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The Army's locally-recruited regiment, the [[Ulster Defence Regiment]] (UDR), was 97% Protestant<ref name="irishnewsmay06">[http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/irish_news/arts2006/may2_subversion_colluson_UDR.php "Collusion - Subversion in the UDR"]. ''[[Irish News]]'', 3 May 2006.</ref> after 1972. A 1973 British Government document (uncovered in 2004), named "Subversion in the UDR", estimates that 5–15% of UDR soldiers at the time were members of loyalist paramilitaries such as the UDA,<ref name="cain-subversion">[http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1973/subversion_in_the_udr.htm "Subversion in the UDR"]. [[Conflict Archive on the Internet]] (CAIN)</ref><ref name="irishnewsmay06"/> which was a legal organization until 1992. The report stated that the UDR was the main source of weapons for those groups,<ref name="cain-subversion"/> although by 1979 stricter controls had reduced UDR weapons losses by 75%.{{citation needed|date=August 2013}} In 1977, the Army investigated a UDR battalion based at Girdwood Barracks. The investigation said there was evidence that 70 of the soldiers had UVF links, but only two were dismissed on security grounds;<ref name="detail2011">[http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/20/udr-girdwood-story/british-army-covered-up-udr-units-links-to-uvf "British army 'covered up' UDR units links to UVF"]. ''The Detail'', 31 July 2011.</ref> that 30 were suspected of fraudulently diverting £47,000 to the UVF; and that UVF members socialized with soldiers in their [[mess]].<ref name="detail2011"/> The investigation was halted after a senior UDR officer claimed it was harming morale.<ref name="detail2011"/> The Army then kept the investigation a secret, until it was uncovered in 2011.<ref name="detail2011"/>
The Army's locally-recruited regiment, the [[Ulster Defence Regiment]] (UDR), was 97% Protestant<ref name="irishnewsmay06">[http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/irish_news/arts2006/may2_subversion_colluson_UDR.php "Collusion - Subversion in the UDR"]. ''[[Irish News]]'', 3 May 2006.</ref> after 1972. A 1973 British Government document (uncovered in 2004), named "Subversion in the UDR", estimates that 5–15% of UDR soldiers at the time were members of loyalist paramilitaries such as the UDA,<ref name="cain-subversion">[http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1973/subversion_in_the_udr.htm "Subversion in the UDR"]. [[Conflict Archive on the Internet]] (CAIN)</ref><ref name="irishnewsmay06"/> which was a legal organization until 1992. The report stated that the UDR was the main source of weapons for those groups,<ref name="cain-subversion"/> although by 1979 stricter controls had reduced UDR weapons losses by 75%.{{citation needed|date=August 2013}} In 1977, the Army investigated a UDR battalion based at Girdwood Barracks. The investigation said there was evidence that 70 of the soldiers had UVF links, but only two were dismissed on security grounds;<ref name="detail2011">[http://www.thedetail.tv/issues/20/udr-girdwood-story/british-army-covered-up-udr-units-links-to-uvf "British army 'covered up' UDR units links to UVF"]. ''The Detail'', 31 July 2011.</ref> that 30 were suspected of fraudulently diverting £47,000 to the UVF; and that UVF members socialized with soldiers in their [[mess]].<ref name="detail2011"/> The investigation was halted after a senior UDR officer claimed it was harming morale.<ref name="detail2011"/> The Army then kept the investigation a secret, until it was uncovered in 2011.<ref name="detail2011"/>


