobruk, as the cost was very high. Rommel decided to hold off attacks on Tobruk for an indetermined time, and set about creating defensive positions, with Italian infantry forces holding Bardia, the Sollum-Sidi Omar line and investing Tobruk, and mobile German and Italian forces held in reserve to fight any British attacks from Egypt. To this end, Halfaya Pass was secured, the high water mark of Rommels offensive.

General Wavell made two unsuccessful attempts to relieve Tobruk (Operation Brevity (Launched on 15 May) and Operation Battleaxe) (launched on 15 June). Both operations were easily defeated as they were hastily prepared, partly due to Churchill's impatience for speedy action. During Brevity the important Halfaya Pass was briefly recaptured by the British, but lost again on 27 May. Battleax resulted in the loss of 87 British for 25 German tanks, in a three day battle raging on the flanks of the Sollum and Halfaya Passes, with the British being unable to take these, by now, well fortified positions.

Rommel requested reinforcements for a renewed offensive but High Command, then completing the preparations for Operation Barbarossa, could not spare any. Chief of Staff General Franz Halder also argued that a larger force could not be logistically sustained. Indeed, Halder sarcastically commented: "now at last he is constrained to state that his forces are not sufficiently strong to allow him to take full advantage of the 'unique opportunities' offered by the overall situation. That is the impression we have had for quite some time over here." Angry that his order not to advance beyond Maradah, had been disobeyed and alarmed at mounting losses, Halder, never an admirer of Rommel, dispatched Friedrich Paulus to "head off this soldier gone stark mad" in Halder's words. Upon arrival Paulus adviced Rommel from undertaking any more small-scale assaults, but to plan a systematic all-out assault, something Rommel appears to have been doing from April according to his papers. Rommel planned a elaborately prepared great assault scheduled for 21 November 1941, but this attack never took place.

In August Rommel was appointed commander of the newly created Panzer Group Africa. His previous command, the Afrikakorps compromising the 15th Panzer Division and the 5th Light Division which by then had been redesignated as 21st Panzer Division, was put under command of Generalleutnant Cruewell, with Fritz Bayerlin as chief of staff. In addtion to the Afrikakorps, Rommels Panzer Group had the 90th Light Division and six Italian divisions, the Ariete and Trieste Divisions forming the XX Motorised Corps, three infantry Divisions investing Tobruk and one holding Bardia.

The Allied counter offensive - Operation Crusader

File:General Erwin Rommel between Tobruk and Sidi Omar.jpg

General Erwin Rommel with the 15th Panzer Division between Tobruk and Sidi Omar. Libya, November, 1941

Following the costly failure of Battleaxe, Wavell was replaced by Commander-in-Chief India, General Claude Auchinleck. The Allied forces were reorganized and strengthed to two corps, XXX and XIII, into the British Eighth Army under the command of Alan Cunningham. Auchinleck, having 770 tanks and 1,000 aircraft to support him, launched a major offensive to relieve Tobruk (Operation Crusader) on 18 November 1941. Rommel had two armored divisons, the 15th and 21st with 260 tanks, the 90th Light Infantry division, and three Italian corps, five infantry and one armoured division with 154 tanks, with which to oppose him.

The Eighth Army deeply outflanked the German defences along the Egyptian frontier with a left hook through the desert, and reached a position from which they could strike at both Tobruk and the coastal road, "Via Balbia". Auchinleck planned to engage the Afrikakorps with his Armoured Division, while XXX Corps assaulted the Italian positions at Bardia, encircling the troops there.

Rommel was faced with the decision of wheter to go through with the attack on Tobruk, trusting his screening forces to hold off the advancing British, or to reorient his forces to hit the British colums approaching. He considered the risks to great if he chose to attack Tobruk, and so called off this attack.

The British armoured thrusts were largely defeated by fierce resistance from antitank positions and German and Italian tanks. The Italian Ariete Armoured Division was forced to give ground while inflicting losses on the advancing British at Bir el Gobi, whereas the 21st Panzer Division checked the attack launched against them and counterattacked on Gabr Saleh. Over the next two days the British continued pressing the attack, sending their armoured Brigades into the battle in a piecemeal fashion, while Rommel, aware of his numerical inferiority, launched a concentrated attack on 23 November with all his armour. 21st Panzer Divison held defensively at Sidi Regezh, while 15th Panzer Divison and the Italian Ariete Division attacked the flanks and enveloped the British armour. During this battle, among the biggest armoured battles of the North Africa campaign, the British tanks were surrounded, with about two-thirds destroyed and the survivors having to fight themselves out of the trap and head south to Gabr Saleh.