Initially, the Army allowed its soldiers to join the UDA.<ref>Wood, Ian S. ''Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA''. [[Edinburgh University Press]], 2006. pp.107-8</ref> In the summer of 1972 the Army mounted a number of joint patrols with the UDA, following public negotiations between General [[Robert Ford (British Army officer)|Robert Ford]] (Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland) and UDA leader [[Tommy Herron]].<ref>Coogan, Tim Pat. ''The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal and the Search for Peace''. Palgrave, 2002. p.170</ref> On 29 November 1972 the Army issued an order that dual membership of UDR and paramilitary organisations would not be tolerated and began a purge which saw 171 soldiers with links to the UDA discharged by the end of 1975.<ref>Potter p376</ref>
Initially, the Army allowed its soldiers to join the UDA<ref>Wood, Ian S. ''Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA''. [[Edinburgh University Press]], 2006. pp.107-8</ref> and in summer 1972 the Army mounted a number of joint patrols with the UDA, following public negotiations between General [[Robert Ford (British Army officer)|Robert Ford]] (Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland) and UDA leader [[Tommy Herron]].<ref>Coogan, Tim Pat. ''The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal and the Search for Peace''. Palgrave, 2002. p.170</ref> On 29 November 1972 the Army issued an order that a soldier should be discharged if his sympathy for a paramilitary group affects his performance, loyalty or impartiality.<ref>http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1972/index.html#291172</ref> By the end of 1975, 171 soldiers with links to the UDA had been discharged.<ref>Potter, John Furniss. ''A Testimony to Courage – the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969–1992''. [[Pen & Sword Books]], 2001. p.376</ref>


In the 1970s, the so-called "[[Glenanne gang]]" carried out a string of sectarian attacks against the Irish Catholic and nationalist community in the area of mid-Ulster known as the "murder triangle".<ref>Tiernan, Joe (2000). ''The Dublin Bombings and the Murder Triangle''. Ireland: Mercier Press</ref> The gang was a secret alliance of loyalist militants and rogue elements within the British Army and the RUC.<ref name="cassel2006">[http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/collusion.pdf The Cassel Report (2006)], pp. 8, 14, 21, 25, 51, 56, 58&ndash;65.</ref><ref name="SArmagh">[http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/sarmagh.html "Collusion in the South Armagh/Mid Ulster Area in the mid-1970s". [[Pat Finucane Centre]]. Retrieved 2 January 2011.</ref> In 1980 two of its members, RUC officers [[John Weir (loyalist)|John Weir]] and [[Billy McCaughey]], were convicted of murdering a Catholic shop-owner and kidnapping a Catholic priest. Weir claimed that his superiors knew the collusion was taking place<ref>[http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/collusion.pdf The Cassel Report (2006)], p.63</ref> and that the gang was commanded by [[British Military Intelligence Systems in Northern Ireland|British Military Intelligence]] and RUC [[Special Branch]].<ref name="SArmagh"/><ref name="cassel613">[http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/collusion.pdf The Cassel Report (2006)], pp. 6, 13</ref> The [[Pat Finucane Centre]] has attributed 87 killings to the Glenanne gang, including the [[Dublin and Monaghan bombings]] (1974), the killing of [[John Francis Green]], the [[Miami Showband killings]] (1975), and the [[Reavey and O'Dowd killings]] (1976).<ref name="SArmagh"/>
In the 1970s, the so-called "[[Glenanne gang]]" carried out a string of sectarian attacks against the Irish Catholic and nationalist community in the area of mid-Ulster known as the "murder triangle".<ref>Tiernan, Joe (2000). ''The Dublin Bombings and the Murder Triangle''. Ireland: Mercier Press</ref> The gang was a secret alliance of loyalist militants and rogue elements within the British Army and the RUC.<ref name="cassel2006">[http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/collusion.pdf The Cassel Report (2006)], pp. 8, 14, 21, 25, 51, 56, 58&ndash;65.</ref><ref name="SArmagh">[http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/sarmagh.html "Collusion in the South Armagh/Mid Ulster Area in the mid-1970s". [[Pat Finucane Centre]]. Retrieved 2 January 2011.</ref> In 1980 two of its members, RUC officers [[John Weir (loyalist)|John Weir]] and [[Billy McCaughey]], were convicted of murdering a Catholic shop-owner and kidnapping a Catholic priest. Weir claimed that his superiors knew the collusion was taking place<ref>[http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/collusion.pdf The Cassel Report (2006)], p.63</ref> and that the gang was commanded by [[British Military Intelligence Systems in Northern Ireland|British Military Intelligence]] and RUC [[Special Branch]].<ref name="SArmagh"/><ref name="cassel613">[http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/collusion.pdf The Cassel Report (2006)], pp. 6, 13</ref> The [[Pat Finucane Centre]] has attributed 87 killings to the Glenanne gang, including the [[Dublin and Monaghan bombings]] (1974), the killing of [[John Francis Green]], the [[Miami Showband killings]] (1975), and the [[Reavey and O'Dowd killings]] (1976).<ref name="SArmagh"/>

Revision as of 18:37, 2 August 2013

Operation Banner
Part of The Troubles

Two British Army soldiers at a checkpoint near Newry, Northern Ireland, 1988
Date14 August 1969 – 31 July 2007
Location
Northern Ireland
Result

Stalemate[1][2]

Belligerents
United Kingdom British Armed Forces Irish republican paramilitaries Ulster loyalist paramilitaries
Casualties and losses

763 dead
6,100 injured

1,854 civilians dead		 127 dead 14 dead
Paramilitary casualties includes only those that were killed by the British Armed Forces.

Operation Banner was the operational name for the British Armed Forces' operation in Northern Ireland from August 1969 to July 2007. It was initially deployed at the request of the unionist government of Northern Ireland to support the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). After the 1998 Belfast Agreement, the operation was gradually scaled down. Its role was to assert the authority of the Government of the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland.

The main opposition to the British military's deployment came from the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA). It waged a guerrilla campaign against the British military from 1970 to 1997. An internal British Army document released in 2007 stated that, whilst the Army had failed to defeat the IRA,[2][3] it had made it impossible for the IRA to win through violence,[2][4] and had also reduced substantially the death toll in the last years of conflict.[3]

Role of the armed forces

The support to the police forces was primarily from the British Army, with the Royal Air Force providing helicopter support as required. A maritime component was supplied under the codename of Operation Grenada, by the Royal Navy and Royal Marines in direct support of the Army commitment. This was tasked with interdicting the supply of weapons and munitions to both sides of the sectarian divide, acting as a visible deterrence by maintaining a conspicuous maritime presence on and around the coast of Northern Ireland and Lough Neagh.[5]

The role of the armed forces in their support role to the police was defined by the Army in the following terms:

  • Routine support — Includes such tasks as providing protection to the police in carrying out normal policing duties in areas of terrorist threat; patrolling around military and police bases to deter terrorist attacks and supporting police-directed counter-terrorist operations
  • Additional support — Assistance where the police have insufficient assets of their own; this includes the provision of observation posts along the border and increased support during times of civil disorder. The military can provide soldiers to protect and, if necessary, supplement police lines and cordons. The military can provide heavy plant to remove barricades and construct barriers, and additional armoured vehicles and helicopters to help in the movement of police and soldiers

Number of troops deployed

At the peak of the operation, the Army deployed some 21,000 soldiers. By 1980, the figure had dropped to 11,000, with a lower presence of 9,000 men in 1985. The total climbed to 10,500 after the intensification of the IRA use of mortars by the end of the 1980s. In 1992, there were 17,750 members of all military forces taking part of the operation. The army build-up comprised three brigades under the command of a lieutenant-general. There were six resident battalions deployed for a period of two-and-a-half years and four roulement battalions serving on six-months tours.[6] Still in July 1997, in the course of fierce riots in Nationalist areas triggered by the Drumcree conflict, the total number of security forces in Northern Ireland increased to more than 30,000 including the RUC.[7]

A British Army Land Rover patrolling South Belfast (1981)
A British Army Ammunition Technical Officer approaches a suspect device in Northern Ireland.

Equipment

Armoured vehicles:

Aircraft

Ships

Controversies

According to the "Sutton Index of Deaths"[8] on CAIN, the British Army killed 305 people during Operation Banner, 156 (~51%) of whom were unarmed civilians. Elements of the Army also colluded with illegal loyalist paramilitaries responsible for numerous attacks on civilians (see below). The journalist Fintan O'Toole argues that "both militarily and ideologically, the Army was a player, not a referee".[9]