Rommel counterattacks

On 24 November Rommel, wanting to exploit the halt of the British offensive, counterattacked deep into the British rear areas in Egypt with the intention of exploiting the disorganisation and confusion in the enemys bases and cutting their supply lines. Rommel considered the other, more conservative, course of action of destroying the British forces halted before Tobruk and Bardia to time consuimg. According to Bernd Stegmann, Rommel knew his forces were incapable of driving such an effort home, but believed that the British, traumatised by their recent debacle, would abandon their defences along the border at the appearance of a German threat to their rear. General Cunningham did make a decision to withdraw his forces to Egypt, but Auchienleck arrived from Cairo just in time to to cancel the withdrawal orders. The German attack, which began with only 100 operational tanks remaining, stalled as it outran its supplies and met stiffening resistance. The counterattack was critiscised by the German High Command and some of his staff officers, including F.W. Von Mellenthin who said that "Unfortunately, Rommel overestimated his success and believed the moment had come to launch a general pursuit.", as to dangerous with Commonwealth forces still operating along the coast east of Tobruk, and a wastefull attack as it bled his forces, in particular some of his precious few tanks were lost. However, the attack very nearly succeded, with the British Eighth Army commander ordering a withdrawal, and only Auchienlecks timely intevention prevented this.

While Rommel drove into Egypt, the remaining Commonwealth forces east of Tobruk threatened the weak Axis lines there. Unable to reach Rommel for several days, the Rommels chief of staff, Oberstleutnant Westphal, ordered the 21st Panzer Division withdrawn to support the defense of Tobruk. On 27 November the British attack on Tobruk linked up with the defenders, and Rommel, having suffered losses that could not easily be replaced, had to concentrate on relieving the 90th Light Divisions that had attacked into Egypt. By 6 December the Afrikakorps had averted the danger, and on 7 December Rommel fell back to a defensive line at Gazala, all the while under heavy attacks from the RAF. The Italian forces at Bardia were now cut off from the retreating Axis. The Allied, briefly held up at Gazala, kept up the pressure to some degree, although they were almost as exhausted and disorganised as Rommels force, and Rommel was forced to retreat all the way back to the initial starting positions he had held in March, reaching El_Agheila on 30 December. His main concern during his withdrawal was being flanked to the south, so the Afrikakoprs held the south flank during the retreat. The Allies followed, but never attempted a southern flanking move to cut off the retreating troops as they had done in 1940. On 5 January 1942 the Afrikakorps received 55 tanks and new supplies, and Rommel started planning a counterattack. On 20 January 1942 the attack was launched, which mauled the Allied forces, costing them some 110 tanks and other heavy equipment. The Afrika Korps retook Benghazi on 29 January and the Allies pulled back to the Tobruk area and commenced building defensive positions at Gazala. The German-Italian garrison at Bardia surrendered on 2 January 1942.

During the confusion caused by the Crusader operation, Rommel and his staff found themselves behind Allied lines several times. On one occasion, he visited a New Zealand Army field hospital that was still under Allied control. "[Rommel] inquired if anything was needed, promised the British [sic] medical supplies and drove off unhindered." (General Fritz Bayerlein, The Rommel Papers, chapter 8.)

The second German offensive - The battle of Gazala

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, with his aides during the desert campaign. 1942

Following General Kesselringss successes in createing local air superiority and suppressing the Malta defenders in April 1942, an increased flow of vital supplies reached the Afrikakorps, after it had been receiving about a third of its needed supplies for several months. With his forces thus strengthend, Rommel began planning a major push for the summer. Rommel felt the very strong British positions around Gazala could be outflanked, and he could then drive up behind them and destroy them. The British were planning a summer offensive on their own, and their dispositions were more suited for an attack rather than a defense.

The British had 900 tanks in the area, 200 of which were new Grant tanks, whereas Rommels Panzer Army Africa commanded a mere 320 German, 50 of which were the obsolete Panzer II model, and 240 Italian tanks, which were no better than the Panzer IIs. Therefore Rommel had to rely predominantly on 88 mm guns to destroy the British heavy tanks, but even these were in short supply. In infantry and artillery Rommel found himself vastly outnumbered also, with many of his units under-strength following the campaigns of 1941. In contrast to the previous year the Axis had more-or-less air parity tough.

On 26 May 1942 Rommel's army attacked in a classic outflanking Blitzkrieg operation in the Battle of Gazala. His Italian infantry assaulted the Gazala fortifications head on, with some armour attached to give the impressions that this was the main assault, while all his motorised and armored forces outflanked the positions to the south. On the following morning Rommel cut throughout the flank and attacked north, but throughout the day a running armour battle occurred, where both sides took heavy losses. The attempted encirclement of the Gazala position had failed, and the Germans had lost a third of their heavy tanks. Renewing the attack on the morning of 28 May, Rommel concentrated on encircling and destroying separate units of the British armour. Heavy British counterattacks forced Rommel to assume a defensive posture, and not pursue his original plan of a dash north for the coast. On 2 June 90th Light Division and the Trieste Division surrounded and reduced the strongpoint at Bir Hakeim, capturing it on 11 June. With the southern strongpoint of the British line thus secured, Rommel attacked north again, forcing the British back, relying on the minefields of the Gazala lines to protect his left flank. On 14 June the British began a headlong retreat east, in the so-called "Gazala Gallop", to avoid being completely cut off.