Relationship with the Catholic and Irish nationalist community

The Army in Northern Ireland was initially welcomed as a neutral force by the Irish Catholic and nationalist community, who had been under attack by loyalists and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), but this changed following the Falls Curfew in July 1970. After a weapons search in the (mainly Catholic and nationalist) Falls area of west Belfast, the Army came under attack from rioters and IRA gunmen. It then imposed a 36-hour curfew.[10][11][12][13] Any journalists inside the curfew zone were arrested by the Army.[14] It is claimed that, because the media was unable to watch them, the soldiers behaved "with reckless abandon". Hundreds of houses were forcibly searched for weapons. Pubs and businesses were also searched and it is claimed that several were looted by the soldiers.[14] The Army saturated the area with CS gas, firing 1,600 canisters,[15] which was deemed "excessive" in such a small area.[14] There were allegations that some soldiers fired CS gas canisters through the windows of houses while residents were still inside.[16] Four civilians were killed by the Army during the operation and another 60 suffered gunshot wounds.

A memorial to those killed by British soldiers during the Ballymurphy Massacre

On 9 August 1971 the Unionist government of Northern Ireland introduced internment without trial (Operation Demetrius). Armed soldiers launched dawn raids throughout Northern Ireland, sparking four days of rioting that killed 20 civilians, two IRA members and two British soldiers. Of the civilians killed, 17 were killed by British soldiers – 11 of them in the Ballymurphy Massacre. About 7,000 people fled their homes, of which roughly 2,500 fled south of the border. No loyalist paramilitaries were included in the sweep and many of those arrested were Catholics or nationalists who had no links with the IRA. The policy of internment was to last until December 1975 and during that time 1,981 people were interned.[17] Those arrested suffered abuse at the hands of British soldiers. They complained of being beaten, verbally abused, threatened, harassed by dogs, denied sleep, and starved. Specific humiliations included being forced to run a gauntlet of baton-wielding soldiers, having their heads forcefully shaved, being kept naked, being burnt with cigarettes, having a sack placed over their heads for long periods, having a rope kept around their necks, having the barrel of a gun pressed against their heads, being dragged by the hair, being trailed behind armored vehicles while barefoot, and being tied to armoured trucks as a human shield.[18][19] The interrogation techniques used on the internees was described by the European Court of Human Rights as "inhuman and degrading",[20] and by the European Commission of Human Rights as "torture".[21]

Banner and crosses carried by the families of the Bloody Sunday victims on the yearly commemoration march

However, the real turning point in the relationship between the Army and the Catholic community was 30 January 1972: Bloody Sunday. During an anti-internment march in Derry, 26 unarmed protesters and bystanders were shot by British paratroopers. Fourteen died of their injuries. Two protesters were also run down by Army vehicles.[22] Five of those wounded were shot in the back.[23] In August that year, the Attorney general said that none of the soldiers involved would be prosecuted.[24] The Widgery Tribunal into their deaths was described as a "whitewash", and was descredited in 2010 after the release of the Saville Inquiry. Prime Minister David Cameron said "What happened on Bloody Sunday was both unjustified and unjustifiable, it was wrong".[25]

On 9 July 1972, British troops in Portadown used CS gas and rubber bullets to clear nationalists who were blocking an Orange Order march into their area. Many Catholics and nationalists see the Orange Order as sectarian, triumphalist and supremacist. The Army then let the Orangemen march into the nationalist area escorted by at least 50 masked and uniformed Ulster Defence Association (UDA) militants.[26][27][28] At the time, the UDA was a legal organization.

That same day in Belfast, British snipers shot dead five Catholic civilians, including three children, in the Springhill Massacre. On the night of 3/4 February 1973, allegedly without provocation, British snipers shot dead four unarmed men (one of whom was an IRA member) in the Catholic New Lodge area of Belfast.[29]

In the early hours of 31 July 1972, the Army launched Operation Motorman to re-take Northern Ireland's "no-go areas". These were inner-city areas that had been barricaded by nationalists to keep out the security forces and loyalist gunmen. During the operation, the Army shot four people in Derry, killing a 15-year-old Catholic civilian and an unarmed IRA member.

On 12 and 17 May 1992, there were clashes between British paratroopers and Catholic civilians in the town of Coalisland, triggered by a bomb attack which severed the legs of a paratrooper. The soldiers allegedly ransacked two pubs, damaged civilian cars and opened fire on a crowd. Three civilians were hospitalized with gunshot wounds. As a result, the Parachute Regiment was redeployed outside urban areas and the commander of its Third Brigade was dismissed. The incident stirred memories of Bloody Sunday, whose 20th anniversary was marked in 1992.[30]

Collusion with loyalist paramilitaries

A republican mural in Belfast with the slogan "Collusion Is Not An Illusion"

One particularly controversial aspect of Operation Banner has been collusion between the British Army and loyalist paramilitaries. As well as being members of loyalist paramilitaries and taking part in paramilitary attacks, some soldiers are alleged to have given weapons and intelligence to loyalists, turned a blind eye to their activities, and/or hindered investigations of them. The De Silva report found that, during the 1980s, 85% of the intelligence that loyalists used to target people came from the security forces.[31] A report released by the Irish Government in 2006 said that members of the British Army also colluded with loyalists in attacks inside the Republic of Ireland.[32]

The Army's locally-recruited regiment, the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), was 97% Protestant[33] after 1972. A 1973 British Government document (uncovered in 2004), named "Subversion in the UDR", estimates that 5–15% of UDR soldiers at the time were members of loyalist paramilitaries such as the UDA,[34][33] which was a legal organization until 1992. The report stated that the UDR was the main source of weapons for those groups,[34] although by 1979 stricter controls had reduced UDR weapons losses by 75%.[citation needed] In 1977, the Army investigated a UDR battalion based at Girdwood Barracks. The investigation said there was evidence that 70 of the soldiers had UVF links, but only two were dismissed on security grounds;[35] that 30 were suspected of fraudulently diverting £47,000 to the UVF; and that UVF members socialized with soldiers in their mess.[35] The investigation was halted after a senior UDR officer claimed it was harming morale.[35] The Army then kept the investigation a secret, until it was uncovered in 2011.[35]

Initially, the Army allowed its soldiers to join the UDA[36] and in summer 1972 the Army mounted a number of joint patrols with the UDA, following public negotiations between General Robert Ford (Commander of Land Forces in Northern Ireland) and UDA leader Tommy Herron.[37] On 29 November 1972 the Army issued an order that a soldier should be discharged if his sympathy for a paramilitary group affects his performance, loyalty or impartiality.[38] By the end of 1975, 171 soldiers with links to the UDA had been discharged.[39]

In the 1970s, the so-called "Glenanne gang" carried out a string of sectarian attacks against the Irish Catholic and nationalist community in the area of mid-Ulster known as the "murder triangle".[40] The gang was a secret alliance of loyalist militants and rogue elements within the British Army and the RUC.[41][42] In 1980 two of its members, RUC officers John Weir and Billy McCaughey, were convicted of murdering a Catholic shop-owner and kidnapping a Catholic priest. Weir claimed that his superiors knew the collusion was taking place[43] and that the gang was commanded by British Military Intelligence and RUC Special Branch.[42][44] The Pat Finucane Centre has attributed 87 killings to the Glenanne gang, including the Dublin and Monaghan bombings (1974), the killing of John Francis Green, the Miami Showband killings (1975), and the Reavey and O'Dowd killings (1976).[42]

The collusion also involved British agents or informers within the loyalist groups. In 1992, Brian Nelson revealed that he was a UDA intelligence chief who secretly worked for the Army's Force Research Unit (FRU). FRU provided Nelson (and thus the UDA) with intelligence on republican activists, theoretically so that the UDA would focus on targeting them rather than civilians.[45] Since the late 1990s, other loyalists have confirmed to journalists such as Peter Taylor that they also received files and intelligence from the Army on republican targets.[46]

Aside from the aforesaid, other high-profile incidents where Army–loyalist collusion has been alleged include the McGurk's Bar bombing (1971), the 1972 and 1973 Dublin bombings, and the killing of Ronnie Bunting (1980).