On 15 June Axis forces reached the coast, eliminating any escape for the Commonwealth forces still occupying the Gazala positions. With this task completed, Rommel set of in pursuit of the fleeing Allied formations, aiming to capture Tobruk while the enemy was confused and disorganised. Tobruk, isolated and alone, was now all that stood between the Afrika Korps and Egypt. On 21 June, after a swift, coordinated and fierce combined arms assault, the city surrendered along with its 33,000 defenders. Only at the fall of Singapore, earlier that year, had more British Commonwealth troops been captured. Part of the reason why Rommel could capture the fortress so quickly, was because the able troops who had defended Tobruk in 1941 had been dispatched to the Pacific at the insistence of the Australian Government, and the defenders were mostly troops who were disorganised after the Gazala battle. Hitler made Rommel a field marshal for this victory. (Rommel later told his confidante, Hans von Luck, that he would have preferred the Führer gave him another division.)

The drive for Egypt

Determined to ensure his supply lines, Rommel determined to press the attack on Mersa Matruh, despite the heavy losses he had suffered at Gazala and Tobruk. He also wanted to prevent the British from establishing a new frontline, and felt the weakness of the reeling British formations had to be exploited by a trust into Egypt. This decision met with some critiscism, as an advance into Egypt meant a significant lenghtening of the supply lines. It also meant that a proposed attack on Malta would have to wait, as the air force would be required to support Rommels drive east. Kesselring strongly disagreed with Rommels decision, and went as far as threatening with withdrawing his aircraft to Sicily. Hitler agreed to Rommels plan, despite protest from Italian HQ and some of his staff officers, seeing the potential for a complete victory in Africa. Rommel, apparently aware of his growing reputation as a gambler, defended his decision by claiming that to merely hold the lines at Sollum would confer upon the British a distinct advantage, in that they could more easily outflank the positions at Sollum, and the oversea supply lines would still have to be routed via Tripoli unless he secured a front further east.

On 22 June Rommel continued his offensive east, and initially little resistance was encountered. Apart from fuel shortages, the advance continued, until Mersa Matruh was encircled on 26 june, surrounding four infantry divisions, the bulk of the Eighth Army. One of the divisions managed to break out during the night, and over the next two days some elements of the remaining three divisions also slipped away. The fortess fell on 29 June, yielding enormous amounts of supplies and equipment, in addition to 6,000 POWs.

Rommel continued his march east, but with the supply situation steadily worsening and his men exhausted after five weeks of constant warfare, the offensive on El Alamein seemed in doubt. On 1 July the First Battle of El Alamein started, but after almost a month of inconclusive fighting both sides, completely exhausted, dug in, halting Rommels drive east. This was a serious blow to Rommel, who had hoped to drive his advance into the open desert beyond El Alamein where he could conduct a mobile defense. Although the Eighth Army suffered higher causalties in the fighting around El Alamein, some 13,000, Rommel lost 7,000 men, a 1,000 of which were Germans, and he could afford the losses to a much lesser degree.

The Allies attack again - Second Battle of El Alamein

The summer standoff

After the stalemate at El Alamein, Rommel hoped to go on the offensive again before massive amounts of men and materiel could reach the British Eighth Army. With Allied forces from Malta interdicting his supplies at sea, and the Desert Air Force keeping up a relentless campaign against the Axis supply vessels in Tobruk, Bardia and Mersa Matruh, most of what supplies reaching Afrika still had to be landed at Benghazi and Tripoli, and the enormous distances supplies had to travel to reach his forward troops, meant that a rapid reorganisation of the Afrikakorps could not be done. Further hampering Rommels plans was that the Italian divisions received priority on supplies, with the Italian authorities shipping materiel for the Italian formations at a much higher rate then for those of German formations. It seems the Italian HQ was uneasy with Rommels ambitions, and wanted their own forces, whom they at least had some control over, resupplied first.

The British, preparing for a renewed drive, replaced C-in-C Auchienleck with General Harold Alexander. The Eighth Army also got a new commander, Bernard Montgomery. They received a steady stream of supplies, and were able to reorganise their forces. In late August they receieved a large convoy, carriying over 100,000 tons of supplies, and Rommel, learning of this, felt that time was running out. Rommel decided to launch an attack, with the 15th and 21st Panzer Division, 90th Light Division and the Italina XX Motorised Corps in a drive through the southern flank of the Alamein lines. The terrain here was without any easily defendable features and so open to attack. Montgomery, having realised this threat, had set up his main defenses behind the Alamein line, along the Alam el Halfa ridge, where he could meet any outflanking trust.