IRA infiltration of 7/10 UDR

At the start of June 1987 three attacks were made against soldiers of the same company of 7/10 UDR including Private Joe Tracey who was shot dead as he started a new job on apartments off the Lisburn Road, Belfast. The Belfast Newsletter reported that 7/10 UDR had been infiltrated by the IRA. The commanding officer accepted that someone must have informed on him but denied that the IRA had been able to penetrate the battalion calling the allegation a "wild rumour".[47]

Casualties

During the 38 year operation, 763 members of the British Armed Forces were killed and 6,100 wounded.[48]

Those killed in Northern Ireland include:[49]

Also 51 military personnel died outside Northern Ireland.

It was announced in July 2009 that their next of kin will be eligible to receive the Elizabeth Cross.[51]

According to the "Sutton Index of Deaths"[52] on CAIN, the British Army killed 305 people during Operation Banner.

Last years

Crossmaglen RUC/Army base, showing a watchtower built during the operation that was later demolished as part of the demilitarisation process. The barracks were handed over to the PSNI in 2007

The operation was gradually scaled down since 1998, after the Good Friday Agreement, when patrols were suspended and several military barracks closed or dismantled, even before the beginning of IRA's decommissioning.[53] The process of demilitarisation had already started in 1994, after the first IRA ceasefire. From the second IRA ceasefire in 1997 until the first act of decommission of weapons in 2001, almost 50 per cent of the army bases had been vacated or demolished along with surveillance sites and holding centers, while more than 100 cross-border roads were reopened.[54]

Eventually in August 2005, it was announced that in response to the Provisional IRA declaration that its campaign was over, and in accordance with the Good Friday Agreement provisions, Operation Banner would end by 1 August 2007.[55] This involved troops based in Northern Ireland reduced to 5,000, and only for training purposes. Security was entirely transferred to the police.[56] The Northern Ireland Resident battalions of the Royal Irish Regiment—which grew out of the Ulster Defence Regiment—were stood down on 1 September 2006. The operation officially ended at midnight on 31 July 2007, making it the longest continuous deployment in the British Army's history, lasting over 38 years.[4] In the words of BBC correspondent Kevin Connolly , the British Army in Northern Ireland "melted away, rather than marched away".[57] While the withdrawal of troops was welcomed by the nationalist parties Social Democratic and Labour Party and Sinn Féin, the unionist Democratic Unionist Party and Ulster Unionist Party opposed to the decision, which they regarded as 'premature'. The main reasons behind their resistance were the continuing activity of republican dissident groups, the loss of security-related jobs for the protestant community and the perception of the British Army presence as an affirmation of the political union with Great Britain.[58]

Adam Ingram, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, has stated that assuming the maintenance of an enabling environment, British Army support to the PSNI after 31 July 2007 was reduced to a residual level, known as Operation Helvetic, providing specialised ordnance disposal and support to the PSNI in circumstances of extreme public order as described in Patten recommendations 59 and 66, should this be needed,[59][60] thus ending the British Army's emergency operation in Northern Ireland.

Analysis of the operation

In July 2007, under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 the Ministry of Defence published Operation Banner: An analysis of military operations in Northern Ireland, which reflected on the Army's role in the conflict and the strategic and operational lessons drawn from their involvement.[2][4] The paper divides the IRA activity and tactics in two main periods: The "insurgency" phase (1971–1972), and the "terrorist" phase (1972–1997).[61] The British Army claims to have curbed the IRA insurgency by 1972, after Operation Motorman. The IRA then reemerged as a cell-structured organisation.[61] The report also asserts that the government efforts by the 1980s were aimed to destroy the IRA, rather than negotiate a political solution.[62] One of the findings of the document is the failure of the British Army to tackle the IRA at strategic level and the lack of a single campaign authority and plan.[63] The paper stops short of claiming that "Northern Ireland has achieved a state of lasting peace" and acknowledges that as late as 2006, there were still "areas of Northern Ireland out of bounds to soldiers."[64]

The report analyses Israeli military theorist Martin van Creveld's comments on the outcome of the operation:

Martin van Creveld has said that the British Army is unique in Northern Ireland in its success against an irregular force. It should be recognised that the Army did not 'win' in any recognisable way; rather it achieved its desired end-state, which allowed a political process to be established without unacceptable levels of intimidation. Security force operations suppressed the level of violence to a level which the population could live with, and with which the RUC and later the PSNI could cope. The violence was reduced to an extent which made it clear to the PIRA that they would not win through violence. This is a major achievement, and one with which the security forces from all three Services, with the Army in the lead, should be entirely satisfied. It took a long time but, as van Crefeld [sic] said, that success is unique.[4]

The US military have sought to incorporate lessons from Operation Banner in their field manual.[65]

References

  1. ^ Taylor, Peter,Behind the mask: The IRA and Sinn Féin, Chapter 21: Stalemate, pp. 246–261.
  2. ^ a b c d "Army paper says IRA not defeated". BBC News. 6 July 2007. Retrieved 21 March 2008.
  3. ^ a b Wilkinson, Paul (2006). Terrorism versus democracy: the liberal state response. Taylor & Francis, p. 68. ISBN 0-415-38477-X
  4. ^ a b c d "Operation Banner: An analysis of military operations in Northern Ireland" (PDF). Ministry of Defence. 2006. Retrieved 31 July 2009.
  5. ^ "Operation Banner: An analysis of military operations in Northern Ireland" (PDF). Ministry of Defence. 2006. Retrieved 31 July 2009. Chapter 6, pp. 1–2
  6. ^ Ripley, Tim and Chappel, Mike (1993). Security forces in Northern Ireland (1969–92). Osprey, pp. 19–21. ISBN 1-85532-278-1
  7. ^ More Troops Arrive in Northern Ireland Associated Press, 10 July 1997
  8. ^ Sutton Index of Deaths. Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN)
  9. ^ Fintan O'Toole (31 July 2007). "The blunt instrument of war". Irish Times. Retrieved 21 March 2008. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  10. ^ Northern Ireland Since c.1960 by Barry Doherty (ISBN 978-0435327286), page 11
  11. ^ Freedom or Security: The Consequences for Democracies Using Emergency Powers to Fight Terrorism by Michael Freeman (ISBN 978-0275979133), page 53
  12. ^ Mick Fealty (31 July 2007). "About turn". Guardian Comment is Free. Retrieved 21 March 2008. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  13. ^ Kevin Connolly (31 July 2007). "No fanfare for Operation Banner". BBC News. Retrieved 21 March 2008.
  14. ^ a b c Dillon, Martin (1999). The Dirty War: Covert strategies and tactics used in political conflicts. Taylor & Francis. pp. 212–3.
  15. ^ Rafferty, Oliver (1994). Catholicism in Ulster 1603-1983: An interpretative history. University of South Carolina Press. p. 265.
  16. ^ Marie Louise McCrory (30 June 2010). "Falls Road Curfew - 40th Anniversary". The Irish News. pp. 12–15.
  17. ^ Joint Committee on Human Rights, Parliament of the United Kingdom (2005). Counter-Terrorism Policy And Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and related matters: Oral and Written Evidence. Counter-Terrorism Policy And Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and related matters. Vol. 2. The Stationery Office. p. 110.
  18. ^ Danny Kennally and Eric Preston. Belfast August 1971: A Case to be Answered. Independent Labour Party, 1971. Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN).
  19. ^ Danny Kennally and Eric Preston. Belfast August 1971: A Case to be Answered. Chapter: Treatment of Arrested. Independent Labour Party, 1971. Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN).
  20. ^ IRELAND v. THE UNITED KINGDOM - 5310/71 (1978) ECHR 1 (18 January 1978)
  21. ^ Weissbrodt, David. Materials on torture and other ill-treatment: 3. European Court of Human Rights (doc) html: Ireland v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on Hum. Rts. 512, 748, 788-94 (Eur. Comm’n of Hum. Rts.)
  22. ^ 'Bloody Sunday', Derry 30 January 1972 – Names of the Dead and Injured. Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN)