The battle of Alam el Halfa

The Battle of Alam el Halfa was launched on 30 August, with Rommels forces driving through the south flank. After passing the Alamein line to the south, Rommel drove north at the Alam el Halfa ridge, just as Montgomery had anticipated. Under heavy fire from the British artillery and aircraft, and in the face of well prepared positions that Rommel could not hope to outflank due to lack of petrol, the attack stalled, and by 2 September Rommel decided the battle unwinable, and decided to withdraw.

Montgomery, seeing that the enemy withdrew, ordered his 2nd New Zealand Division and 7th Armoured Division to attack on 3 September, but the attack was stalled by a firece rearguard action by the 90th Light Division, and Montgomery called off further pursuits. On 5 September Rommel was back where he had started, with only heavy losses to show for it. Rommel had 2,940 causalties, lost 50 tanks, a similar number of guns and perhaps worst of all 400 lorries, vital for supplies and movement. The British losses, except tank losses of 68, were much less, furher adding to the numerical inferiority of Panzer Armee Afrika. The Desert Air Force had inflicted the highest proportions of damage to Rommels forces, and he now realised the war in Africa was unwinnable without more air support, which was an impossibility with the Luftwaffe already stretched to the breaking point on other fronts.

Second battle of El Alamein

El Alamein 1942: British Matilda tanks move forward at Tobruk

In September the British launched a series of raids on important logistical harbours and supply points, collectively known as Operation Agreement. Added to this, the level of supplies successfully ferried across the Mediterranean had fallen to a dysmal level. In addition, Rommels health was failing and he took sick leave in Italy and Germany from late September, thus being away from the front when the Second Battle of El Alamein was launched on 23 October 1942. Although he immediately set out for the front it took him two vital days to reach his HQ in Africa. The defensive plan at El Alamein was more static in nature than Rommel had wished, but with the shortness of motorised units and fuel supply he had left it was the only course left open to him. The defensive line had strong fortifications and was protected with a large minefield, which in turn was covered with machine guns and artillery. This, Rommel hoped, would allow his infantry to hold the line at any point until motorised and armour units in reserve behind the front could advance to the points of engagement and counterattack any British breaches.

During the initial fighting the commander in charge of Panzer Army Africa in Rommels absence, General Georg Stumme, died of a heart attack while en route between two command posts. This delayed the German command staff in reaching vital decisions in the battles early hours, until General Ritter von Thoma took command. After having returned to the Alamein front, Rommel learnt that the fuel supply situation, critical when he left in September, was now disastrous, with his army scarcely having any fuel left, hampering any mobile defense Rommel might undertake. Counterattacks by the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions on 24 October and 25 October had cost heavy tank losses, due to the intensity of the British artillery and aircraft bombardments. Rommels main concern was to counterattack in full force and throw the British out of the defensive lines, in his view the only chance the Germans had of avoiding defeat. The counterattack was launched early on 26 October, but the British units that had penetrated the defensive line held fast on Kidney ridge. The British continued pushing hard with armored units to force the breakthrough, but the defenders fire destroyed many tanks, leading to doubts about the chances of clearing a breach among the officers in the british armored brigades.

Montgomery, seeing his armored brigades losing tanks at an alarming rate, stopped major attacks until 1 November, when he achieved a 4km penetration of the line. Rommel immediately counterattack with what tanks he had available in an attempt to encircle the pocket during 2 November, but the heavy British fire stopped the attempt. By this time Panzer Army Africa had only one-third of its initial strength remaining, with only 35 tanks left operational, virtually no fuel or ammunition and with the British in complete command of the air, yet the British had been fought to a standstill, having taken murderous losses with some Armour Brigades reporting losses of 75% of its strength.

Rommels retreat

On 3 November Montgomery found it impossible to renew his attack, and he had to wait for more reinforcements to be brought up. This lull was what Rommel needed for his withdrawal, which had been planned since 29 October, when Rommel determined the situation hopeless. At midday, however, Rommel received a message from from Hitler, forbidding a retreat with his infamous "victory or death" stand fast order. Although this order demanded the impossible and virtually ensured the destruction of Panzer Army Africa, Rommel could not bring himself to disobey a direct order from der Führer and the Axis froces clung desperately on.

On 4 November Montgomery renewed the attack, with fresh forces brought up against the rear, and with almost 500 tanks against the 20 or so remaining to Rommel. By midday the Italian XX Motorised Corps had been surrounded, ann after some hours of desperate resistance the Corps was completely destroyed. This left a 20 km gap in Rommels line, with powerfull armour and motorised British units pouring through the lines, threatening the entier Panzer Army Africa with encirclement. At this point Rommel could no longer uphold the no retreat order, and ordered a general retreat. Early on 5 November he received authorisation by Hitler to withdraw, 12 hours after his decision to do so - but it was far to late, with only remnants of his Army streaming West, while most of his unmotorised forces (the bulk of his army) unable to reach safety.

After the defeat at El Alamein, Rommel's forces managed to escape, but took heavy losses from constant air attacks. Despite urgings from Hitler and Mussolini, Rommel's forces did not stop to engage the pursuing Allies until they had entered Tunisia, except for brief holding engagements, due to the numerical superiority and air supremacy of the Allied and most of Rommels remaining divisions reduced to combat groups.

In Tunisia Rommel launched an offensive against the U.S. II Corps, rather than the British Eighth Army. Rommel inflicted a sharp defeat on the American forces at the Kasserine Pass.

The end in Africa

A Tiger I tank, captured by American forces in Morocco in 1943.

Turning once again to face the British Commonwealth forces in the old French border defences of the Mareth Line, Rommel could only delay the inevitable. At the end of January 1943, the Italian General Giovanni Messe was appointed the new commander of Rommel’s Panzer Army Africa, which was now renamed the 1st Italo-German Panzer Army (in recognition of the fact that it consisted of one German and three Italian corps). Though Messe was to replace Rommel, he diplomatically deferred to the German, and the two coexisted in what was theoretically the same command until 9 March, when Rommel finally departed Africa. Rommel's departure was kept secret on Hitler's explicit orders, so that the morale of the Axis troops could be maintained and respectful fear by their enemies retained. The last Rommel offensive in North Africa occurred on 6 March 1943, when he attacked Bernard Montgomery’s Eighth Army at the Battle of Medenine with three Panzer divisions (10, 15, and 21). Decoded Ultra intercepts allowed Montgomery to deploy large numbers of anti-tank guns in the path of the offensive. After losing 52 tanks, Rommel was forced to call off the assault. On 9 March he handed over command of Armeegruppe Afrika to General Hans-Jürgen von Arnim and left Africa, because of health reasons, never to return. On 13 May 1943, after the collapse of the German 5th Army, the fall of Tunis and the surrounding of the Italian 1st Army, still holding the line at Enfidaville, General Messe formally surrendered the remnants of Armeegruppe Afrika to the Allies. On 12 May, one day before the surrender, Messe was promoted to the rank of field marshal.

Some historians contrast Rommel's withdrawal back to Tunisia against Hitler's wishes with Friedrich Paulus's obedience of orders to have the 6.Armee stand its ground at the Battle of Stalingrad, which resulted in its annihilation. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, appointed overall Axis commander in North Africa, saw things differently. He believed the withdrawals, some of which were carried out against his orders, unnecessary and ruinous since they brought forward British airfields ever closer to the port of Tunis. As far as he was concerned Rommel was an insubordinate defeatist and string-puller. The increasingly acrimonious relations between the two did nothing to enhance performance.

Some sources state that during this period, there was a failed Allied attempt to capture Rommel from his headquarters, 250 miles behind enemy lines. [1]

France 1943-1944

Back in Germany, Rommel was for some time virtually "unemployed". On 23 July 1943 he moved to Greece as commander of Army Group E, to defend the Greek coast against a possible allied landing that never happened, only to return to Germany two days later, upon the overthrow of Mussolini. On 17 August 1943, Rommel moved his headquarters from Munich to Lake Garda, as commander of a new Army Group B, created to defend the north of Italy. After Hitler gave General Albert Kesselring sole Italian command, on 21 November, Rommel moved Army Group B to Normandy, France, with responsibility for defending the French coast against the long anticipated Allied invasion. Dismayed by the situation he found, the slow building pace, and fearing he had just months before an invasion, Rommel reinvigorated the whole fortification effort along the Atlantic coast. Under his direction, work was significantly sped up, millions of mines laid, and thousands of tank traps and obstacles set up on beaches and throughout the countryside. Rommel, like all other commanders in Wehrmacht, was sure that landings were to occur in Pas-de-Calais.

After his battles in Africa, Rommel concluded that any offensive movement would be nearly impossible due to overwhelming Allied air superiority. He argued that the tank forces should be dispersed in small units and kept in heavily fortified positions as close to the front as possible, so they would not have to move far and en masse when the invasion started. He wanted the invasion stopped right on the beaches. However his commander, Gerd von Rundstedt, felt that there was no way to stop the invasion near the beaches due to the equally overwhelming firepower of the Royal Navy. He felt the tanks should be formed into large units well inland near Paris, where they could allow the Allies to extend into France and then cut off the Allied troops. When asked to pick a plan, Hitler vacillated and placed them in the middle, far enough to be useless to Rommel, not far enough to watch the fight for von Rundstedt.

During D-Day on 6 June 1944, several tank units, notably the 12th SS Panzer Division, were close enough to the beaches to create serious havoc. Hitler refused however to release the panzer reserves as he believed the Normandy landings were a diversion. Hitler and the German High Command expected the main assault in the Pas de Calais area, thanks to the success of a secret Allied deception campaign (Operation Fortitude). Facing only small-scale German attacks, the Allies quickly secured a beachhead. Rommel personally oversaw the bitter fighting around Caen, were only the determined defence of Kampfgruppe von Luck hindered a British breakout on the first day. Here, again, the necessary liberty of the on-site commanders where withheld, and the German commanders did not launch a concentrated counterattack before midday on the 6 June.