  23. ^ Extracts from 'The Road to Bloody Sunday' by Dr. Raymond McClean. Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN)
  24. ^ A Chronology of the Conflict: August 1972. Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN)
  25. ^ "Bloody Sunday report published". BBC News, 15 June 2010
  26. ^ Kaufmann, Eric P. The Orange Order: a contemporary Northern Irish history. Oxford University Press, 2007. p.154.
  27. ^ Bryan, Dominic. Orange parades: the politics of ritual, tradition, and control. Pluto Press, 2000. p.92.
  28. ^ Belfast Telegraph, 12 July 1972, p.4.
  29. ^ "Unofficial inquiry will examine north Belfast's 'Bloody Sunday'". Irish News, 8 November 2002.
  30. ^ Fortnight issues 302-12, Fortnight Publications, 1992, p. 6
  31. ^ "Pat Finucane murder: 'Shocking state collusion', says PM". BBC News, 12 December 2012. Retrieved 13 December 2012.
  32. ^ "British 'colluded with loyalists'". BBC News. 29 November 2006.
  33. ^ a b "Collusion - Subversion in the UDR". Irish News, 3 May 2006.
  34. ^ a b "Subversion in the UDR". Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN)
  35. ^ a b c d "British army 'covered up' UDR units links to UVF". The Detail, 31 July 2011.
  36. ^ Wood, Ian S. Crimes of Loyalty: A History of the UDA. Edinburgh University Press, 2006. pp.107-8
  37. ^ Coogan, Tim Pat. The Troubles: Ireland's Ordeal and the Search for Peace. Palgrave, 2002. p.170
  38. ^ http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1972/index.html#291172
  39. ^ Potter, John Furniss. A Testimony to Courage – the Regimental History of the Ulster Defence Regiment 1969–1992. Pen & Sword Books, 2001. p.376
  40. ^ Tiernan, Joe (2000). The Dublin Bombings and the Murder Triangle. Ireland: Mercier Press
  41. ^ The Cassel Report (2006), pp. 8, 14, 21, 25, 51, 56, 58–65.
  42. ^ a b c [http://www.patfinucanecentre.org/sarmagh/sarmagh.html "Collusion in the South Armagh/Mid Ulster Area in the mid-1970s". Pat Finucane Centre. Retrieved 2 January 2011.
  43. ^ The Cassel Report (2006), p.63
  44. ^ The Cassel Report (2006), pp. 6, 13
  45. ^ "Dark side of the war". BBC News. 31 May 2000.
  46. ^ "A Chronology of the Conflict: 1999". Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN).
  47. ^ Potter p302
  48. ^ Michael Evans (2 August 2005). "Garrison to be halved as Army winds up longest operation". The Times. Retrieved 21 March 2008. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)
  49. ^ Operation BANNER ends in Northern Ireland after 38 years. Ministry of Defence
  50. ^ Sea Your History
  51. ^ MOD press release
  52. ^ CAIN – Sutton Index of Deaths
  53. ^ O'Brien, Brendan (1999). The Long War: The IRA and Sinn Féin, Syracuse University Press, p 393. ISBN 0-8156-0597-8
  54. ^ Albert, Cornelia (2009). The Peacebuilding Elements of the Belfast Agreement and the Transformation of the Northern Ireland Conflict. Peter Lang, p. 234. ISBN 3-631-58591-8
  55. ^ Brian Rowan (2 August 2005). "Military move heralds end of era". BBC News. Retrieved 21 March 2008.
  56. ^ Army ending its operation in NI BBC News, 31 July 2007
  57. ^ No fanfare for Operation Banner BBC News, 31 July 2007
  58. ^ Albert, p. 236
  59. ^ "House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 13 Sep 2006 (pt 2356)". Houses of Parliament. 13 September 2006. Retrieved 21 March 2008.
  60. ^ Ministry of Defence
  61. ^ a b Operation Banner, Chapter I, page 3
  62. ^ Operation Banner, Chapter II, page 15: "The British Government’s main military objective in the 1980s was the destruction of PIRA, rather than resolving the conflict."
  63. ^ Operation Banner, Chapter VIII, p. 4
  64. ^ Operation Banner, Chapter II, page 16
  65. ^ Richard Norton Taylor and Owen Bowcott (31 July 2007). "Analysis: Army learned insurgency lessons from Northern Ireland". The Guardian. Retrieved 21 March 2008. {{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in: |publisher= (help)

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