The plot against Hitler

File:LangRugeSpeidelRommel May1944.jpg

May 1944, Rommel (right) with his closest staff members: (L to R), his personal aide Captain Hellmuth Lang, his chief naval aide Admiral Friedrich Ruge, and his chief of staff General Hans Speidel. Speidel was heavily involved in the anti-Nazi conspiracy within the Wehrmacht.

On 17 July 1944, Rommel's staff car was strafed by an RCAF Spitfire piloted by Charley Fox; he was hospitalized with major head injuries. (Although the Americans claimed to have hit the vehicle as well, many German reports specifically mentioned a Canadian Spitfire as the sole attacker). In the meantime, after the failed July 20 Plot against Adolf Hitler a widespread investigation was conducted to identify possible participants in the plot. Rommel was identified in some of the coup ringleaders’ documentation as a potential supporter and an acceptable military leader to be placed in a position of responsibility should their coup succeed.

A memorial at the site of Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's suicide outside of the town of Herrlingen, Baden-Württemberg, Germany (west of Ulm).

No evidence was found that directly linked Rommel to the plot, nor that he had been contacted by any of the plot ringleaders. At the same time, local Nazi party officials reported on Rommel's extensive and scornful criticism of Nazi incompetent leadership during the time he was hospitalized. Bormann was certain of Rommel's involvement, Goebbels was not. The only serious evidence against him was provided by his chief of staff Speidel who scapegoated Rommel for his own actions, claiming that the rebellious orders were issued by Rommel, not him, and that he, Speidel, tried to report these criminal acts to Berlin, but was prevented from so doing (See Reuth 2006). Unfortunately for Rommel, the 'Court of Military Honour' that was to decide whether or not to hand him over to Roland Freisler's people's court included two men with whom Rommel had crossed swords before, Heinz Guderian and Gerd von Rundstedt. The Court decided that Rommel should be handed over to the People's Court

Erwin Rommel's Grave.

The true extent of Rommel's knowledge of or involvement with the plot is still unclear. After the war, however, his wife maintained that Rommel had been against the plot. It has been stated that Rommel wanted to avoid giving future generations of Germans the perception that the war was lost because of backstabbing, the infamous Dolchstoßlegende, as was commonly believed by some Germans of World War I.

Because of Rommel's popularity with the German people, Hitler gave him the option of committing suicide with cyanide or facing a trial before Roland Freisler's "People's Court" and the murder of his family and staff. Rommel ended his own life on 14 October 1944, and was buried with full military honours. After the war, an edited version of his diary was published as The Rommel Papers. He is the only member of the Third Reich establishment to have a museum dedicated to him. His grave can be found in Herrlingen, a short distance west of Ulm.

Rommel as a military commander

Rommel was a brilliant tactician and competent strategist, but certianly not without flaws. Contemporaries who had to work with him under adversity often had very few kind words to say about him and his abilities. Following Paulus' return from his inspection of Rommel's doings in North Africa and also considering the reports submitted by Alfred Gause, Halder concluded: "Rommel's character defects make him very hard to get along with, but no one cares to come out in open opposition because of his brutality and the backing he has at top level". Others mentioned his leadership style, with expecting much of his commander, and not being open to critiscism or objections.

F.W. Von Mellenthin, who served on Rommels staff during the Africa campaign, says Rommel took great chances at several occasions, gambling entire battles on decisions made almost on the spur and with incomplete information, citing Rommels counterattack during Operation Crusader as just one such instanse. Others who served under him in Africa, most notably General Fritz Bayerlein, said he took risks, but only after carefully weighing the potential dangers and rewards. Rommel himself was aware of his growing reputation as a gambler, and added carefull notes in his papers explaining and defending his actions, especially concerning his decision to drive into Egypt during the 1942 Summer Offensive.

His leadership style was also admired and criticised, with aggresive sub-ordinates, like Hans von Luck, praising his leadership from the front, , while others, like Mellenthin, questions this leadership style, as it often led to his staff officers becoming involved in the fighting, instead of maintaining a overview of the situation. His sometimes long absences from HQ also meant that subordinates had to make decisions without running it by Rommel, leading to confusion.

Rommel achieved decisive victories in Africa, both during 1941 and 1942, against British forces that always outnumbered him and had better supply lines, through aggresive attacks. Yet his eagerness to drive for Egypt, despite not having the logistical "tail" to support it, meant that these drives were stopped, with great losses in men and materiel. Rommel percieved "unique opportunities" in capturing Egypt and perhaps the Middle East, a result which would definently have had a huge impact on the Allies capabilities of waging war, but his grand vision was never supported by Hitler, nor the General Staff in Berlin.

Popular perception

Rommel was in his lifetime extraordinarily well known, not only with the German people, but also with his adversaries. Popular stories of his chivalry and tactical prowess earned him the respect of many opponents: Claude Auchinleck, Winston Churchill, George S. Patton, and Bernard Montgomery, for example. Rommel, for his part, was complimentary towards and respectful of his foes. Hitler considered Rommel among his favorite generals.

The Afrika Korps was never accused of any war crimes, and Rommel himself referred to the fighting in North Africa as Krieg ohne Hass - war without hate. Numerous examples exist of Rommel's chivalry towards Allied POWs, such as his defiance of Hitler's infamous Commando Order, as well as his refusal of an order from Hitler to execute Jewish POWs. When British Major Geoffrey Keyes was killed during a failed Commando raid to kill or capture Rommel behind German lines, Rommel ordered him buried with full military honors. Also, during the construction of the Atlantic Wall, Rommel directed that French workers were not to be used as slaves, but were to be paid for their labor.

Tempering this favorable view of Rommel are the facts that he did loyally serve Hitler and the Nazi government if not throughout his life at least until 1944, that he never publicly disagreed with any Nazi actions or goals during his lifetime. There are several documented examples of racially prejudiced policies enacted under Rommel's command including his 1942 order that non-white Allied prisoners of war in Axis captivity be fed less (1,400 calories a day) than white prisoners' calories, and his killing of unarmed black prisoners of war in 1940 in order to film the propaganda newsreel Victory in the West.. When his illegitimate daughter informed him of her desire to marry her Italian boyfriend and asked for his blessing, he admonished her to make sure that the man was an `Aryan`, that is non-Jewish under Nazi law. On one occasion he wrote to his wife about a discussion with some Swiss officers, commenting approvingly about their "amazing understanding for our Jewish problem".

His military colleagues would also play their part in perpetuating his legend. His former subordinate Kircheim though critical of Rommel's performance nonetheless explained: "thanks to propaganda, first by Göbbels, then by Montgomery, and finally, after he was poisoned (sic), by all former enemy powers, he has become a symbol of the best military traditions. ....Any public criticism of this legendary personality would damage the esteem in which the German soldier is held" (in a letter to Streich another former subordinate, one who came to loathe Rommel).

After the war, when Rommel's alleged involvement in the plot to kill Hitler became known, his stature was enhanced greatly among the former Allied nations. Rommel was often cited in Western sources as a general who, though a loyal German, was willing to stand up to the evil that was Hitler (however accurate or inaccurate this depiction may be). The release of the film The Desert Fox: The Story of Rommel (1951) helped enhance his reputation as one of the most widely known and well-regarded leaders in the German Army. In 1970 a Lütjens-class destroyer was named the FGS Rommel in his honor.

In fiction

He has been portrayed by:

• Erich von Stroheim in the 1943 film Five Graves to Cairo
• James Mason in both the 1951 The Desert Fox and the 1953 The Desert Rats
• Werner Hinz in 1962's The Longest Day
• Karl Michael Vogler in the 1970 Patton, starring George C. Scott
• Wolfgang Preiss in the 1971 Raid on Rommel
• Hardy Krüger in the 1988 television miniseries War and Remembrance
• Michael York in the 1990 TV-movie Night of the Fox
• Kevin Peckenpaugh, Union Pines production of Kill Hitler

In Philip K. Dick's alternative history novel The Man in the High Castle, Rommel is the Nazi-appointed president of the United States of America in the early 1960s.

In Douglas Niles's and Michael Dobson's alternative history novel Fox on the Rhine (ISBN 0-8125-7466-4), Hitler is killed by the bomb plot of 20 July 1944. This leads to Rommel's survival, and a different quick offensive strike. This is repelled and the book ends with his surrender to the Americans and British, in the belief that the Germans would be better off with the western powers than with the Soviets. Fox on the Rhine was followed by a sequel, Fox at the Front (ISBN 0-641-67696-4).

In Donna Barr's novel Bread and Swans, the historical Rommel shares his concerns and career with a fictitious younger brother, Pfirsich, also known as The Desert Peach. Both Rommels also appear as focal characters of Barr's long-running comic strip series about "The Peach".

During the 1980s, there was a popular arcade tank-based game called Rommel's Revenge which found its way to the home computer market.

Quotations about Rommel

• The British Parliament considered a censure vote against Winston Churchill following the surrender of Tobruk. The vote failed, but in the course of the debate, Churchill would say:
  • "We have a very daring and skilful opponent against us, and, may I say across the havoc of war, a great general."
• Churchill again, on hearing of Rommel's death:
  • "He also deserves our respect, because, although a loyal German soldier, he came to hate Hitler and all his works, and took part in the conspiracy to rescue Germany by displacing the maniac and tyrant. For this, he paid the forfeit of his life. In the sombre wars of modern democracy, there is little place for chivalry."
• Theodor Werner was an officer who, during World War I, served under Rommel.
  • "Anybody who came under the spell of his personality turned into a real soldier. He seemed to know what the enemy were like and how they would react."

Quotations

• "Sweat saves blood, blood saves lives, and brains save both."
• "Mortal danger is an effective antidote for fixed ideas."
• "The best form of welfare for the troops is first-rate training."
• "Don't fight a battle if you don't gain anything by winning."
• "In a man-to-man fight, the winner is he who has one more round in his magazine."
• "Courage which goes against military expediency is stupidity, or, if it is insisted upon by a commander, irresponsibility."
• "In the absence of orders, find something and kill it."
• Referring to Italians: "Good troops, bad officers. But remember that without them we wouldn't have civilization."
• "Training errors are recorded on paper. Tactical errors are etched in stone."
• "There is one unalterable difference between a soldier and a civilian: the civilian never does more than he is paid to do."
• "Men are basically smart or dumb and lazy or ambitious. The dumb and ambitious ones are dangerous and I get rid of them. The dumb and lazy ones I give mundane duties. The smart ambitious ones I put on my staff. The smart and lazy ones I make my commanders."
• "Be an example to your men, in your duty and in private life. Never spare yourself, and let the troops see that you don't in your endurance of fatigue and privation. Always be tactful and well-mannered and teach your subordinates to do the same. Avoid excessive sharpness or harshness of voice, which usually indicates the man who has shortcomings of his own to hide."
• "I know I haven't offered you much; sand, heat, scorpions ... but we've shared them together. One more last push, and it is Cairo. And if we fail, ... well, we tried, ... together"*

References and further reading

• John Bierman and Colin Smith. The Battle of Alamein: Turning Point, World War II, (2002). ISBN 0-670-03040-6
• Michael Carver (1962); El Alamein; Wordsworth Editions; ISBN 1-84022-220-4
• Francois De Lannoy.Afrikakorps, 1941-1943: The Libya Egypt Campaign, ISBN 2-84048-152-9
• George Forty. The Armies of Rommel, (Arms and Armour Press, London 1997) ISBN 1-85409-379-7
• David Fraser. Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, ISBN 0-06-092597-3, the standard full-length biography
• Jack Greene. Rommel's North Africa Campaign: September 1940 - November 1942, . ISBN 1-58097-018-4
• Thomas L. Jentz. Tank Combat in North Africa: The Opening Rounds : Operations Sonnenblume, Brevity, Skorpion and Battleaxe February 1941-June 1941 (Schiffer Military History), . ISBN 0-7643-0226-4
• Orr Kelly. Meeting the Fox: The Allied Invasion of Africa, from Operation Torch to Kasserine Pass to Victory in Tunisia, . ISBN 0-471-41429-8
• Jon Latimer. Alamein, . ISBN 0-674-01016-7
• Jon Latimer. Tobruk 1941: Rommel's Opening Move ISBN 1-84176-092-7
• Ronald Lewin. Rommel as military commander B&N Books: ISBN 0-7607-0861-4
• F.W. Von Mellenthin (1956). Panzer Battles, Ballantine Books. ISBN 0-345-32158-8
• Samuel W. Mitcham. Rommel's Greatest Victory, ISBN 0-89141-730-3
• Reuth, Ralf Georg. Rommel: The End of a Legend. London: Haus Books, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 1904950205).
• Dennis Showalter. Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century. 2005. 441 pp. ISBN 978-0-425-20663-8.
• Hans von Luck (1989). Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck, Cassel Military Paperbacks. ISBN 0-304-36401-0
• Desmond Young. Rommel The Desert Fox (1950)
• Germany and the Second World War. Vol 3, part 4 Clarendon Press • Oxford 1995
• Inside the Afrika Korps: The Crusader Battles, 1941-1942. ISBN 1-85367-322-6
• Generalfeldmarschall Rommel: opperbevelhebber van Heeresgruppe B bij de voorbereiding van de verdediging van West-Europa, 5 November 1943 tot 6 juni 1944, by Hans Sakkers (1993). ISBN 90-800900-2-6 [text/photobook in Dutch about Rommel at the Atlantic Wall 1943/44]

Primary sources

• Liddel-Hart, Basil ed. The Rommel Papers (1982)
• Erwin Rommel, Infantry Attacks (2006)
• Erwin Rommel, Rommel and his Art of War (2006)
• Laszlo Almasy. With Rommel's Army in Libya (2001)

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See also

• Nazi Germany
• North African Campaign
• Western Desert Campaign
• Wehrmacht
• List of German military units of World War II
• Hans-Jürgen von Arnim
• Afrika Korps
• Panzer Army Africa
• László Almásy

External links

• Rommel Chronology World History Database
• The Forced Suicide of Field Marshall Rommel, 1944
• Excerpts from Rommel's account of the blitzkrieg, 1940
• Prominent People - Erwin Rommel
• Erwin (Johannes Eugen) Rommel, The Desert Fox / Der Wüstenfuchs at Achtung Panzer!
• A history of Rommel in headquarters of La Roche Guyon (French)
• Erwin Rommel's Gravesite
• Essay: The Success of the Deutches Afrika Korps was Based on Rommel's Leadership